Community-based Natural Resource Management in Namibia: How does it Influence Local Governance?

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Acronyms

AGM	annual general meeting
BDP	benefit distribution plan
CBNRM	Community-based Natural Resource Management
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CSD	CBNRM Support Division (in the DEA)
DEA	Department of Environmental Affairs (in the MET)
DFID	Department for International Development
FIRM	Forum for Integrated Resource Management
GFU	Grootberg Farmers' Union
GRN	Government of the Republic of Namibia
IRDNC	Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation
MET	Ministry of Environment and Tourism
NACOBTA	Namibia Community-based Tourism Association
NACSO	Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations
NBC	Namibia Broadcasting Company
NDF	Namibia Development Foundation
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NNF	Namibia Nature Foundation
PTO	Permission to Occupy
RF	Rössing Foundation
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
TA	Traditional Authority
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNAM	University of Namibia
USAID	United States Agency of International Development
WILD	Wildlife Integration for Livelihood Diversification Project
WWF-LIFE	World Wildlife Fund - Living in a Finite Environment

Abstract

The focus of this research is on the socio-political effects of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) in Namibia. It rests on field research undertaken by Eva Schiffer in the second half of 2002 in Namibia.

After the end of apartheid (1990) the new Namibian government chose a number of strategies to right the wrongs of the past, both economically and politically. One of them is Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM): Since 1996 communities in the communal areas (former "homelands") have the right to form communal conservancies to jointly manage and protect their wildlife. This approach to conservation is expected to have ecological, economic and socio-political effects. The main aim of this research was to assess the effects, both material and immaterial, that CBNRM has on local resource use governance.

To find out how and why CBNRM changed local governance, the institutional framework ("rules of the game") was analysed in relation to actor-specific factors. To this end an interactive visualisation tool (the "power game") was developed. This tool allowed for the discussion of complex social relationships with interviewees from different backgrounds in terms of culture, education and experience.

The analysis of the relevant formal and informal institutions showed that they tended to be

- Dynamic / subject to change

- Conflicting (i.e. legislation vs. traditional rules)

- Unclear (especially about the role of the respective actors) and

- Not always effectively enforced.

Two field studies (#Khoadi //Hoas and Ehi-Rovipuka[1] conservancy in the Kunene Region) showed: Wherever the institutional framework was ambiguous, the importance of actor-specific

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[1]Some remarks about spelling: "#" and "//" of #Khoadi //Hoas signify two of the four click-sounds that are typical for the Damara language. The committee members of Ehi-Rovipuka voiced their displeasure about the fact that the name of their conservancy was frequently misspelled, see e.g. map 1, p 29.

factors increased. On the one hand, institutional dynamics offered options for change and development. Local groups and individuals were encouraged to actively shape their socio-economic and natural environment. On the other hand unclear institutions were prone to being abused and the abuse of institutions was rarely sanctioned. In some cases unclear hierarchies and conflicting institutions impeded the resolution of conflicts that accompanied the redistribution of power through CBNRM.

While CBNRM in Namibia appeared to be rather successful in devolving power from the national to the local level, the empowerment effects on the community level favoured local elites. In the two case study conservancies a "central power-group" tended to (more or less) seize benefits and decision-making capacity. Community members and outside observers described the following problems:

- A gap between conservancy staff / committee and the rest of the local population; local disparities were aggravated;

- An unclear and potentially explosive role of the respective traditional authorities: relying on their land rights and traditional power position they acted either as motor or as stumbling block of conservancies;

- A difficult relationship between NGOs and the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, both following complementary development and conservation goals but competing for influence and resources;

- Extremely high expectations from all sides that overburdened the projects and lead to frustration when not met.

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die sozio-politischen Effekte von Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM)[2] in Namibia. Die Analyse fußt auf Daten, die während eines fünfmonatigen Feldaufenthaltes in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahres 2002 erhoben wurden.

Nach Ende der Apartheid (1990) hat die Namibische Regierung verschiedene Strategien erprobt, um das vergangene Unrecht wieder gut zu machen und der Verarmung und Machtlosigkeit großer Teile der ländlichen Bevölkerung entgegenzuwirken. Einer dieser Ansätze ist CBNRM: Die Verantwortung für und die Profite aus dem Wildschutz werden auf die lokale Ebene verlagert. Hierdurch soll der Ressourcenschutz verbessert, die lokale Wirtschaftskraft erhöht und die lokale Politiklandschaft demokratisiert werden. Zu diesem Zweck erhielten die Bewohner der kommunalen Gebiete durch eine Gesetzesänderung 1996 das Recht, Communal Conservancies (kommunale Hegegebiete) zu gründen, in denen Wildschutz und Nutzung kommunal organisiert werden.

Die zentrale Forschungsfrage dieser Arbeit fokussiert auf die Veränderung der sozio-politischen Verhältnisse durch CBNRM: Wie verändert CBNRM die local governance[3]? Dazu wurde zunächst der institutionelle Rahmen (die formellen und informellen Regeln) analysiert. Dieser bildet den Hintergrund für akteursspezifische Faktoren zur Verteilung von Macht und Einfluss auf lokaler Ebene.

Zur Datenerhebung wurde ein interaktives Visualisierungsinstrument entwickelt, das „power game". Dieses erlaubte eine Diskussion der komplexen sozialen Beziehungen mit Interviewpartnern, die durch unterschiedliches Bildungsniveau, kulturellen Hintergrund und Erfahrungshorizonte geprägt waren.

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[2] Kommunales Management natürlicher Ressourcen

[3] „Local governance" bedeutet die Bereitstellung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen im weiteren Sinne durch die Kooperation staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Akteure auf lokaler Ebene und unter Einbeziehung lokaler Akteure. Ein stimmiger deutscher Ausdruck, der das Konzept auf den Punkt bringt, fehlt. Generell entspricht „governance" eher dem deutschen „Regieren" (als Tätigkeit) als der „Regierung", engl. „government" (als Akteursgruppe: staatliche Akteure).

Die analysierten formalen und informellen Institutionen waren häufig

- Dynamisch

- Widersprüchlich

- Unklar

- Nicht effektiv durchgesetzt.

Zwei Feldstudien (#Khoadi //Hoas und Ehi-Rovipuka in der Kunene Region) deuteten darauf hin, dass die akteursspezifischen Faktoren bei unklarem institutionellen Rahmen besonders einflussreich werden. Einerseits ermöglichte die institutionelle Dynamik Veränderung und Entwicklung. Lokale Akteure wurden ermutigt, ihre eigene Lebenswelt aktiv zu gestalten. Jedoch bergen unklare Institutionen und fehlende Durchsetzungsmechanismen auch die Gefahr von Missbrauch durch einzelne Akteure oder Interessengruppen auf Kosten der Allgemeinheit. Ein weiteres Problem waren unklare Hierarchien, die zu komplexen Konfliktsituationen führten.

Die Verlagerung von Macht von der zentralstaatlichen zur lokalen Ebene wurde von vielen Interviewpartnern als erfolgreich beschrieben. Der Machzuwachs auf kommunaler Ebene kam jedoch vor allem bestehenden lokalen Eliten zugute. In beiden Fallstudien waren zentrale „power groups" entstanden, die überproportional an Entscheidungsgewalt und Nutzen der conservancies beteiligt waren. Folgende sozio-politische Probleme erschienen als besonders gravierend:

- Zwischen „normaler" Lokalbevölkerung und Conservancy-Akteuren tut sich eine Kluft auf: lokale Disparitäten werden eher verstärkt als aufgehoben.

- Die Rolle der traditionellen Autoritäten ist unklar und potentiell konfliktreich: Aufgrund ihrer Landrechte und traditioneller Macht können diese Akteure Conservancies befördern oder blockieren.

- Nicht-Regierungs-Organisationen und Regierungsakteure verfolgen zwar die gleichen inhaltlichen Ziele, konkurrieren aber um Mittel und Einfluss. Unterschwellige Konflikte binden einen Teil der Energie und verhindern Synergie-Effekte.

- Hohe Erwartungen aller Akteure an CBNRM überfordern die Projekte und beinhalten die Gefahr von Frustration, wenn sie nicht erfüllt werden.

Preface

When I first visited Namibia in 1997 I learned about the newly emerging conservancies and met some of the CBNRM (Community-Based Natural Resource Management) programme's pioneers. I was fascinated by the idea: Giving the responsibility for and profits from local wildlife to local people to create incentives for conservation, improve local livelihoods *and* strengthen democratic local-level decision-making. This concept promised so much more than the existing approaches to *either* conservation *or* economic development *or* political institution building. But over the years discussions with Namibian friends and personal observations nourished one question: Does CBNRM actually manage to keep all these promises?

While early reports describe impressive increases in wildlife and income generation through conservancies, the socio-political effects of CBNRM proved to be difficult to assess. The lion's share of the early literature about CBNRM in Namibia showed a general enthusiasm about democratic and decentralised decision-making procedures, but empirical data about their actual exertion remained relatively little.

Early in 2000 I had the chance to discuss with some of the Namibian CBNRM field staff how they experienced the local governance effects of the programme. While they could only add individual stories, I left the country with the impression that the issues of power and local governance were somewhat sore spots. But was there a *general* flaw in the programme concerning its ability to improve local governance? Or was it only some field staff that experienced difficulties contrasting the generally positive tendency that was described in a greater streak of literature?

When I came back to Namibia in 2002, to investigate this question in the field, I experienced a double-role: as a researcher, wanting to collect valid data, and as an actor in a lively political field that was about to awaken to the discussion of power issues in CBNRM. So while much of the results remain ambiguous and open for discussion, one aspect was directly observable: Power and local governance *did* become generally discussed issues in CBNRM in Namibia.

Acknowledgements

Executive summary

This research provides an analysis and assessment of the local governance effects of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) in Namibia, mainly focussing on two conservancies[4] in the Kunene region where case studies were conducted. The field-observations cover the second half of 2002, thereby to a great extent drawing from the experience and memory of local actors.

Framework of analysis (Chapter 1)

Taking into account the diversity of the actors involved in this research (researcher as well as research partners), this work rests on the core assumptions of *social constructivism* (Chapter 1.1): The researcher does not strife for the "truth" but acknowledges that a number of realities is constructed by the minds of the different actors involved. These perceptions of the world do not develop independently but are both a result of and a reaction to the social, cultural and natural environment of the individual.

The actors are conceptualised as attempting to maximise their own benefit and accumulating power (Chapter 1.2). Power is seen as a relational characteristic of human social interaction and is defined in an outcome-oriented way as:

> "(…) the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." (Weber, 1922, Vol. 1, p.53)

But actors do not follow their own goals entirely freely: The respective institutions define the restrictions of accepted actor behaviour (Chapter 1.3). These institutions are the rules that societies develop to moderate the interest of individuals (and interest-groups) against the requirements of the general public. Formal institutions are those rules that are fixed (i.e. written down) like legislation or a conservancy constitution. Informal institutions are less definite, like a shared understanding of "decent" behaviour or traditional rules that are passed on orally.

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[4] Conservancies are the legal bodies in which rural communities organise themselves to gain rights over wildlife.

The interrelation of actors and institutions in CBNRM forms the local-level *natural resource use governance* – as far as wildlife is concerned (Chapter 1.4). Most authors define governance as a broader term than government, as the latter only includes governmental actors in a strict sense (Pierre and Peters, 2000). The concept of governance suits far better to analyse the processes and actors involved in natural resource management in CBNRM. Even though governmental actors *do* play a significant role here, they are only one of a number of actors like traditional authorities, NGOs, tour operators and community-based organisations.

In Namibia natural resources like land and wildlife are subject to a complex network of institutions. The concept of *resource use regimes* (Chapter 1.5) helps to frame the actual distribution of rights. The relevant point here is not so much ownership but range of distinct property rights like the right to access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).

International policy development concerning natural resource use (Chapter 2)

The occurrence of CBNRM in Namibia is embedded in an international development in the perception of human-nature relations. Chapter 2 highlights resource use strategies from *pre-colonial* (Chapter 2.1) to *colonial* (Chapter 2.2) and finally *post-colonial* ones (Chapter 2.3). The post-colonial development incorporated a *paradigm shift* from top-down fortress conservation towards participatory approaches (Chapter 2.3) with concepts like *community-based natural resource management* (Chapter 2.4).

CBNRM in Namibia (Chapter 3)

In Namibia three *ecological factors* (Chapter 3.1) make CBNRM an interesting alternative to other forms of land-use:

- In the regional comparison Namibia still has a relatively high density and variety of game living outside national parks (Tarr, 1996).

- In many parts of the country the extremely arid conditions make other forms of land-use less attractive than conservation (Barnes, 1998).

- Low population densities and scenic beauty of parts of the communal areas make them highly suitable for wildlife-related tourism (Barnes, 1998).

The *economic profile* (Chapter 3.2) of these areas is characterised by very limited economic opportunities with the main livelihood-strategy being subsistence livestock farming (Long, 2004). The *history of land use and nature conservation* (Chapter 3.3) in these areas reflects the political history of the country, with a strong emphasis on external control and fortress conservation during colonial times and increased local responsibilities after independence (1990). The *political and legal background of CBNRM in Namibia* (Chapter 3.4) shows a structure that is typical for many African countries, featuring overlapping modern and traditional institutions. The *legislation* (Chapter 3.5) that enables communities to form communal conservancies blends in this background of ecological, economic, historical, political and legal features. It aims at devolving the responsibility for and profits from wildlife to rural communities. The Nature Conservation Amendment Act (1996) defines the institutional requirements for forming and maintaining a communal area conservancy.

The governance field of CBNRM is structured by the *actor groups* (Chapter 3.6) involved. These can be divided into:

- Governmental actors

- NGOs and Donors

- Traditional authorities

- Community-based actors

- Private sector actors

- Researchers and consultants.

The question of governance effects of CBNRM is analysed on the micro-level, taking two conservancies as case studies (Chapter 3.7). Both, Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas, are situated in the Kunene region. Great parts of this region feature the ecological and economic characteristics that were presented above as furthering CBNRM development: a high tourism and conservation value and a lack of viable economic alternatives for the local population. Both communities look back on a considerably long history of community-based conservation efforts

that finally led to the formation of conservancies. They differ in their cultural imprint, as Ehi-Rovipuka is predominately inhabited by Hereros and #Khoadi //Hoas by Damaras.

Research Questions (Chapter 4.1)

To allow for analysis, the general question of governance effects of CBNRM was transformed in four focused research questions:

- *Question 1: Who are the relevant actors of CBNRM in Namibia and in the specific conservancies?*

- *Question 2: What is the range of actions of these actors in CBNRM?*

- *Question 3: What are the power relationships between the different actors involved in CBNRM? Where does this power come from?*

- *Question 4: In the eyes of the stakeholders, do CBNRM projects reach their material and immaterial local governance goals?*

Participants (Chapter 4.2)

Interviews were undertaken in the two case study conservancies as well as in the regional centres and in the capital Windhoek. All interviewees belonged to at least one of the stakeholder groups of CBNRM.

Method (Chapter 4.3)

The core instruments for data collection were semi-structured face-to-face interviews. Those interviewees with a detailed knowledge of governance aspects were asked to play the "power game", a visualisation tool that was developed to facilitate discussion about the complex socio-political set-up: The respective actors were represented by board-game figures. These were characterised by adding symbol-cards identifying their range of action (observing, giving advice, decision-making, funding). Finally they were put on "power towers" of variable size, the height of the tower indicating the power-position of the actor. The resulting set-up provided structured quantitative data and served as a sketch for the following qualitative discussion.

Some groups of interviewees had a less detailed knowledge of the different actors involved. This applies to overview-experts as well as to a majority of the local community members without

portfolio in the conservancy. For both groups flexible sets of questions were prepared for explorative interviews.

Results of primary research (Chapter 5)

Between the July 24th and December 17th, 2002, 81 stakeholders of CBNRM in Namibia were interviewed. Added to this was the information gathered at different meetings organised by CBNRM stakeholders and at four feedback group discussions about this research, both in the conservancies and in Windhoek (Chapter 5.1 gives an overview).

Results concerning question 1 (Chapter 5.2):

The answer to this question is mainly drawn from the stakeholder lists of the semi-structured interviews. The actors of CBNRM were clustered as

- Governmental actors (mainly Ministry of Environment and Tourism)

- Conservancy actors (conservancy staff and committee)

- Other local actors (local individuals and community-based organisations)

- NGOs and donors

- Traditional authorities (mainly Damara and Herero)

- Private sector tourism actors

- Researchers and consultants

- Multi-portfolio local actors

Results concerning question 2 (Chapter 5.3):

The interviewees were asked to characterise the different stakeholders by giving them the following attributes: observing, giving advice, making decisions, funding. The provision of funding was seen as a strongly stakeholder-specific activity that mainly concerned the respective NGOs and Donors. Decision-making was attributed to a broad variety of actor-groups. The data indicate a considerable proportion of local-level decision-makers with an especially high representation of multi-portfolio actors. Giving advice was seen as a less direct way of influencing the conservancy. While all stakeholder groups were represented in this cluster, the

authority associated with it differed: Traditional leaders, for example, drew the authority for advice from their traditional recognition, while NGOs strengthened their point with the prospect of funding. The cluster of those described as only observing includes a relatively high proportion of local actors, both conservancy actors (staff and committee) and others (76% of the data-sets for observers).

Results concerning question 3 (Chapter 5.4):

The distribution of power was analysed and set into relationship to institutional power potentials and actor specific factors. Generally interviewees observed a certain degree of devolution of power in natural resource management from national to local-level actors. A closer analysis of the local governance situation showed that this power was not evenly distributed amongst community members. In both case studies central power-groups were identified.

The power of traditional authorities in the conservancies was seen as connected to the degree of modernisation of the community and to cultural parameters. It was generally observed that Herero chiefs in the Kunene North aspired to a more active position in the conservancy than the Damara chiefs of the Kunene South. The role of traditional authorities was described as ambiguous as their custodianship over land gave them the potential to further or block conservancy development.

NGOs played an important role in both conservancies, which was especially pronounced in Ehi-Rovipuka. The power of NGOs was described as strongly linked to their resourcefulness, both in material and human resources. While the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) was respected for its role in legislation and law enforcement, a relatively weak resource-base impeded comprehensive supervision and facilitation of conservancies through governmental actors. So a number of interviewees rated NGOs as stronger than the MET.

Tourism actors were rated as weak in both conservancies. But interviewees agreed that this position was likely to change as soon as long-term co-operations like joint-venture lodges would be established.

Results concerning question 4 (Chapter 5.5)

Both, material and immaterial governance effects of CBNRM were analysed. In the perception of the interviewees conservancies led to a general improvement of natural resource management, namely poaching control. Localised control and / or benefits were seen as the driving forces behind a decline of poaching. Anyway, some interviewees claimed that "hunting for the pot" was a livelihood strategy complementary to subsistence farming, that was still practiced and in some cases even negotiated with the local game guard.

The second important natural resource management task of conservancies is control of problem animals. In both conservancies community members complained about slow reactions of conservancy officials and lack of compensation for wildlife-related costs.

The analysis of benefit distribution focuses on employment and meat distribution. In both conservancies the local actors framed very high expectations when it came to benefit potentials of the conservancies. These were not achieved yet and their general tendency seemed far from realistic. In the assessment of benefit distribution that had already taken place (meat and casual jobs), members of both conservancies complained about uneven or unfair distribution.

The analysis of immaterial governance effects started with assessing the participation of the local community in conservancy processes. Complaints about a gap between community and committee were quite common in both conservancies. Amongst the factors that impeded participation were difficult logistics, legislation that did not cater for the stratification of rural communities and, for #Khoadi //Hoas, a mode of committee-election that favoured those living close to the centre of the conservancy. The central power-groups showed tendencies to promote and protect members of their group and to exclude outsiders. But also a lack of interest in conservancy matters and a low degree of self-organisation of ordinary community members impeded active participation.

The assessment of mechanisms of conflict resolution followed the lines of three conflict constellations that interviewees described as typical: Conflicts including conservancies and traditional authorities, multi-stakeholder conflicts about benefits from tourism (Hobatere concession area) and simmering conflicts between NGOs and MET.

Mechanisms of conflict resolution and their application were not always seen as sufficient. This was partly due to the institutional set-up with institutions that were not comprehensive, not exclusive and not precise. That resulted in unclear hierarchies especially in conflicts between members of different stakeholder groups that recurred to different institutions. The problem was engraved in situations where stakes were high (like the conflict about tourism benefits) and actors from different hierarchy levels (local, regional, national) were involved. Interviewees observed a general reluctance of central government to interfere with local conflicts. Unresolved conflicts were seen as a serious obstacle for further economic and institutional development.

Discussion and Outlook

Discussion and Outlook (Chapter 6.) of this research debate the usefulness of the theoretical approach to the research questions (Chapter 6.1), critically acclaim the methods developed for this research (Chapter 6.2) and discusses the results of this research, mainly framing the governance effects of CBNRM (Chapter 6.3).

1. Theoretical framework

The following chapters introduce the theoretical background of this research. The concept of social constructivism guided the general approach (Chapter 1.1). Then concepts of power as one central characteristic of governance are framed (Chapter 1.2). Social interaction is conceptualised by regarding actors as well as institutions (Chapter 1.3) and an actor-institutional model of governance is developed (Chapter 1.4). The concepts of resource use regimes are clarified as they cater for the special governance structures of natural resource management in rural Africa (Chapter 1.5).

1.1 Social constructivism

Before laying out the details of the theoretical background of this research, this chapter provides an insight in the researcher's view of the world. It is added here to allow for a better understanding of *why* the respective approaches were chosen. The reader will see that the methodological approach strongly emphasises the appraisals that are given by the different stakeholders (Chapter 3.2). This is done because the researcher adopts the views of social constructivism.

That means acknowledging that – especially in intercultural research – the stakeholders (researchers, interviewees, local research staff, tutors) follow different value systems and perceptions of the world. The approach of social constructivism is rooted in the works of the Russian psychologist and philosopher Vygotsky from the 1930s (Vygotsky, 1987). He describes the socio-genesis of mind, the development of human thinking and perception, as a reaction to the social surrounding. For the analysis of CBNRM in Namibia, two aspects of social constructivism are crucial:

According to social constructivism there is no such thing as "the truth" to be found. The furthest social research can go is to analyse reported perceptions of the world. So, trying to find out more about the socio-political processes induced by CBNRM at local and national level means analysing the reported perceptions of different actors concerning these processes and thus altering

and broadening the researcher's perception. This is supplemented by watching what people do and observing material changes (like built infrastructure).

These perceptions of the world do not develop in detached, independent minds but are developed as a reaction to the social, cultural and natural environment. There is "an intimate connection between the special environment that human beings inhabit and the fundamental, distinguishing qualities of the human psychological process" (Cole, 2001; p. 2). Culture in this sense is the connection of the present with the material and immaterial achievements of the past (ibid). The development of societies is only possible, if groups share similar constructions of reality and find converging cognitive orientations and broadly accepted institutions (Berger and Luckmann, 1966).

The practical implications of these assumptions are especially visible for a field where actors from different social and cultural backgrounds interact. The way these different actors perceive social processes and make decisions varies (amongst other factors) according to their backgrounds. Social constructivism prevents the researcher from naïvely *judging* the findings by his or her own, for example euro-centric standards. But, by definition, one cannot help the fact that one *sees* the world through the eyes of the own culturally formed perception. This emphasises how important it is to take cultural and social aspects into consideration, when one tries to understand what actors do, why they do it and how they asses the results of their (and other people's) action.

1.2 Power as relational characteristic of social interaction

This research focuses on the impact of changed resource use regimes on specific fields of local governance. It asks how Community-Based Natural Resource Management changes the distribution of power in the local management of natural resources. The definitions of power are many-fold, not only in social sciences but also in the day-to-day understanding (Ritzer, 1991). Power is an attribute of actors (individual or collective) and only exists as a characteristic in the relation between actors. So as it is not a thing of its own to be seen and touched, it cannot be measured directly. The analysis of power means the analysis of those aspects of social interaction that are *structured by power*. It means describing actors and their relationship towards each other. The phenomenon can be approached from two directions:

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- The input: Where does power come from, what are the factors leading to an accumulation of power with one individual or organisation in a social setting?

- The output: What are the effects of power, what can actors do with "power" that they could not do without?

The definition of power used in this research is largely that of the German sociologist and historian Max Weber (1864–1920), who is generally seen as one of the founding fathers of modern sociology (Ashley et al., 1995). For his definition of power Weber chooses to start with the output, he describes the tool in describing what you can build with it:

> "Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." (Weber, 1922, Vol. 1, p.53)

For this definition it is irrelevant where power comes from and how it is legitimised. Power can be exercised as long as the circumstances allow so (Claessens, 2000). But while the legitimisation of power is not so important for defining *what* it is, it is relevant for explaining *how* it works. This is where the term "domination" (Herrschaft) comes into the discussion, describing a specific kind of power.

While power includes all options for achieving one's goals in a social relationship, domination only describes power that is seen as *legitimate*. The core feature of legitimisation is the general acceptance by the subjects of power.

> "Domination is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons." (Weber, 1922, Vol. 1, p.53)

From the observation of historic and his own temporary societies Weber derives several modes of legitimising power:

> "There are three types of legitimate domination. The validity of their claims to legitimacy may be based on:
>
> Rational grounds – resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority).
>
> Traditional grounds – resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally,
>
> Charismatic grounds – resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority)." (Weber, 1922, Vol. 1, p.215)

But the changes in power relations induced by CBNRM do not have to be limited to legitimate domination. CBNRM opens a new field of options to prevail over other actors, both with and without the acceptance of the subjects of power. So while local governance with its legitimate forms of domination is analysed, this research tries to gain a bigger picture, including the interaction of legitimate governance and other forms of power that are exercised with the help or in the sphere of CBNRM. This is why the output-oriented definition of Weber was chosen as a working definition for the fieldwork and analysis of the results[5].

1.3 Actors and institutions: actors' striving for power framed by institutional conditions

In the analysis of power scholars differ in the extent to which they ascribe power to the characteristics and actions of the actor or to structures, rules and the position of the actor (Hradil, 1980). Examples for personal attribution of power can be found in actor-oriented approaches of Przeworski (1992), Schmitter (1994) and Popitz (1992). A structural understanding of power is one of the features of system theory and structuralism (compare Münch, 2002, Luhmann, 2003).

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[5] In the formulation of the interview questions one concession to the laypersons' understanding was made. As it became obvious that the term "power" had a negative connotation for some and was confused with domination by others, the term "influence" was added. So the couple "power & influence" was used to cover the social phenomena that are termed "power" by Weber.

But in this long lasting academic discussion about the superiority of structures or action in determining social development, schools of consolidation of the opposing approaches have gained importance. Amongst others the actor-centred institutionalism (Akteurzentrierter Institutionalismus) strives for this integration of approaches (Scharpf, 2000). While human action is seen as influenced by the structures of specific societies and organisation, still these structures are human-made; they can be changed as well as broken.

When describing the structures that impact on human action, Scharpf recurs to North's definition of institutions as "the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, (…) the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North, 1990, p. 3). Some authors include social entities with the ability of strategic action into their definition of institutions (March, 1989)[6]. For the sake of clear analytical distinction here the nomenclature of North will be used, who differentiates between institutions and *organisations*: institutions are the rules of the game whereas organisations (as well as individuals) are the players. The importance of institutions for sound governance is analysed by Wunsch (2000):

> "Institutions are necessary to guide political decision-making along procedures regarded as just and fair, to define certain outcome sets as acceptable and unacceptable, to clarify just who has a right to participate in decisions, to assure and reassure people that future decisions will be made predictably and not randomly and to specify what sorts of citizen obligations might and might not be incurred." (Ibid, p.490)

Even though institutions are constructed by people, once they are working, they are "experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 76). Berger and Luckmann (1966) describe how institutions are effectively stabilised through reification: The institutional order is represented as a non-human, immutable facticity, as a product of either divine will or economic circumstances.

Institutions do not strictly determine human action but provide a structure and guideline: they limit the options of sanctioned actions. As rules of human behaviour institutions can be formal (written down) or informal (like conventions, traditions). Informal institutions are of a specific relevance in cultures with strong traditional ties. Institutions can be violated so there is provided for punishments (North, 1990). As there are formal and informal institutions, there is formal and

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[6] This is true for a lot of the reports on CBNRM in Namibia that use a nomenclature that is closer to day-to-day language (compare e.g. Jones, 1996)

informal punishment as well. The violation of a law (formal institution) can lead to a term of imprisonment (formal punishment) but also to ostracism (informal punishment).

A formal institution that contradicts an informal institution (for example a law against "poaching" criminalizing a traditional hunting practice) can lead to the paradox situation that an action is formally punished but informally approved. Especially in former colonies, where many of the formal institutions are exogenous and not deeply rooted, conflicts between formal and informal institutions are common. So the analysis of local governance in Namibia has to keep both, formal and informal institutions, in mind. An overview of the relevant institutions is given in Chapters 3.4 and 3.5.

The institutional systems that shape societies share a number of characteristics with public goods: Their general *benefit* of structuring society and making social interaction predictable is available to all. In working institutional systems not only the benefits but also the *costs* are broadly distributed (i.e. for example, paying taxes, participating in elections, attending military service). But for individuals there are incentives to only enjoy the benefits but avoid the costs. Wunsch emphasises that in many surroundings individuals can accrue specifically high benefits by suborning specific rules to their advantage but leaving the general institutional system intact for all others:

> "For example if a person can 'buy a judge' and pursue a civil suit but leave the rest of the rule system intact or stuff a ballot box or two while leaving the electoral system intact for others, the rules will work greatly to enrich those who suborn that small part of the system." (Wunsch, 2000, p. 489)

Though institutions are the structures that provide stability and reduce uncertainty in societies, they are subject to change. North (1990) observes that most institutional changes come about slowly and change tends to be incremental rather than discontinuous. Some institutional changes seem to happen pretty quickly, like changes in legislation[7]. But the surrounding informal institutions of customs, traditions and codes of conduct are inert and change in a slow, evolutionary manner (North, 1990).

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[7] But observing the whole process from the first policy development to the more or less complete implementation of a law, the actual change of legislation in parliament is only a brief moment in a long evolutionary process (for CBNRM in Namibia compare Corbett, 2000; Jones, 1996; Baker and Jones, 1997)

In most societies actors are subject to several, often conflicting, institutions. A traditional leader of a rural community in Namibia might serve as an example here: His local community has formed a conservancy, and he is a member of the conservancy committee. He does not only have to follow the national legislation of the Republic of Namibia but also the formal and informal rules of traditional authorities of his cultural group and, on top of this, the newly implemented institutions of the conservancy (conservancy constitution). So while traditionally he might be the sole leader of his community, in wildlife matters he has to submit himself to a democratic decision making process.

This research rests on the assumption that actors generally strive for increasing their power as it means being able to reach their goals in a social setting. The definition of goals, as well as the means for achieving them, are moderated by the various formal and informal institutions that structure a society. Diagram 1: gives a model of how the interaction of various institutions governs the definition of goals. It provides an overview of the different dimensions that are framed by institutional conditions: personal interest (What suits me?), ethical demands (What is good?), legality (What is allowed?) and possibility (What is possible?).

Diagram 1: Formal and informal institutions frame the definition of actors' goals (own source)

Formal Institution A		What is good?		Goals of actors framed by institutions
Formal Institution B		What is allowed?		
Informal Institution C		What is possible?		
Informal Institution D		What suits me / my group?		

Institutions do not only impact on the goals that actors develop. The dimensions of legality and possibility refer to institutions as guidelines for the actors' behaviour. The analysis of different institutions in a societal setting shows that some rules further the achievement of specific goals by certain actors while they impede the success of others.

Here two aspects seem to be crucial for the impact of institutions on the power (ability to reach goals) of actors: The options as laid out in the respective institutions and the enforcement mechanisms attached to the institutions. Diagram 2 shows a simplified model of this complex situation, reduced to one actor's behaviour as framed by one set of institutions. It shows that the institutional background (including all different formal and informal institutions) does not strictly determine what actors do. Especially in cases with open, flexible of conflicting institutions the way in which actors use or abuse institutions is also influenced by *actor-specific factors*.

Diagram 2 also shows the role of *enforcement mechanisms*. Functioning enforcement mechanisms reward compliance and punish non-compliance. Enforcement mechanisms that do not work properly either do not reliably reward compliance, do not punish non-compliance or give rewards regardless of compliance / non-compliance.

Diagram 2:Institutions framing actors' striving for power (own source)

This model shows two main paths, which allow actors to increase their power in a certain institutional background:

Path 1: Legitimate increase of power:

- Institutions provide "power-options" for specific actors, e.g., by giving them a legal legitimisation for taking specific decisions;

- Actors pro-actively use the potential provided to them by institutions;

- Precise enforcement mechanisms reward those that adhere to institutions.

Path 2: Illegitimate increase of power:

- Institutions do not provide "power-options" that satisfy specific actors, e.g., by redistributing responsibility to other actors or to a broader variety of stakeholders;

- Actors break institutions to reach their own goals and increase their power;

- Enforcement mechanisms are either not precisely aimed or not effectively enacted; non-compliance is not sanctioned.

The model includes various paths that are likely not to increase the actors' power significantly. Two likely scenarios follow path 3 and 4:

Path 3: Inactive actor does not use potential:

- Institutions provide "power-options" for specific actors;

- Actors do not use their potential;

- Enforcement mechanisms provide that only those actively involved are rewarded.

Path 4: Non-compliance is sanctioned

- Institutions do not provide "power-options" that satisfy specific actors;

- Actors break institutions to reach their own goals and increase their power;

- Enforcement mechanisms are precisely aimed and effectively enacted; non-compliance is sanctioned.

But especially in cases where enforcement mechanisms are not precisely linked to the active participation and the compliance of actors, the implication for the power of actors seems to be less predictable. Where active participation is not rewarded, a decrease of power of those actively engaged might be encountered as they "waste" energy that they could use in other fields to increase their power. Where rewards are given irrespective of compliance and active participation, "free riders" are invited to benefit without investing.

Diagram 2 shows the relationships between actors and institutions from an individual perspective of maximising utility. While the interaction of various actors framed by a number of formal and informal institutions forms the skeleton of local governance[8], the perspective from which the quality of governance is analysed is a broader one. It does not restrict itself to the achievement of power by certain stakeholders but aims at reaching governance goals that can be summed up as the "delivery of public services".

1.4 An actor-institutional model of local governance

The following chapters retrace the emergence of the governance concept in policy debate and practice, and they develop a model of local governance that considers actors as well as institutions. This provides the structural backbone for an assessment of the governance impacts of CBNRM.

1.4.1 The rise of the governance concept in development debate and practice

"Governance" as a concept gained momentum in the policy debate during the 1990s. Especially for developing countries some donor agencies began to see good national and local governance as one of the pre-requisites of sustainable socio-political development:

> "Local governance is being promoted in a number of African countries because it is believed that it provides a structural arrangement through which local peoples and communities with the support from other national, regional as well as international actors can participate in the fight against poverty at close range." (Kauzya, 2003, p.1)

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[8] See Chapter 1.4.

Table 1: highlights the development of the government / governance debate and practice in first world countries in the second half of the 20th century and how this debate was reflected in changing approaches to development programmes (Stoker, 1998; Wunsch, 2000)

Decade	Government / governance approach in the developed world	Government / governance approaches in development programmes
1960s	General belief that strong central governments could deliver welfare and solve society's problems.	Tendency towards big-scale technology-centred development projects.
1970s	Fiscal crises and social problems in various western countries challenged the belief in governments' capacities. Overloaded and inflexible governmental bodies were seen as part of the problem.	Observed failure of big-scale technology-centred development projects.
1980s	Promotion of market-centred approaches. Rise of concepts like "New Public Management" and the outsourcing of governmental tasks to private sector actors.	Beginning of an era of Structural Adjustment Programmes: Conditional loans of World Bank to countries that privatise state-owned enterprises, liberalise the domestic economy and open up for international trade.
1990s	Increased privatisation and globalisation lead to "hollowed-out" national states. The governance approach attempts strengthening a network of all actors that are now involved in the provision of public services.	Criteria for "good governance" gain increased importance in development debate and as conditions for development aid. Increased focus on decentralisation and local governance
2000s	Further consolidation of governance approaches.	Search for generally accepted criteria of good governance and good local governance.

Table 1: Development of the governance debate in developed and developing countries (Stoker, 1998; Wunsch, 2000)

1.4.2 Definition of governance

Scholars and donor organisations engaged in the field employ a whole range of different definitions for the term governance. Generally it describes the processes needed for the delivery of public services. It includes the "mechanisms needed to negotiate various interests in society" (Johnson, 1997), but also the way these mechanisms are used for the "steering of a people's socio-politico-economic development" (Kauzya, 2003, p.1). Governance balances the interests of the utility maximising stakeholder against the interest of a broader society (Compare Chapter 1.3). It involves the creation of institutions as well as their supervision and enforcement (Wunsch, 2000)

Governance is generally distinguished from the similar term government by the broader approach of the former: It involves a whole range of stakeholders, including governmental actors, but also others like civil society and the private sector.

1.4.3 Indicators for the quality of governance

A number of donor organisations made good governance a precondition for development aid, so they developed their own indicators to distinguish between good and failing governance. An overview of the literature has lead to the following quality indicators concerning the different aspects of governance.

The *institutions* shaping good governance cover formal law but also informal institutions like traditions and codes of conduct. The following criteria for good governance institutions are gathered: They should be equitable and fair, culturally appropriate and familiar to the governed, allow for the participation of relevant actors, offer modes of conflict resolution and provide for predictable governance action (DANIDA, 1999; Kauzya, 2003).

When it comes to the *actors involved*, good governance is described as including all relevant stakeholders, governmental and others, putting a special emphasis on civil society actors, the private sector and the ordinary local population. What actors do and how they do it is described as vital for the understanding of governance. This includes rendering of accounts, provision of transparency and broad participation, legitimisation and legal responsibility and respect for the rule of law.

The governance *effects* are measured against the goals set out. The question that is posed to assess governance effects is: To what extent have the material or immaterial governance goals been achieved? One problem is inherent in the analysis of the complex socio-political field of governance: Goals are not always explicitly formulated in a measurable way and that goals might vary between different actors involved (Kauzya, 2003).

The *material governance effects* of CBNRM that are assessed in this research are those that are defined as central in the conservancy legislation (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996), conservation effects and benefits for the local community. When analysing the *immaterial effects* of CBNRM the process character of the governance concept becomes especially apparent. In

coherence with the relevant legislation and policy the immaterial governance effects analysed here are "participation of the local community" and "conflict resolution" (see Chapter 5.5).

The analysis of governance *impacts* goes further than the analysis of effects (see Diagram 3). The relevant question here is: What are the changes, intended as well as unintended, positive as well as negative, that have accrued due to governance action? While this broader view of all consequences of governance is a very interesting one indeed, it proves to be hardly completely assessed. While some estimates can be made on the basis of a one-off evaluation like this, especially the causal relations between specific governance actions and impacts are difficult to establish in a complex real world setting (DANIDA, 1999; Wunsch, 2000; Lowndes, no year, UNDP, 2002; Kauzya, 2003; Johnson, 1997).

Diagram 3: Actor-institutional model of governance (own source)

Local governance process

Governance effects: Extent to which
objectives have been achieved

Material
effects

Immaterial
effects

Conservation   Benefits   Conflicts   Participation   Analysis
of
effects

Governance impacts   Assessment
of impacts

1.4.4   The community as the lieu of local governance

Community-based Natural Resource Management is an intervention that aims at rural communities in particular. The organisational unit that is formed following the CBNRM legislation (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996) is the *communal conservancy*, a local governance body focussing on nature conservation and resource management. The sphere of influence of these conservancies is framed by the physical boundaries of the respective communities (see Chapter 2.2.5). The CBNRM programme provides for the involvement of local, regional, national and international actors in matters of local resource use. These actors are governmental as well as civil society, traditional authorities, international and national NGOs and local individuals (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996). So the "governance" as a network approach serves well to analyse this complex socio-political set-up. The central focus group of CBNRM is the local population. But the involvement of actors from different levels raises the questions: What is local about local governance?

Kauzya (2003) emphasises that good local governance generally involves the *participation* of local actors and focuses on the way that various actors strive for the provision of public services that *serve local interests*. But it does not necessarily exclude external actors.

Local governance concerns the community, but while the term "*community*" is widely used in the discourse about rural development and local governance, it is far from having one consistently used and generally accepted definition. Defining community is especially difficult in semi-pastoral environments where residency alone is not a suitable determinant. First-world approaches of clear geographical community boundaries do not necessarily apply in circumstances where traditional agro-pastoral lifestyles and modern temporary work migration are combined. Some authors hold the view that community is a noun that completely defies one concrete definition. Others give a variety of possible approaches. Community definitions range from

- Functional definitions,
- Spatial areas,
- Groups of common interest,

- Ethnic groups,

- Groups of affinity to

- Resource and land user groups. (Barrow and Murphree, 1998)

The Community-Based Tourism Policy of the Namibian Ministry of Environment and Tourism defines local community according to residency and resource use:

> "The local community is to be defined according to specific circumstances, but in each case is primarily the residents in, or closest to, the tourism development / area, who utilise land and other resources in the area, and wherever possible will be represented through an existing institution such as Development Committee(s), Farmers Association(s), Council, or, once established, a wildlife Conservancy[9]." (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1995a, p. 4)

The conservancy legislation in Namibia basically follows a residential definition of community (see Chapter 2.2.5). Only community members qualify for becoming conservancy members. Conservancy legislation and the respective conservancy constitutions define those as community members who are permanent residents of the community for a certain period of time[10]. So keeping in mind that the delineation of communities is much more complex than that, for the sake of this research, the residential community definition of the conservancy legislation is followed (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996).

1.5 Resource use regimes

The major institutional innovation that goes along with CBNRM is a radical change of property rights. Conservancies change the property regime for game and challenge the existing property regime for land. This is more than likely to introduce changes in local governance because the range of possible actors is broadened and redefined and their options for legitimate action changed. In Namibia there are various resource use regimes for different areas of the country and applicable to different parts of the population. Furthermore different institutions (compare

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[9] This document was written prior to the CBNRM legislation and uses the term "wildlife conservancy" for the entity later called "communal conservancy".

[10] This is e.g. three years in #Khoadi //Hoas and five years in Ehi-Rovipuka. To calm boundary conflicts the Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy chose a flexible regulation, allowing residents of one disputed area to choose being member of either Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy of their neighbouring conservancy (personal communication, Nahor Howoseb, MET Outjo).

Chapter 3.4) regulate the use of different natural resources (like water, land and game). To understand the complex situation in Namibia, some concepts are discussed that are commonly used in the discussion about ownership and property regimes.

In the earlier economic discussions about property rights the term "common property" has often been used as a synonym for "no property" (compare Scott, 1955). Anthropologists and historians used it to refer to systems of collective property rights. Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop (1975) clearly stated the difference between

- open access regimes, where no actor has the right to exclude any other actor from using the resource, and

- common property, where the institutional setting allows members of a defined group to exclude non-members from using a resource (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975).

Demsetz proposes a typology that consists of three idealised types of ownership:

- Communal ownership

- Private ownership

- State ownership (Demsetz, 1967).

Demsetz's definition of communal ownership includes the notion that neither individual nor state can exclude any community member from using the communally owned goods.

With this concept of communal ownership as open property in the background, Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" seems to be the inevitable climax of common property regimes (Hardin, 1968) The commons are commonly owned and provide free access to every member of society. The benefits from exploiting the commons accrue on the individual level while actors can distribute the costs to the broader community. So actors maximise their own profit by maximising exploitation. Eventually this leads to an over-exploitation of the resource. This "tragedy" proved to be a strong narrative that influenced resource use policy in both developed and developing countries over the last decades (Adams at al., 1998).

But Hardin's influential article is of more philosophical than ethnological nature (Elliot Herschel, 1997)[11]. The tragic commons of Hardin are a thought experiment with its relevance going much further than the imagined medieval herder who overgrazes the communal commons[12].

The ethnological and historical research about commons shows that some real-world common property regimes have a feature that Hardin's ideal type lacks and that he calls for to escape the tragedy: They contain institutions that enable the limitation of resource use. These institutional restrictions are controlled within functioning local governance and moderate the actions of individuals and interest groups trying to maximise their own utility (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975). So, even though the *ownership* of land for example might be communal (neither state nor private), the resource user group might develop formal or informal institutions to regulate *access* to the resource and avoid over-exploitation. One typical mechanism that has been observed in Namibia is to restrict the use of a resource that is difficult to control (like land for grazing) by regulating a connected resource (like water-points) that is vital for the effective use of the first resource, but more easily controlled (Quiggin, 1993).

To understand the situation of land ownership and land use in Namibia, the typology of Demsetz proves to be too simple to describe a complex institutional setting. The focus here is not solely on ownership (the right to sell the thing that is owned) but on property as an enforceable authority to undertake particular actions in a specific domain (Ostrom, 1998). Schlager and Ostrom identify five property rights that they see as the most important:

Property right	Definition
Access	The right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy non-subtractive benefits (e.g. hike, canoe, sit

[11] A lot of the debate about the pros and contras of common property regimes appears to be rather ideological. Not taking into account the diversity of real-world property arrangements the one party argues for individual ownership and property rights and the powers of free markets to solve all existing problems while the opposing party follows the temptation to romanticise communal arrangements: "because they have been <individualized> as citizens of an industrialized society, where private and state property systems predominate. <Community> is idealized as something that is authentic to third-world rural life but it should be remembered that the price of belonging to a rural community is the acceptance of its customs, like patriarchy, or deference to elders, unlike urban western society where individuality is emphasised." (Metcalfe, 1996, p. 1)

[12] Hardin focuses on the need to restrict the use of commonly owned resources by individuals. The resources he names include fresh air and energy. He argues that there are no sufficient technical solutions for the problem of limited resources and growing populations but that political solutions are needed instead. He calls for coercive measures to restrict the use of common goods per individual and to reduce population growth. (Hardin, 1968)

	in the sun).
Withdrawal	The right to obtain resource units or products of a resource system (e.g. catch fish, divert water).
Management	The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improvements.
Exclusion	The right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be transferred.
Alienation	The right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights.

Table 2: Property right definition following Schlager and Ostrom, 1992

Holders of the above-mentioned rights can hold one or more of these rights. In most cases holders of further-reaching rights like alienation will also be holding the less far-reaching rights like withdrawal. But there can be institutional set-ups where the right of alienation rests in one actor while the management rights are given to another. This is the case in communal area conservancies in Namibia that are on state land (Chapter 3.5).

2. Overview over the international policy development concerning natural resource use

The following chapters give an overview over the emergence of community-based approaches to natural resource management. From the first nature conservation efforts to present day's community-based approaches, a long history of practical experience and policy development had to take place. CBNRM in Namibia is part of international developments in policy debate and related practice of nature conservation. These developments lead from pre-modern cultures before their contact with colonisation (Chapter 2.1) through colonial efforts of exploitation and fortress conservation (Chapter 2.2) to a change of narrative in the global policy development towards increased community-involvement in nature conservation (Chapter 2.3).

2.1 Pre-colonial resource use

In the different cultural groups of pre-colonial Africa an abundance of rules and beliefs regulated the use of wildlife and other natural resources. Early European travellers documented some of these rules (for Namibia e.g. François, 1896; Oberländer, 1885); other rules have survived as informal institutions in the "traditional" ways of the people until today. But in most cases slavery, colonialism and modernisation have altered and influenced the interaction of local people with their environment. The pre-colonial resource use rules were diverse:

> "In the pre-colonial phase, except for a few specifically protected resources, most of Africa's natural resources were managed under a wide and creative range of state, private, common property and communal land tenure arrangements for the benefit of the resource owners or those with rights of access or use of the resource in question" (Murombedzi, 1998).

These rules were adapted to low population densities, so if strategies led to the temporary depletion of a resource, migration was a common coping strategy. Many of those natural resource use institutions were applicable to groups rather than individuals. This is why their control focused on resource user groups, too (Murombedzi, 1998).

While most of the resource use institutions adapted in an evolutionary manner, radical changes were brought in by outside actors. For Southwest Africa such outsiders inducing changes were the Bantu tribes that started to live in the area early AD and the European settlers, military and

missionaries in the 19th century (Dierks, 1999, compare Chapter 3.3). Along with the development of colonialism some romantic ideas about wilderness and the "savages" evolved. These culminated in the narrative of bio-centric conservation as described below.

2.2 Bio-centric conservation narrative of colonial and post-colonial times

In Europe, romanticism in the arts coincided with the industrial revolution. Idealised pictures of unspoiled nature were created as a reaction on the mercantilism and mechanisation of urbanised life. After "leaving" nature as a concrete place to live and work in, European artists, poets and the European society in general re-discovered nature as a place to dream about[13]. But not only in Europe even more so in the colonies, nature was defined twofold, as a set of marketable resources (Murombedzi, 1998; Banuri et al., 1993) and as mystical, unspoiled wilderness, the bounteous and pristine cradle of humanity that needed to be protected (Matowanyika and Marongwe, 1998).

In times when wilderness and adventures became rare in Europe, adventurers travelled through Africa, to fulfil their own dreams but even more those of the readers of their reports (MacKenzie, 1989; MacKenzie, 1987). Few areas of Africa were really unpopulated when the explorers arrived (for Namibia, compare Dierks, 1999). When more and more areas were degraded by colonial land use practice and exploitation, the picture of unspoiled African wilderness prevailed and (compare tourist brochures etc.) still prevails (Sharma, 2002).

This romantic idea of wilderness was strongly connected to a certain hunting ethos. Colonisation went along with hunting for the exploitation of ivory, as a source of food and as big game trophy hunting. In most cases hunting was exclusively reserved for the colonial male masters while the hunting of local people for food or trading was redefined, using the European concept of "poaching". Wildlife conservation attempts mainly focused on defending hunting reserves and suppressing what was defined as poaching (Adams at al., 1998).

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[13] Grove describes the development of conservation ideas in the British Empire beginning in the mid-18th century, in accordance with the interactions of imperial trade, the sensitivity of Romanticism and the increasing importance of science. These concepts were not only applied in Great Britain but travelled to the furthest ends of the Empire as Grove shows for the example of South Africa (Grove, 1987; Grove, 1990)

The history of this western-type nature conservation in Africa is nearly as old as colonialism itself. After early European adventurers and hunters had reduced wildlife numbers significantly, early colonial literature warns of over-exploitation of huntable game. Following the Northern American example (compare Yellowstone as the first National Park founded in 1870 (Government of the United States of America, 1872), governments started to proclaim protected areas, forest reserves and National Parks: Areas of scenic beauty and abundance of wildlife were set apart for conservation purposes. That normally meant the exclusion of traditional land uses[14].

These strategies followed the narrative of "fortress conservation" (Adams at al., 1998): The dominant theme of this narrative is the threat of extinction of animal species due to human action. The standard answer is to separate humans from other species by creating exclusive wildlife reserves[15]. Conservation was defined as the maintenance of quantified aggregates of bio-diversity and habitat (Murphree, 1996). The relationship between poverty and environmental degradation was perceived in a simplistic way: If the local people are poor, they do not have a choice but to over-exploit their local resources. People in general were seen as negative for the environment. The "solution" was to exclude them from using resources and inhabiting areas, e.g. by demarcation of parks (Twyman, 1998). An especially influential concept supporting the narrative of "fortress conservation" is that of the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968, see Chapter 1.5).

This approach is centred on wildlife, not on people, and as such it relies heavily on government control and abstract policy. The demarcation of reserved areas and the enforcement of these boundaries called for an organised state effort. In Europe and Northern America first formal conservation administrative units were already established in the 19th century (Sheail, 1976, Nash, 1973). But the conservation discourse got a special momentum after World War II[16]. This led to the establishment of governmental conservation actors (like Ministries of Environment) in

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[14] First colonial forest reserves were declared on Tobago and St Vincent in the 18th century, in India in the 19th century. In the South African Cape area the first forest reserves were established as early as 1858 (Grove, 1987). Compared to this the Etosha National Park in Namibia was established relatively late (1907 see Dierks, 1999).

[15] Early accounts for these narratives can be found in Marsh (1864).

[16] The 1950s and 1960s were marked by an intensified public discourse especially on the extinction of individual species of big mammals. Crucial for this awakening of the public opinion was a broad TV coverage of the issue hand in hand with publications like Grzimek (1959).

many First World countries as well as to increased conservation efforts in the developing world, most of them following the narrative of fortress conservation.

The international discourse and action that focused around bio-centric conservation was stirred and transformed into policy by a number of international organisational actors. Adams at al. (1998) lists the following entities as the main players in this game:

- The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN)[17]

- The UNESCO

- The World Bank and

- The UNDP (Adams at al., 1998)

But the implementation of fortress conservation policies proved to be much more problematic in practice than it seemed in theory. Where governments did not build on local knowledge and strategies they had to construct new arrangements of natural resource management and provide for implementation and sanctioning mechanisms. The implementation of the new institutions required resources in terms of personnel and finance. In many cases this did not lead to improved resource management but only to a weakening of local resource management institutions and the erosion of existing regulatory measures (Murphree, 1994). The new actors and institutions of resource management were often not capable of developing the capacity needed to manage the resources (Murombedzi, 1998).

In many countries badly adapted colonial and post-colonial government interventions damaged the informal indigenous rules of resource use. At the same time formal institutions did not function effectively to protect the resources. This resulted in institutional insecurity. Misuse of natural resources (according to one or the other system) was sometimes sanctioned, sometimes not. Brokensha and Little (1988) describe the resulting situation as assurance problem:

> "(…) Producers lack confidence in the capacity of either the state or local institutions to regulate resource use, creating considerable ambiguities over who has access to range, water and forests" (Brokensha and Little, 1988, p.13).

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[17] The IUNC was originally established as the International Union for the Protection of Nature in 1934 (Adams at al., 1998).

Especially further away from the administrative centres and government control open access regimes developed, with the tragedy of the commons (Ostrom, 1990, Hardin, 1968) leading to depleted local resource bases. Individual entrepreneurship "invaded" the commons, and the collective sense of proprietorship was lost (Murphree and Cumming, 1991). So at the end of the colonial era a great part of sub-Saharan Africa was in an environmental crisis with

- Eroded indigenous resource use rules,

- Strained governmental conservation efforts,

- Impoverished but quickly growing local populations and

- High pressure on natural resources from the respective governments, local communities and private sector companies.

In many cases, the liberation struggles and other wars had added to the stress on natural resources as they led to an increase of poaching and growing numbers of refugees settling in areas that had been unpopulated until then (UNEP, 2002). Some authors state a "failure of top-down approaches to 'development' and 'conservation'" (Rozemeijer and van der Jagt, 2000). In many countries fortress conservation was impeded by a conflict between formal and informal institutions. While colonial law (formal institution) forbade hunting in certain areas or by certain parts of the population, hunting often had high cultural values attached to it (informal institution)[18]. In some cases it was even seen as resistance against a government that was perceived illegitimate in the first place.

2.3 Shift of policy from top-down to participatory approaches

The described weaknesses of top-down approaches to development and conservation opened the doors for the emergence of alternative approaches. While elements of participation can be traced in some educational and community development programmes of the 1950s and 1960s, the concept of participation only gained a broader political influence in the 1970s.

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[18] Like hunting for religious ceremonies, hunting to be recognised as a strong grown-up man, as part of initiation rites (Long, 2004).

This development went along with the disenchantment of the big-scale, technocratic, centralised early development projects and the realisation that the expected trickle-down effects rarely did occur. The driving forces for this change of narrative originated from two directions: international policy making organisations as well as practitioners on the ground. For the international development debate the following two documents were seen as crucially important for the change of narrative:

- The McNamara Doctrine of the World Bank and

- The New Directions of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that emphasised the importance of the poor majority and searched for alternatives to these large-scale capital-intensive development programmes that benefited largely the elites (Horowith and Painter, 1986).

During the 1980s and 1990s this trend spread into the conservation sector (Little, 1994). In the field of nature conservation and sustainable development a catalyst for the paradigm shift to participatory approaches was the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. One result of this conference was the "Agenda 21" (United Nations, 1992), an internationally supported declaration of intent focussing on the economic, ecological and social challenges of the 21st century. The Agenda 21 popularised the term "sustainable development", a term originating from forestry, where it describes the principle of only cutting the amount of wood that one can use the forest on a long term without depletion of the resource base[19].

Not only did the Agenda 21 focus on what governments and supra-national organisations should do to cope with these challenges, but also the strength of locally appropriate grass-roots activities was strongly acknowledged. This was explicitly formulated in the chapter 28 on the "Local Agenda 21" where the global action plan is translated into local steps (Mehta, 1996). The increased emphasis on local level activities was reflected in governmental policy changes including increased decentralisation efforts as well as in a focus on local level activities in the work of NGOs and Donors world wide.

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[19] The term "sustainability" entered the policy debate with the Brundtland Report "Our Common Future" as a combination of social, economic and ecological matters (Bruntland, 1987).

These policy developments had their counterparts on the field level. Scientists close to development practices, such as Robert Chambers and Norman Uphoff, advocated and tested participatory approaches in their project planning and implementation (Chambers, 1983; Uphoff, 1985). For Namibia Garth Owen Smith and the NGO IRDNC (Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation) can be seen as influential grass-roots level advocates for this policy change (Chapter 2.2).

One of the prominent results of this policy change is the development of a whole range of conservation projects that aim at giving local communities a stronger role in their own resource management. They can be summarised under the umbrella term "community-based conservation", an approach widely accepted in today's conservation discourse (Hannah, 1992; United Nations, 1992; Barrow and Murphree, 1998).

This term includes approaches like Integrated Conservation and Development (ICD), Community-Based Conservation (CBC), Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), Community Wildlife Management (CWM), Collaborative Management (CM) and Protected Area Outreach Project, with some of these being significantly different and others just being different names that describe similar kinds of approaches. A workable definition is given by Little (1994):

> "(…) CBC refers only to local, voluntary initiatives involving a minimum of several households in which at least one of the outcomes of local management practices is either the maintenance of habitats, the preservation of species, of the conservation of certain critical resources and another outcome is improvement of social and economic welfare." (Little, 1994, p. 349)

The approach used in Namibia is called Community-Based Natural Resource Management, which again is a broad term that is used to cover a range of concepts where control and management authority over local resources is devolved to communal actors (Murombedzi, 1998). The specific character of the Namibian programme and its background is provided in Chapter 3.

3. CBNRM in Namibia

Map 1: Registered communal conservancies as of 09/2002 (Long, 2004)

The development of CBNRM in Namibia was driven by a supportive climate in the international policy debate (described in Chapter 2) as well as by engaged field-level proponents. A special dynamic was added by the national-level policy changes that went along with the end of apartheid and the dawn of independence of Namibia in 1990.

Though not as well known as the Zimbabwean CAMPFIRE programme (Metcalfe, 1994), the Namibian CBNRM programme is one of the pioneers in community conservation on the African continent. It has been described as especially far reaching in giving rights to the actual local people and not to intermediaries like district administration (Murombedzi, 2003).

The assessment of the impact of CBNRM on local governance is embedded in Namibia's ecological, economic, socio-political and cultural background (see Chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). As CBNRM solely applies to the *communal* areas of the country, the main focus is on the situation in these areas. Commercial areas are only added to give a comparison, where needed.

With the end of apartheid in 1990 the new government strived to abolish all discriminatory legislation. But the definition (especially self-definition) of the different cultural groups as distinct entities is still rather strong. Some observers even describe an increased ethnisation in independent Namibia (Malan, 1998; Fosse, 1992). So when analysing governance of communal area conservancies, the cultural background has to be included in the analysis (Chapters 3.3 and 3.4).

In the following chapters the history of resource use, especially concerning game and land, is described, starting in early pre-colonial times, analysing the changes through the German and South African colonialism and assessing how independence influenced the resource use policy and practice. The analysis puts a special emphasis on the effects that the apartheid division into a two-tier society had and still has on resource use rights (Chapter 3.3). The conservancy legislation is one of the efforts of the Namibian government after independence to correct the wrongs of the colonial past. It is analysed in its contents and put in perspective by relating it to other parts of the national legislation that have an impact on local resource use (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1990, 1995, 1996 and 2003, see Chapter 3.3).

After analysing the institutional set-up of CBNRM in Namibia, Chapter 3.6 gives an overview of the actors involved. The stakeholders are chosen as found in the literature and clustered according to mostly functional criteria.

Chapter 3.7 leads the reader into the field study areas. CBNRM in Namibia started in the Kunene region, which is where both case studies are located. So the introduction of the case studies also implies an account of the emergence of CBNRM in Namibia. The development of CBNRM is described for the Kunene region in general and more specifically for the two case study areas.

3.1 Ecological background

Namibia is the driest country in southern Africa. It features very patchy rainfall patterns with an increasing variability of rainfall from the Northeast to the Southwest. While the average rainfall in the Northeast lies between 348 and 871 mm per year, it decreases to 2 to 28 mm in the Namib Desert (Dealie et al., 1993). Rainfall determines the vegetation, so the dominant vegetation of the Northeast is forest and woodland. Savannah woodlands dominate the central parts of the country. The Southwest is characterised by shrubs and sparsely distributed grasses, while the typical feature of the Namib Desert is the near lack of vegetation.

One ecological feature of Namibia that is especially important for CBNRM is the country's rich wildlife. Though seriously diminished by poaching especially in the first half of the 20th century, wildlife numbers and diversity are still high in the regional comparison of Southern Africa. One example is the Etosha National Park, which is close to both case-study conservancies and borders one of them (Ehi-Rovipuka). It carries around 114 mammal species, 340 bird species, 110 reptile species, 16 amphibian species and one fish species. Among these are the following specially protected mammals: roan antelope, black rhinoceros, elephant, giraffe, klipspringer, black-faced impala and Burchell's and Hartmann's zebra (Baker, 1996). The game-counts in the two case study conservancy given in Chapter 3.7 show that many of these species also occur outside National Parks.

Agricultural production in Namibia is limited by the climatic preconditions on the one hand and by different forms of land rights on the other. The relatively wet North and Northeast are suitable for rain-fed crop production while the drier parts of the country are dominated by cattle, goat and

sheep production (Katjiua, 1998). Only 8% of the country receives more than 500 mm rainfall annually, the minimum amount that is necessary for dry land cropping (Byers, 1997). Namibia has no perennial rivers between the northern and southern borders. The only perennial rivers that touch the Namibian territory are those that delineate the northern and southern borders.

3.2   Economic background

Population growth and economic activities are limited by the lack of water. Namibia has a total land area of approximately 825 000 km^2 with a population of only around 1.6-1.9 million. Not only agriculture but also the industrial development is limited by the arid conditions. This is especially true for two of the main export industries, mining and tourism (Corbett, 2000; Auswärtiges Amt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2003; CIA, 2003).

3.2.1   Economic potential of agriculture in the communal areas

70% of the population depend on agriculture for their livelihood; in the communal areas it is the main and often sole livelihood activity. The proportion of agriculture of the GDP varies according to rainfall. Its contribution to the GDP of only around 10% does not properly reflect the importance of agriculture in the everyday life of the majority of the population (Halbach, 2000). Subsistence farming is the sector that involves by far the highest workforce with two thirds of the Namibian population still living in rural areas (Brown, 1996). Subsistence farming rarely involves formal employment, so the estimated figures of unemployment (20%) and under-employment (a further 40%) are more than vague. The same is true for the figures concerning population growth, estimations range from 2.6–3.2% per year (UNDP, 1996, Auswärtiges Amt der Deutschland, 2003). The average income of subsistence farming per household is estimated at US$ 700 per year and for the poorest 20% around US$ 200 a year (Roe et al., 2003).

Jones and Corbett emphasise that the socio-economic situation of the post-independence country is still very much shaped by the colonial past. The gap between rich and poor is significantly high even for a developing country and so are the differences between rural and urban lifestyles, with a poorly educated rural majority (Corbett and Jones, 2000). A relatively high per capita GDP (1,683 €in 2002, Auswärtiges Amt der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2003) cannot belie the poverty of the majority of mainly rural households: It is estimated that the richest 10% of all

households receive 65% of total income (UNDP, 1996). CBNRM is one of the strategies of the Namibian government not only to protect natural resources but also to provide income opportunities to these rural poor.

3.2.2 Relevance of tourism for the Namibian economy and tourism potential of communal areas

Tourism is described as the world's fastest growing economy. Starting in the 1980s there has been a noticeable shift of tourism streams from developed to developing countries (Namibia Natural Resource Consortium, 2002). The interest of tourists visiting Namibia mainly focuses on wildlife and nature-related attractions. Jones (2003) argues that due to its special characteristics, tourism has a high potential to contribute to poverty reduction:

> "1. Contributing to poverty alleviation through direct and indirect employment;
>
> 2. Contributing additional income to local communities through joint venture photographic and hunting safari operations;
>
> 3. Stimulating local enterprises based on tourism (traditional villages, camp sites, etc.) or on providing services (tyre repair, cool drink sales etc.);
>
> 4. Improving the earning ability of rural women by stimulating trade in basketry, pottery and other traditional crafts;
>
> 5. Providing employment close to home in rural areas so that wage earners can still engage in other household livelihood activities." (Jones, 2003)

For the Namibian private and communal farmland areas alike, tourism offers profitable alternatives to farming activities. This is especially true for the extremely arid areas that are marginal for farming. On freehold farms this has led to an increase of nature-related tourism as supplement or replacement of farming. One important factor facilitating this development was a change of legislation (1968) that allowed for the formation of wildlife conservancies on the commercial land (Chapter 3.4.).

For the communal areas (former homelands, see Chapter 3.3) the right to form communal conservancies (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996), granted two decades later, also induced changes in land use practice and income generation (Palm, 2000). As these wildlife and tourism-related projects are mostly in their starting phase the increase of turnover and income per annum is impressive. The benefits of the national CBNRM programme, which includes most of

the organised community-based natural resource management and tourism initiatives, showed an increase of 82% between 2001 and 2002. The benefits of 2002 (about N$ 11,130,000) can be broken down as shown in Diagram 4 (Jones, 2003).

Diagram 4: Diversity of benefits from CBNRM in Namibia 2002 for all registered conservancies (Jones, 2003, p. 25)

3.3 History of land use and nature conservation in Namibia

The following chapters give an overview of the development of resource use practice from pre-colonial times up to present-day independent Namibia. This is especially important for understanding the complex resource use regimes at present, including old and new, formal and informal institutions. North emphasises that the speed and direction of institutional change is influenced by institutional heritage (North, 1990). In the context of CBNRM in Southern Africa the cultural and historical background of the local communities is important for assessing institutional changes. But also the policy development of implementing agencies (state and NGO) had a significant impact on the emergence of CBNRM (Anstey at al., 2002).

Pre-colonial times

The first change of general land use practice in Southwest Africa occurred long before the arrival of the first white explorers. It is estimated that early in the first millennium AD the Khoi began to arrive in Southwest Africa and brought with them the lifestyle of nomadic pastoralism (Dierks, 1999). They encountered earlier immigrants who were hunter-gatherers[20].

The geographic features of the country with rough seas, harsh coastlines and extended coastal deserts (Namib) prevented the intrusion of Europeans for much longer than in other areas of Africa. But not only the coastal barriers prevented colonisation, explorers who approached from the east were faced with the Kalahari desert, which borders to the Omaheke sandveld. Only the South and North allow for rather unproblematic entrance to the territory (crossing the Kunene or Oranje river) (Nuhn, 1994). So even though the first reported Europeans setting foot on the now Namibian area arrived from the sea, the colonisation started with the influx on land, from the southern cape.

---

[20] The oldest communities still living in Namibia and partly still practising pre-pastoralism hunter-gatherer-subsistence are the San and the !Nu-Khoen. But from the sources available it is not sure whether they are the descendants of original inhabitants of the country (Dierks, 1999; Williams, 1991).

The first documented visit to the Namibian coast was that of the Portuguese explorer Diego Cão in 1486 at the point he called Cape Cross (21°47'S). But the first recorded contact of local people with (and resistance against) Europeans took place only in 1677 (Dierks, 1999).

In the 18th century first white settlers from the South started exploring the Namibian inland and settling there. But their numbers and their influence were still low. The 19th century can be described as the pre-colonial period of the missionaries. Especially after 1840 missionaries start to interfere in local politics. So the second revolution of socio-economical structures[21] is induced by the massive influence of Europeans. For Namaland, Dierks (1999) describes:

> "Namaland undergoes a rapid social change in the first half of the 18th century, from a kinship based, pastoral, self-sufficient society, to military oligarchies supported by European missionaries, dependent for reproduction on a destructive trade network of European traders and hunters." (Dierks, 1999, p. 11)

The 19th century is marked by struggles between local people and the European intruders but also fights between the different peoples of Southwest Africa who formed varying alliances with the missionaries and traders. The interventions of the missionaries and traders in local politics and warfare steered in two opposite directions. Some lead to a de-stabilisation of local social and economic conditions by kindling existing conflicts. Others helped to – at least temporarily – appease the local situation[22]. For the 1860s Dierks describes a loss of economic powers of the local leaders to the hands of the Europeans:

> "A new form of European colonial domination is unofficially introduced by the missionary-trader alliance long before the official colonial annexation takes place." (Dierks, 1999, p. 18)

Colonial times

The German colonial rule starts in 1884, when the German Government promised to protect the territory bought by the German trader Luederitz. For a detailed account of the German colonial rule see Dierks (1999). For the sake of this research the German and South African colonial rule is highlighted with a special focus on land use questions and the role of traditional authorities.

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[21] The first one was the introduction of pastoralism into a hunter-gatherer society.

[22] From the existing documents no consistent strategy can be observed. The motives are not clear and seem to be variable within the different stakeholder groups.

The post-independence situation still mainly reflects the colonial distribution. This has a massive impact on

- Where people live,

- Who has access to what kind of resources and

- What kind of institutions regulates this access.

Reserves: "homelands" for the "natives"

The communal areas of Namibia are a heritage of the colonial times when these areas were created as "homelands" for the local black population. This process started in 1901 when the missionary organisations started to demand "reserves" for the "natives" (Nuhn, 1994). The separation of black and white inhabitants of the country was continued by the South African Government, which took over colonial rule in 1915.

While the homelands politics were rather ad hoc and uncoordinated in the beginning of South African rule, the 1960 saw a formalisation of apartheid politics. One milestone was the Report of the Odendaal Commission of Inquiry that was released in 1964 (Government of the Republic of South Africa, 1964)[23].

One of the core recommendations was the formation of ten ethnically homogeneous "homelands" for the black people of Southwest Africa where they should live apart from the coloureds and the whites. It was recommended to expand the reserves from 26% to nearly 40% of the territory (Halbach, 2000).

Following a divide and rule approach the colonial governments had started early to support and form traditional power structures.

> "Chiefs and headmen had to be kept strong enough to control their own people but weak enough for the regime to control them." (Berat and Gordon, 1991, p. 633)

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[23] The implementation of the plan started in 1968 with "The Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in Southwest Africa Act, No 54 of 1968" (Harring, 1998).

So parallel to the "modern", white government several representative authorities of the different language groups were put into power and given certain resources and responsibilities to partly manage the affairs of their people (Kössler, 1998). In some cases, were tribes had weak traditional hierarchies, the colonial powers invented new pseudo-traditional structures. The traditional leaders of the homelands were in the double role of being the traditional authority of their people and a petty official of the Southwest African administration (Kössler, 1998).

Most of the "homelands" were located in the North of the country, whereas the Middle and the South were predominately freehold farmland of white commercial farmers. This structure was inherited from the German colonial era when the Middle and South were the well-controlled "Polizeizone" of white settlement, and the North was only nominally part of the colony but not effectively controlled (Nuhn, 1994).

In the "homeland" areas land and other natural resources were owned by the state and under the custodianship of the respective traditional authorities. So despite of the active role that some traditional authorities took, the applicable colonial regulations did not give them the authority to allot land. But still, even though the formal institutions deprived traditional authorities from land decisions, strong informal institutions lead to an active involvement in land questions. Traditional authorities and their subjects believed that the chief or king was the owner of their land, so that their decisions and recommendations had a strong influence (Corbett and Daniels, 1996).

Approaches to nature conservation before independence

In most African countries colonisation went along with big scale hunting (compare Chapter 2.2). In Namibia this led to a depletion of the game population; so earliest measures towards conservation were hunting regulations taken in 1892 (Schoeman, 1996). In 1907 the first three game reserves of the country were proclaimed. Their aim was twofold:

- To protect game and

- To provide a buffer zone against the spreading of the rinderpest. (Schoeman, 1996)

During the South African colonisation the responsibility for nature conservation and wildlife lay in two separate hands. The Southwest African administration had established a permanent section to manage the country's wildlife in 1955. But this section was only responsible for the white

commercial land and the protected areas. The Secretary of Bantu Affairs of South Africa was responsible for conservation in the "homelands". Schoeman sees corrupt office holders on the South African side as one main reason for an unlimited plundering of the communal areas (Schoeman, 1996). Environmentalist Brown[24] criticises:

> "Before independence there was virtually no environmental planning between sectors and regions of the country; sectors operated in isolation and there was little co-operation between government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community groups. Two additional factors added to Namibia's environmental problems: neglect of the communal areas of the country and the application of euro-centric and rigid agricultural policies, imposed on a highly variable environment" (Brown, 1996, p.16).

In the first half of the 20th century, Southwest Africa, both in the reserves and on the commercial farmland faced a massive decline in wildlife numbers. Game was seen as open access resource on the one hand (people benefited from hunting) and as a competition or threat for livestock on the other (people avoided / reduced costs through hunting). Especially in the North of the country there was severe poaching by members of the South African defence forces. Local communities and their authorities had few means to effectively exclude outsiders from using local resources (Owen-Smith, 2002).

The trend of decreasing game numbers was reversed on the commercial farmland due to a change in legislation in the late 1960s: In 1968 the Southwest African government granted private land-holders custodial rights to manage and use wildlife on their farms and the right to form conservancies (Joubert, 1974).

> "A conservancy is a group of farms on which neighbouring landowners have pooled their resources for the purpose of conserving and utilising wildlife on their combined properties."(Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1995, p. 4)

As they were now allowed to profit from the wildlife on their farms, many farmers stopped treating game just as competition for their livestock. Most observers agree that this was the crucial incentive that led to a significant increase of wildlife on commercial land over the last decades (Barnes and de Jager, 1996; Van der Walt, 1987; Berry, 1990). In the same period most "homelands" went on to face a severe decrease of wildlife with poaching being particularly rife in the 1970s (Jones, 1995; Owen-Smith, 2002).

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[24] Chris Brown is the managing director of the Namibian Nature Foundation.

This trend was slowed down or stopped in those communities where there had been long-standing community involvement in wildlife conservation, especially in what now is the northern Kunene region (Carter, 1990; Long, 2004).

The changes in land rights and distribution in the course of independence have been described as slow and not revolutionary (Werner, 2003). However, many of the changes that *have* taken place after independence root in pre-independence developments. This is especially true for the change of the conservancy legislation that builds on good experience with commercial conservancies on the one hand and community-based conservation on the other.

3.4 Political and legal background of CBNRM in Namibia

The development of CBNRM was shaped by the legal and political situation in the newly independent country. The programme aims at the communal lands where ethnic segregation (Chapter 3.4.1) and traditional governance structures (Chapter 3.4.2) still prevail. Even though CBNRM is not part of the official decentralisation policy it does intend the devolution of power to lower levels of governance (Chapter 3.4.3). While observers criticise the slow speed of the decentralisation process, even more concern is mentioned about the still unsolved land issue as land is a crucial asset for conservancies (Chapter 3.4.4).

3.4.1 Role of ethnic differences after the end of apartheid

The post-colonial government is faced with a big challenge as for the integration and acknowledgement of the different cultural groups of Namibia. On the one hand the strict cultural separation and emphasis on cultural differences was a fundamental feature of the apartheid system. So the abolishment of discriminatory legislation and government practice was one core aim of the independence movement (Malan, 1998).

But on the other hand many Namibians maintain a strong sense of affiliation to their own cultural group. This is consistent with findings of Cornell (1985) about group affiliation:

> "Movement in and out of a community of culture is difficult because it involves putting on and taking off a system of meaning, patterns of customary behaviour, a view of the world. The act is a more vital and comprehensive one, often involving a profound redefinition of the self and its relations with the social

environment. Such movement occurs regularly enough, but in general the membership of a community of culture is less volatile than that of other types of groups." (Cornell, 1985, p. 8)

The Namibian society currently experiences an increase of tribalism that is seen as an effect of the uncertainties going along with political transition, modernisation and globalisation. So after independence a number of cultural groups claimed stronger recognition. They argued that albeit the apartheid rhetoric of separate development, the core objective of the racial segregation was the disempowerment and fragmentation of the anti-apartheid movement (Suzman, 2002).

Indicators for a strengthening of ethnic ties in Namibia are the inauguration of traditional kings and claims for stronger traditional land rights or for an increase of land areas for the respective groups[25]. The strategies of the Namibian government in these processes remain unclear: They range between the fear of ethnic division[26] and the acknowledgement of ethnic diversity.

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[25] E.g., San communities claim extended land-rights in the area of the Etosha National Park, the Mbunza and Shambyu communities in the Kavango struggle about tribal areas and the Damara appoint a king, Justus Garoëb (Malan, 1998).

[26] This fear was strengthened by the actions of the secessionist movement in the Caprivi Strip.

Ethnic group[27]	Percentage of population of Namibia
Ovambo	49.8
Kavango	9.3
Damara[28]	7.5
Herero	7.5
Whites (Afrikaans, German, English)	6.4
Nama	4.8
Colerds	4.1
Caprivians	3.7
San	2.9
Rehobother Baster	2.5
Tswana	0.6
Others	0.9

Table 3: Size of ethnic groups in Namibia in 1989 (Malan, 1998)[29]

In the communal areas, where the communal conservancies are located, the cultural segregation of the Odendaal Plan to a large part still prevails. Suzman (2002) observes that even after independence,

> "(…) ethnicity remains an important marker of social and political identity. This is mainly because Namibia remains geographically and functionally divided into areas in which individual tribes and language communities dominate." (Suzman, 2002, p. 6)

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[27] This ethnic division is a very rough one that follows the divisions of the apartheid system and is not necessarily consistent with divisions that anthropologists or the people themselves would follow (Suzman, 2002).

[28] The Damara and Herero are the main target group of the empirical work as the case studies cover one conservancy mainly inhabited by Damaras (#Khoadi //Hoas) and one mainly inhabited by Hereros (Ehi-Rovipuka). For further information on their culture see Chapters 3.7.5 and 3.7.6.

[29] To avoid any impression of apartheid the post-independence census did not include ethnic information. So the figures about ethnic division available are outdated and can only be used as rough estimates to give an idea of today's distribution.

Table 4 shows how the standard of living still hugely differs according to language group.

Language group	Income (N$)	Literacy (%)	School enrolment (%)	Life expectancy (Years)
German	30,459	100	92	75.0
English	21,708	97	93	66.9
Afrikaans	13,995	91	91	67.2
Setswana	5,326	70	81	61.7
Namibia whole	3,608	66	83	61.0
Otjiherero	3,077	58	77	64.1
Damara/Nama	2,404	63	80	56.6
Oshivambo	1,707	64	91	61.3
Silozi	1,692	73	86	56.6
Rukavango	1,652	56	81	55.9
San	1,315	23	21	48.1

Table 4: Socio-economic differences between Namibian language groups (UNDP, 1999)

3.4.2 Traditional law as relevant source of law in the communal areas

The core stakeholders promoting ethnic interests are the respective traditional authorities who derive their power from the ethnic division of the nation. So the state of traditional authorities' affairs can be seen as indicator for the development of ethnic matters and the strength of tribal structures in general (Malan, 1998).

Because the conservancies are on communal land and traditional authorities still have a rather strong formal and informal position in these areas, the legislation *about* traditional authorities and the laws made *by* traditional authorities influence CBNRM.

A general characteristic of customary law is that most of it is unwritten but passed in an oral tradition. So rules are often unsystematic and subject to interpretation. While the enforcement and efficiency of modern written law is (or should ideally be) independent of the individuals working in the executive, traditional law is largely dependent on the respect and legitimacy of the traditional authorities implementing it (Corbett and Daniels, 1996).

For Namibia Hinz (1998) observes that customary rules for some resources are reasonably developed (land administration, hunting, forests) but for others they are still unclear (like water and inland fisheries). The degree to which these rules are adhered to in Namibia is not systematically evaluated (Corbett and Jones, 2000).

The constitution of the independent Namibia gives traditional authorities a comparably clearly defined position[30]. Article 140 (1) of the constitution of Namibia states that the customary law in force at the date of independence shall remain so to the extent that it does not conflict with the constitution of any other statutory provision. Corbett and Jones (2000) observe that on the ground, in the communal areas of Namibia

> "(…) a parallel system of indigenous law continues to operate alongside and impact upon CBNRM legislative provisions." (Corbett and Jones , 2000, p.7)

---

[30] compared to other southern African nations (Hlatshwayo, 1998)

However, the terms "traditional" or "customary" law are likely to evoke the picture of indigenous, "unspoiled", original rules. So it is important to keep in mind that these rules have been under the influence of a "divide and rule" strategy of different colonial powers that supported those rules and individuals that suited their interests, suppressing those that conflicted with them. So, up to present-day politics, "tradition" is constructed as a means to put forward own interest[31] (Hinz, 1998).

3.4.3 Decentralisation efforts and regional restructuring after independence

One instrument for levelling the inequalities between the different cultural groups was the regional restructuring of the country after independence (completed in 1992). The country was divided into regions to allow for decentralisation (Halbach, 2000). These regions were purposefully *not* ethnically based but were constructed with the aim of putting rich and poor areas into one region. So, many of the regions include commercial as well as communal land. Still, the inner-regional re-distribution of resources shows only moderate effects[32]. The two field-study conservancies are both located in the Kunene region that includes the commercial farmland around Khorixas as well as former Kaokoland and parts of former Damaraland[33].

Chapter 12 of the constitution of the Republic of Namibia provides the constitutional background on which the decentralisation efforts rest that government has undertaken since independence. Decentralised governmental structures, which did not copy the apartheid institutions described above, were introduced through the Regional Councils Act 1992 and the Local Authority Councils Act 1992 (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1992 and 1992a). They created a legal framework for decentralisation. In 1997 the Decentralisation Policy was adopted (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1997). A practical guideline for the implementation of

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[31] Garoeb (2002) is one of the examples how Damara king Justus Garoëb attempts to use tradition as an argument in the political power-play surrounding conservancies.

[32] Critics complain that the richest region (Khomas region, which is greater Windhoek) is too small and excludes poorer neighbours. As a positive example Halbach (2000) sees the Erongo region, which includes the economically strong centres of Swakopmund and Walfisbay as well as an extended area of less wealthy hinterland.

decentralisation was given through the Decentralisation Enabling Act, 2000 (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2000). This act served to define the roles of the different actors in the process. With the workload and responsibilities of regional councillors gradually increasing, they were granted the status of full-time politicians in 2001 (Tötemeyer, 2002). The role of a regional council is defined in the Regional Council Act as:

- Assisting and consulting with central government concerning legislation and development planning concerning the region

- Playing an initiating role in identifying settlement areas

- Advising the President or any minister in any matter where advice is demanded

- Making recommendations to the Minister of Finance in matters of regional relevance. (ibid)

To strengthen the role of the Regions in the national level decision-making, the Namibian government is structured as a two-chamber government with the National Assembly as the central government and the National Council, constituted of regional councillors. But observers of the Namibian political situation describe the Regional Councils as well as the National Council as rather weak actors. In 2002 Tötemeyer observes that in its twelve years of existence the National Council never made any use of the right to recommend legislation of regional concern to the National Assembly (Tötemeyer, 2002). The Regional Councils are described as bodies of limited administrative duties, limited financial and personnel resources and no legislative or executive powers (Bebi et al., 1997). Tötemeyer sees the reluctance of central government as main constraint for effective decentralisation:

> "The politics of decentralisation will for some time remain a sensitive issue in Namibian politics. Ultimately, the success of decentralisation will to a significant extent be determined by the co-operation and willingness of line ministries which is partly lacking." (Tötemeyer, 1999, p. 3)

In his position as Minister of Regional and Local Government and Housing, Tötemeyer criticises that:

> "It cannot be denied that a strong opinion is prevailing among members of the ruling cadre that regional councils should not be elevated to or recognised as bodies that could undermine central authority, alternatively compete with central government at regional level" (Tötemeyer, 2002, p. 5).

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[33] In the regional restructuring Damaraland was divided – with the northern part falling into the Kunene region and the southern part into the Erongo region.

Only the urban areas have town or city councils. For the rural areas the regional councillors are the closest governmental actor. Here it is important to mention that regional councillors are not elected from party lists like the National Assembly, but on a constituency basis. They have to live in the constituency that elected them. This increases the likeliness that they are "closer to the people" (Tötemeyer, 2002).

3.4.4 Land rights

In a country where most of the population depends on farming for their livelihood, access to land has a high socio-political and economic relevance. So the "land question" is seen as a burning issue by many observers of the political developments in Namibia and the Southern African Region in general[34] (for a comprehensive overview see Hendricks, 2000). For the local population land has a strong symbolic value as it is seen as one of the most obvious aspects of the overall skew distribution of wealth. In CBNRM reliable agreements about land use and boundaries are crucial for the registration and running of conservancies (Chapter 3.5). Albeit the radical redistribution rhetoric of SWAPO before independence, the new Namibian government followed the principles developed by the Western Contact Group in the 80s and chose a non-radical approach. After independence the new government started a programme of land reform (1990). It consists of four major components:

- Redistributive land reform

- Tenure reform

- Development of unutilised communal land and

- The Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (for details see Werner, 2003).

Werner (2003) lists the following legal and policy frameworks that are related to the land reform:

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[34] The violent example of Zimbabwe was mentioned quite frequently in discussions with the local population. The judgement of the forceful farm occupations varied, with a good proportion of discussion partners expressing the view that: "No, it is not good that they are so brutal, but something has to be done in this question. If they wait too long with change we will go and take the land that these rich white farmers have stolen from us" (personal communication, local community member in #Khoadi //Hoas). This personal observation goes in line with Melber (2002) who describes that unconstitutional steps in the land question received substantial rhetoric support in the public discussion.

> "The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia;
> Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act, 1995;
> White Paper on Resettlement, 1997;
> National Land Policy, 1998;
> Communal Land Reform Act, 2002." (Werner, 2003, p.6)

There have been many claims of the different ethnic groups to restore their ancestral land but as most of them had migratory lifestyles when the colonisers arrived, claims were overlapping and it was agreed on a redistribution programme based on need not ethnicity (Adams at al., 2001). As a main means of redistribution, the government buys land from willing sellers and redistributes it to the landless (Melber, 2002). The actual re-distribution achieved with this system is still rather low: By the mid 1990s the government had bought and redistributed some 100,000 ha; a decade after independence that summed up to 54 farms covering 341,000 ha (Werner, 2000 and 2001). Melber does not only criticise this as an insignificant amount, but:

> "(…) even this tiny slice of the cake all too often benefited the haves rather than the have-nots, as much of the state-owned land was utilised by those now occupying influential positions in the government and state apparatus." (Melber, 2002, p. 3)

A Land Reform Act defining the possible beneficiaries not according to income but to amount of land they own enabled this (Werner, 2003). So, well-paid government employees can benefit as long as they do not own too much land. The discussion of a land reform for the communal areas did receive a stronger priority with the outburst of violent land conflicts in Zimbabwe (Palmer, 2000). The Communal Land Reform Act was signed into law in 2003 and it provides for the registration of all land rights held in communal areas (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2003)[35]. The responsibility of the traditional leaders to allocate land is more formalised, and other stakeholders are included in the process. Communal Land Boards shall serve as control organs. Existing and new land rights shall be checked whether they "infringe on the land held by another person, (…) exceed the maximum area prescribed (or) (…) fall into an area reserved for common usage" (Werner, 2003). The land boards are to consist of

- One representative from each traditional authority within the area of the board

- One representative of the organised farming community (i.e. the Farmers' Union)

- The regional officer of the area

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[35] As the field-stay was undertaken in 2002 this change could not be accounted for in the empirical research.

- At least four women

- If there is a conservancy, one representative of the conservancy; if there is more than one conservancy, these have to find one common representative

- Four staff members from the public services, nominated by the Minister of Regional and Local Government and Housing, the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, the Minister of Agriculture, Rural Development and Water and the Minister of Environment and Tourism. (Malan, 2003)

For the actual situation in the communal areas before the implementation of land boards Corbett and Jones (2000) observed that traditional authorities still administered land but with "varying degrees of efficiency and legitimacy" (Corbett and Jones, 2000, p.4). Especially where traditional authorities were not broadly accepted, the situation either developed into a free access situation or a de-facto privatisation of resource access (Werner, 2003). This is of special relevance where two cultural groups live together that practice different forms of land use (Botelle and Rohde, 1995).

3.5 Conservancy legislation and policy: The institutional frame of conservancies

Namibia is the first country in the world that incorporated the protection of the environment into its constitution (CIA, 2003). The constitution of the newly independent country defines the aim to

> "(…) actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the following: maintenance of ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological diversity of Namibia and utilisation of living natural resources on a sustainable basis for the benefit of all Namibians, both present and future." (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996)

To realise this aim and building on the experience with commercial conservancies and the community game guard programme, the new government, with a strong support of the NGOs[36] and donors involved, aimed at a change of legislation so that

> "(…) as far as possible, given the different land tenure systems, the rights enjoyed by communal and commercial farmers will be the same" (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997).

The change of policy from fortress conservation to a community-based approach can be seen as embedded in a global change of policy focus as described in Chapter 2. In tune with this general development the local NGO IRDNC (Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation) had tested the ground for CBNRM even before independence. Since 1982 this NGO worked closely with communities in helping them establish a network of community game guards and develop earning opportunities through tourism (Hagen et al., 1998; Corbett and Jones, 2000). These pilot projects, which were continued with government support after 1990, served to try out the CBNRM philosophy in practice and to strengthen local-level institutional actors (Jones, 1996). This work focused on the Kunene region (then Damaraland and Kaokoland). While the projects stood in opposition to the general policy of the apartheid government[37], after independence their experience helped shaping the new CBNRM policy and legislation.

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[36] The links between NGOs and government were especially strong because a high proportion of the NGO staff in the conservation sector is former government staff, so they have personal contacts and know the institutional set-ups from inside the organisation.

[37] Though the pre-independence project experienced significant hostility from central government, there was dedicated government field-staff closely co-operating with the NGOs (Owen-Smith, 2002).

To profit from this experience the MET initiated and supported research about potentials and strategies of communal area resource management. The titles of some DEA (Department of Environmental Affairs) Research Discussion Papers of these years give an overview over the issues discussed during the process of policy definition:

"Tourism, communities, and the potential impacts on local incomes and conservation" (Ashley, 1995a)

"Institutional relationships, capacity and sustainability – Lessons learned from a community-based conservation project, eastern Tsumkwe district, Namibia 1991–96" (Jones, 1996)

"Wildlife Management, Utilization and Tourism in Communal Areas: Benefits to Communities and Improved Resource Management" (Jones, 1995)

"The value of non-agricultural land-use in some Namibian communal areas: a database for planning" (Barnes, 1995)

The Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism (now Ministry of Environment and Tourism) started a process of policy development in 1992 that led to a change of legislation in 1996. In the meantime a new actor entered the scene, backing the CBNRM movement with international financial support: The WWF / LIFE (World Wide Fund for Nature / Living in a Finite Environment) programme started in 1993.

The *Nature Conservation Amendment Act, 1996* sets four preconditions, which rural communities have to meet to be registered as a conservancy. They need:

- A statement setting out the *boundaries* of the geographic area in respect of which an application is made;

- A *constitution* that provides for the sustainable management and utilisation of game;

- A *committee* that is representative of the community residing in the area to which the application relates;

- A list of *members* of the conservancy. (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996, 1)

The geographic *boundaries* have to be either following physical features of permanent nature or have to be marked using GPS (Global Positioning System). The boundaries have to be agreed upon with all neighbouring communities.

The *constitution* of a conservancy consists of one standard part that is compulsory for all conservancies and variations / additions of the individual conservancies. In the "toolbox for the

establishment of communal area conservancies" the MET gives five aims of a conservancy constitution:

> "Meet the legal requirements of the amended Nature Conservation Ordinance which makes provision for communal area conservancies;
>
> Meet the requirements for giving the conservancy constitution legal status under common law;
>
> Satisfy the MET that there is a real commitment to sustainable management of wildlife and the conservancy will draw up a management plan once established;
>
> Provide for the operational arrangements of the conservancy (e.g. election of the committee, holding of meetings, financial matters etc.);
>
> Express the particular objectives, interests, needs etc of a specific community." (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997b, p. 1)

The legislation is rather flexible when it comes to the appointment or election of the *committee*. It does not prescribe procedures, nor does it give a clear definition of what "representative" means in this context (Baker and Jones, 1997).

A list of *conservancy members* is needed especially when it comes to benefit distribution. Not all the inhabitants of the designated area are automatically members of the conservancy. They have to register to become a member. Only registered conservancy members are supposed to receive direct benefit from the conservancy, elect committees, be committee members and make decisions at meetings (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996).

The conservancy legislation is framed by a number of policy documents and other material that the Ministry provides to facilitate conservancy formation (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1995, 1995a, 1997, 1997a and 1997b). As the conservancy legislation remains rather general, the "Model Constitution for Communal Conservancies" (Ministry of Environment and Tourism 1997a) serves as an important source regarding obligatory and additional regulations.

The conservancy constitution (obligatory regulations) gives the *conservancy committee* the right to manage the conservancy and administer its rights and property. The power of the committee includes the following:

- Employ staff and consultants

- Handle the finances of the conservancy (distribute to members, invest, re-invest and borrow money) with the approval of the general meeting

- Guarantee the performance of contracts of the conservancy

- Institute or defend any legal arbitration proceedings and settle any claims made by or against the conservancy (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997a)

The rights of the committee are restricted. The financial decisions (see above), any decision to lease property or rights and any amendment of the constitution have to be approved by the general meeting of the conservancy members. A second restriction is vested in governmental actors: the rights of the committee may be limited by a development plan or government policy. (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997a)

Within the group of core conservancy actors there is provided for a hierarchy of the actors: Formally the conservancy committee is superior to the conservancy staff. In the committees those committee members with portfolio (like chairman, secretary and treasurer) have specific duties. For the *chairperson* the model constitution does not only give him or her the responsibility for calling and chairing conservancy meetings but also a second and casting vote in the case of equal votes at committee meetings and general meetings. The *secretary* is responsible for organising meetings, taking minutes and conducting correspondence on behalf of the conservancy. The *treasurer's* responsibilities are the keeping of financial records, co-signing all conservancy's cheques, preparing financial reports and ensuring that the annual audit is carried out (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997a).

The role of traditional authorities in the conservancies is not catered for in the conservancy legislation. Here it is also the role of the Model Constitution to provide a guidance. It demands that at least one representative or nominee of the local traditional authorities shall be part of the conservancy committee (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997a). Still the Model Constitution does not exactly define the position of this traditional authority, e.g. whether he or she should have a vote and count as ordinary committee member or act as observer and advisor only.

NGOs are neither mentioned in the conservancy legislation nor in the Model Constitution. But MET documents aimed at facilitating CBNRM frame NGOs as important actors in the areas of community development and value their capacity to mobilise resources quickly (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997).

This change of legislation led to a boom of community-based conservation: In 2004, 28% of all communal land in Namibia fell under conservancy management. This amounts to just below 9% of the Namibian surface (Long, 2004).

3.6 Actors involved in CBNRM in Namibia

CBNRM is an activity that allows for the participation of a number of governmental, civil-society and private sector actors. To allow for an analysis of the local governance impacts of the approach, an overview over the relevant stakeholders is given. The minimum number of actors needed to form and maintain a conservancy is low; essential are the community and a governmental actor. The inclusion of further actors has two major advantages:

- The inclusion of other actors can increase the *resource base*.

- The exclusion of actors who feel they should be included can fuel *conflicts* (Jones, 1996).

For CBNRM in southern Africa, Murphree divides the relevant actors into three groups: communal actors, government actors and NGOs (Murphree, 1994). As a fourth and fifth category Jones adds donors / consultants and private sector actors (Jones, 1996). These clusters have been reviewed and adapted by the researcher according to the actors found in the literature about Namibia. The following criteria helped to define the groups:

- The actors in one group act on the basis of similar *rights.*

- They follow comparable *aims* and *strategies*.

- They act under a specific organisational or legal form.

The resulting actor-groups are:

- Governmental actors

- NGOs and donors

- Traditional authorities

- Community-based actors[38]

- Private sector actors

- Researchers and consultants

The following chapters will shed some light on the role of these actor groups in CBNRM in Namibia, including some details about their internal structures.

Governmental actors

The central governmental actor of CBNRM is the *Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET)* and within this ministry the *Directorate of Environmental Affairs (DEA)*. MET and DEA have developed policy and legislation, they register conservancies, set hunting quotas, provide law-enforcement in case of poaching, co-ordinate research and evaluation and supervise governmental field support of CBNRM (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996). The newly founded (early 2002) *CBNRM Support Division (CSD)* focuses exclusively on CBNRM (personal observation).

Other ministries are stakeholders of CBNRM as far as they deal with the management of rural natural resources. These fall into the responsibility of the *Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Water* and the *Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing*.

Another governmental actor that has a stake in CBNRM is the *regional government*. The conservancy legislation names regional government as one actor deciding on the applications of conservancies (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996).

NGOs and Donors

NGOs and Donors are clustered into one stakeholder group because the responsibilities of the different organisations involved in CBNRM in Namibia are overlapping. One organisation can be

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[38] The cluster "community-based actors" is the most diverse according to the above criteria. It is chosen to provide for brevity and clarity of the presentation but needs a further sub-clustering.

channelling or providing funds as well as working in the field of implementation[39]. It is acknowledged that some of the Donors are governmental organisations, so they have a different legal form from non-governmental organisations. But being governmental organisations of *foreign* governments their legal situation in Namibia resembles strongly that of NGOs.

The role of NGOs has been described as vital for the development of the community-based conservation approach in the first place as they started first community-based conservation projects in the early eighties (Owen-Smith, 2002). To date there is a broad range of NGOs active in the various conservancies and lobbying CBNRM on national and international levels. They offer different services to the communities, like institution building, financial management and conflict resolution.

Major donor support for CBNRM in Namibia commenced in 1993 with the beginning of the LIFE (Living in a Finite Environment) programme that started off with US $14 mill. per annum. This money was supplied by USAID, WWF-US and the MET. Other donors involved are the German, Swedish, Finnish and British development agencies (GTZ, SIDA, Finnida and DfID, Hagen et al., 1998). To improve co-ordination, the key organisations of Namibian CBNRM have formed a collaborative group in 1993 (Jones, 1996). This group was further formalised with the foundation of the umbrella organisation Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations (NACSO see Table 5).

MET[40]	Ministry of Environment and Tourism
NACOBTA	Namibia Community-Based Tourism Association
NNDFN	Nyae-Nyae Development Foundation of Namibia
NNF	Namibia Nature Foundation
RF	Rössing Foundation
LAC	Legal Assistance Centre

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[39] An example would be the Namibia Nature Foundation that manages most of the funds for the Namibian CBNRM programme and facilitates the implementation in some selected conservancies (e.g. #Khoadi //Hoas).

[40] Long (2004) reports that the MET has recently withdrawn as a member of NACSO due to the Minister's reservations against governmental actors being associated with an NGO forum. But still, MET observers attend NACSO meetings and co-operation continues.

IRDNC	Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation
NANGOF	Namibian NGO Forum
RISE	Rural Institute for Social Empowerment
MRCC-UNAM	Multidisciplinary Research and Consultancy Centre of the University of Namibia
NDT	Namibia Development Trust

Table 5: NACSO Partner-Organisations (Namibia, 2002)

Traditional authorities

The Nature Conservation Amendment Act does not define the role of traditional authorities in conservancies very clearly. The MET provided a "model constitution" to guide emerging conservancies as to what are the obligatory and what are the optional aspects of a conservancy constitution. It refers to traditional authorities, stating that: "At least one member of the Conservancy Committee shall be a representative or nominee of the .... traditional authority" (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997a, p.5).

As in Namibia there are no democratically elected local government bodies in the communal areas, the local traditional authorities tend to be the lowest-level governing body. The role of traditional authorities in CBNRM is connected to their custodianship over land (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2003). Some of the traditional authorities also act as national-level players. This is especially true for the higher hierarchy levels like kings and for those who are involved in national politics[41]. On the local level every community has their community-based traditional authorities (headmen and headmen's councils).

Community-based actors

In CBNRM the main policy focus is on the community-based actors. The conservancy legislation of Namibia is rather unspecific about the local target group of CBNRM:

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[41] For example Justus Garoëb, who is king of the Damaras and leader of the United Democratic Front opposition party (personal observation).

"For the purpose of this regulation <community> means the community represented in the register referred to in subregulation (2)" (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996, 155B, 10).

"(2) The committee (…) shall submit with such application a register compiled by that committee containing the names, identification numbers and addresses of the members of the community residing in the area to which the application relates, and who are represented by that committee" (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996, 155B, 2).

As for who is liable of being a community member in the way defined above, the legislation states that the constitution of the respective conservancy should provide for

"the criteria and procedure for being recognised as a member of the community represented by the conservancy committee, provided that no-one may be excluded from membership on the grounds of ethnicity or gender." (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996, 155B, 3e)

As the cluster "community-based actors" is rather heterogeneous, it is sub-clustered for this study. One central group for this research are the *core conservancy actors*, those who have a portfolio in the conservancy, either as member of the committee or as staff (or, in some cases, both). In many communities there are *other community-based organisations* (CBOs) like women's league or farmers' union. Then there is the *"ordinary" local population*, those locals who neither have a post in the conservancy nor in any other CBOs.

Private sector actors

In the majority of the communal areas there are no remarkable private sector activities (Halbach, 2000, Barnes, 1995). One aim of the communal-area conservancies is to open these areas to increased private sector entrepreneurship, namely tourism (Ashley, 1995a, Jones, 1995). A small number of tourism actors have already operated on a permanent basis in the communal areas before the amendment of the Nature Conservation Act, some even before independence[42] (Owen-Smith, 2002).

Researchers and consultants

The phase of policy development for CBNRM was accompanied by research and consultation under the auspice of the MET (e.g. Botelle and Rohde, 1995). The continuing evaluation of the implementation is documented by a series of DEA research papers. The WILD (Wildlife

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[42] e.g. Hobatere Lodge located between the two field-study areas.

Integration for Livelihood Diversification) project, which focuses on the livelihood impacts of CBNRM, was launched in 2000 with funding of the Department for International Development (DfID) of the UK Government (for results of the WILD project, see Long, 2004).

3.7   Two field studies in the Kunene region of Namibia

The local governance effects of CBNRM are analysed in two field studies. The choice of these conservancies was guided by the following rationale: a relatively high number of similarities (especially in the background variables) had to be combined with differences especially in the institutional context and the set of actors involved[43].

The accessible data about individual conservancies was limited, concentrating on a few well-researched examples and most of it out-dated. This is why the final choice of field studies was left open until first interviews with stakeholders in Windhoek provided further insights. This approach was also chosen to avoid what Chambers criticises as "project bias": In the evaluation of a programme or region the same projects are focused on repeatedly, just because they are part of the accessible literature already. Authors take existing reports as a line of orientation[44]. Table 6 provides details of 29 of the 31 registered conservancies.

Name	Region	Biome	Date registered	Size (km^2)	Total registered members	Estimated population
Nyae Nyae	Otjozondjupa	Woodland	Feb-98	8,992	752	1,500
Salambala	Caprivi	Woodland	Jun-98	930	3,500	7,000
Torra	Kunene	Desert	Jun-98	3,493	450	1,200
#Khoadi //Hoas	Kunene	Desert/ Savannah	Jun-98	3,364	1,600	3,500
Uibasen-Twyfelfontein	Kunene	Desert/ Savannah	Dec-99	286	61	200
Doro!Nawas	Kunene	Desert / Savannah	Dec-99	3,979	430	6,000

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[43] The complexity of real-world settings makes it very unlikely to find two or more empirical cases where the combination of factors is identical. In cases like this, Przewoesky and Teune and Przeworski (1970) recommend to chose and compare either the most similar or the most different systems (Teune and Przeworski, 1970). So the aim was to choose two cases that have a high level of similarity and only some differing variables. In the view of Scharpf (2000) such a careful choice of case studies allows for causal conclusions with a high reliability (Scharpf, 2000).

[44] A typical example would be Torra conservancy in the Kunene region, often quoted as prime example for a financially successful conservancy and used to give credits to the whole concept (Jones, 2003). On the other side of the spectrum is the well-researched emerging conservancy of Sesfontein, with its heavy conflicts that make it a good example for those who want to prove the pitfalls of the concept (e.g. Sullivan, 2002, Sharma, 2002).

Kwandu	Caprivi	Woodland	Dec-99	190	1,800	6,000
Mayuni	Caprivi	Woodland	Dec-99	151	1,500	[45]
Wapuro	Caprivi	Woodland	Dec-99	148	1,700	4,300
Purros	Kunene	Desert	May-00	3568	85	260
Tsiseb	Erongo	Desert	Jan-01	7,912	950	2,500
Ehi-Rovipuka	Kunene	Savannah	Jan-01	1,980	500	[46]
Marienfluss	Kunene	Desert	Jan-01	3,034	121	300
Oskop	Hardap	Shrub / Savannah	Feb-01	96	20	120
Sorris Sorris	Erongo	Desert / Savannah	Oct-01	2,990	380	800
Mashi	Caprivi	Woodland	Mar-03	297	718	3,900
Omatendeka	Kunene	Savannah	Mar-03	1,619	374	7,000
Otjimboyo	Erongo	Desert / Savannah	Mar-03	448	148	3,000
Uukwaluudhi	Omushati	Savannah	Mar-03	1,437	25,000	30,000
!Khob-!Naub	Hardap	Shrub / Savannah	Jul-03	2,747	429	13,000
//Gamaseb	Karas	Shrub / Savannah	Jul-03	1,748	495	14,000
//Huab	Kunene	Desert / Savannah	Jul-03	1,817	364	10,000
Orupembe	Kunene	Desert	Jul-03	3,565	132	20,000
Sanitatas	Kunene	Desert	Jul-03	1,446	76	20,000
Anabeb	Kunene	Savannah	Jul-03	1,570	337	7,000
Sesfontein	Kunene	Savannah	Jul-03	2,591	438	7,000
Okongundumba	Kunene	Savannah	Jul-03	1,131	448	20,000
N#a Jaqna	Otjozondjupa	Woodland	Jul-03	9,120	782	8,000
Ozondundu	Kunene	Savannah	Jul-03	745	173	20,000
Total				**71,394**	**37,163**	**226,080**
Namibia total				**825,000**		**1,750,000**[47]
Proportion of conservancies of national total				**8.7%**	**2.1%**	**12.9%**

Table 6: Conservancies registered by 2003 (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 2003, and own calculation)

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[45] Data lacking in Namibia, 2003b.

[46] Data lacking in Namibia, 2003b.

[47] Estimated population, see Chapter 3.2.

Both conservancies analysed in this research are situated in the Kunene region, in the area where CBNRM in Namibia started. They featured similar natural resources, climatic conditions and dominant forms of land use. They both looked back on a rather long history of communal resource management before their registration as conservancies. But they had not yet established a tourism joint venture or adopted a benefit distribution plan. In both conservancies there were serious but non-violent conflicts including traditional authorities. The case studies differed in their cultural background and in the constellations of actors involved (see Chapters 3.7.5 and 3.7.6).

3.7.1   Natural resources in the Kunene

The Kunene region stretches from the commercial farmland around the towns of Khorixas and Outjo in the South up to the Angolan border in the North. It comprises the Etosha National Park in the East and the Skeleton Coast Park in the West. The region includes the remote costal fog desert, the Hartman and Etendeka Mountains of the central 2,000 m escarpment and the plains and saltpan of Etosha. The only perennial river of the region is the Kunene River on the border to Angola (Namibia Development Consultants, 2001). Fauna and flora of the region are determined by the generally dry conditions with annual mean precipitation of 17.9 mm at the coast (Möwe Bay), 352.6 mm at the regional capital Opuwo in the North and 415.5 mm at Outjo in the southern freehold area. This is contrasted by extremely high evaporation rates of more than 2,300 mm per annum (Ministry of Lands, 1999). In the majority of the Kunene region the soils have low organic content and are of low agricultural value (Namibia Development Consultants, 2001).

Inside and outside National Parks the area supports an abundance of wildlife with species of international conservation value like desert elephant and white rhino (Namibia Development Consultants, 2001).

3.7.2 Population and socio-economic structure of the Kunene

The whole region covers 144,255 km^2 (17.5% of the whole nation) with a population density of only 0.44 persons per square km (Katjiua, 1998)[48]. The total population of the area is estimated 64,000 (census of 1991), which makes up for 4.5% of the national population. The population is unevenly distributed with lowly or un-populated desert areas in the Northwest and higher population densities towards the East (Halbach, 2000).

The main language group of the Kunene region is Damara with Otjiherero, Otjihimba and Oshivambo being widely spoken. The distribution of languages still mainly follows the old homeland boundaries with Damara being the dominant language in Kunene South (former Damaraland) and Otjiherero / Otjihimba being the language of the Kaokoveld in the North. Water is the central limiting factor for land use and settlement. Within the central area scattered springs allow for small-scale settlements. 13.7% of the population are urban dwellers (1991) with the main centres being Outjo, Khorixas, Kamanjab, Ruancana and Opuwo (Halbach, 2000).

Before the German colonisation, Damara, Himba and Tjimba communities lived in the areas around Khorixas/Sesfontein and Opuwo/Okongwati (Namibia Development Consultants, 2001). In colonial times white settlers proclaimed farms up to the boundary of Etosha National Park and to the fringes of the costal desert. But following the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, 223 of these farms were bought back from white farmers by the Southwest African government to connect the existing Damara settlements at Okombahe, Fransfontein, Sesfontein and Otjohorongo and create the Damara homeland (Malan, 1998). This is why former Damaraland is the only communal area with fenced farms whereas in other communal areas the fencing-in of pasture is illegal. Another result of the Odendaal Plan was the scaling down of the Etosha National Park to increase the Kaokoland.

Most households in the commnal lands of Kunene practice subsistence farming (mainly livestock) with 62% of the economically active population working in agriculture. The communal part of the Kunene is divided by the stock disease fence (the "red line"), which was established in the 1960s to stop the spreading of foot and mouth disease from the northern communal areas to

the commercial farms. The game-proof fencing cuts the country into two parts, effectively stopping natural game migration routes (Schoeman, 1996). The areas south of the fence are described as semi-commercial because farmers have straightforward access to stock markets. The communal farmers north of the red line have to quarantine their livestock if they want to sell it to buyers south of the cattle fence. This means a significant increase of transaction costs and thus a decrease of value per head of livestock (Halbach, 2000). While the majority of Ehi-Rovipuka falls within the quarantine area, the majority of #Khoadi //Hoas lies outside this area.

3.7.3 Infrastructure

The infrastructure development in Namibia still reflects the priorities of pre-independence times: Generally the infrastructure in the commercial farmland sector and in the towns and cities is far better than that in the communal areas. For the Kunene that means that roads, especially in the western areas, are of poor condition, often not of all-weather quality and especially in the Northwest only suitable for 4x4 cars. The percentage of villages without electricity is the highest in Namibia (96.7%) with a small off-grid energy sector serving commercial farms and some of the clinics and schools (Namibia Development Consultants, 2001).

3.7.4 Development of CBNRM in the Kunene region

Until 1978 the access to the northern tribal areas was strictly limited to government officials and scientists. The areas were briefly opened to private travel in 1978, but as the armed liberation struggle spread into the area only two years after, virtually all tourism north of Purros stopped until the cease-fire of 1989. First efforts to install community-based conservation in the area started in 1982 with the foundation of the Namibia Wildlife Trust (NWT) and the occupation of Wereldsend as a local working base in Kunene West. The first local group co-operating with the NWT were the Hereros. In 1983 the headmen Keephas Muzuma[49], Joshua Kangombe, Goliath Kasaona and Vetemuna Tjambiru appointed the first six communal game guards.

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[48] Compared to 2.2 persons per square km in the national average (Sanderson et al., 2001).

[49] Keephas Muzuma was the late headman of the people that formed the Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy, case study two.

But as the project contradicted the official apartheid doctrine, it soon conflicted with central government. In 1984 the local government official who supported the approach was transferred to the South and the Namibia Wildlife Trust was asked to close down the project and to leave conservation in the area to government. But still the support for game guards continued; the Department of Nature Conservation supplied them with food rations. In 1986 six more game guards were appointed. Garth Owen-Smith, the founder of NWT (now Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation, IRDNC) had remained most of these years in the Kunene area. He observed that poaching was under control in the areas with game guards, and game numbers started to increase. For example, the numbers of black rhino in the Northwest had doubled between 1982 and 1987. To honour the effort of the communities in poaching control, 120 springbok, gemsbok and zebra were harvested in 1987 and distributed to the communities through the traditional leaders at Warmquelle and Sesfontein (a similar amount was distributed the following year) (Owen-Smith, 2002). After independence the policy development process for a national CBNRM programme started (see Chapter 3.5).

Map 2: #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy (Namibia Nature Foundation, 2002)

The #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy is part of the former Damaraland. The area was divided into wards as administrative units that comprised several farms and were under the rule of one traditional leader respectively.

Physical features / geography

#Khoadi //Hoas is composed of 223 farms (3.364 km^2) that used to be Ward 10, excluding only five farms that had been turned into a concession area (Hobatere concession area) for tourism use. While the eastern part of the area are flat sandy highland plains with granite hills and elevations of 1,000 to 1,200 m above see level, the West is characterised by a rocky plain of basalt ridges with the Grootberg Plateau (1 645 m) as the western boundary of the conservancy. As in the whole country, rainfall is very variable both temporally and spatially. The annual average rainfall decreases towards the West of the conservancy from 300 to 240 mm. The main water sources are boreholes with diesel, wind and few solar pumps. The ephemeral river catchments of the Huab and the Hoanib rivers touch the conservancy area and provide additional water supply (and the danger of floods) in the rainy season (Kamwi, 1997). In the East and Southeast the conservancy is bordered by commercial farmland[50], the West, Northeast and Northwest respectively have bordering conservancies (Torra, Ehi-Rovipuka and Omatendeka). In the North #Khoadi //Hoas shares a boundary with the Hobatere concession area. Hobatere is adjacent to the Etosha National Park and rich in wildlife. It provides one main influx of game into the conservancy.

Population

Around 3,000-3,500 people, forming 130–160 households, inhabit the area. That is a population density of 0.83-0.97 persons per square km, well below national average (1.9) but about twice as high as the regional average (0.44) of the Kunene. The majority of the population are Damara. Especially where the conservancy boundaries touch former Kaokoland there is a substantial

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[50] The transition between black communal land and white-owned commercial farmland gets more and more blurred with especially the private farms bordering communal land being likely to be black-owned and forming a kind of buffer zone between the two still quite separate worlds (personal observation).

number of Otjiherero-speaking people. As a relatively new, post-independence development a limited number of Ovambo people have settled in the area (personal observation).

The population of the conservancy is scattered throughout the whole area with two conglomerations at the major settlements Anker and Erwëë with several hundred semi-permanent inhabitants and access to electricity, primary education, health services and several small shops covering basic needs. Erwëë has a recently finished agricultural extension centre (personal observation).

Many (extended) families have more than one place to stay. It would be typical for the main family (or head of the household) to live at the main farm[51], with relatives or (less likely) labourers living at more remote cattle posts. Also those inhabitants mainly living in the towns of Anker and Erwëë and having formal employment still tend to own livestock at a cattle post (Jones at al., 2002)

Infrastructure

#Khoadi //Hoas, like most of the former Damaraland, profits from existing infrastructure, which remains from the commercial farming days. Some of the buildings, fencing, boreholes and dams are in poor condition, though (personal observation). The two main roads are gravel roads of high quality and regular maintenance, but minor roads to the single farms and cattle posts tend to be only donkey cart tracks that cannot be travelled in all weather conditions[52]. As for a majority of the population, donkey carts are the main means of transportation, distances between the settlements are perceived as far and travelling is time-consuming.

Livelihood

The majority of the people in the conservancy (as in the whole Kunene region, compare Long, 2004) are subsistence farmers, with livestock playing the main role and gardening not being more

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[51] That is the old farmhouse that was built by white settlers before the area was redistributed to the Damara people. Though of more solid substance than most of the mud huts of traditional construction method, they are often in an advanced condition of decay.

[52] During the dry season though, all but very few places in the conservancy can be reached with an ordinary 2x4 VW bus with the local population being incredibly helpful when it comes to pushing of stuck cars (personal observation).

than a supplement. Typical livestock are cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys and horses. Historically the inhabitants of this area were pastoral nomads following the rains and good grazing with their herd throughout the year. During the rainy seasons people gathered in small settlements. When the dry season started and grazing began to become scarce they dispersed to find necessary resources (Jensen, 2001).

But developments during and after the colonial phase led to a more and more sedentary lifestyle with livestock only being moved in a smaller scale from one cattle post to another or to areas of emergency grazing in case of drought. Due to the previous landowners' remaining fences the farming practice in #Khoadi //Hoas is not clearly that of a common pool resource shared by the whole community. The approach is more mixed with some areas having more restricted access than others, neighbouring communal farmers in some cases co-operating for exclusive (excluding other communal farmers) rotational grazing systems whereas in other areas livestock roam around and mingle more freely (personal communication by local community members).

Cultural background: Damara (#Nû-khoin[53])

The Damara are presumed to belong to the very early inhabitants of Namibia, along with the Nama and Bushmen/San. These three ethnic groups speak Khoisan languages with their typical clicks. The Damara language is a dialect that closely resembles the Nama language. The ancestry of the Damara people is still unclear. Their physical features suggest that they are of negroid origin, but their language and culture have been strongly influenced by the "red people", the Nama. For pre-colonial times Malan lists eleven distinct groups of Damaras but qualifies that these groupings had no or low institutional leadership and so they could not be called tribes (Malan, 1998). When the German colonisers arrived they found the Damara divided into those who were servants to the Herero and Nama and those who lived a hidden life of hunter-gatherers and occasional cattle-thieves in the remote semi-deserts and mountains of the Brandberg, the mountains around Otavi and the Khomashochland[54]. There are repeated accounts of Hereros

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[53] #Nû-khoin is the Damara name for their cultural group and means "black people". The name Damara comes from Dama, which is the name the Nama people gave to this group.

[54] „Ihrer sozialen und politischen Stellung entsprechend, gruppieren sich die Bergdamara in die eigentlichen Bergbewohner, Kwaai-doenders (Übelthäter), wie der Bastard sie nennt, und die an bewohnten Plätzen als Diener

going on Damara "raids" killing all independently living Damaras they could find (François, 1896; Oberländer, 1885[55]; Vedder et al., 1928).

The position of the Damaras in the local hierarchy was strengthened when the Rhenish Mission started to intervene in indigenous politics. The missionaries asked Herero chief Zeraua to give the area of Okombahe to the Damaras, so it was declared Damara reserve in 1906 (Malan, 1998). Thus the Damaras had a predominately positive relationship to the colonisers, which became obvious when they fought on the sides of the Germans to defeat the rising of Herero and Nama in 1905–07. The Damara reserve mentioned above can be seen as a reward for the close co-operation with the authorities (Namibia Tourism Office Frankfurt, 2001). In present day's Namibia the Damara make up about 7.5% of the population or 80,000 people. About a quarter of them live in the former Damaraland while the rest is spread around the country (Namibia Tourism Office Frankfurt, 2001).

The Damara refer to the year 1415 as a traditional date of the emergence of their chiefdom. But this date is more of folkloristic than of scientific value. Currently they have a traditional hierarchy with one king[56], several chiefs, local headmen and their councillors. During the field stay the researcher observed leadership struggles between the chiefs and the king (see Chapter 5.5.4).

In present day's Namibia the Damara have a close-to-average position regarding the Human Poverty Index and a position slightly below average in the Human Development Index by language group (UNDP, Namibia Human Development Report 1998 as quoted by Suzman, 2002).

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angesiedelten Parias. Erstere sind wegen ihrer Diebesgelüste berüchtigt und fügen den in der Ebene befindlichen Herdenbesitzern mancherlei Schaden zu, weshalb sie denn auch wie die wilden Tiere des Gebirges verfolgt und niedergeknallt werden, wo man sie findet. Die Wahl ihres Wohnplatzes entspricht ihrem Diebeshandwerk. In die höchsten und verstecktesten Schlupfwinkel der Berge und Felsen ziehen sie sich zurück; tief eingeschnittene, von genügend überragenden Kuppen umgebene Sättel werden bei der Wahl des Wohnplatzes bevorzugt, damit von außen der Rauch des Feuers nicht gesehen werde. Ob die nächste Wasserstelle ein oder zwei Stunden entfernt ist, ist durchaus ohne Belang" (François, 1896, p. 247).

[55] „Sie sind ausgefeimte Diebe und stellen dem Vieh der Herero eifrig nach, weshalb sie von denselben wie wilde Thiere gejagt und getödtet werden." (Oberländer, 1885, p.164)

[56] Justus Garoëb, born in 1942, is Damara king since 1993 and leader of the UDF (United Democratic Front) opposition party.

Game

The #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy has a high variety of game (including species like elephants, rhinos, leopards and occasional lions, see Table 7). The highest wildlife numbers concentrate on the areas close to Hobatere and Etosha National Park in the northeast and in the Klipriver valley in the east of the conservancy (Jones, 1999). The Klipriver is declared exclusive wildlife area where livestock grazing is prohibited in favour of conservation, hunting and tourism.

Species	Total number of animals seen	Total animal numbers estimated
Baboon	39	213
Caracal	1	4
Duiker	0	0
Elephant	20	144
Gemsbok	96	742
Giraffe	25	163
Jackal	1	6
Klipspringer	2	16
Kudu	71	540
Ostrich	12	97
Rhino	0	0
Springbok	192	1246
Steenbok	15	102
Zebra	18	152

Table 7: Observed and estimated Wildlife Numbers in #Khoadi //Hoas 2001 (Jones at al., 2002)

Conservancy development in #Khoadi //Hoas

Enrolled in 1998, #Khoadi //Hoas is one of the first conservancies officially registered after the Amendment of the Nature Conservation Act (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996). A strong proponent in the conservancy development was the community-based Grootberg Farmers' Union (GFU). This conservancy differs structurally from most other conservancies with its

integrative approach. The stakeholders interested in conservation and in agricultural development co-operate under the name of *FIRM* (Forum for Integrated Resource Management). FIRM includes the MET, Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development, the LIFE programme, the National Programme to Combat Desertification (NAPCOD), the Sustainable Animal and Range Development Project (SARDEP) and the Desert Research Foundation of Namibia (DRFN). FIRM is described as an innovative project for the strengthening of inter-ministerial and NGO co-operation and for extending the range of resources that are managed in a CBNRM set-up (Hagen et al., 1998).

At the time of the field stay the conservancy had an office staff of three (technical advisor, information liaison officer and co-ordinator of environmental shepherds), nine environmental shepherds[57] and 1600 registered members (Long, 2004). The office of the conservancy is situated between the two major settlements. It shares the buildings and infrastructure (and some committee members) with the Grootberg Farmers' Union. The conservancy office has a telephone, electricity supply and a computer.

At the time of the field research the conservancy hosted another team of researchers, the WILD project, which was focussing on the livelihood impacts of conservancies, with #Khoadi //Hoas and Torra conservancy as examples in the Kunene (see Long 2004).

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[57] To foster the integration of natural resource management and agriculture, the position called "community game guard" in other conservancies has the title of "environmental shepherd", with the shepherds having slightly broader duties including livestock-related issues.

3.7.6 Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy, field study 2

Map 3: Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy (Namibia Nature Foundation 2002)

The Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy is situated in the former Kaokoland, with most of its area stretching north of the cattle fence.

Physical features / geography

The climatic and soil conditions are similar to those described for the #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy: arid conditions in sandy plains with granite hills and generally shallow and poor soils. The vegetation also resembles that of #Khoadi //Hoas with mopane savannah[58], annual and a lower density of perennial grasses. The eastern part of the conservancy features flat open grassland, while the western part includes rigged mountainous areas. The dry riverbeds host oases of ample trees. One area of specific scenic beauty is the Ombonde Riverbed. At the time of the field stay a contract for a joint venture lodge at this spot had just been signed and first construction works started. The general observation of the researcher was that Ehi-Rovipuka showed even stronger signs of over-grazing that #Khoadi //Hoas, especially in the surroundings of settlements. Two likely reasons might be the lack of grazing control through fences and the high traditional value of cattle in the Herero culture (Talavera, 2000).

The Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy measures around 2,000 km^2 and is situated between the Hobatere concession area and the #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy in the South, the Etosha National Park in the West and the emerging Omatendeka conservancy in the East. The northern and parts of the western boundary touch communal farmland that is neither concession nor national park or conservancy. Apart from the far southern edge, the conservancy is situated north of the stock disease fence.

Population

The population of Ehi-Rovipuka consists predominately of Hereros with some Damaras especially at the boundaries to former Damaraland. A very limited number of residents come from other cultural backgrounds, e.g. teachers who come from other areas. When the conservancy was inaugurated (2001) it had 500 registered members. The area is relatively newly occupied by its current inhabitants, as it was part of the Etosha National Park up to the mid-70s and only

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[58] This habitat is named after the characteristic mopane tree (colophospermum mopane).

given to the Hereros in the procedure of extending their homelands. The population of the conservancy is scattered over the whole area with nine villages including the major settlement of Otjokavare. Like in #Khoadi //Hoas many families tended to have cattle posts outside the main settlement areas.

Infrastructure

The centre of the conservancy is easily accessible by the main all-weather gravel road from Kamanjab to Opuwo, which cuts through the conservancy from North to South. The main settlement of the conservancy, Otjokavare, where the conservancy office is based, is located at this main road. This road partly forms the eastern boundary of the conservancy. Apart from this one well-maintained road most of the other transport infrastructure consists of donkey-cart tracks that are only partly suitable for 2x4 drives even in the dry season. The area has two schools for basic education, several small shops and access to telecommunication. The only source of electricity is a diesel generator at the gate of the cattle disease fence. It belongs to the police station and provides electricity for three hours a day. In contrast to #Khoadi //Hoas the area of Ehi-Rovipuka has barely inherited infrastructure of white farmers, so it features few fences and old colonial farmhouses.

Livelihood

The majority of the people in the conservancy are subsistence farmers, with livestock farming being the central activity. While many of the Damaras in #Khoadi //Hoas had well maintained gardens around their houses for supplementary food production, the Hereros of Ehi-Rovipuka generally did not grow vegetables. Members of other cultural groups cultivated those gardens that did exist in Ehi-Rovipuka. In line with the Herero culture the most important livestock was cattle. But there were also considerable numbers of goats and donkeys. The traditional lifestyle of Hereros is transhumance, but in Ehi-Rovipuka the observations were similar to those in #Khoadi //Hoas: A generally sedentary lifestyle was combined with small-scale movements of livestock. One indicator for this was the observable tendency of extreme overgrazing close to settlements with vegetation cover increasing further away.

Cultural background: Herero

The Herero arrived in the Kaokoland in the middle of the 16th century from Angola[59]; they first tried to settle in the rich rangeland north of Etosha. Driven further by the Ovambo who were occupying that area already, they went to the drier and hilly West. About two centuries later the greater part of them decided to move further towards the Southeast, looking for an escape from severe drought and despoliation of the natural resources. Both the remaining and the southern part of the Herero people experienced continuous conflict with neighbouring tribes, especially the Nama and Damara. Cattle husbandry was and still is the central economic activity of the Hereros and is connected with a high cultural value (Oberländer, 1885; Malan, 1998; Talavera, 2000).

The power of Herero chiefs was not so much determined by the number of people that followed them but far more by the number of cattle they possessed (Nuhn, 1994). So the main conflict between Hereros and their neighbours was about robbery of cattle and, to a lesser extent, about the competition for grazing[60]. While the conflict with the Nama tended to be an open warfare of two opponents of similar strength, the Hereros treated the marginalized Damara either as servants or as cattle thieves (Malan, 1998).

Between 1830 and 1884 the Nama and Hereros lived in times of alternating warfare and unstable peace treaties. The beginning of German colonialism in Southwest Africa also marks the beginning of a short peaceful period between the two groups that formed a coalition against the external enemy. The anti-colonial movement had a first climax in the battle of the Waterberg in 1904 in which the southern Herero population suffered great losses, coming close to the extinction of the whole population (Drechsler, 1966; Nuhn, 1994).

Hugo von François, Premier Lieutenant of the Schutztruppe, had put much hope in the "educability" of the Herero to form a core pillar of the colonial economy (François, 1896). But

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[59] The origin of the Herero people is unclear. Their traditional records report origins in the Congo. Other sources locate their forefathers in the East African Nile area (Nuhn, 1994).

[60] One significant example being the robbery of 1500 oxen that chief Maherero had reserved for his own funeral in 1880. After the incident the infuriated chief ordered the elimination of all Nama people in any of the Herero areas (Malan 1998).

after the uprising, general Lothar von Trotha (who took over military command from Leutwein in 1904) ordered to kill or expel all Hereros out of the country[61].

Only after World War I, when Southwest Africa was given to the South African Union under a C-mandate, the rights and freedoms of Hereros were partly restored with the construction of Herero homelands around the Waterberg and in the Kaokoveld. As they were further apart from the commercial centres of the country, the Kaokoveld Hereros remained in many ways more traditional than their Hereroland counterparts[62].

One typical feature of the social structure of the Hereros is their system of descent[63] (Wilson, 1969). Each member of the Herero society defines him/herself as part of two family groups, one of matri- and one of patrilinear descent. Settlement, religious activities and leadership are determined by patrilinear principles while the central economic activities follow the matri-lines (Malan, 1972). The European terminology for family relations does not cover the Herero views of relationships. When using the English terms, all clan members of the same generation will be called brothers and sisters while those of the older generation will be called father, mother, grand-father and grand-mother respectively, even if they actually are second cousin or uncle (Malan, 1998 and own observation)[64].

Malan (1998) describes the traditional Herero society as decentralised and stateless with leadership not being inherited but a matter of election. That is one effect of the double linear relationship system where it would be unclear whether the positions should be inherited

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[61] "The Herero are no longer German subjects. They have murdered and plundered … Now, out of cowardice, they want to give up the fight … The Herero nation must leave the country. If it will not do so, I shall compel it by force. Inside German territory every Herero tribesman, armed or unarmed, with or without cattle, will be shot. No women and children will be allowed in the territory: they will be driven back to their people or fired on. These are the last words to the Herero nation from me, the great General of the mighty German Emperor" (Dierks, 1999, p. 67).

[62] Personal communication Usiel Ndjavera, Herero and business advisor for WWF/LIFE.

[63] As one government interview-partner (Damara himself) put it: "It took me six years of working together with them to finally understand who is who and comes from where and claims what rights. I don't think in your short time here you will be able to understand. First you would have to learn about their system of extended families."

[64] To make matters even more complex, the sociological position in the clan can also be inherited. So when the grandfather dies, the husband of his older sister will be approached as grandfather and inherit his responsibilities. When he also dies, his position will be inherited by his son and then by the son of his oldest daughter. So possibly someone of the same generation (the grandchild of someone's great-uncle) will be approached as respectable grandfather to solve conflicts and help family members in need (personal observation).

following the matri- or patriclan (Malan, 1998). The need for a singular leadership of the whole Herero nation arose through two developments: First the Hereros experienced increasing conflicts with neighbouring nations and German colonisers – so they needed a military leader. Second, the German colonial administration demanded for one central contact person (François, 1896). As the positions of traditional authorities were not inherited, the leaders of the communities had to strongly co-operate with their communities and namely their councils (Malan, 1998). Matters of common interest and traditional court cases are handled in public meetings. Though the complex hierarchical structures often determine the weight of their contribution, generally every (male) member of the community can add his view (Malan, 1998, and personal observation at a meeting about a traditional leadership conflict in Otjokavare). So the Herero people are observed as being used to participating in leadership and stating their interests and ideas at public meetings.

The double lineage system with the depth of five generations (three living and two generations of ancestors that are individually remembered and worshiped) leads to a social situation of large interconnected families. This effect was engraved by the tradition of polygamy (François, 1896)[65].

Game

Sharing boundaries with both Etosha National Park and the Hobatere concession area, Ehi-Rovipuka is characterised by an abundance of game especially in the southern and eastern parts. The riverbed of the ephemeral Ombonde River in the South is especially rich in rare species and reserved as exclusive wildlife area. In 2002 the conservancy signed a joint venture contract with a tourism company planning to build a lodge here. The data available for game numbers in Ehi-Rovipuka comes from the conservancy's request for game utilisation quotas for 2003 to the MET (Uaroua, 2002, see Table 8).

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[65] Even though this is becoming less usual today, in the field study area many of the powerful men belonging to the grandfather generation had more than one wife. One present-day traditional leader (in his late twenties) also stated in personal communication that he is expected to have more than one wife.

Species	Trophy hunting requested for 2003	Estimated population 2002/03	Percentage taken off
Damara Dik-Dik	2	± 30	6.66
Cape turtle dove	100	?[66]	?
Laughing dove	100	?	?
Duiker	5	± 150	3.33
Eland	2	100	2,0
Elephant	1	±40	2,50
Red-billed francolin	25	?	?
Gemsbok	30	900	3.33
Giraffe	2	100	2.00
Double-banded sand grouse	25	?	?
Helmeted guinea fowl	25	?	?
Spotted hyena	4	?	?
Klipspringer	2	± 40	5.00
Kudu	10	150	6.66
Leopard	4	?	?
Lion	2	?	?
Ostrich	10	300	3.33
Springbok	40	700	5.71
Steenbok	3	± 50	6.00
Zebra	10	150	6.66

Table 8: Game utilisation quota requested for 2003 (Uaroua, 2002).

The request included some explanations: For Elephant it was admitted that the exact population numbers and developments were hardly known, but research was on the way. The long-term plan

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[66] The high variation of estimated populations shows the difficulties in "counting" highly migratory game in a vast area with limitations both in technical support and human resources. This problem is aggravated when it comes to

was to consider one bull for trophy hunting every four or five years, taking into account the slow reproduction cycles of elephants. Leopards were described as problem animals to the local farming community. In the past these animals used to be eliminated as measures of problem animal control. The new strategy was not to use the full leopard quota in the beginning of the hunting season but to "reserve" them as problem animals if need arises – so the animals would not be shot by local people or the MET but by trophy hunters (who would be paying for the trophy).

For spotted hyena the request was to only hunt them if they were declared problem animals by the MET. Local knowledge shows that uncontrolled hunting of this species can disrupt stable clans and increase problems. There were no population numbers for lions as they are mainly observed as "visitors" coming out of the Etosha National Park. As they can cause significant damage of livestock their quota was reserved for problem animals (Uaroua, 2002).

Conservancy development in Ehi-Rovipuka

The Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy was launched in 2001. So as a legal entity the conservancy was relatively "young" when this research was undertaken. But the communities involved belonged to those where CBNRM in Namibia started. The NWT (now IRDNC) started its community-based conservation facilitation in collaboration with Herero headmen of the Kaokoland. One of these was Keefas Muzuma, late headman of Otjokavare, which is the main settlement of the Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy. So when the conservancy was finally gazetted it already looked back on a history of 18 years of community-based conservation efforts and a longstanding relationship with IRDNC.

The core reasons for this delay were boundary conflicts with neighbouring emerging conservancies. The conflicting parties finally excluded the disputed triangle from the claimed territory of all developing conservancies involved, with the option of debating this area after they all were registered conservancies[67].

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birds so that for the avifauna (double-banded sand grouse, helmeted guinea fowl, red-billed francolin, cape turtle dove, laughing dove) no population numbers were given.

[67] Personal communication, Nahor Howoseb, regional warden MET.

At the time of the field research the conservancy had an office staff of two (community activator and field officer) and four game guards. The conservancy committee consisted of 18 members, nine of them ordinary and nine additional committee members. The office is situated in the main settlement Otjokavare, close to the main road to Ruacana. The conservancy office had a telephone and a radio unit but no electricity.

4. Research questions, participants and method

The concept of CBNRM is not merely another *technical* solution for the problem of resource depletion. Its special appeal comes from the fact that it focuses on socio-political and institutional changes in resource management. It is widely acknowledged that the organisational relationships and capacities of the actors are fundamental for the sustainability of CBNRM (Wells and Brandon, 1992; Ack, 1991; Brown and Wyckoff-Baird, 1992; Murphree, 1994).

One intention of the approach is to shift certain responsibilities and authority from central government agencies to local communities (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996). But as shown in Chapter 1.5, the definition of the community remains rather vague. In Namibia there is no general monitoring system for the socio-political processes induced by CBNRM. Observations from neighbouring countries reveal that the devolution of power in resource management shows a tendency to get stuck at medium and lower government levels[68].

This worry goes along with an observation of Quiggin (1993) about common property systems in general:

> "The appeal of common property ideas may be traced in large measure to the fact that they seem to embody widely held values of equality. On the other hand, empirical examination of common property institutions reveals that they can coexist with significant inequality." (Quiggin, 1993, p. 1128)

One of the core assumptions of many CBNRM programmes is that the "community" is a well-defined entity that needs no further differentiation (Rozemeijer and van der Jagt, 2000). For Botswana Rozemeijer and van der Jagt (2000) observe that the reactions of the direct beneficiaries on the introduction of CBNRM are not merely enthusiastic but include uncertainty, mistrust and confusion.

But also in Namibia itself, the discussions with stakeholders of CBNRM in the preparation phase of this research showed that the devolution of power did not as easily go about as policy

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[68] Over the years, the much acclaimed CAMPFIRE project in Zimbabwe (Metcalfe, 1994) has turned from a shining example to a warning model for the blocking capacities of regional and local government structures (for a description of initiation, pitfalls and lessons to be learned from CAMPFIRE, compare Hasler, 1999).

documents make believe. So the challenge of the a research design was to transfer this general unease and anecdotal knowledge about the distribution of power and governance effects of CBNRM into observable valid data.

4.1 Research questions

Local governance and the distribution of power in CBNRM are broad issues. To allow for analysis this complex field had to be broken down into research questions that were more operational. The institutional background was analysed in Chapter 3.4. But how actors *use* their options given by the institutional setting of CBNRM had to be assessed in the field. The main source of information in the field research was the reported perception of stakeholders of CBNRM.

The first research question is instrumental to the following ones and aims at identifying the relevant actors to outline the range of this research.

Question 1: Who are the relevant actors of CBNRM in Namibia and in the specific conservancies?

To characterise these actors it is assessed what they are allowed to do and what they actually do in the field of CBNRM (range of actions), their actions to further the programme and their own and their organisational goals. To answer Question 2, the interviewees are asked to assess every stakeholder that they name according to these parameters.

Question 2: What is the range of actions of these actors in CBNRM?

Asking what the respective actors *do* in CBNRM for understanding their power status draws on two assumptions:

- Power is seen as related not only to the structural *potentials* that the respective institutions provide for the actor but also to the way actors *use* their potentials (see Chapter 1.4).

- Power is not only limited to those with legitimate decision making authority. It can be derived from various ways in which actors achieve their goals in a social setting (see Chapter 1.2).

So the actors were characterised by the way they engaged in this social interaction, according to whether they observed, gave advice, made decisions and / or gave money (funding).

For the analysis of the power ascribed to the different actors Question 3 analyses the relative power status of actors and the different sources of power.

Question 3: What are the power relationships between the different actors involved in CBNRM? Where does this power come from?

Power of actors is analysed as one feature of the relationship between actors (see Chapter 1.2). The sources of the power of actors are found in the institutional framework as well as in the specific characteristics of the actors and their ways of action.

Question 4 expands the perspective towards the broader, societal analysis of governance. It analyses the interplay between actors and institutions in their ability or disability to provide public services.

Question 4: In the eyes of the stakeholders, do CBNRM projects reach their material and immaterial local governance goals?

To analyse the local governance effects of CBNRM, material and immaterial indicators are assessed[69]. Four central goals serve as a reference for the analysis.

The *material governance* goals of CBNRM are:

- Improved natural resource management and

- Material revenues to the conservancy and benefit distribution

Namibia (1996) defines the "sustainable management and utilisation of game" as one of the core objectives of conservancies. In practice the natural resource management aims of conservancies concentrate on two tasks: The prevention of poaching and the management of problem animals.

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[69] The time frame and scope of the research did not allow for a thorough analysis of the impacts of CBNRM. At least for the material governance impacts the results of the WILD project can provide interesting insights as it conducted a long-term survey of livelihoods impacts of CBNRM in the Kunene and Caprivi (Long, 2004).

The central idea of CBNRM is to link conservation with benefits, so both aspects are analysed to assess whether the material governance goals have been reached.

Namibia's "Policy on Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas" (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1995) states that one of the objectives of communal area conservancies is:

> "To link conservation with rural development by enabling communal farmers to derive a direct financial benefit from the sustainable use of wildlife and tourism" (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1995).

The way the benefits of the conservancy should be distributed is outlined in the legislation. One precondition for a successful application for a conservancy is that the conservancy committee

> "(…) has the ability to manage funds and has an appropriate method for the equitable distribution, to members of the community, of benefits derived from the consumptive and non-consumptive use of game in such area" (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996).

The legislators saw benefits as crucially important because conservancies were designed as "an incentive to rural people to conserve wildlife and other natural resources, through shared decision making and financial benefits" (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1995). In line with this institutional framework, interviewees rated benefit distribution as one of the core aims of conservancies.

When analysing the *material revenues* raised by the conservancy it is important to take the perspective of the local population into consideration: For the target group the quality of governance results is closely linked to the question whether the benefits produced actually reach them in an effective, timely and fair manner. So the analysis of governance results includes the analysis of the quality of distribution. Distribution is assessed in relation to two parameters: the logistical *effectiveness* and the *fairness* of distribution.

To analyse the *immaterial governance effects* of CBNRM it is crucial to understand that governance is an ongoing process and not a static end state. So the immaterial effects analysed here have a strongly procedural character:

- Participation of the local community

- Implementation of functioning mechanisms for conflict resolution.

One core aim of the communal conservancy legislation is to empower communal farmers to decide about and benefit from wildlife. Policy documents, the conservancy legislation (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996) and the model conservancy constitution (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997a) put a special emphasis on the openness of the CBNRM process to the participation of all community members. They accentuate that:

- Conservancy committees should be representative of the community residing in the area of the conservancy

- Conservancy membership should not be limited by factors like gender or culture and

- General strategic decisions like the committee-election or the drawing of a benefit distribution plan should be made by a general assembly of the conservancy members.

Hence one of the immaterial governance effects that is analysed is the degree to which the case study conservancies provide for the *participation of the local community* (Chapter 5.5.3).

The second immaterial governance effect analysed is the implementation of functioning mechanisms for *conflict resolution*. The communal conservancy legislation opened this field of local governance to new actors and allowed for a redistribution of power amongst the actors (Chapter 2.2.4 and 5.4). As the utility maximising actor is likely to be reluctant to let go her/his own power, conflicts are inevitable in the process. This is acknowledged in the legislation. It includes the directive that conservancy constitutions have to provide for a "procedure for dispute resolution". This requires an analysis of conflict constellations and processes that were described as "typical" by interviewees.

4.2 Participants

The research tools were constructed considering in detail the characteristics of possible participants. To ensure that the method is appropriate is specifically challenging in intercultural research and with participants speaking different languages and coming from different educational backgrounds. Logistical constraints impeded elaborate pre-testing, so the method was developed recurring to prior experience with the respective stakeholder groups and adjusted according to lessons learned during the field stay.

To begin with, a list was set up of stakeholder groups and experts that were likely to be able to contribute. Preconditions for qualifying as interviewee were:

- Knowledge about and experience with CBNRM in Namibia

- Impact on or close observation of the Namibian CBNRM

- Being part of the target group of CBNRM (local community member)

- Being a gatekeeper who could allow or hinder further research

- Accessibility, willingness to participate

Choosing the interview-partners, the researcher tried to assure that a variety of different views and interests was represented. Stakeholders from the national and regional level were included as well as those from the local level. Gatekeepers for the different stakeholder groups were identified. Actors like the head of Department of the CBNRM unit in the MET, the managing directors of respective NGOs or the Damara king had to be consulted to get their "go-ahead" for interviews with their subordinates. The stakeholder groups to be included were defined beforehand (see Box 1:) while most of the specific interview-partners were chosen in the field.

Name of stakeholder group	Level: Local, regional, national
Ministry of Environment and Tourism	Regional and national
NGOs	Regional and national
Traditional authorities	Local, regional and national
Private sector tourism	Local
Conservancy staff and committee	Local
"Ordinary" community people	Local
Regional government	Regional

Box 1: List of stakeholder groups

These interviewees were clustered according to their expected knowledge about CBNRM and specific conservancies:

- *Overview experts*: They work on a regional or national level and have knowledge about aspects of the policy processes, about the national development of CBNRM and / or have an overview over a number of conservancies. They were interviewed using a semi-structured interview, which included a visualisation tool (the "power-game") described below (Chapter 4.3.2).

- *Experts on specific issues*: They work on a regional or national level and have expertise in specific aspects of CBNRM (for example tourism or legal issues). With them, qualitative open expert interviews were undertaken. These interviews were flexible according to the specific field of expertise (Chapter 4.3.2).

- *Ground-level experts / implementers*: They have in-depth knowledge about one or few conservancies because they work either for implementing agencies (NGOs and MET) or for one individual conservancy as staff or committee member. Added to this group (because of a similar range of knowledge) are local people that are close to the conservancy and have an in-depth knowledge about it (without playing a formal role). They were interviewed with the semi-structured interview including a visualisation tool (Chapter 4.3.1).

- *Target group with restricted detailed knowledge*: The target group of CBNRM consists of the members of the local communities. This group of interviewees covers those locals with little detailed knowledge about the conservancy. They were interviewed to analyse the impact of the conservancy on local people's lives. For the "ordinary" community members a flexible set of questions close to their day-to-day experience was developed in the field.

4.3   Method

The choice of potential interview-partners and the complexity of the questions posed *methodological challenges*. A complex concept (distribution of power in a field of local governance) was to be applied on a multi-actor setting with a whole range of differing interview-partners. The following assumptions outlined the challenges that the methodology had to meet: Some of the interviews were to be interpreted (Damara-English and Otjiherero-English), the cultural backgrounds would be varied and some of the interview-partners would have low or no formal education. That meant that the concepts used had to be explained in a careful and down-to-earth way so that the flaws that might arise due to different interpretations of the questions were minimised.

A tool for visualising the perceived characteristics of the different actors and their relationships towards each other was needed to allow for handling the complexity of the setting. One requirement of this tool was that it was not letter-based to avoid complications with the interpretation and to make it useful for both literates and illiterates. Another aim of the methodology was to give the interview-partners an active role in the interview without letting them take over the process completely. While the interviewees were to describe their own view of the set-up, the methodology would only be appropriate if it also helped to collect comparable qualitative and quantitative data. Even though the interviewees had a lot of similarities, as they were all stakeholders of CBNRM, their differences were big enough that one completely invariable tool did not seem appropriate.

4.3.1 Semi-structured interview

The semi-structured interview was developed for the groups "overview experts" and "ground level experts / implementers". This tool suited those interview-partners with in-depth knowledge about CBNRM in general and specific conservancies. The interview comprised three parts. The first one varied according to stakeholder group. The second and third part was consistent for all groups. The following chapter describes the course of the interview, the supporting visualisation method ("power-game") and specifies the research aims of the questions asked.

The centrepiece of the semi-structured interview is the power-game, a visualisation method developed for this research. So the introduction of the methods applied commences with this tool (thought it only formed the second and third part of the interview). In a second step the introductory questions (part one of the interview) are explained. They differed according to the stakeholder group of the interviewee.

Visualisation tool: the "power-game"

The "power-game", which formed the second and third part of the semi-structured interview, was the same for all actor groups on the local, regional and national level. The only difference was that some of the national and regional-level interview-partners analysed more than one conservancy. Interviewees were to choose one or two conservancies they wanted to analyse in more detail. The aim of this part was to assess the to-date situation of local natural resource governance in the areas covered by the conservancy. A special focus was on distribution of power.

The setting-up of the "power-game"

To start with, a definition of power was given. That was seen as a very important part of the interview as the layman's understanding of this term is varied but also the scientific world knows a whole range of different definitions. The interview followed Weber's definition of "power". But discussions with people in the field showed that many saw power as having a negative connotation or had a narrow understanding of power only including legitimate domination (Chapter 1.2). To assure a broader understanding, including the negative and the positive, the legitimate and other forms of influencing the outcome of social interaction, in the interviews the term "influence" was added. The *definition of "power and influence"* given to the interviewees followed the outcome-oriented definition of Weber. This was chosen because it seemed easier to talk about something "you can see and touch" than about an abstract concept. Power and influence were defined as the "ability to reach your goals" in a social situation. It was stressed that this ability of an actor can stem from different sources like wealth, traditional recognition, intelligence, networks, rights but also the willingness to bend or break rules. Goals were described as anything a person or a group of people wants to happen, be it for egoistic or altruistic reasons.

Together with the interview-partner a *stakeholder list* of the conservancy was assembled. He or she was asked to list all individuals and groups that had an influence on the conservancy[70]. The figures could signify individual as well as organisational actors. It was emphasised that these could be local as well as regional, national and international actors and that not only the direct decision-makers of the conservancy should be on the list but also actors who influenced the conservancy, e.g. by giving money or advice. If they had not done so anyway, they were asked to also add their own name to the list.

The stakeholders were symbolised by board-game figures of different colour that were clustered on a board according to the *stakeholder groups[71]* they belonged to.

In simple constellations with few stakeholders they were arranged inside a circle for those who were in the committee and around it for those outside the committee. In situations with a complex set of actors they were arranged in several, sometimes overlapping, circles representing different groups of stakeholders (see example Box 2). The main aim of the clustering was to facilitate working with the actors now. Especially in cases with many different stakeholders this put them in a clear and easy-to-remember order.

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[70] In the first interviews a list of possible stakeholders was given as answer alternatives. But as the set of actors varied a lot between interviewees, it was decided to turn this into an open question so that interview-partners could design their own list of stakeholders.

[71] While some stakeholders only belonged to one stakeholder group, others belonged to more than one, e.g. being traditional authority and committee member.

Box 2: Example for set-up of stakeholder groups

Box 2 shows an example in which the relevant stakeholder groups named are the local community, conservancy committee, traditional authorities, Ministry of Environment and Tourism and NGOs. The committee is described as part of the local community. Relevant traditional authorities are found in the committee and in the local community, but traditional authorities from outside influence the conservancy, too. NGOs and ministry actors are seen as external to the local community.

In the next step the stakeholders were characterised according to *the way they influenced the operations in the conservancy*. Each figure had cards with symbols put next to it, characterising

- Those who observe,

- Those who give advice

- Those who make decisions and

- Those who give money[72].

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[72] This function was only added after pre-testing the tool in the field. Interviewees mentioned this way to influence a conservancy frequently but it did not fit into one of the given characteristics.

To make this tool applicable for different cultural settings, the symbols chosen (for the first three characteristics) were pictures of parts of the body needed for these actions. The symbol for observing was the eye, for giving advice the mouth and for taking decisions a person voting by show of hands. The giving of money (funding) was indicated by small coins (see Box 7).

Box 3: Stakeholder on power-tower; actions of stakeholders: observing, giving advice, decision-making, and giving money

After determining the means with which the different stakeholders influenced the conservancy, it was asked how much power and influence they had compared to each other. Wooden pieces of the board game "nine men's morris" were used to build "*power towers*" and put the actors on top of them (see Box 7).

Some *rules* were explained to the interviewees:

- They were allowed to build the towers as high as they wanted to.

- If actor A was put on a tower of six pieces and an actor B on a tower of three pieces, this meant: actor A has more power than actor B – but not: actor A has twice as much power as actor B.

- The power of actors in one stakeholder group was not added up: If there were three NGO actors with two pieces each and one government actor with three pieces that did not mean that the NGO sector together was stronger than the government sector.

When the whole "power-game" was set up, the results were gone through with the interviewee with great care to make sure that all power relations (who has more power than who) were represented according to the interview-partner's ideas. The interviewer verbalised the

constellation as put down by the interview-partner and asked whether that all relations were as intended. Starting with the actor on the highest tower questions were asked like:

- "You have put this one on the highest tower, is that the way you wanted it?"

- "I see that this and that actor have the same number of pieces, so they have the same power and influence?"

Interviewees were encouraged to adjust the set-up until they were content with each relation. A second set of symbol cards contained a smiling face, a neutral one and a sad one for those stakeholders who like the conservancy, those who neither like nor dislike it and those who dislike the conservancy. These cards were tried but not used in all interviews as they made the interview longer without adding much information.

The results of the power game were noted as displayed in Table 9.

Name of actor	Colour	Stakeholder group	Attributes (observe, advice, decision, money)	Height of power tower
Ernst Guriab	Black	Traditional authorities Damara	O;A	2
NNF	Blue	NGO	O;A;M	4
…				

Table 9: Matrix of CBNRM actors

The discussion of the power-set-up

Part 3 of the interview started when all actors were arranged and provided with their respective attributes. This was the most flexible part of the interview. The aim was to encourage the interviewee to explain the position of the stakeholders. Following the list of stakeholders they were asked:

- Why have you put this actor in this position?

- Where does his / her / this organisation's power and influence come from?

- What does he / she / this organisation do with this power and influence?

Further questions were about the relationships between actors. Here a special emphasis was laid on conflict and co-operation in local governance. With increased knowledge about the situation in the policy field and in the specific conservancies, the questions of Part 3 became more and more concrete. The interviewees were asked about the roles and the influence of all actors involved in certain conflicts. A prepared list of possible areas of conflict was filled with local examples. This approach was chosen to fill the rather abstract information of Part 2 with concrete meaning. Possible conflicts included:

- Conflict about the use of natural resources / land tenure

- Conflict about costs of living with wildlife

- Conflict about benefit distribution

- Conflict about the abuse of power and the legitimacy of governance

In the interviews with national-level stakeholders where two conservancies were compared, questions about similarities and differences between these two were added to this part.

The last question of the interview tried to gather visions and outlooks of the interviewees: They were asked to imagine they had the power to change whatever they wanted in CBNRM and / or their conservancy overnight, with no-one knowing it was them. What would they do? This question was posed to allow for unusual scenarios and to open the floor for further discussion.

Introductory questions: Variable according to stakeholder group

This stakeholder-specific part was the one that was most open to changes as it was seen beforehand that the researcher's expectations about stakeholder groups would differ from the reality in the field. This part contained a rather high number of questions in the first version so that after pre-testing in the field some of the questions could be just deleted. Part 1 of the interview was a structured questionnaire with open and closed questions. It covered organisational structures of conservancies, nature conservation in general and changes through CBNRM. The interview-partners were divided into the national-level actors and local-level actors.

Introductory questions for national-level experts

It was presumed beforehand that staff of NGOs, MET and researchers that work on a national level would have a better overview over the whole national CBNRM movement and could describe how CBNRM was embedded in the whole policy process. Consequently Part 1 of the interviews for national level observers was more extensive and included questions about the national policy environment and a comparison of different conservancies all over the country. It was unclear, though, how far this group's in-depth knowledge about individual conservancies would go. But it seemed to be a "typical biography" especially of NGO staff to first work in the field and then change to a higher position in the central offices. So it was expected that Windhoek staff were also able to give insight in processes on the ground.

The regional actors were seen as intermediaries that had some characteristics of local actors (knowing the situation on the ground as most of them were involved in implementation of CBNRM) and others of national actors (having an overview over more than just one conservancy). So in the interviews with regional actors those questions of national and local interviews that seemed appropriate for the specific actor were added to the general Part 2 of the interview.

The "*national level interview*" started with questions (A1–A4) about the professional background of the interviewee and the role of the interviewee and his or her organisation in the Namibian CBNRM process. These introductory questions aimed at getting a picture of the interview-partner and added to the stakeholder profile, showing how the organisation sees itself. Questions A5–7 were about the position of CBNRM in the national political background of Namibia. They referred to the topical situation as well as to the development of policy and practice. National-level interview-partners were asked about the reasons for some communities to apply for being a conservancy (while others do not), the biggest obstacles in the national CBNRM process and the role of CBNRM in the context of decentralisation and devolution of power (see Box 4).

A 1. I would like to start with some questions to get a better picture of the scope of your personal experience with CBNRM. Could you first please tell me: How is your job at _____ (name organisation) related to CBNRM?

A 2. What is the role of _____ *(name organisation)* in the Namibian CBNRM processes?

Regional Focus: _____
Tasks: _____

A 3. Does or did your job include visits to communal conservancies?

O yes   O no

A 3. If it does / did: Where have you been? For how long? With what tasks?

Name of conservancy   duration of stay   tasks

_____   _____ _____

A 4. Before you started to work as _____ did you work in other CBNRM-related fields?

A4a)
O yes   O no

A4b) With what organisation
A4c) What was the job about:

A4d) Where

O Windhoek
O Conservancy:
O others

A 5. I have often wondered why some communities apply for a conservancy while others don't. What do you think are the most important differences between the communities that apply and those that do not?

A 6. What were the biggest obstacles / the most difficult things on the way from the first ideas to the state CBNRM in Namibia is now?

A 7. If you think of the decentralisation processes in Namibia would you say CBNRM is

O a spearhead of decentralisation (preparing the way for other sectors to follow)
O one of many interconnected decentralisation project (neither first nor last)
O a late-comer in an already busy landscape of decentralisation
O a decentralisation project not connected to other decentralisation activities
O no decentralisation project
O other:

Box 4: Question A1–A7 of the interview, stakeholder groups on the national level

The national-level interview included a rating of those conservancies the interview-partner was familiar with according to the perceived changes in the distribution of power. Interviewees were asked to arrange cards with the names of conservancies on a matrix that had one scale for the

distribution of power between central government and the local community and one scale for the distribution of power within the community (B1–7). This rating of a whole range of conservancies aimed at collecting a background in front of which the field studies were to be analysed and put into broader perspective[73].

B 1. Could you please tell me which conservancies you are familiar with ?

B 2. As I told you, I am interested in the effect that the conservancies have on the distribution of influence and power in the local communities. Theoretically developments in both directions are possible: that the emergence of a conservancy strengthens the existing patterns (the powerful gain more power) or that different actors who had little power before gain more influence.

When you think of the conservancies you are familiar with *(pick cards with names of conservancies),* what would you say about their effects on the distribution of power in the communities? *(Organise cards on "Changes-in-power-sheet" above "power-in-communities-arrow")*

B3. The concept of CBNRM includes that resources and responsibilities are transferred to local levels. That implies that the distribution of power and influence between the central government and local-level actors might change.

Would you say that in general communities gain more power through the emergence of a conservancy?

O yes   O no   O don't know

B 4. Now let us have another look at the conservancies you are familiar with. For which community did the power relation towards Windhoek change how? (*organise on sheet*)

Distribution of power in the communities

Powerful gain power   other actors gain power

Box 5: Question B1–B4 of the interview, stakeholder groups on the national level

Introductory questions for ground-level experts

The first part of the interview had a different focus for ground-level experts, i.e.: conservancy committee and staff, traditional authorities and well-informed "ordinary" community people. The interviews with these groups started with one introductory question (A1) specific to the respective groups, while the rest of Part 1 of the interview with local people was identical for all interviews.

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[73] The results of this part were crucial for the choice of field study conservancies but were not included in the results analysed in Chapter 5.

A1 for committee members and staff was about the procedures and pre-requisites of becoming a committee member. The introductory question for traditional authorities was more general about the process of conservancy formation. This entry point was chosen while taking into consideration that traditional authorities might have less knowledge about the detailed procedures. But as important long-term actors of local governance, they would be able to give their view of the development and position of CBNRM in the local setting. This rather open first question was also selected to pay respect to the general knowledge of this potentially powerful local actor.

A 1. (I heard that you have _____ committee members,) Could you tell me how someone becomes a member? (Alt.: If I wanted to become a committee member, what would I have to do?)

A1a) "Characteristics" of the person:

	is a criterion for membership	is no criterion	in what way:
residence	O	O	_____
belonging to ethnic group	O	O	_____
place of birth	O	O	_____
age	O	O	_____
sex	O	O	_____
level of education	O	O	_____
profession	O	O	_____
others:			

A1b) Procedural aspects of appointment/election:

First question of interview with **traditional authorities** local level:

A1. It is a great honour for me that you give me some of your time to answer to my questions. I know that you as the traditional leader of the _____ community have a good knowledge of the things that have happened in the past and are happening in the present in your community. Could you first please tell me how the conservancy started in your community?

Box 6: Question A1 of the interview with ground-level experts

Questions A2–7 were the same for the different local stakeholder groups. Their aim was to assess how local people perceive the changes through CBNRM. A2 asked about the most important changes in the community with A3 adding specific areas covering ecological, economic and socio-political changes. While the perceptions of change for the whole community can be seen as informed guesses for most of the interview-partners, the change of the personal situation (A4) is something that interviewees have definite knowledge about. One reason to ask about the change of the interview-partner's situation was to be able to judge his or her relationship to the

conservancy and the size of vested interest. Questions A5–7 asked about the areas of responsibility of the conservancy and about the change of natural resource management responsibilities through the conservancy. This question was added to give an insight into the changes in local governance, especially focussing on the effectiveness of local governance action.

A 2. What do you think, how does the conservancy change your community? What are the three most important changes?

A 3. Could you please tell me if you have observed changes in the following areas? What did change? (Only for those areas not mentioned in A6)

Area of change	changed	did not change	don't know	How?
Game numbers sources of income	O	O	O	
for local people opinion of locals	O	O	O	
about conservation number of conflicts	O	O	O	
in the community	O	O	O	

A 4. How does the conservancy change your personal situation?

A 5. What would you say: What are the 3 most important tasks and responsibilities of your conservancy? (Alt.: What does the conservancy have to do? What is it about? What is your conservancy for?)

A 6. Who was responsible for wildlife management before you had a conservancy?

O traditional authority
O higher level of state hierarchy:
O local-level government representative:
O NGO:
O other local group or committee:
O others:
O no one

O don't know

A7 How did it work?

Box 7: Question A2–A7 of the interview with ground-level experts

4.3.2   Explorative expert interviews

Some of the interview-partners were especially interesting for their knowledge about overview issues, general information and discussion about the CBNRM policy and politics and the socio-political impacts of CBNRM. This group generally had less in-depth knowledge about specific

conservancies. Some of them were chosen for their specific insight in one aspect of the research, e.g. the role of tourism or of the regional government. Their knowledge and views were discussed in explorative expert interviews. The aim of these interviews was to generate new ideas and insight, to discuss issues on a practical as well as theoretical level and to reflect on preliminary findings and their implications together with key stakeholders and observers. The issues discussed were on different levels according to how abstract or concrete they were (see Box 8). In most explorative interviews all of these five levels were touched but some were tackled with more intensity than others.

CBNRM as *philosophy / general approach*: Feasibility of the concept, tension between benefit and control as driving factors of conservation, between effective management and democracy, between financial sustainability and welfare issues, individual and collective benefits

CBNRM in the set-up of *Namibian policy and politics*: History of natural resource management in Namibia, development of CBNRM, strengths and weaknesses of the legislation, relationship to other policies and legislation, position in the devolution / decentralisation process

Implementation of CBNRM: success factors and obstacles, indicators for success and failure, changes through CBNRM, roles of different actors in the power play

Concrete cases: individual conservancies, conflicts as examples for more general statements

Own role in CBNRM, plans and strategies of own organisation.

Box 8: Themes of expert interviews

4.3.3   Set of questions for "ordinary" community people

During the preparation of the apparatus the accessibility of the stakeholder group "ordinary" community people as interviewees was under-estimated. Two main factors were expected to impede contact with local people that were not part of organised actors: The short period of field research that would make it difficult to become familiar with local people and the problems of interpretation. Practice showed that the contact to local people was easily found and interviews could be either conducted in English, Afrikaans or German or with the help of an interpreter. This was seen as an unexpected chance to add information about the impacts of conservancies directly given by the target group. This was especially valuable because most of the other interview-partners had a vested interest in showing the conservancies and CBNRM in general in a positive light. Stakeholders like the staff of conservancies, NGOs and MET had their own livelihoods

relying on CBNRM being successful or at least being seen as successful by the respective "higher" levels.

This is not to say that "ordinary" community members did not have certain personal interests in the conservancy, but it was likely that their interest and views differed from those of organised actors. Some of these community people could be seen as "local-level experts" who had sufficient knowledge about the conservancy to answer most of the questions of the above-mentioned semi-structured interview (see Chapter 4.3.1). But for those with less detailed knowledge an instrument had to be developed in the field.

This resulted in a flexible set of questions (see Box 9). The strategy here was not to start with issues concerningthe conservancy but with those areas of the day-to-day experience of local people that could be affected by the conservancy. Choosing their experience as entry point meant asking about things they are experts in. During the development of the "community questions" it was seen that local people could feel intimidated if interviews started with questions that were perceived as difficult. But when asked about their own experience, also the more marginalised community members, who did not benefit much from the conservancy and had little information about the different actors, were an interesting source of information.

Questions about different areas of experience were asked (see Box 9). Each group of questions started with a general one that was linked to everyday experience as closely as possible. The following questions were more and more specific about the conservancy. But whether they were asked or not depended on the knowledge the interviewee showed in the introductory questions. The interview started with questions about *costs* (problem animals) and *benefits* (meat, jobs, formal benefit distribution) of living with wildlife and having a conservancy. The following blocks of questions were optional and chosen according to the knowledge and willingness to talk the interviewee showed in the first set of questions. Here the foci were on the *conservation* aim of the conservancy, *the role of the local community* in the conservancy, the *distribution of power* in the conservancy and community, and *visions* for the conservancy.

Problem animals

Do you have problems with wild animals here (elephants, predators)?
What kind of problems?
What do you do if that happens (i.e. a predator kills livestock, an elephant destroys your pump)?
Do you go to the conservancy? How do they react?

Benefits

What about meat distribution? Did you get meat from the conservancy?
What did you get? Were you content?
Do you know how the meat distribution is organised?
Did you ever work for the conservancy?
What kind of job did you do?
How did you get this job?
If you didn't work for them, would you like to?
Do you know how they choose the people who work for them?
Do you know if there are plans for the distribution of financial benefits?
If you could decide, what would you do with the benefits?
Do you think they distribute benefits like meat and jobs in a fair manner?

Conservation

What is the conservancy there for? What is the aim of the conservancy?
Do you remember how wild animals were protected before the conservancy started?
The conservancy tries to stop poachers. How do they do that? Would you say they are successful?
If interview-partner states that there still is poaching: What do you think: why do people still hunt?

Information, co-operation with local people

Do conservancy people (staff or committee) come around to your place?
Who comes?
What do they do?
When / How often?
Where do you get your information about the conservancy?
Are you conservancy member?
Have you been to conservancy meetings?
Could you explain to me what happens there?

Distribution of power and influence

What would you say: Who are the strong people in the conservancy?
Are you content with what they are doing? If not, what goes wrong?
Do you know what the role of the traditional authority is in the conservancy?
I heard there is a conflict between the traditional authorities, could you explain to me what it is about?
Do you think it will have any influence on the conservancy?
Are you of the family of one of the traditional authorities?

Vision

If you could change whatever you wanted in the conservancy, what would you do?

Box 9: List of questions for community members

The interview started with the material aspects of everyday life in the conservancy while the socio-political ones formed a second part. This order was chosen because it proved easier to start with rather innocuous, matter-of-fact questions and only touch the more political, potentially sensitive issues after the interview-partners got used to the interview situation and had the chance to develop at least a minimum base of trust.

5. Results of primary research

Interview in the Stamkantoor (office of traditional authorities) in Anker, #Khoadi //Hoas

Conservancy representatives present their work plan at the IRDNC quarterly planning meeting at Wereldsend

Gathering at the cattle auction in Grootberg, #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy

5.1 Overview

The empirical data were collected between 24 July and 17 December 2002 in Namibia. 83 interviews with stakeholders of CBNRM were accomplished. Interviews were conducted in the Namibian capital Windhoek as well as in regional centres of the Kunene region (Outjo, Opuwo) and in two field-study conservancies in the Kunene region (#Khoadi //Hoas and Ehi-Rovipuka).

33 semi-structured interviews were conducted with interviewees who had a rather detailed knowledge about individual conservancies (for method see Chapter 4.2.2.1). In these interviews 36 conservancy power set-ups were provided, as three interview-partners analysed two conservancies. 36 interviewees participated, with two interviews being group interviews. 17 times #Khoadi //Hoas was analysed in interviews, 14 times Ehi-Rovipuka and 5 times other conservancies.

Stakeholder group	Number of semi-structured interviews
Conservancy actors	12
NGO staff	5 (7 interview-partners)
"Ordinary" local community	6
Researchers	4
Locals with position in traditional authority and conservancy	2
Local traditional authorities without position in conservancy	2
MET staff	2 (3 interview-partners)
Total	33

Table 10: Number of semi-structured interviews per stakeholder group

The information gathered in the power game was transformed into "sets of stakeholder data". Each set included the information that one interviewee gave about one stakeholder (see Box 10:

for an example). All in all, 500 sets of stakeholder data were gathered. This includes 225 for Ehi-Rovipuka, 229 for #Khoadi //Hoas and 46 for the remaining five conservancies[74].

```
              no of interview      ┌──────────33──────┐
                       date        │    03.11.02       │
      name of interview partner    ┌──────────────────────────────XXX─┐
          name of conservancy      └───────────────────────Ehi-Rovipuka┘

              name of actor        ┌──committee member Ehi-Rovipuka Jatiye Uaroua┐
             stakeholder-group     └────────────────────────────combi-actor┘
  sub-cluster stakeholder group    ┌──────combi-position conservancy / trad auth┐

           power tower total       ┌──────────4───────┐
        power status relational    └──────────,4──────┘

            range of actions       ⊠ observe
                                    ⊠   advise
                                    ⊠   decide
                                    □ give money

                                    □    no action

                  comment          Council of Licius, he is the one who says: Let's sit down
                                       and talk, don't shout. If there is an argument about
                                    boundaries he knows the history and traditional borders.
                                       He is game guard but illiterate so I help him with the
                                                                               reports.
```

Box 10: Example: One set of stakeholder-data[75]

22 explorative expert interviews were conducted with overview experts[76]. Six of those interviews were second or third talks with interview-partners who had already been addressed in semi-structured interview and were consulted again on specific issues.

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[74] Torra and Sorris Sorris conservancy in the Kunene, Mayuni in the Caprivi, Kalkplateau and Oskop in the South.

[75] The data has been anonymized, so that the name of the interview-partner cannot be published in this example.

[76] See Chapter 4.3.2.

Stakeholder group	Number of explorative expert interviews
NGO staff	8
Government staff	6
Conservancy actors	3
Tourism Sector	2
Traditional authorities	2
Researchers / consultants	1
Total	22

Table 11: Number of explorative expert interviews per stakeholder group

31 local people in #Khoadi //Hoas (18 interviews) and Ehi-Rovipuka (12 interviews) and one from the neighbouring //Huab conservancy were interviewed using the flexible set of questions for "ordinary" community members (see chapter 4.3.3). 15 of them were "ordinary" community members with no formal role in the conservancy (other than being a conservancy member), no government employment and no formal role in other CBOs like water-point committees or Farmers' Unions. Four interview-partners were classified as "other community based actors" because they were either government employees or actors of CBOs apart from the conservancy. Of the conservancy actors (committee or staff) who were interviewed, four showed so little detailed knowledge (generally newcomers in the committee) that they were also included in this group of interviews. Finally, eight traditional authorities participated in local community interviews.

Stakeholder Group	Number of flexible community interviews
"Ordinary" local community people	15
Traditional authorities	8
Conservancy actors	4
Other community-based actors	4
Total	31

Table 12: Number of flexible community interviews per stakeholder group

During the field stay the researcher was invited to attend and/or facilitate several *meetings* of conservancies and other stakeholders. The meetings focused on the planning and networking of

conservancies and outside agencies (3) and the visioning and planning with local people (4). Observations about decision-making, communication, conflicts and visions of stakeholders were gathered in the researcher's protocols. Statements of interviewees about the performance of the conservancy were compared with these observations of the conservancy "at work".

The researcher organised four *feedback group discussions* with the different stakeholder groups in the conservancies (committee, staff, traditional authorities) as well as in Windhoek (researchers, MET, NGOs). At these meetings preliminary results were presented to provide for feedback and learning in the Namibian CBNRM programme and to allow for discussion.

In the following Chapters (5.1–5.5) the data collected in the different rounds of interviews and meetings will be analysed in view of the four research questions. The core sources of information for questions 1 and 2 (Who are the actors? What is their range of actions?) are the quantitative aspects of the power game. Question 3 asks for the power of the actors in CBNRM. Part of the answer is drawn from the power set-up in the power game. A more complex understanding of the power-relations, though, is only accomplished by including the qualitative discussions in Part 3 of the semi-structured interviews and in the expert and community interviews.

Question 4 is the most complex one, asking about local governance effects of CBNRM. This includes the material governance effects (conservation and benefits for the local community) and immaterial effects (participation and conflict resolution). The main sources of information relevant for question 4 are the qualitative parts of the interviews and the observations gathered at meetings.

5.2 Question 1: Who are the relevant actors of CBNRM in Namibia and in the specific conservancies?

In the semi-structured interview a list of CBNRM stakeholders was assembled. Interviewees were asked to mention not only those actors who were in a formal decision-making position but also those who influenced CBNRM from outside. These stakeholder lists form the main source of information drawn from to answer Question 1.

Diagram 5 shows the proportion of the different stakeholder groups in the 500 sets of stakeholder data[77].

Diagram 5: Proportion of stakeholder groups in the data (100%=500)

The more detailed analysis focuses on the data for Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas. The proportion of stakeholder groups in the data for these conservancies is displayed in Diagram 6 and is further elaborated in Chapters 5.2.1–5.2.7.

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[77]The initial question was: Who was mentioned how often? This is not to jump to the quick conclusion that those who appear most frequently also were perceived as the most important or powerful actors – though in some cases it does give a hint.

Diagram 6: Relative frequency of stakeholder groups in the data for Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

5.2.1 Stakeholder group NGOs and donors

NGOs and donors were mentioned in 30 of 33 interviews and form 22 % (100%=500) of the stakeholder data. A long list of implementing NGOS and Donors was named for the two conservancies[78]:

- DRFN (Desert Research Foundation of Namibia)

- GTZ (Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit)

- IMLT (Institute for Management and Leadership Training)

- IRDNC (Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation)

- LAC (Legal Assistance Centre)

- NACOBTA (Namibia Community-Based Tourism Association)

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[78] In alphabetical order

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- NACSO (Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations)

- NAPCOD (Namibia's Programme to Combat Desertification)

- NDT (Namibia Development Trust)

- NNF (Namibia Nature Foundation)

- Raleigh International

- Rossing Foundation

- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)

- USAID (United States Agency for International Development)

- WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature)

Diagram 7: Proportion of interviews where NGOs were mentioned in Ehi-Rovipuka (100%=14) and #Khoadi //Hoas (100%=17)

This group of stakeholders includes a whole range of different organisational actors. While some of the Namibian NGOs provide specific services to most of the conservancies, others have a regional focus. This is reflected in the data for the two conservancies: They have different "core" facilitators.

For *Ehi-Rovipuka* the implementing NGO IRDNC was mentioned in 12 out of 14 interviews. It is closely followed by NACOBTA (11 of 14), the organisation responsible for the tourism development in conservancies, and WWF (9 of 14).

For *#Khoadi //Hoas* the NGO that was mentioned most frequently was the DRFN (11 of 17), followed by the WWF and the NNF (both 8).

5.2.2 Stakeholder group local conservancy actors

The local conservancy actors are conservancy staff and committees. They were seen as relevant stakeholders in 30 of 33 interviews and form 17% of the stakeholder data.

The staff members are further subdivided into office staff with management tasks and field staff (environmental shepherds or game guards) responsible for the monitoring and protection of local wildlife. The conservancy committees have internal hierarchies with chairperson, vice-chairperson, treasurer, secretary and ordinary committee members. In Ehi-Rovipuka the committee consists of ordinary and additional committee members; the latter being less involved in the committee meetings but more in the community outreach work.

One of the difficulties in clustering the stakeholder data stems from the fact that a number of actors hold more than one position and are part of more than one stakeholder group. It will be shown below that belonging to more than one group is a special characteristic of these actors and often goes along with other characteristics, like the accumulation of power. For this reason the category of the *multi-portfolio local stakeholder* was created. This category includes actors who were:

- Members of the committee *and* staff of a conservancy (multi-portfolio actor: staff and committee)

- Members of the committee and / or staff of a conservancy *and* of the traditional authorities (multi-portfolio actor: conservancy and traditional authorities)

- Members of the committee and / or staff of a conservancy *and* the community-based organisation: Farmer's Union (multi-portfolio actor: conservancy and community-based organisation).

If not otherwise indicated, multi-portfolio stakeholders are not included in the figures for those various stakeholder groups they belong to. 13% of the stakeholder data concerned multi-portfolio stakeholders. They were mentioned in 23 of the 33 stakeholder set-ups.

In both case study conservancies there were multi-portfolio stakeholders holding committee and staff position at the same time. In #Khoadi //Hoas multi-portfolio actors with position in conservancy and CBOs were mentioned quite frequently. This combination did not exist in Ehi-Rovipuka. Here those actors who combined a position in the conservancy with another one as traditional authorities received a relatively high attention. In #Khoadi //Hoas the combination of traditional authority and conservancy portfolio was rarely mentioned at all (see Diagram 8).

Diagram 8: Proportion (%) of conservancy actors in stakeholder data of Ehi-Rovipuka (100%=225) and #Khoadi //Hoas (100%=229)

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5.2.3 Stakeholder group traditional authorities

In all 33 conservancy set-ups traditional authorities were seen as relevant actors, making up for 11% of the stakeholder data.

The traditional authorities that were seen as relevant actors were mostly local actors[79]. For *Ehi-Rovipuka* traditional authorities were named 47 times (21% of the stakeholder sets for Ehi-Rovipuka), 45 times relating to local traditional authorities. The two local traditional authorities that were mentioned most frequently were multi-portfolio actors of the conservancy: the conservancy chairman / secretary of traditional authorities and the acting headman / committee member. Those two traditional leaders listed who were not local lived in neighbouring emerging conservancies and were actors of boundary conflicts with Ehi-Rovipuka.

Diagram 9 (left): Sub-clusters of traditional authorities in Ehi-Rovipuka (100%=47) and

Diagram 10 (right): Sub-clusters of traditional authorities in #Khoadi //Hoas (right, 100%=20)

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[79] While this statement is true for the stakeholder data analysed here, the analysis of conflict resolution in CBNRM, Chapter 6.4, shows how traditional authorities from the national level may want to interfere with conservancy matters (Hobatere conflict).

While in Ehi-Rovipuka mostly individual members of the traditional authorities were named, in *#Khoadi //Hoas* "traditional authorities Damara" were most often named as a group[80]. In the 17 set-ups of #Khoadi //Hoas traditional authorities were mentioned 20 times (8% of the #Khoadi //Hoas stakeholder data), 13 times as a group and 7 individual ones. Multi-portfolio traditional authorities were mentioned less often than in Ehi-Rovipuka. Two individuals fell into this category: A game guard / traditional council and a traditional leader / non-voting committee member.

This can be seen as a hint of a lower importance of traditional authorities for the #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy than for Ehi-Rovipuka, an observation that is strengthened and explained in the further data analysis[81].

5.2.4   Stakeholder group other local actors

Local actors outside the conservancy staff and committee were mentioned in 32 of 33 conservancy set-ups. 19% of the stakeholder data is about members of this group. This summarises the inhabitants of the local community, both conservancy members and non-members, some of them organised in local community based organisations (CBOs). In the two conservancies the following CBOs were said to play a role in CBNRM: The Farmers' Union, the farmers' associations (sub-groups of the Farmers' Union), water-point committee, women's league and youth committee.

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[80] Throughout the data it occurs that the Ehi-Rovipuka interviewees were more likely to name individual actors while #Khoadi //Hoas interviewees rather named collective actors. It lies beyond the scope of this study whether this reflects typical cultural patterns of the Hereros and Damaras respectively. But the interviewer has the suspicion that this difference could also have occurred due to translation deficits. The interpreter (only needed in Ehi-Rovipuka) seemed to prefer the concept of individual actors and explain the questions accordingly. But for the non-existent knowledge of Otjiherero by the interviewer, this suspicion could not be verified.

[81] See Chapter 5.4.

Diagram 11: Other local actors in stakeholder-data for Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas (total)

Diagram 11 indicates that community-based organisations were seen as relevant actors of the conservancy more frequently in #Khoadi //Hoas than in Ehi-Rovipuka. This is especially true for the multi-portfolio actors who combine a position in the conservancy and a CBO: While there was none mentioned for Ehi-Rovipuka, 12% of the stakeholder data for #Khoadi //Hoas concerned this group. In #Khoadi //Hoas the Farmers' Union and the conservancy shared a number of committee and staff members. The chairman, treasurer and secretary of the conservancy had the same positions respectively in the Farmers' Union.

5.2.5 Stakeholder group governmental actors

14% of the stakeholder data concerned governmental actors. They were mentioned in 30 conservancy set-ups. The governmental actors of CBNRM comprise the core implementing agency (Ministry of Environment and Tourism) and other actors who touch CBNRM but do not have an explicit implementation or sanctioning authority. Some interviewees sub-divided the MET actors into national and regional actors, sometimes even pointing out specific individuals like regional wardens.

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The secondary governmental CBNRM actors include the regional governments, schools and ministries like the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Rural Water Supplies, the Ministry of Local Government and Housing and the Ministry of Land, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. The bigger attention that "other ministries" received in #Khoadi //Hoas concentrates mainly on the Ministry of Agriculture. This is related with the fact that the chairman of the conservancy committee was a governmental extension worker of that ministry.

Diagram 12: Governmental actors in stakeholder data for Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas (total)

5.2.6 Stakeholder group researchers / consultants

Relatively low attention was given to the group *researchers and consultants* (2% of the stakeholder data). In the interviews concerning the two case-study conservancies, researchers and consultants were only mentioned seven times, six of them for #Khoadi //Hoas. All but one of these talked about the WILD project that had been carrying out research in #Khoadi //Hoas for more than two years already when the interviews were undertaken. Only one local-level

interview-partner (in Ehi-Rovipuka) put researchers on his stakeholder-list[82]; apart from that, only researchers themselves, NGO and MET staff mentioned researchers as stakeholders.

5.2.7 Stakeholder group tourism

Tourism actors made up for 1% of the stakeholder data. Four interview partners saw tourism actors as relevant for #Khoadi //Hoas and only one for Ehi-Rovipuka. All of them talked about private tourism firms coming into the conservancies either for hunting or for building a joint venture accommodation. Local tourism entrepreneurs were not mentioned in the interviews.

5.2.8 Others

One percent of the stakeholders mentioned did not fit into any of the above categories. Interviewees listed the National Broadcasting Company and neighbouring conservancies.

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[82] Very likely as a courtesy to the interviewing researcher.

5.3 Question 2: What is the range of actions of these actors in CBNRM?

After assembling a list of stakeholders, the interview-partners were asked to add the range of actions through which the stakeholders influence the conservancy. In a closed question a number of typical interventions was offered:

- Observing

- Giving advice

- Making decisions

- Giving money to the conservancy (funding)

The interviewees were asked to add at least one of these as characteristics to each stakeholder on their list.

Of the 454 sets of actor-specific data for Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas, 4 are about actors that were said to perform *none* of the above tasks. Three of these were "local people who are no conservancy members", one was an individual of the traditional authorities.

5.3.1 Acting non-observers

Observing is the most general and least active relation to the conservancy. The researcher assumed that observation was the precondition for any further intervention. So one combination of items was not expected: the "acting non-observer": an actor that was described as not observing but either giving advice, making decisions or giving money. For Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas this occurs in 52 sets of stakeholder-data (11%) including nearly all different stakeholder groups[83]:

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[83] The only exception being the group "researchers / consultants", which is no surprise, as observing is their core-competency in the field.

Diagram 13: Proportion of stakeholder groups in the cluster "acting non-observers" in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas (100%=52)

The interviewees described different types of stakeholders who acted without observing. When talking about *external* actors like NGOs and governmental actors, one reason given was that they were too far away to observe the day-to-day business of the conservancies. One community member put this into a critical statement about the funding and implementing NGO NNF:

> "Because they are not staying in the area they do not know the problems. They think it is good so this is why they always give money." (Interview 1, community member #Khoadi //Hoas)

But interviewees also criticised that powerful local actors acted without observing and listening before. A local traditional authority characterised the chairman of the #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy:

> " (…) There is no time left to be active, no time to do other things than making decisions. He does not have time to sit and listen to advice." (Interview 26, traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas)

But still in some cases it rather seemed to be a different understanding of the term "observing". It seems likely that interviewees saw observing as the passive opposite of the other actions described and not as the precondition for them[84].

5.3.2 Observers

For Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas together 48 sets of stakeholder data (11% of the total data) exist that describe an actor as only observing. The group of stakeholders that was described as only observing covers all different kind of actors.

Diagram 14: Proportion of stakeholder groups in the cluster "only observers" in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas (100% = 48)

A relatively high percentage of these observers are either community-based actors outside the conservancy or conservancy actors. The community actors who were described as only observing include: Conservancy members as a group, non-members as a group, local youth, teachers and local individuals. A traditional authority describes the conservancy members in #Khoadi //Hoas as rather passive:

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[84] Unfortunately this possible misunderstanding only became apparent in the data analysis after the end of the empirical research so that it cannot be clarified finally.

> "They [conservancy members #Khoadi //Hoas] are waiting for profits and see that they have no power and suffer from wildlife." (Interview 26, traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas)

When conservancy staff or committee were described as only observing, interviewees normally focused on certain individual conservancy actors who only had a marginal position in their stakeholder group.

5.3.3 Advisors

Giving advice is likely to be an activity with more impact on the conservancy processes than observing is. Still, even though there is a potential of power in giving advice, it differs from legitimate decision-making by the higher degree of uncertainty. The degree of security of an advice being followed is much lower than with legitimate decisions[85].

For Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas 153 sets of stakeholder data describe actors who do give advice but are not seen as decision-makers or donors of financial resources in the conservancy. Advisory functions were seen as typical for those traditional authorities that did not have a portfolio in the conservancy. They gave advice in the typical areas of responsibility of traditional authorities:

> "He [headman Langman Muzuma] gave advice with the boundary conflict. They came to the headman, he says: Why don't you take the border back a bit so that the conservancy can go forward?" (Interview 44, conservancy committee Ehi-Rovipuka)

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[85] Compare the difference between power and domination as described in Chapter 1.2.

Diagram 15: Proportion of stakeholder groups in the cluster "advisor, no decisions, no funding" in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas (100% = 153)

Advisors from the government were seen in the MET and other governmental organisations like other ministries, regional government and schools. A committee member who saw the MET as only advising and observing described:

> "The only power of MET is to give knowledge and get things started, they don't give money." (Interview 37, conservancy committee Ehi-Rovipuka)

With regard to the NGOs especially those were described as advisors who provided training to the conservancy.

5.3.4 Decision-makers

Decision-making (in/for the conservancy) is the action that characterises those stakeholders who directly govern the conservancy.

Diagram 16: Proportion of stakeholder groups in the cluster "decision-makers" in Ehi-Rovipuka (100%=125) and #Khoadi //Hoas (100%=94)

The group that was mentioned most often as decision-makers in both conservancies were the *multi-portfolio stakeholders*. It was shown above that Ehi-Rovipuka had more multi-portfolio stakeholders who were traditional authorities while in #Khoadi //Hoas there was a larger number of those who had a position in community-based organisations (CBO), especially the Farmers' Union (FU). This difference is reflected in these groups' decision-making capacities. In Ehi-Rovipuka traditional authorities that had a position in the conservancy were rated as relevant decision-makers. This group makes up for 15% of the stakeholder-data for decision-making. In #Khoadi //Hoas none of the traditional authorities with position in the conservancy was regarded

as decision-maker in any interview[86]. In #Khoadi //Hoas 18% of the data sets about decision-makers were about actors who were in the FU and conservancy staff or committee.

Diagram 17: Proportion of different multi-portfolio stakeholders in the cluster "decision-makers" in Ehi-Rovipuka (100%=125) and #Khoadi //Hoas (100%=94)

Generally interviewees attributed a high decision-making competency to the conservancy actors (single and multi-portfolio). In the data about decision-makers they form the biggest group for both conservancies: 42% for Ehi-Rovipuka and 51% for #Khoadi //Hoas. This indicates that (in the perception of interview-partners) CBNRM *did* lead to a certain empowerment of local-level actors.

And also the *other community-based actors* were described as decision-makers (in 15% of the decision-maker data for Ehi-Rovipuka and 19% for #Khoadi //Hoas). This group includes the local conservancy members. Their decisions are mainly focused on the General Annual Meeting. One conservancy actor from #Khoadi //Hoas considered them to be the crucial in the conservancy:

> "The conservancy members are the strongest power because they vote and make the basic strategic decisions. The members *are* the conservancy as the majority counts. They elect the members of the committee and can take down members. They make the constitution. Sometimes they are organised, sometimes not." (Interview 4, conservancy actor #Khoadi //Hoas)

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[86] This is not surprising as the two individuals had low-profile positions in the conservancy, being environmental shepherd and non-voting committee member respectively.

Diagram 18: Proportion of local and external actors in the cluster "decision-makers" in Ehi-Rovipuka (100%=125) and #Khoadi //Hoas (100%=94)

The importance of local actors as decision-makers becomes even more apparent in Diagram 18: Of all data sets where actors were described as decision-makers, 66% in Ehi-Rovipuka and 76% in #Khoadi //Hoas referred to local-level actors. This group includes conservancy actors, multi-portfolio actors, traditional authorities and other community-based actors. The group of external decision-makers contains governmental actors, NGOs and tourism actors.

But even though this relation seems to indicate a stronger position of local actors than national actors in both conservancies, the data has to be interpreted carefully. The large number of data sets describing local decision-makers is not necessarily connected with their power. It is partly due to fact that interview-partners gave a detailed picture of the local set-up and a more general one of the regional and national one. So typically they would name a number of individual actors for the staff and committee, but only mention the MET once, as organisational actor.

When it came to NGOs a number of interview-partners were not sure whether their actions should be rated as decision-making in the conservancy or not. Some followed the perception of this conservancy actor:

> "They play the most important part in the conservancy because they advise us but they do not make decisions." (Interview 9, conservancy actor #Khoadi //Hoas)

One way of influencing conservancy decisions without actually taking them was mentioned regularly:

"(They) have power through money." (Interview 45, NGO)

Other interviewees held the view that NGOs did make or strongly influence conservancy decisions:

"NACOBTA only have power on the tourism side. They can give strong advice. For example where a campsite should be or where lodges should be, they can say: If not here, we will give no funding. The community can still override them but then there is no money." (Interview 32, NGO)

"IRDNC and DRFN draw the management plan together, they decide what we do where, [they tell us] this is a tourism area, this is a hunting area." (Interview 43, conservancy actors Ehi-Rovipuka)

5.3.5 Providers of funding

"Giving money" was not included in the original design of the interviews but was added after it was named by several interview-partners. It was not included in the first 13 interviews but in the following 20. These first interviews were undertaken with stakeholders in Windhoek who described a whole range of different conservancies and with stakeholders in the first field study conservancy. So all interviews without "giving money" as feature were either about #Khoadi //Hoas (92 sets of stakeholder data) or about those conservancies added into the category "others" (46 sets of stakeholder data about the conservancies Sorris Sorris, Oskop, Kalkplateau, Torra and Mayuni). So for the analysis of the "money givers" of Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy, only 362 sets of data can be used.

Diagram 19: Proportion of stakeholder groups in the cluster "funding" for Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas (100%=79)

Obviously, funding is very much a stakeholder-specific activity: NGOs / Donors and the tourism sector were seen as the stakeholders responsible for "giving money to the conservancy", with NGOs / Donors having a definite overweight. This reflects the reality that in both conservancies

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the tourism activities were relatively limited and NGOs and Donors were the core financial resource for the conservancies. In two cases local actors were named as giving money to the conservancy. One was the field officer of Ehi-Rovipuka who was responsible for financial matters in the conservancy, the others were the local farmers of #Khoadi //Hoas. The interview-partner understood that the farmers gave money in form of membership fees to the Farmers' Union and this was seen as identical to the conservancy, so that local people gave money to the conservancy.

5.4 Question 3: What are the power relations between the different actors involved in CBNRM? Where does this power come from?

This chapter analyses the distribution of power between CBNRM stakeholders as described by the interviewees. The aim is to portray the reported power of the actors and to analyse how institutional and actor-specific factors led to this distribution. The analysis takes the following steps:

1. The stakeholder data from the power game are analysed to assess what power the interviewees ascribe to the respective actor groups.

2. The particular formal and informal institutions are evaluated focusing on the power potential they provide to the different stakeholders of CBNRM.

3. The data from all interviews and meetings is scanned for actor-specific factors said to increase or decrease the power of different stakeholders.

This is done separately for the different stakeholder groups, as the analysis shows that the institutional and actor-specific sources of power differed between the groups.

5.4.1 The perceived power of the stakeholder groups involved

Diagram 20: Perceived power of stakeholder groups in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

To allow for analysis, the quantitative data of the power game had to be transformed into a comparable scale. When setting up the power profile the interviewees were allowed to build power-towers as high as they wanted to. So to make the data comparable, the highest tower of each interview was set equivalent to one and ground level was set equivalent to zero. So the resulting "relative power values" are on a nominal scale between zero and one.

In one interview (in Ehi-Rovipuka) an interruption prevented that the set-up of power towers was written down properly. That means that 24 sets of stakeholder data are excluded from the power analysis. So 430 sets of stakeholder data form the basis for the following analysis.

The relatively small number of cases for each stakeholder group in each conservancy leads to quantitative data that shows high variations and standard deviations. But even where the quantitative data is not suitable for intricate statistical interpretation, it demonstrates tendencies that are complemented by the qualitative data. Especially for an ambiguous issue like power the quantitative data ("this actor has so much power") needs to be supplemented by qualitative explanations ("this is where the power comes from, this is how it shows").

Diagram 20shows the average power attributed to the respective stakeholder groups in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas. To allow for a realistic understanding of the data, the frequency with which the stakeholder groups were mentioned by interview-partners is added (Diagram 21). The relevance of this comparison becomes apparent when regarding the example of the tourism actors in Ehi-Rovipuka. They seem to be by far the most powerful actors in the set-up, but Diagram 21 shows that they were mentioned rarely at all.

Diagram 21: Proportion of stakeholder groups in the data for Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

5.4.2 Perceived power status of core conservancy actors

The core conservancy actors are conservancy staff and committee members including the multi-portfolio actors. The multi-portfolio actors were rated as rather powerful in both conservancies (average power-status of 0.55 in Ehi-Rovipuka and 0.63 in #Khoadi //Hoas). In Ehi-Rovipuka a combination of conservancy and traditional authority status was associated with strong power, while in #Khoadi //Hoas this was true for conservancy and Farmers' Union. This is consistent with the strong decision-making capacity of these two groups that was demonstrated in Chapter 5.3. The strength of these groups hints that the power of stakeholders within the conservancy was related to their position in the community in general.

Diagram 22: Perceived power of core conservancy actors in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

Conservancy actors without further portfolio were rated differently in both conservancies. While the staff and committee in general were seen as rather powerful in #Khoadi //Hoas there were comparably low ratings for them in Ehi-Rovipuka.

5.4.2.1 What are the institutional power-factors affecting the status of core conservancy actors in CBNRM?

To assess where the power of core conservancy actors comes from the power effects of the respective formal and informal institutions are analysed.

Formal institutions

Central formal institutions are the *conservancy legislation* and the *conservancy constitutions* that give every community member the option to become a core conservancy actor. This is restricted by factors like minimum age and permanent residence in the community. Furthermore the following people are seen as unsuitable for holding a conservancy office: not rehabilitated insolvents, people who have been removed from an office of trust on account of misconduct and people who have been convicted of theft, fraud, forgery or any other offence involving dishonesty (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1997a). The procedures for the selection of staff and committee are not clearly defined in the legislation. It only gives the precondition for conservancy applications that there has to be a committee and:

> "(…) that the relevant committee is representative of the community in the area to which the application relates."(Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996)

The model constitution proposes that all committee members should be elected into office at a general annual meeting of all conservancy members. They shall remain in office for one year. But this is one of the flexible parts of the constitution where "details might differ according to choice" (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997b).

In the case-study conservancies the modes of election differed from those given in the model constitution: In *Ehi-Rovipuka* the term of office was one year, but the election of committee members took place on the village level and the office holders like chairman, secretary and treasurer were put into position by the committee, not the community. In *#Khoadi //Hoas* the term of office was five years, the election took place at a central annual meeting and the office holders were put into position by the community directly (personal conversation, conservancy actors)

The conservancy committee is the body that has the right to manage the conservancy and administer its rights and property (see Chapter 3.5). These powers are restricted as fundamental

decisions can only be taken with approval of the conservancy members and may be limited by a development plan or government policy (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997a).

The conservancy legislation provides for a hierarchy amongst core conservancy actors, with the committee being superior to the staff and a number of committee members having portfolios (treasurer, chairman, secretary) that result in specific duties and responsibilities (see Chapter 3.5).

For Ehi-Rovipuka a further criterion stratifies the committee members: The committee is divided into ordinary and additional committee members. The additional committee members are not eligible for portfolios and have a less active role in the management of the conservancy. Their core competency is seen in information outreach. As shown in interviewees generally attributed stronger power to those committee members who had a portfolio than to those without. Interviewees of both conservancies showed a tendency to rate multi-portfolio actors combining a position in the committee and staff as most powerful core conservancy actor. They were followed by conservancy committee members and then by conservancy staff.

Diagram 23: Perceived power in relation to portfolio in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

The conservancy staff members are divided into office staff and their subordinate field staff. Generally they are bound by a double supervision: The conservancy constitutions give the choice

and supervision of staff to the conservancy committee, but – at least in the case-study conservancies – the payment of the staff came directly from NGOs (IRDNC and NNF).

Informal institutions

Local informal institutions, mainly traditional rules and customs, were described as influencing the power position of conservancy actors. As the case studies were conducted in different cultural backgrounds, the researcher collected different informal rules impacting on the distribution of power in the conservancy. As informal rules are difficult to assess, especially in a short-term field stay, the judgement of the role of informal institutions in the field study areas has to be handled carefully. The researcher experienced a varying degree of modernisation of actors that led to a flexible blending of traditional and modern institutions. Still, some traditional institutions that were mentioned by interviewees are discussed here. These focussed on:

- The culture-specific role of traditional authorities,

- The role of extended family networks and

- The role of women in local governance.

Traditional authorities were generally seen as being more influential in Ehi-Rovipuka. Some interviewees stated that the size and role of *extended family networks* was bigger in Ehi-Rovipuka than in #Khoadi //Hoas.

> "You know in Kunene South we have traditional authorities but they see that their jurisdiction and the conservancies are two different things. The communities and committees do their work; then they consult and inform the traditional authorities. That is different in Kunene North: Here conservancies can do nothing if they don't go through traditional authorities. They have to maintain very good relationships, conservancies have to follow traditional boundaries but as they are not clear that causes a lot of friction. It took me six years of working together with them to finally understand who is who and comes from where and claims what rights. I don't think in your short time here you will be able to understand. First you would have to learn about their system of extended families. That it different from that of us Damaras." (Interview 3b, government actor)

In Ehi-Rovipuka gender seemed to have an impact on the power of committee and staff members. Whereas in #Khoadi //Hoas there were powerful women in staff and committee, the central power group in Ehi-Rovipuka was exclusively male. The female office staff member (information liaison officer) in #Khoadi //Hoas was seen as a very powerful woman:

> "There would be no conservancy without her, she is an independent thinker, works together with the management and the rest of the staff." (Interview 26, traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas)

Diagram 24: Perceived power of male and female conservancy actors in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

Mainly due to this one powerful woman the average power position of the female conservancy actors in #Khoadi //Hoas is rated quite close to that of male actors. Still these figures have to be set into relationship with the significantly higher number of male actors in the conservancy. Opposed to that the one female staff member (community activator) of Ehi-Rovipuka was generally seen as quite powerless (see Diagram 24). The typical explanation given was:

> "Well, to be honest … She's just a woman."(Interview 50, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

In Ehi-Rovipuka the stakeholder lists of all interview-partners had a very high overweight of male actors, and no interviewee put any woman high in the power ranking. This was explained with cultural reasons. Herero-women were said to be powerful in the house, not outside, in public matters. Even factors like good education or being part of powerful networks (headman's family) could – in the case of the community activator – not make good for that. This is not to say women did not have any influence in the matters of this conservancy, but if they did, it was neither obvious nor acknowledged in the interviews[87].

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[87] These results were also reflected in the personal experience of the – female – researcher. In Ehi-Rovipuka the researcher was asked by male and female interviewees alike if it wasn't difficult to do all these male jobs on her own as a woman (especially driving a car). Similar concerns were not mentioned once in #Khoadi //Hoas.

5.4.2.2 What are the actor-specific power-factors affecting the status of core conservancy actors in CBNRM?

In the discussion about the power-status of conservancy actors, interviewees gave a whole range of reasons *why* specific actors managed to increase their power in the framework of conservancy institutions. The following actor-specific factors were described as likely to increase the actors' power which will be further elaborated below:

- Education and knowledge

- Membership of powerful local networks apart from the conservancy

- Personal will to power

- Pro-activity (making things happen) or sabotaging potential

- Preparedness to exclude other actors from participation

Power-factor: education and knowledge

One central skill shared by the powerful in the committees was the skill to communicate well. But also being knowledgeable in general and in conservancy matters and being able to speak different languages (English, Afrikaans) was described as increasing the power potential of committee members.

> "If there is a discussion about concessions, Filimon (field officer), Gerson (chairman), German (acting headman and committee member) and Benardt (secretary) will dominate it because they (…) know a lot about it. Their level of education and exposure makes them more comfortable with things. They have a high status in the community, also outside conservancy matters." (Interview 46, NGO, Ehi-Rovipuka)

In #Khoadi //Hoas there were a lot of rather well-educated committee members like teachers and other government employees. As this was not the case in Ehi-Rovipuka, education was seen as important issue in Ehi-Rovipuka while in #Khoadi //Hoas it was barely talked about. Some committee members in Ehi-Rovipuka intended to make a minimum level of schooling and language skills the prerequisite to become a committee member, but this NGO employee warned:

> "If we take people (for the committee) based on their level of education only, we are going on with supporting the elites. (…) When committee members say about others, they are illiterate, not capable for their job, a lot of it is bitching because of competition, a high level of unemployment (and) jealousy." (Interview 46, NGO, Ehi-Rovipuka)

But even though skills and education were seen as important, they alone did not determine the status of committee and staff members. As shown above in Ehi-Rovipuka the community-activator had very good language skills and a high knowledge of conservancy matters but still was seen as very low in the power ranking.

Power-factor: networks

> "The (power) positions of committee members come from the power they have in the community." (Interview 43, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

This statement was agreed on by a number of interviewees and is also reflected in the quantitative data. As described above, the central power-group of Ehi-Rovipuka was structured by traditional authority networks, whereas in #Khoadi //Hoas the powerful tended to be related to the Farmers' Union. But also for #Khoadi //Hoas interviewees stated that family networks provided access to power. Most of the powerful actors in the conservancy were said to belong to two extended families residing around one of the two main settlements (Anker). Some interview-partners in Ehi-Rovipuka said that conservancy matters stayed untouched by matters of other networks:

> "If someone is traditional authority and game guard, they only talk according to the conservancy in the conservancy and according to traditional authorities in the traditional authorities." (Interview 49, committee member Ehi-Rovipuka)

But it was more common to say that in practice the status in the community did influence the status in the conservancy.

> "There is no problem of authority when game guards are traditional authorities because you can split the role, the game guard can practice his headmanship outside work. In reality the person supervising this game guard will limit his actions towards him because he is like your father. You respect him. Culturally he is your father." (Interview 46, NGO)

The power-status of multi-portfolio actors indicated that powerful positions in the community were connected with power in the conservancy (compare Diagram 23). But not only local networks were seen as influential with regard to the power of conservancy actors. Being employed by an external NGO was described as increasing the power status of staff members. This is related to the organisational structure: The committee is superior to the staff, but the employer is an external NGO that is regarded as powerful actor:

> "(The technical advisor of #Khoadi //Hoas) is the strongest of the staff because he was brought in by NNF, he is not from this area but worked in Arandes before, he is employed by NNF to facilitate the whole

conservancy. He is brought in by the people with the money. That gives him power (…)" (Interview 27, NGO)

It was shown above that being a member of influential networks is one characteristic that bears a high potential of power. An actual increase in power was seen as related to the way the actors actively used and built their networks. With some networks, like powerful extended families, the membership was given. Other networks, like the Farmers' Union, were more flexible and permeable for outsiders. But with both networks, being a member of them alone was not enough to increase the power of an actor in the conservancy. Actors had to actively partake in conservancy matters and use the power-potential of the network. Typical cases would be lobbying through the channels of the networks before committee elections or using resources of the network for the increase in power in the conservancy.

Power-factor: will to power

A lot of interview-partners saw personality as central in determining the power and influence of individuals. Here the ambivalent appraisal of power was apparent: Interviewees saw the potential of power being something positive (the ability to make things happen) but also negative (monopolising decision-making and benefits). People who were described as having a "leadership personality" or being "power hungry" were observed to use many different means (like getting a portfolio, acquiring skills, building networks) to gain and maintain power. One traditional authority gave a positive description of a leadership personality when he lobbied for what was going to be the new chairman (before the committee elections):

> "He is a leader, straightforward, listens, debates, even compromises."(Interview 26, traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas)

The negative option can be seen in the description of the old chairman by the same interviewee:

> "The chairperson makes the decisions in the conservancy, not the members. Why? Because more than 50% of the community people are semi-skilled, can just read and write, no secondary education, do not know business, the chair manipulates them, abuses the situation instead of teaching the community." (Interview 26, traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas)

In two feedback meetings the researcher discussed the reasons for the accumulation of power with conservancy actors. In both meetings participants strongly emphasised the impact of someone's *will* to power.

Power-factor: Pro-activity (making things happen) or sabotaging-potential

Those conservancy actors who were perceived as especially dedicated and as making things happen were rated as especially powerful. That concerned committee and staff of the conservancies and was especially strong for multi-portfolio actors. Typical actors who were described this way were members of conservancy management staff in both conservancies:

> "He (field officer and committee member Ehi-Rovipuka) can make things happen, has the ability to do something, he is hard-working. He is responsible for the car and the finances. Those are factors influencing other conservancy committee members. (He) has influence on the conservancy being fast. He does not plan, but jumps in. People say he does things on his own but that works." (Interview 35, conservancy actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

> "Office staff: Without them the conservancy will break down, so nothing can be done without them, they play a critical role in the conservancy, the progress of the conservancy lies on their shoulders." (Interview 9, conservancy actor #Khoadi //Hoas)

But it was also acknowledged that power could stem from *keeping* things from happening (the sabotaging-potential). Again, those staff members who are responsible for logistics (like being the driver of the car) are especially prone to using this chance of power accumulation.

> "If he does not want a meeting, Filimon (field officer and committee member) can break the meeting by just not collecting the people. (…) He is not interested if he has his own job to do or if there might be questions about money. He can avoid that by not making the meeting happen." (Interview 23, NGO)

Power-factor: Preparedness to exclude other actors from participation

In both conservancies interviewees saw one central power group within the conservancy actors. This group was described as making decisions and taking action without including all other actors. These actors were said to *exclude* local community members as well as their fellow committee and staff members. One governmental actor who had an overview over a range of conservancies in the Kunene gave examples:

> "When I was at the AGM (annual general meeting) at Grootberg (#Khoadi //Hoas conservancy) last year I told them: Currently you, the committee, decide on your own and only report back to the community. I also told Torra (conservancy) the same thing. I asked: Where are the minutes of your meetings? In Torra only 3 people in the committee are doing things so it is not even the committee but only these few people. That is not community-based. (…) I am concerned that the investors and committees are running forwards together, leaving all other stakeholders behind." (Interview 12, governmental actor)

The allegation that conservancy actors tried to keep community members away from participation is further discussed in Chapter 5.5.3.

5.4.3 Power status of traditional authorities

As described in Chapter 3.4, the role and power of traditional authorities in Namibia varies between (and within) the different cultural groups. This was reflected in the data from the interviews, as one conservancy (#Khoadi //Hoas) was predominately Damara, while the other was predominately Herero (Ehi-Rovipuka).

Diagram 25: Perceived power of traditional authorities in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

Diagram 26: Proportion of traditional authorities in the stakeholder data for Ehi-Rovipuka (100%=255) and #Khoadi //Hoas (100%=229)

The power-ratings of traditional authorities in the two conservancies indicate that traditional authorities, especially those with a portfolio in the conservancy, were seen as more powerful actors in Ehi-Rovipuka than in #Khoadi //Hoas. When the power status is analysed along with the frequency (see Diagram 26) this becomes even more apparent.

5.4.3.1 What are the institutional power-factors affecting the status of traditional authorities in CBNRM?

Formal institutions

As shown in Chapter 3.4 the analysis of formal institutions influencing the power status of traditional authorities in CBNRM follows two different paths: The analysis of legislation concerning traditional authorities with statements about natural resource use and the legislation about natural resource use with about the role of traditional authorities.

While the field research was undertaken (2002) the Communal Land Reform Act was on its way already but it was only passed in 2003. In the unclear policy situation between independence and the passing of this act the communal areas were regarded as government property under the supervision of traditional authorities. Corbett and Daniels (1996) describe that in practice traditional leaders believed the chief or king to be the owner of communal land, so they were

responsible for the allocation of land. Those interviewees who discussed land rights in the two conservancies had a more accurate view of the situation, generally stating that traditional authorities were only custodians of the land. The responsibility for land allocation gave traditional authorities the potential power to hamper conservancy formation and development. This was especially rife with boundary conflicts in the conservancy formation and conflicts about exclusive wildlife areas for tourism use.

> "They (traditional authorities) are custodians over land, so they have the last say about land. For example with the exclusive wildlife areas like Klipriver, we cannot come together at that point, when it comes to land issues. Other problems are easier to solve." (Interview 9, conservancy actors #Khoadi //Hoas)

The conservancy legislation (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996) makes no provision for the role of traditional authorities in conservancies. The more detailed Model Constitution for Conservancies contains one compulsory regulation concerning traditional authorities:

> "At least one member of the conservancy committee shall be a representative or nominee of the … traditional authority (…)" (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997a, p. 3)

The way this rule was implemented differed between the two case-study conservancies. The interviewees indicated that this difference was connected with the *informal institutions* governing the matters of traditional authorities in the Damara and Herero culture.

Informal institutions

Chapter 5.4.2 already gave an insight in the different traditional authorities' self-conceptions of their role in CBNRM. It was shown that generally the Herero traditional authorities of the Kunene North were seen as more actively involved in CBNRM than the Damara headmen of the Kunene South. This difference showed in the two case-study conservancies.

In #Khoadi //Hoas one non-voting committee member was delegated from the traditional authorities. In Ehi-Rovipuka the conservancy constitution prescribed that each of the two local headmen[88] had one (voting) committee member as representative. But the following quote shows

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[88] The two headmen of the conservancy who were already recognised by government were Langman and Licius; the third one, Gottfried, was only striving to be recognised as a headman. The arising conflict is analysed in Chapter 5.5.4.

that the involvement of traditional authorities in the conservancy committee and staff went further:

> "In the constitution there are two councils included in the executive committee, one for each headman, now the new headman Gottfried wants another one. (…) I am in the traditional authorities, I am a son of (headman) Langman, the community activator is a daughter of Langman, German (committee member and acting headman) is a son of Langman, Maria Mbaisa, the vice chair is of the family of (headman) Licius, Abiude Kativa (committee member) as well, Titus Karunga (committee member) as well, Langman and Gottfried are one family. Jatije Uaroua is additional committee member and councillor of Licius, Tjaanare Tjeundo (committee member) is also family of Licius. Langman and Gottfried have the more important people in the committee, Licius has the additional members." (Interview 42, conservancy actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

In the quantitative data, only those who had a formal position in the traditional hierarchy were counted as traditional authorities. But especially in Ehi-Rovipuka interviewees described how the strength of the traditional structures ranged further than those formal positions. One example for this informal influence, based on complex family ties, is given for the field officer of the conservancy, who was generally seen as rather powerful (0.54):

> "Filimon, his father is the man who was the advisor of (late headman) Kephas Muzuma, was the old brother of Kephas. If [Filimon's father] got a kid and his young brother (Kephas) got a kid then that one (the child of Filimon's Father) has more power. Filimon is a child of the big brother (of the headman) so even though he is younger he has more to say than Langman (headman) who is the kid of the small brother. But Langman's father was headman, so the headman post runs in that line of the family. They are brothers in the long family line – like cousins having the same grandparents." (Interview 51, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

Even without going much deeper into Herero kinship rules, the above examples indicate that the hierarchies of the conservancy and the traditional authorities in Ehi-Rovipuka were overlapping. But not only were most committee members relatives of at least one of the headmen; most of the local interviewees saw themselves as related to the headmen's families. The only exceptions were outsiders who had moved into the community (like teachers). This self-definition of local individuals as members of extended family networks goes in line with the analysis of the Herero kinship networks by Malan (Malan, 1998, compare Chapter 3.7). The power of traditional authorities in CBNRM seems to be related to the grade of cohesion and inclusiveness of traditional authorities. In #Khoadi //Hoas no interviewee described a similar informal link between traditional authorities and the conservancy.

This indicates that the power-potential given by different institutions is related to the question: How important is this set of institutions in the whole complex institutional background? So the degree of modernisation of local actors and the importance they give to traditional structures play a role in determining the power of traditional authorities. The researcher observed that indicators

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for modernisation, like education level (including the ability to speak the official language) and modern infrastructure (i.e. stone houses, access to electricity), were less common in Ehi-Rovipuka than in #Khoadi //Hoas.

5.4.3.2 What are the actor-specific power-factors affecting the status of traditional authorities in CBNRM?

Interviewees described two directions into which traditional authorities could go to accumulate power in CBNRM. That was, broadly speaking, either co-operation ("capturing the conservancy") or sabotage. In the case-study conservancies it was more common for traditional authorities to try to co-operate than to impede the progress of conservancies. But especially at the quarterly planning meeting with conservancies from the Kunene North the researcher met a number of representatives of emerging conservancies that suffered from conflicts with traditional authorities. Their application processes were delayed because the traditional authorities refused to agree on boundaries. Generally interviewees saw the following actor-specific factors as influential in respect to the power status of traditional authorities:

- Power-position in the traditional hierarchy

- Reputation in the community

- Openness for the conservancy concept

- Holding a conservancy position

- Flexibility in combining traditional and conservancy institutions

- Maintenance of exclusive networks

Power-factor: status in the traditional hierarchy

Some of the overview experts explained that the role of traditional authorities in the conservancies differed between the different areas and cultural groups. They hinted that traditional authorities with a strong position in the community also had a good chance of acquiring power in the conservancy:

> "When pulled into the conservancies, traditional leaders can be strong proponents of the conservancies like in the Caprivi. In the Northwest there are mostly resettled people so there are some strong traditional leaders but the power of most of them isn't as strongly rooted. Some of these rather strong leaders in the Northwest are very supportive of the idea." (Interview 16, NGO)

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Power-factor: reputation in the community

The position of traditional authorities in the communities was seen as related to their reputation. Because of the democratic procedures and broader participation potential of conservancies, they were seen as a threat for traditional authorities that did not have a secure position in their communities. One overview expert stated:

> "Where traditional authorities are democratic and have the support of the people, they will support the conservancy. If traditional authorities are not sure of their power, they see conservancies as a threat." (Interview 11, NGO)

Power-factor: openness for the conservancy concept

Those traditional authorities described as powerful in the respective conservancies shared a certain openness for the concept. Often they saw themselves as instrumental in the establishment of the conservancy and saw their role as being an umbrella body for the conservancy and other community-based organisations. This showed in the way traditional authorities described the establishment of the conservancies.

> "So the government (…) said: The animals are yours now. This is where the conservancy started. All the nature including trees and animals is now yours. You have to observe it so you get the profit. Now the people here asked: What is actually a conservancy? Government said: The traditional authorities should start it on behalf of the community as they have the authority here." (Interview 19, traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas)

Power-factor: holding conservancy position

At least one representative of the traditional authorities has to be member of the conservancy committee. As the above data shows, multi-portfolio stakeholders who were traditional authorities and conservancy actors were mentioned by far more frequently in Ehi-Rovipuka[89]. For both conservancies it was observed that those traditional actors who had a position (committee member or staff) in the conservancy had a stronger impact on conservancy matters than those acting apart from it.

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[89] During the field stay, the conservancy actors in #Khoadi //Hoas even reported a decline in activity of the one non-voting committee member that represented the traditional authorities: He asked the committee to just inform him about the day-to-day business and only wanted to attend the "really important" meetings (personal information conservancy actor).

Power-factor: flexibility in combining traditional and conservancy institutions

Active engagement in the conservancy committee is a good example for traditional authorities using traditional as well as modern institutions to have an impact on local governance. Traditional authorities running for committee elections campaigned recurring to their traditional power. After being elected as committee members, they added democratic legitimisation to the traditional one.

But not only in their legitimisation, also in their range of decisions they combined their traditional authority (most notably decisions about land use) with their conservancy authority (decisions about natural resource management, tourism and benefit distribution). Also in conflicts amongst traditional authorities or between them and the conservancy they brought the power potential of traditional and modern institutions to bear.

Especially in Ehi-Rovipuka the conservancy could be described as a seemingly modern institution resting on democratic principles and procedures that in practice acquired a traditional imprint: The elected committee members were at the same time regarded as representatives of the different traditional authorities. Interviewees emphasised that the most important positions in the committee were held by representatives of the strongest headman. One traditional leader who was protagonist of a local conflict, was appeased by allowing him to appoint the chairman.

Power-factor: maintenance of exclusive networks

This power-factor was observed especially in Ehi-Rovipuka. As described, a great number of interview-partners who did not have a position in the traditional authorities stated to be related to the traditional authorities. These community members generally saw the committee and the traditional authorities as legitimate leaders and "our people". But those local actors who did not belong to the extended family networks gave a critical picture of this constellation:

> "(…) People here are too close to each other. There is a problem when people are close to each other. Family would never recognise if I make a mistake. The people of (headman) Muzuma won't see that their family makes mistakes or allow that they are not elected again. That is a problem." (Interview 40, community actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

> "Information is withheld from us, they never wanted teachers to be included, that is why they hold the meeting in holidays. Teachers are strangers, they only want to include their own people." (Interview 40, community actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

5.4.4 Power status of other community-based actors

This stakeholder group includes conservancy members and non-members, people organised in CBOs and people that were not organised. Diagram 27 shows that CBOs only played a relevant role in the interviews conducted in #Khoadi //Hoas. In both conservancies non-members were named as a group but as one with basically no impact on the conservancy.

Diagram 27: Perceived power of other community-based actors in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

Some interviewees warned that non-members could develop into a destructive influence:

> "The non-registered community members[90] have much less power than the registered. When it started people were frightened that conservancy means more elephants or they just did not care. There are a lot of not registered people, they could one time organise themselves against the conservancy" (Interview 18, community member #Khoadi //Hoas)

In #Khoadi //Hoas the Farmers' Union and especially its multi-portfolio actors were seen as powerful. Diagram 27 indicates that "ordinary" conservancy members were only attributed moderate power. The interviewees showed a tendency to rank these actors either as very powerful or as not powerful at all. For #Khoadi //Hoas that means that 58% of the ratings were in the

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[90] Community members are not automatically conservancy members, but have to register first.

lowest third (below or equal 0.33) and 29% in the highest third (above 0.66). In Ehi-Rovipuka this was not as obvious with 50% of the ratings in the lowest and 15% in the highest third.

5.4.4.1 Which are the institutional power-factors affecting the status of other community-based actors in CBNRM?

Formal institutions

The legislation (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996) gives the right to form a conservancy to "any group of persons residing on communal land". The power of the conservancy committee and staff are explained above. But also the "ordinary" conservancy members are given certain decision-making capacities. They are especially important in the long-term strategic development of the conservancy. At a general meeting they can elect and remove committee members, decide about changes in the conservancy constitution, about benefit distribution, investment and the leasing-out of conservancy property. Also the decision to dissolve the conservancy can only be taken by its members (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1997).

This institutional background led some interviewees to rate the local community members as strongest actors in the conservancy.

> "The conservancy members are the strongest power because they vote and make the basic strategic decisions." (Interview 4, conservancy actors #Khoadi //Hoas)

Others declared that these far-reaching decision-making capacities in some areas were opposed by limited capacities in others:

> "Without them (conservancy members) no changes in the constitution are possible. That is a lot of power but it is the only power they have." (Interview 37, conservancy actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

Some rules were described as disempowering the local community members. One example would be the regulation that a two-thirds majority of all conservancy members was needed for far-reaching decisions like expelling a committee member or changing the constitution. This was seen as quite difficult, as long as community members were not organised:

> "Locals (in #Khoadi //Hoas), well you could say ultimately they have the power to vote people out, theoretically, but they are not organised and disenfranchised from the process of decision-making, at the moment they have no power. (…) They do not advise on a regular basis or out of own initiative." (Interview 7, researcher)

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> "If the community does not like the committee, they can kick us out. They need a 2/3 majority of all the members. We have 700–730 members, 2/3 majority, that is ok for us because: Where do you get a 2/3 majority? You cannot get that, never." (Interview 42, conservancy actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

Informal institutions

Some interviewees saw the reason for the power status of the community in the informal institutions of the respective cultures. For the Hereros of Ehi-Rovipuka, interviewees who saw the community as strong conservancy actor gave cultural reasons. The same was true for interviewees who saw the Damara community members as weak conservancy actors:

> "(In #Khoadi //Hoas) the community people just have power at the annual general meeting. Normally, they don't talk. They don't take action. Maybe it's their culture, they never demand a meeting; there they are different from the Hereros." (Interview 23, NGO)

5.4.4.2 What are the actor specific power-factors affecting the status of other community-based actors in CBNRM?

Interviewees described a number of specific characteristics of *those* community members that had a remarkably high power status. But, as the quantitative data above shows, talking about the power status of the ordinary community members also means talking about a *lack* of power. So the characteristics listed below were also the characteristics that powerless community members lacked:

- Skills and education

- Membership of powerful networks

- Ability to afford costs of participation

- Closeness to the centres of the conservancies

- Effort and persistence

- Promotion of the conservancy in the community

Power-factor: skills and education

Skills and education, including knowledge about conservancy matters, were seen as one reason for actors accumulating power in the conservancy. A lack of it was seen as one reason for disempowerment. Interviewees warned that badly informed community members were prone to either being left out or forming opposition to the conservancy:

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"The chairperson makes the decisions in the conservancy, not the members. Why? Because more than 50% of the community people are semi-skilled, can just read and write, no secondary education, they do not know the business." (Interview 26, traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas)

"People who are uninformed are usually angry. Misinformed people make wrong decisions." (NGO at IRDNC quarterly planning meeting)

Power-factor: membership of influential networks

Membership of influential networks was said to increase the power potential of local community actors. Several interviewees in #Khoadi //Hoas stated that belonging to the family of committee and staff members increased the chances for benefiting from the conservancy. One indicator for the power potential of networks was their cohesion. As conservancy meetings required majority decisions, local actors were seen as having a higher power potential if they managed to organise themselves as a group beforehand. This explanation was also used for the weakness of local actors: Their incapability of organised action was seen as one major reason why community members had little power in the conservancy. On the other hand it explained the strength of some community-based organisations, namely that of the well-organised Farmers' Union in #Khoadi //Hoas.

The importance of powerful networks also shows in the analysis of actors with an ethnic background different from the majority of conservancy members:

"(Ovambo conservancy members), they are a small group that only came to the community after independence, do not have a lot of power as they do not have networks and family here." (Interview 4, conservancy actor #Khoadi //Hoas)

Power-factor: ability to afford the costs of participation

It cannot be said that participation linearly increased with the wealth of community members. But it was observed that a minimum wealth was needed to be able to afford the costs of participation. The major obstacle seemed to be transport to meetings. But also the time that a meeting "costs" without direct benefits was mentioned. These costs were partly mitigated by the direct benefit of attending meetings: The food that all attendants of a meeting received.

Power-factor: closeness to the centres of the conservancies

The transportation costs were one reason why participation was easier for those living close to the venue of conservancy meetings. This was obvious at the annual general meeting (2002) in

#Khoadi //Hoas, where the conservancy members from the more remote areas were seriously under-represented. This led to a committee that was obviously skewed, as it favoured members from the southern areas of the conservancy. Ehi-Rovipuka mitigates this problem with village-level meetings and elections.

Power-factor: effort and persistence

Interview-partners saw the degree to which community members actively participated in conservancy processes as one central factor for the power of "the community" and for the power of individual community members:

> "There is criticism of the community, they ask questions. If you cannot answer them, you have to go back to the committee and ask them again. You are supposed to know everything, be polite and a nice person and tell the truth. They say things like: I didn't get meat and diesel. This is how Hereros are: Even if you don't find a problem, they find problems." (Interview 49, conservancy actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

One example for power through active effort would be this community member of Ehi-Rovipuka:

> "He is having a lot of power. He is the one in the community to catch people who steal cattle to report them to the traditional authorities. He is hard working. When they report from the committee, he asks a lot of questions." (Interview 56, conservancy actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

One group of powerful local actors that derived power from their (former) active participation were former conservancy actors. They tended to still have an affinity to the conservancy, spend time at the conservancy office or at meetings and give advice.

Especially in the discussion with facilitators it became apparent that the conservancy legislation was seen as *potentially* empowering but that the local majority did not actively use this potential. One NGO interview-partner demonstrated this in a vision for the future of CBNRM:

> "My vision would be to make the members more proactive so that they go to the committee and say: We want to see the books. That people know their rights." (Interview 25, NGO)

A conservancy actor of #Khoadi //Hoas claimed:

> "(Local) People are reluctant to participate." (Interview 13, conservancy actor #Khoadi //Hoas)

Power-factor: promotion of the conservancy in the community

Especially in Ehi-Rovipuka some community members were said to be powerful because they promoted the conservancy and nature conservation in general amongst their neighbours. For example they were characterised as "the one who tells the children not to kill birds".

5.4.5 Power status of NGOs / Donors

NGOs in CBNRM in Namibia have specialised on certain geographical regions and / or thematic fields. This is reflected in the landscape of NGOs in the two conservancies: Some of those with thematic specialisation (like organising game counts or marketing of local crafts) tend to assist most conservancies. Typical cases are Namibia Community-Based Tourism Association (NACOBTA, for tourism matters) and the Rossing Foundation (for training). Each conservancy has a leading implementation agency and these generally have regional foci: In #Khoadi //Hoas, the Namibian Nature Foundation (NNF) was the central implementing NGO, in Ehi-Rovipuka this role was taken by Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC). Both were seen as strongest NGO actors in the respective conservancies with the role of IRDNC being especially outstanding (compare Diagram 28 and Diagram 29).

Diagram 28: Perceived power of NGOs in #Khoadi //Hoas

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
Diagram 29: Perceived power of NGOs in Ehi-Rovipuka

In both conservancies NGOs were described as relatively strong actors. In Ehi-Rovipuka the main implementing NGO, IRDNC, had an exceptional status as being named by nearly all interview-partners and being described as a very powerful actor by most of them. The strong role of NGOs was seen in a critical light by some, especially by interview-partners who worked for governmental organisations:

"Some NGO people want to run away with committees alone." (Interview 12, governmental actor)

One blind spot in the perception of power of NGOs and donors in CBNRM is remarkable: Very few interviewees saw pure donor organisations as relevant conservancy actors. The core governmental donor of CBNRM in Namibia is the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was only mentioned once in the power games. Other governmental donor involved, like the development agency of Finland (Finnida), Great Britain (DIFID) and Sweden (SIDA) were not mentioned at all; the German GTZ was mentioned only once. The central non-governmental donor involved, the WWF, was mentioned more often, but mainly in its capacity as facilitator. So even though the international donors can be seen as powerful actor from a macro-perspective, the data collected on the micro-level only allows for the analysis of the

power of implementing NGOs and local NGOs that channelled international funding to the conservancies (like NNF).

5.4.5.1 What are the institutional power-factors affecting the status of NGOs in CBNRM?

Neither the conservancy legislation nor the Model Constitution mentions NGOs explicitly as conservancy actors. But the accompanying documents published by the MET show that throughout the policy development and implementation process NGOs were seen as important actors of CBNRM. (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997) sees NGOs as facilitators for the conservancy development. It reads:

> "As the MET does not have a community development mandate, this component is best left to NGOs at the request of the ministry or communities, but MET field staff should be kept informed or be involved where possible." (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997, p.12)

This publication also indicates the funding capacity of NGOs referring to their ability to "mobilise resources more quickly (than the MET) to deal with certain situations" (ibid, p.10). It is emphasised that neither MET nor NGO are the organisational actors to *actively establish* conservancies but that their role should be only information and facilitation.

Other formal institutions that regulate the activities of NGOs are the respective mission statements and constitutions of the NGOs themselves. They are not analysed in detail in the scope of this research.

5.4.5.2 What are the actor-specific power-factors affecting the status of NGOs in CBNRM?

When talking about NGOs, interviewees either talked about the whole organisation or about individuals working for NGOs. This is due to the open request to "assess a list of all groups or individuals that are important for this conservancy". So the characteristics that were seen as likely to increase the actors' power include those that relate to individuals and those that relate to organisations. Typical characteristics were:

- Resourcefulness in terms of human resources and logistics.

- Tight and all-embracing programme of outreach / facilitation.

- Reputation for being a trustworthy partner.

- Giving training and advice to conservancies.

- Lobbying in the policy development.

- Coalitions with other CBNRM actors.

Power-factor: resourcefulness in terms of funding, human resources and logistics

Funding was seen as a core activity of NGOs (see Chapter 5.3). Interviewees stated that the powerful position of certain NGOs in comparison to the MET was strongly related to the resources that these NGOs had and to a lack of resources with the MET:

> "Of the regional MET Nahor is the one guy in the Kunene. Siegfried and Ben (MET regional staff) are only indirectly involved with CBNRM. That means one (MET) guy against 40 NGO guys. So he is too powerless to keep them under control." (Interview 7, researcher)

Interviewees described a "brain drain" from the MET to the NGOs in the last years, so NGO staff was not only seen as high in numbers but also experienced in CBNRM. While interviewees generally agreed that NGOs did not *dictate* what conservancies had to do, funding was seen as a strong incentive for deciding according to the priorities of NGOs.

> "It is difficult to decide on their power status because they are giving the money and money talks. No but they do not tell us what to do, do not force something upon us." (Interview 2, conservancy actor #Khoadi //Hoas).

> "We (NGO) don't tell the communities what to do so that afterwards people cannot say, you manipulated us." (Interview 46, NGO)

Interviewees saw that holding the "purse strings" gave certain NGOs the possibilities to give strong advice and control the ways that the conservancies were going.

> "IRDNC have power because they give cars, money, knowledge, supervise us to keep the conservancy running. When the committee gives a proposal to IRDNC they submit it to different donors. We are working closely hand in hand, we are the same person, one group, at this time office, telephone, chairs, all the money for that comes through IRDNC, the power comes from them." (Interview 41, conservancy actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

Power-factor: tight and all-embracing programme of outreach / facilitation

In both conservancies the approach of the respective NGOs was co-ordinated. In #Khoadi //Hoas this co-ordination followed the structure of the FIRM approach, including all actors of agricultural and natural resource management. In Ehi-Rovipuka one leading NGO, the IRDNC,

served as the main co-ordinator of outreach and funding. In both cases the support was described as rather tight and comprehensive. This was criticised by MET staff and researchers. The main issue was that this strong role of NGOs left little time for the other actors, especially the MET as second facilitating stakeholder:

> "A problem is that most of the conservancies' time is programmed by NGOs. They (conservancies) get their budget from them (NGOs) to do jobs (…). No time is planned for government to go in and work with the community. We can do nothing because the NGOs set them a full agenda. The vehicle is remote-controlled; the management committee is remote-controlled by NGOs. (…) The set-up of CBNRM and NGOs versus government, if you go further into that, it is a political situation." (Interview 3, governmental actor)

Power-factor: reputation for being a trustworthy partner

Generally core conservancy actors described NGOs as good and trustworthy partners. Staff and committee members were prepared to take advice especially from those NGOs with which they had a long-term working relationship and that had proven to be good partners in the past. In some interviews local people saw NGOs as "the whites" or "the outsiders" and attributed all different kinds of experience they had made with outsiders to NGOs. This was described for the initial stages of conservancy development in Ehi-Rovipuka. Local people had felt betrayed when the South West African government had changed access to land in the course of the establishment of the cattle disease fence – so some feared that conservancy development would lead to similar losses.

One feature that was seen as important for the development of trust was the cultivation of long-term personal relationships. One example is the founder of the NGO IRDNC, Garth Owen-Smith. Interviewees in Ehi-Rovipuka spoke of him with personal respect and trusting his judgement[91]. This respect was enhanced by the fact that he, though being a white man, had chosen to live in the area and learn the Otjiherero language.

Only interviewees in Ehi-Rovipuka mentioned the knowledge of the local language as increasing trustworthiness and impact of NGO actors. This could have two reasons: The community members of Ehi-Rovipuka generally had little knowledge of Afrikaans or English. So for visitors not speaking Otjiherero interpretation was inevitable and participating in social events was

hampered. In #Khoadi //Hoas the researcher observed meetings with community members and visitors being held in Afrikaans, which seemed to be well-understood by almost everyone. The other reason could be that there were fewer facilitators who spoke Damara. During the field-stay the researcher met no NGO staff in the conservancy able to speak Damara[92].

Power-factor: giving training and advice to conservancies

Their relatively high number of staff allowed NGOs to influence conservancies through time-intense training and assistance. When NGOs were described as advisors of conservancies this focused on their training activities. The researcher observed several training sessions in the conservancies that were aimed at determining the further strategic orientation of the conservancy and enabling the local actors to reach the set goals. This concerned financial management and natural resource management as well as the drafting of a benefit distribution plan. Some interviewees from NGOs saw themselves in a conflict between facilitating self-determined development and giving this development an intended direction:

> "Sometimes you have to push people to keep their house in order. Yes they should do their own things, but it is terrible to see them collapsing after you put so much work into it. So if we see a conservancy is not working properly, like the committee here not turning up if you want to work with them, we, IRDNC, tell them we are going to pull out if they do not get their house in order. Now the problem is solved. This conservancy was in a mess, the committee did not work, we had to come in and say we are pulling out if they are not working. Now things are in place." (Interview 32, NGO, Ehi-Rovipuka)

Power-factor: lobbying in the policy development

A number of NGO staff had been MET employees when the CBNRM legislation was developed. But also as NGO actors they were said to have a strong impact on policy development. They were seen as experts for the implementation of CBNRM, able to contribute to a further policy development. Their strength was not only attributed to their experience and knowledge but also to the weight of the donor funding that they managed to channel into CBNRM.

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[91] The way in which local conservancy actors and traditional authorities in Ehi-Rovipuka spoke about Garth Owen-Smith in many cases resembled the way they spoke about a respected traditional authority.

[92] This was different with the regional MET staff. Here the responsible staff members were generally of the same cultural background as the majority of the conservancy members they worked with.

Power-factor: coalitions with other CBNRM actors

Interviewees described typical stakeholder-coalitions within the policy field. Especially those observers who criticised the strong position of NGOs spoke of coalitions between NGOs and communities (sometimes adding tourism investors) that tried to "run away with the process", excluding other actors, especially traditional authorities and governmental actors.

5.4.6   Power status of governmental actors

Diagram 30: Perceived power of governmental actors in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

In both conservancies interview-partners stated that the MET was the central governmental actor of CBNRM. But the power of the MET was rated as higher in Ehi-Rovipuka than in #Khoadi //Hoas[93]. While a whole list of other governmental actors was given, they were generally rated as having limited power in both conservancies.

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[93] This is a surprise to the researcher. The observations in the two conservancies would have led to the estimation that the MET played a more active role in #Khoadi //Hoas than in Ehi-Rovipuka. During the whole field stay the researcher observed no activity of the MET in Ehi-Rovipuka. Also, no MET staff attended any meetings in the conservancy. The situation looked differently in #Khoadi //Hoas, where the regional MET person was observed to actively participate in several meetings, once even supported by his national-level supervisor. In an interview a regional warden described his plans to assist the #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy in conducting house-to-house visits to increase participation.

5.4.6.1 What are the institutional power-factors affecting the status of governmental actors in CBNRM?

As for legal institutions, the special characteristic of governmental actors is (obviously) that they are not only subject to the institutions but they can also make and change them. In the interviews this capacity was frequently mentioned as one of the reasons for the power of governmental actors:

> "MET has given us the idea (of CBNRM) and the same rights like commercial farms have them, to also get benefit from problem animals." (Interview 51, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

Because of these legislative powers governmental actors were seen as "senior players" (Interview 32, NGO) that set the rules. Through the legislation governmental actors gave away certain resource-use responsibilities to other (community-based) actors. But some responsibilities remained within government. The conservancy tool kit (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1997) explains the task sharing between MET and NGOs:

> "Broadly speaking, there is a division between the *community development aspects* (institution-building and enterprise development), *procedure* (application to MET) and *wildlife management*. Different skills, expertise and experience are required for assisting communities in community development and wildlife management. As the MET does not have a community development mandate, this component is best left to NGOs at the request of the ministry or the communities, but MET field staff should be kept informed or be involved where possible. The wildlife management component should be provided by the MET. The procedural aspect should also be handled by MET as it is the body authorised to approve and register conservancies." (ibid, p. 12)

The wildlife management component included the setting of quotas, responsibility for problem animal control and the sanctioning of poaching. That means that on the natural resources side government retains the overall control. Generally the institutional background gives to the MET the following power:

- The right to gazette and de-gazette conservancies

- The right to set hunting quotas

- Law enforcement in the case of poaching

- Problem animal control.

5.4.6.2 What are the actor-specific power-factors affecting the status of governmental actors in CBNRM?

The analysis of actor-specific power-factors either focused on the MET as organisational actor or on specific members of MET staff as individual actors. The following factors were collected:

- Lack of resources in terms of human resources and logistics

- Supportive climate for CBNRM in the MET

- Monitoring, control and sanctioning of conservancies

- Effective facilitation of natural resource management

- Active involvement in conservancy matters

Power-factor: lack of resources in terms of human resources and logistics

Both material and human resources were said to be meagre at the MET. This was one of the reasons given for low impact of governmental actors on the day-to-day management of conservancies. Interviewees compared the resources of NGOs and of MET field staff and claimed a strong overweight of the NGOs. One interviewee phrased the relationship between NGOs and MET in the following metaphor:

> "The MET is like a disabled child in a wheelchair, pushed around by the NGOs. It starts to crawl now but still it is disempowered." (Interview 7, researcher)

A number of interviewees ascribed the weak position of the MET to the fact that most staff members involved in the policy development of CBNRM had later left the MET to work for NGOs. So the MET staff that replaced them had to gain experience and build up networks before they would retain the position of the MET in CBNRM. This was of special relevance for the national-level staff. On the regional level the researcher encountered a number of staff members who were experienced CBNRM proponents.

Power-factor: supportive climate for CBNRM in the MET

A supportive climate for CBNRM in the ministry was seen as essential for increasing the power and resources of the CBNRM support unit. But interviewees both from the national and the local level described that the split between fortress conservation and community-based conservation

went right through the ministry. Some interviewees saw a silent struggle between the "Parks Division" and the "CBNRM Support Unit". The Parks Division was seen as protecting their animal-centred approach to conservation and not trusting in local-level decisions. Some statements framed the accusation of prevailing apartheid structures with a "white school" and a "black school" in government, the first being contra and the second being pro conservancies. But the researcher observed that it was common to accuse all kinds of political opponents of "practicing apartheid", so these interpretations have to be read with care.

Power-factor: monitoring, control and sanctioning of conservancies

The institutional framework of CBNRM sees one important role of the MET in the monitoring, control and sanctioning of conservancies. The legislation gives the MET the right to degazette[94] conservancies that massively fail to achieve their goals. Conservancy-actors and other interviewees saw this as a large power potential and the threat alone seemed to have a disciplining effect on the conservancy actors:

> "The MET, they are the big big big one, the top one. They gave us the conservancy and within that all the trees, animals, natural resources. They are watching us, how we treat the wildlife. The community applies for a quota and they decide. That means they are the eyes of the whole conservancy. If an animal gets killed (poaching), the game guards take it to the MET; they do to that person what they want. They also look if this conservancy is going forward or being bankrupt. The MET has the right to de-gazette us. Being bankrupt, that is if there is money but no benefit distribution or if the conservancy cannot control poaching. No, de-gazetting of conservancies has not happened yet, because we are still new." (Interview 44, committee member Ehi-Rovipuka)

But it was seen as problematic that the sanctioning potential of the MET could not be used in a gradual way. There was a lack of moderate sanctions for minor infringements. Some interviewees added that there was no structured comparative monitoring of all conservancies to give a fair and informed basis for sanctions. They warned that a sanction that was never enacted could lose its power. One researcher asked for government to actually make an example and de-gazette one conservancy:

> "The approach in general is right. Proper monitoring mechanisms have to be put in place to review the status of the conservancies. MET has to take action, kick (de-gazette) one and everybody knows, action can be taken." (Interview 54, researcher)

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[94] E.g. take the conservancy status away from a community.

As it was under the auspice of the MET, the WILD research project (Long, 2004) can be seen as one way how governmental actors tried to improve the monitoring of conservancies. But it concentrated on a small number of conservancies.

Power-factor: effective facilitation of natural resource management

Generally the interviewees stated that the local natural resource management improved through the conservancy. The conservancy development meant that MET wardens were more and more in the position of only acting on demand, if requested by the conservancy. Interviewees stated that this distribution of work suited the capabilities of conservancy and governmental actors. The conservancy actors, especially game guards / environmental shepherds, were close enough to the ground to detect poaching of problem animals more effectively than governmental wardens. But governmental actors were needed for any legal action.

Power-factor: active involvement in conservancy matters

Especially when talking about regional MET staff, local actors attributed power to those who were "seen around" and those who were perceived as active and engaged. The researcher observed one regional warden who was a senior CBNRM player and attended most of the meetings of #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy. He influenced conservancy decisions by being vocal and knowledgeable. Even those core conservancy actors who disagreed with his comments described him respectfully as a dedicated conservancy actor. Interviewees claimed that restricted resources (especially staff and transport) often hampered the active involvement of MET actors.

5.4.7 Power status of tourism actors

Diagrams 1 and 2 show that tourism actors generally were not seen as an important in the two conservancies. They were only mentioned by three interviewees in #Khoadi //Hoas (average power 0.3) and by one in Ehi-Rovipuka (power 0.8). Two of these interviewees explained their perception of the power of tourism actors in the present and future of the conservancies:

> "Their power comes from giving money." (Interview 41, conservancy actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

> "(In #Khoadi //Hoas) Private sector companies have limited power yet. If they were to sign a joint venture they would want the power to exclude people from areas. There is nothing in the legislation to allow

conservancies to do that, to give that to someone because that is the role of the traditional authorities. That is the big issue at the moment." (Interview 7, researcher)

5.4.7.1   What are the institutional power-factors affecting the status of tourism actors in CBNRM?

The position of tourism actors is touched only briefly in the conservancy legislation. The conservancies are given the right to consumptive and non-consumptive use of wildlife. Conservancies cannot claim any areas subject to lease. This excludes existing concession areas from conservancies. According to the Model Constitution conservancies can lease hunting rights and areas to outsiders. At the time of the field-stay the consultations for a concession policy were on the way. Interviewees claimed that without policy, the decisions about tourism rights in communal areas tended to be ad-hoc and unpredictable. Neither conservancies nor tourism companies had the right to exclude people from using communal land. So tour companies working in the conservancies did not only have to maintain good relations with the local communities but also with their traditional leaders.

5.4.7.2   What are the actor-specific power-factors affecting the status of tourism actors in CBNRM?

Tourism actors were the only profit-organisations in the stakeholder set-up. Their power potential lay in their ability to add to the financial viability of conservancies. As tourism was only in a beginning state in the two case studies, these are only general observations. Those tourism actors who successfully managed their enterprises in the communal areas seemed to have certain local roots, a substantial capital background, a long-term interest and a certain "realistic enthusiasm" about community involvement.

5.4.8 Power status of researchers / consultants

Diagram 31: Perceived power of researchers in Ehi-Rovipuka and #Khoadi //Hoas

Researchers received low power ratings in both conservancies and were rarely mentioned at all. While the results of research might have an impact on policy decisions, interviewees did not see them as influential stakeholders in the individual conservancies. This stemmed from the role of researchers as "outsiders" who had no mandate to induce change and should not have vested interests in the conservancies. The research team that was mentioned most often in the interviews was the WILD team. The researcher observed this team's efforts to apply their findings and become a motor for change. But the various actor groups greeted these efforts with little enthusiasm.

5.5 Question 4: In the eyes of the stakeholders, do CBNRM projects reach their material and immaterial local governance goals?

To analyse the local governance effects of CBNRM, material and immaterial indicators are assessed[95]. Four central goals of CBNRM serve as a reference for the analysis. They can be found in the relevant policy and legislation (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996; Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1995 and 1997) and were also common answers to the interview-question: What are the goals of the conservancy?

The *material governance effects* that CBNRM aims for mainly concentrate on:

- Improved natural resource management and
- Material revenues and benefit distribution favouring the community.

The *immaterial governance effects* analysed are:

- Participation of the local community
- Implementation of functioning mechanisms for conflict resolution (see Chapter 4.1).

5.5.1 Material governance effects: natural resource management

When talking about the natural resource management duties of conservancies, interviewees saw the prevention of poaching as a central issue. They described the natural resource management before the conservancy. In both cases, no interviewee stated that the poaching control was better without the conservancy. The problems experienced before the conservancy formation were described as more severe in #Khoadi //Hoas. Here poaching control lay in the hands of MET wardens who came for patrols every once in a while. In Ehi-Rovipuka the protection of game was

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[95] The time frame and scope of the research did not allow for a thorough analysis of the impacts of CBNRM. At least for the material governance impacts the results of the WILD project can provide interesting insights as it conducted a long-term survey of livelihoods impacts of CBNRM in the Kunene and Caprivi. (Long, 2004)

more localised already before the conservancy started. Headman Kephas Muzuma and the NGO IRDNC (Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation) had set up a system of community game guards working on a voluntary basis (see Chapter 3.6.6). A typical judgement for #Khoadi //Hoas was the following:

> "The MET was responsible; they could not get hold of poachers as they did not come down to the grassroots-level. They relied on reported cases only. Game did not belong to the community so they did not have a problem with stealing it."(Interview 26, traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas)

The situation in Ehi-Rovipuka was described as slightly different:

> "Government gave the right to headmen to look after the wildlife. Government said if some people want to be game guards as volunteers they should be. Later they helped them with food, later with food and little money, now they are permanently working for the conservancy." (Interview 51, local community Ehi-Rovipuka)

Interviewees were not unanimous about the question whether poaching had really successfully been stopped in the conservancies. The following chapter analyses the interviewees' judgements as to *why* poaching control succeeded or failed.

5.5.1.1 Reasons given for reduced poaching

Those describing a successful reduction of poaching through the conservancy mainly gave two reasons:

- Changed attitude towards wildlife through incentives

- Effective localised control mechanisms.

Changed attitude towards wildlife through incentives

Conservancy actors and NGO staff typically voiced the understanding that a change of attitudes towards wildlife was the driving force for changed behaviour:

> (The opinion of locals about conservation) "changed totally, poaching is minimised, if there is any poaching, members report it to the conservancy management who reports it to the police." (Interview 2, conservancy actor #Khoadi //Hoas)

Reduced poaching through better control

But other conservancy actors, community members and researchers saw control as the core factor for changed behaviour towards wildlife:

"Poaching is no problem here any more because of a lot of control." (Interview 48, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

"The benefit-driven approach does not work for big conservancies. People at the moment don't change their behaviour because of benefit but because of control." (Interview 7, researcher)

5.5.1.2 Reasons given for ongoing poaching

Some of the interview-partners (game guards, community members and researchers) were less positive. They indicated that some local people continued to hunt illegally. They did not support the idea that "tasting game meat in a legal manner" (Interview 13, conservancy actor #Khoadi //Hoas) had much impact on the behaviour of community people[96]. Local people and outside observers named the following reasons for illegal hunting:

- Poverty

- Inadequate feeling of ownership

- Game was seen as an everlasting free resource.

- Hunting was seen as part of tradition and culture.

- Predators were destroyed to protect livestock.

Poverty

Game was seen as a communal good with which one could supplement insufficient individual resources. Meat distribution was not seen as a disincentive for poaching, for as long as they did not get caught, local people could combine the two.

> "One little piece of rotten meat every year (meat distribution) will not stop us. You see that it stinks and then you see a nice fat kudu running there, you want to have that. People will not tell you they hunt but if you come there and you see they have just ten goats but three children, they cannot go to the kraal every day to get meat. People are hungry here." (Interview 30, community member #Khoadi //Hoas)

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[96] Illegal hunting is a sensitive issue. A lot of the following information was gathered during informal conversation rather than in interviews. There was more in-depth talk about poaching in #Khoadi //Hoas than in Ehi-Rovipuka. This may be due to a different quality of contact with some of the local people (as they talked about sensitive issues) and not because there was more poaching in one conservancy than in the other.

Inadequate feeling of ownership

Some interview-partners said that the conservancy was about "giving the wildlife to the people". But there were local people who complained that it was only given to the committees. Chapter 5.5.3 will show that the legitimacy of leadership was under discussion and participation of all relevant stakeholders was not achieved in the eyes of some interview-partners. This was seen as one stumbling block for the effective exercise of the governance task nature conservation.

Game was seen as an everlasting free resource

One reason observed for a lack of compliance from local people was that some community members did not see nature conservation and poaching control as important tasks. People perceived the development of game numbers differently according to where they lived. Not every interview-partner saw the need to protect game as strictly as the conservancy aimed to. Hunting was seen as especially tempting, as it does not decrease individual wealth as slaughtering livestock does. This refers to the logic of the tragedy of the commons (Chapter 1.5): The benefits go to the individual resource user while the community has to bear the costs.

> "Ok, we do not only hunt because we are hungry. But we want to eat meat, not pap (maize porridge). And if you go to your kraal, to get a goat, you have a goat less. But there is so much wildlife, you can just go out and hunt and keep your goats. You need them for emergencies, you sell your goats to pay school fees and hospital bills." (Interview 30, community member #Khoadi //Hoas)

Hunting as part of tradition / culture

Non-compliance in the case of hunting was also explained as a conflict of traditional and modern institutions. Hunting had a high traditional value (i.e. as rite of transition in the maturation of young men) and during colonial times it could be seen as an act of resistance against the colonisers. Not all community members agreed on the conservancy ethos that unauthorised hunting was "stealing from your own community". This interview-partner described the position that hunting has in his own system of values:

> "I do not say everyone hunts, but most of the households where you have strong young men. Hunting is also about being a strong man. You know, going out into the bush at night, tracking an animal, killing it and coming back home with some meat for the pot, to show that you can do that. Hunting is fun." (Interview 30, community member #Khoadi //Hoas)

Due to conflicting formal and informal institutions, game guards and environmental shepherds were in a difficult position. As community members they were expected to follow informal

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institutions of loyalty with "your own people", on the other hand, the formal institutions of the conservancy and their job in it put them in the position to control their neighbours and hand them over to the police if found poaching. In #Khoadi //Hoas the story of the local game guard, who reported his own stepson to the police for poaching was told with disgust. One interview-partner from Ehi-Rovipuka described the fear of some game guards:

> "(A game guard) will never tell you: Today I go into the bush. You might kill me. Some people say: If I see you in the bush and I have a gun, I'll kill you. Game guards are watching the wild animals so they are the enemy between food and him." (Interview 41, conservancy actor Ehi-Rovipuka)

Predators are killed to protect livestock

A specific issue is the illegal hunting of predators. They are not hunted for food but rather for the protection of local people's livestock. However, particularly in Ehi-Rovipuka the ideas about when local people are allowed to kill predators were quite unclear.

> "We have a lot of problems with predators, hyena and lions. If there is a problem, the local youth shoot it. The people of the conservancy say it's not good to shoot it, but we say: It kills our livestock. If they say we shouldn't kill lions they should pay for the cattle that dies, but they don't." (Interview 52, traditional authorities Ehi-Rovipuka)

So hunting of predators, when it occurred, had to be seen as an indicator for insufficient governance in the field of problem animal control.

5.5.2 Material governance effects: benefit and distribution

Benefits can come in many different ways, ranging from intangible benefits such as empowerment to tangible monetary benefits such as compensation for stock losses. Most community members and a lot of observers concentrated on the tangible benefits, so this community member's idea of benefits is rather exceptional:

> "If you don't have a conservancy you can't stay with overseas people and tourists, share culture, learn their language, stay with a lot of friends, get world-wide support from Donors because you work with people and nature." (Interview 51, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

The more formal benefit distribution following a benefit distribution plan (BDP) is a big and, as some people stated, scary task for conservancy committees who had never handled such amounts of money before.

"Everyone is watching Torra[97] because Wilderness Safaris and the hunting add money to their account all the time. What is Torra going to do with it? That is what everyone wonders. People from other conservancies would like to see them make their mistakes first." (Interview 32, NGO)

At the 2002 annual general meeting of #Khoadi //Hoas that the researcher attended, the conservancy committee presented a draft of a benefit distribution plan. Committee members stated that they experienced a lot of pressure from outside organisations and from their own community to proceed with benefit distribution. Ehi-Rovipuka was still in an early stage where benefit distribution mainly consisted of meat distribution and employment. Most interviews in #Khoadi //Hoas were conducted before the presentation of the draft benefit distribution plan and all before the actual distribution started. So for both conservancies the focus is on the more informal ad-hoc distribution of benefits.

When it came to benefit distribution, two issues stirred a lot of discussion:

- Was there a sufficient amount of benefits distributed?

- Was the distribution of benefits fair?

The community member quoted here sets clear priorities:

"One thing is: Do I finally get the job, do I get the salary. But the more important thing it: Do I have a fair chance to get it? Or can I be sure, they just give jobs to their family?" (Interview 1, community member #Khoadi //Hoas)

All interviews included the option to discuss conflicts around the conservancies[98]. So in the analysis of conflicts all different types of interviews are included – 32 for Ehi-Rovipuka and 33 for #Khoadi //Hoas. Diagram 32 shows that conflicts about benefit distribution were discussed more often in #Khoadi //Hoas than in Ehi-Rovipuka.

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[97] Torra conservancy is said to be the most advanced one in Namibia, the conservancy is neighbouring #Khoadi //Hoas and receives special attention of the NGO IRDNC as it hosts their regional centre as the regional centre, Wereldsend. In late 2002 Torra was the first conservancy to distribute a dividend of N$ 630 (63 US $) to their members (Jones, 2003).

[98] See Chapter 3.2.

Diagram 32: Proportion of interviews in which conflicts regarding benefit distribution were mentioned in Ehi-Rovipuka (100%=32) and #Khoadi //Hoas (100%=33)

5.5.2.1 Amount of benefits distributed

In #Khoadi //Hoas 11 of 33 interviewees complained that too few benefits were distributed. This number was considerably lower in Ehi-Rovipuka with 2 out of 32. In both conservancies there were high expectations about the benefits that a conservancy *could* yield. While these were not yet met in either of the conservancies, the interviewees in #Khoadi //Hoas seemed to be more impatient. In Ehi-Rovipuka a lot of those interview-partners hoping for more benefits of the conservancy saw it as still growing:

> "First animals were under MET, now we know they are ours and treat them like ours. We gain money from the animals. We have not yet started to utilise it because it is still low and we want it to become more. This conservancy is only one year old, not yet grown up." (Interview 53, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

Community members in #Khoadi //Hoas started to be impatient as their conservancy had already been registered for five years. Some of the community members voiced fairly harsh criticism:

> "They gave many promises but nothing changed. As a young man staying here there would be many options to be changed by the conservancy but they didn't." (Interview 1, community member #Khoadi //Hoas)

Overview experts gave a general warning of giving too beautiful promises to the communities. While the expected benefits might help to get a conservancy started in the beginning and to mobilise a sufficient membership, the long-term effects of disillusion were seen as severely harmful to the conservancy process and the likeliness of continuous active participation.

> "They are selling the programme with too high expectations. People want too much. It is like selling a car on free air." (Interview 7, researcher)

> "Unrealistic expectations of conservancies are another problem. They expect that as soon as they apply they will get a car, an office and be able to employ six game guards. Because that is what some NGOs did to some conservancies in the beginning. Because NGOs have given so much, some conservancies don't think about viability. They don't have to, as there is so much support. Some of these newly emerging conservancies don't have a big chance of being viable if you look at their resource base." (Interview 20, MET)

This community member of Ehi-Rovipuka gives one concrete example of high expectations that go along with conservancies:

> "After three to five years we will have no jobless people here, all the staff of the lodge will come from here, 25 people plus 15 for the campsite. (…) I think that at the moment there are about 20 people with grade 12 looking for a job in Otjokavare." (Interview 50, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

5.5.2.2 Fairness of benefit distribution

The question of fairness cannot be answered easily. Interviewees from both conservancies complained about *uneven* benefit distribution. Whether that was also perceived as *unfair* was connected to one factor: Did the interviewees ascribe the uneven distribution to logistical problems (for meat distribution mainly lack of transport and refrigeration), or did they suspect that central conservancy actors saved a bigger amount of the benefit for themselves?

In both conservancies there were complaints regarding uneven *distribution of meat*. In #Khoadi //Hoas 24% of the interviewees complained about uneven benefit distribution (meat and casual employment), in Ehi-Rovipuka 19%. Committee and staff members of both conservancies saw the logistical problems of distribution as a primary obstacle. Added were very high expectations of community members when it came to the amount of meat and a low hunting quota.

Community members agreed that logistics of distribution were difficult but also complained about favouritism, saying that central actors received more than the more marginal community members did. The groups that were said to benefit more than others were basically equivalent with the central power groups described in Chapter 5.4: Core conservancy actors, namely those with more than one portfolio. One representative of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism observed:

> "(Because of the high membership numbers) #Khoadi cannot satisfy all members. It is the elite groups versus those in conflict with wildlife, there are losers and winners." (Interview 3, government)

The *procedures* of distribution seemed to influence whether community members perceived benefit distribution as fair. In both conservancies the committee delegated the distribution of the meat to a lower level, in #Khoadi //Hoas to the Farmers' Leagues, in Ehi-Rovipuka to the heads of extended households. In #Khoadi //Hoas the problem was that most of the leagues were said to be malfunctioning. Interviewees said that only one to three of the eight leagues were active. So giving the distribution to them meant a delegation of responsibility to a partner who – at that time – was not able to carry it.

> "There was a meat distribution while you were here, under this tree, but people out there in more distanced areas probably got nothing. (…) Some people have no radio and no donkey. So till the people from the far-away leagues come, the meat might be rotten or distributed already. (…) Those in the far-away areas think: Why do I have to go far for a little bit of rotten meat? Yes, some leagues do not co-operate with the conservancy. Most people in the committee and the leagues don't get a salary so they don't do it properly." (Interview 19, traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas)

The distribution mechanism chosen in Ehi-Rovipuka, giving meat to the heads of extended household, meant using grown and respected organisational structures and provoked less criticism about the distribution on the grassroots level. But also in Ehi-Rovipuka a number of interviewees complained that meat did not reach certain areas.

When it comes to the *distribution of casual jobs* especially community members of #Khoadi //Hoas complained about unfairness. That might also be due to procedural factors. In #Khoadi //Hoas the office staff spread the job offer by word of mouth through the Farmers' Leagues. The staff chose workers following the informal guideline: "If we chose people from this side this time, we will chose people from the other side next time." (Interview 9, conservancy actor #Khoadi //Hoas). In Ehi-Rovipuka the selection of workers was delegated to the village level. While it is not said that the method in Ehi-Rovipuka is going to be fairer in its *outcome*, it seemed to cause less friction because the ownership of decision-making was more localised and the *procedures* were more transparent.

> "One lady from this village was doing the cooking and washing when the hunters were here. They include all people in jobs." (Interview 48, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

> "If there is a sponsored workshop there must be people to do the cooking. They come and collect people at the houses but it is only their own families and they get paid. It's always the same people." (Interview 1, community member #Khoadi //Hoas)

Some interviewees severely criticised the delegation of tasks from the conservancy to the Farmers' Leagues in #Khoadi //Hoas:

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"I say it is unconstitutional if the farmers' leagues have to do the conservancy's job. (…) I support the integrated approach but if each one is said to carry the other side, nothing happens as no one carries." (Interview 3, government actor #Khoadi //Hoas)

5.5.3 Immaterial governance effect: participation

One of the central aims of CBNRM is to allow for the participation of "the rural community" in natural resource management. But the concept of CBNRM does not expressly acknowledge the stratification of local communities (see Chapter 3.5). An overview over all interviews shows that complaints about participation deficits were quite common. Local interviewees as well as overview experts described the participation of conservancy members as far from optimal. Some overview experts described this as a general problem that did no only occur in the two field-study conservancies[99].

Diagram 33: Proportion of interviewees that mentioned conflicts about participation of the local community

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[99] And as a more critical streak of literature shows, this problem is not only limited to Namibian CBNRM (e.g. Rozemeijer, 2000, Anstey at al., 2002).

Diagram 33 shows the percentage of interviewees in both conservancies that described conflicts about the participation of the local community. The following problems were described concerning participation (absolute numbers in brackets):

- Few actors monopolise power in the conservancy (13)

- Little power is given to the local community (7)

- The local community does not participate actively (5)

- Locals are against the conservancy (4)

- There is no feedback from the committee to the members of the conservancy (3)

- There is little consultation of the community (2)

- There are no written protocols of the meetings (1)

- Problems are not discussed (1)

- There is little training for the community (1)

- Facilitators mistake the committee for the community (1)

- Conservancy actors discourage participation (1)[100]

The reasons for these deficits were seen in some background factors, the institutional set-up and some actor-specific factors, which are elaborated below.

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[100] This includes semi-structured interviews with power-game but also the flexible discussions with overview experts, special issue experts and local people with low specific knowledge. To understand this proportion it is important to note that these were not the results of a closed question ("Is there a gap between the committee and community, yes or no"). These numbers show all interviewees mentioning participation deficits in the general discussion about power issues.

5.5.3.1 Background factors constraining participation

For both conservancies, interviewees claimed that the insufficient local physical infrastructure was a stumbling block for participation. Local people were discouraged from attending meetings by the poor conditions of roads and a lack of transport. This was especially problematic for marginalized community members. This group includes both economically marginalized (the very poor) and those living at the geographic margins of the conservancy. This problem was described as more severe in #Khoadi //Hoas where the decision-making of the conservancy members took place at one central annual meeting. In both conservancies the relatively high number of community members made it difficult to give everyone the space to participate.

5.5.3.2 Institutional factors constraining participation

Interviewees criticised that the national legislation as well as the respective conservancy constitutions contained regulations that impeded participation.

National-level legislation

The Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1996) goes a fundamental step towards devolving natural resource use *rights* to the community level (see Chapter 3.5). But even though the aim of the legislation is to empower "local communities" in general, the data obtained indicates that only certain groups of locals really increased their power in natural resource management through CBNRM (see Chapter 5.4). Interviewees saw one institutional reason for this flaw in the flexibility of the legislation. They criticised that it left the devolution of power below the committee level rather vague. The legislation leaves the concrete procedures of finding committee members to the communities. So the respective conservancy constitutions are important institutions implementing these rather general standards. The interviewees were not unanimous about the effects of this open legislation. Some – as described above – criticised it as too open. But others argued that this flexibility really succeeded in giving room to culturally appropriate local institutions.

Conservancy constitutions

Interview-partners from both case-study conservancies emphasised that the choice of committee members was not discriminatory according to the cultural background, gender, profession,

education or place of birth. Committee members had to be 18 years or above, live in the community for several years and had to be conservancy members.

But the modes of election in the two conservancies carried the potential of favouring certain groups of conservancy members. The differences between the two constitutions showed in the composition of the conservancy committees.

As a result of village-level elections basically every village of *Ehi-Rovipuka* had a representative in the conservancy committee. Inhabitants of the smaller settlements even had a better chance of becoming committee members as they only competed against their small number of neighbours. But as much as the village-level elections facilitated the interaction with ordinary community members and allowed for a broad regional representation in the committee, this structure impeded the close cooperation of committee members. Transport problems were seen as one reason why committee meetings regularly tended to start significantly later than arranged. But another argument against village-level elections was heard more often:

> "Following the constitution here [Ehi-Rovipuka] every village should have someone in the committee. So on village level it is possible that there is no-one with adequate skills (…). General elections would be better here so that you can elect those with the highest potential." (Interview 32, NGO)

This reflects the general tension between effective management and the empowerment aspect of CBNRM.

In *#Khoadi //Hoas* the central elections furthered a bias as it favoured those living close to the venue of the central meeting and those who could afford transport to the meeting. This became obvious at the annual general meeting that the researcher observed in October 2002. The newly elected committee had a strong over-representation of people from one settlement, Anker. This was seen in a critical light by a number of interviewees (including some committee members). This outcome of the elections was seen as consolidating the current distribution of power: One "power-group" from Anker was central in the decision-making of the conservancy, whereas in other areas conservancy members said they did not feel represented and hostility against the conservancy started to grow.

At the time of the field stay different actors discussed a change of the election procedure. While some external observers favoured a village-level election system, the conservancy actors preferred a stronger involvement of other community-based organisations:

> "We (committee / staff) are not content with the outcomes of the last election. We are thinking about ways to improve the process. We would like it if organisations like the farmers' leagues, women's association, youth league and so on nominate candidates beforehand so at the general meeting you have a list of people to elect. So not anyone who comes to the AGM and brings a few friends along, can be elected into the committee." (Staff member #Khoadi //Hoas at feedback meeting)

5.5.3.3 Actor-specific factors constraining participation of the local community

Actor-specific constraints against participation were seen in various stakeholder groups. While the behaviour of ordinary community members and core conservancy actors was described as crucial, also traditional authorities and facilitating agencies (MET and NGOs) were said to have a bearing on the participation of the local community.

For the local actors the actor-specific factors are generally those that were used to explain their power-status in CBNRM (see Chapter 5.4). The factors that were said to increase the influence of *core conservancy actors* at the expense of general community participation were:

- The maintenance of powerful networks,

- The will to power and

- The preparedness to exclude other actors from decision-making.

Some committee members openly campaigned against democratic and participatory procedures:

> "Free and fair elections are a problem because then I can vote for whoever I want, just because he is my friend." (Committee member #Khoadi //Hoas at feedback meeting)

Typical characteristics of *ordinary local actors* that reduced their degree of participation were:

- A lack of interest in conservancy matters,

- A lack of active participation in CBNRM,

- A low degree of self-organisation as a group,

- Marginal status in the conservancy in terms of geographical distance, culture and livelihood.

Traditional authorities were seen as having an impact on the participation of ordinary community members in different ways. Where they formed part of the power-network of the conservancy (as multi-portfolio actors) they were described as following similar strategies as conservancy actors in general. But some interviewees also saw traditional authorities as external to the conservancy and their role as representing either their own group interests or the interests of the community against the conservancy.

Facilitating agencies (MET and NGOs) were seen as responsible for supervising conservancies also in the aspect of participation. Interviewees expected MET and NGOs to exert control and – if participation was impeded – to interfere. Interviewees rated the effectiveness with which facilitators assured participation differently. During the field stay there was a growing discussion about a gap between committees and communities. Interviewees from NGOs and MET stated that overcoming this gap would be one of the big challenges of CBNRM in the future.

5.5.4 Immaterial governance effect: conflict resolution

Indicators for the quality of governance can be found in the way governance actors treat and solve (or do not solve) conflicts. The redistribution processes inherent in the concept of CBNRM are likely to be accompanied by conflicts as the power that is transferred is *taken from* other actors who might not be so happy with their loss of influence. During the interviews some conflicts repeatedly came up in the discussion. Interviewees described them as typical for the CBNRM development in Namibia. They will be analysed below – especially according to the potential for conflict resolution vested in the respective actors. The examples analysed are:

- Power struggles involving traditional authorities and conservancy actors

- Multi-actor conflicts concerning benefit from tourism

- Simmering conflicts between MET and NGOs

5.5.4.1 Power struggles involving traditional authorities and conservancy actors

When talking about a redistribution of power through conservancies, traditional authorities are one group of actors likely to feel threatened to lose power. As described above, traditional

authorities saw themselves as "fathers of the land", generally responsible for the distribution of land in the communal area[101]. Even though the conservancy legislation does not give *land rights* to the conservancies, they have to make *land-related decisions* (like outlining conservancy boundaries and exclusive wildlife areas).

So at least a minimum degree of co-operation between conservancies and traditional authorities is necessary for the establishment and management of conservancies. But this co-operation takes place in a field of institutional insecurity with conflicting as well as changing institutions. It was shown earlier that one of the pillars on which the power of traditional authorities rested was their right to interfere with (especially land-related) decisions.

In the interviews typical conflict constellations including traditional authorities were described:

- Traditional authorities felt excluded from the conservancy process and feared to lose power. They fought against conservancy actors (local and others) to secure their own power-base and benefits.

- Conflicts with less clearly defined camps. Conservancy actors and traditional authorities used the respective other actors and institutions as a vehicle for their own conflict.

Traditional authorities felt excluded and feared to lose power / benefits

One example for a power-struggle between traditional authorities and conservancy actors is described below, that is the multi-actor conflict about concession areas. At the time of the field research, interviewees in both conservancies did not describe conflicts with clear-cut lines between traditional and conservancy actors – at least not for the local level. But in the discussion with overview experts the problem of traditional authorities feeling threatened by conservancies was widely acknowledged. This kind of conflict was described as typical for the application process of conservancies.

Traditional authorities used their land rights to hamper the process of conservancy formation through long-lasting boundary conflicts. This problem was especially rife in Kunene North with its unclear land situation. It seemed less severe in Kunene South, where the colonial farm-

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[101] Although the land rights were in flow in the time this research was undertaken, generally all interview-partners agreed that it was the responsibility of traditional authority to exercise land rights in the communal areas.

boundaries were generally accepted as dividing the land between different traditional leaders. Interviewees gave two reasons why traditional authorities felt threatened by conservancies. Firstly they acknowledged that conservancies *did* shift power to other actors and that this gave the old local elite a good reason to dislike the process. Secondly some said that mainly those traditional authorities conflicted with the conservancies who feared that CBNRM would increase accountability and uncover their abuse of power.

> "In the past traditional authorities were respected. They lose power through conservancies and land boards." (Interview 3, governmental actor)

> "People that are powerful now might lose with the conservancy as everyone is made powerful because it is a democratic institution, that's the idea. Traditional hierarchy is not changed through conservancies. You stay chief. But everyone starts to know what is going on, opens the eyes. Not everyone likes that, it is a threat to some greedy people." (Interview 46, NGO)

> Having a conservancy "challenges traditional authorities as it raises awareness of local people. They shift from civil subjects to people with rights, conservancies bring in a culture of democracy." (Interview 25, NGO)

In CBNRM various strategies are tried out to overcome conflicts between traditional authorities and the conservancies. In the interviews the following options were discussed:

- Integration of traditional authorities in the conservancy power group

- Symbolic recognition of traditional authorities

- Decrease of the power of traditional authorities through changed institutions

The *integration* of traditional authorities into the process of conservancy development and management was the option chosen in the Ehi-Rovipuka conservancy. Here traditional authorities were treated as core stakeholders for conservancy development right from the beginning. A precondition for this solution is that the traditional authorities co-operate. A price one might have to pay for this solution is a decrease of democratisation effects of CBNRM. This was described above for Ehi-Rovipuka where the traditional authorities formed a cohesive power-network with a tendency to exclude outsiders and minimise internal criticism.

The situation in #Khoadi //Hoas was less clear. While some of the traditional authorities saw themselves as strong actors in the conservancy, there were also interviewees who stated that conflicts were avoided by merely showing *respect* – without giving away too much decision-making capacity. So the headman's power in the conservancy is to a certain degree symbolic:

"The power of the traditional headman [in #Khoadi //Hoas]has diminished and the community has more power. This is not a problem for the headman because he sees the community benefits and the committee always acknowledges the traditional authority whenever there is a success. They always say that it was also because of his support." (Interview 36, NGO)

While the central power-group of the #Khoadi //Hoas included one traditional leader, it was not consistently structured by traditional elite patterns.

Another option is a gradual *disempowerment* of traditional authorities. As the impact of traditional authorities on CBNRM mainly comes from their responsibility for land decisions, a recent change of legislation tries to – at least partly – take this power from traditional authorities and distribute it among a bigger diversity of stakeholders.

"(…) the communal land reform act. That is about land rights. Land boards are developed to give the power over communal land from just the traditional authorities to a body with government, conservancies, regional government and the traditional authorities. At the moment the power of traditional authorities is great, that creates problems of accountability and democracy when traditional authorities do not consult their people." (Interview 28, NGO)

Stakeholders of CBNRM in Namibia were unsure how the changes in land-rights would be applied in practice and what effects the introduction of land boards would have on conservancies. The disempowerment of traditional authorities was seen in a critical light not only by the authorities themselves. Other interviewees like NGO staff – but even more so governmental actors – emphasised the importance of traditional authorities. Some openly disagreed with the power of democratic legitimisation of local governance actors:

"At a meeting in Uis last year we said the conservancy committee is just a committee, traditional authorities are authorities, they are put in by legislation so they must be recognised. (…). The traditional authorities are permanent fathers of the land, whereas committees are there only for five years, so traditional authorities guarantee continuity. The PTO application form must be recommended by traditional authorities to the governor. If I get one that does not have the signature of the traditional authorities I send it back to them. If the chief signed, I do not question." (Interview 12, governmental actor)

"Western NGOs and researchers want to impose democracy on Africa but that does not work here. Not that way as you like it. We are in the situation of having the option of practising both systems, the traditional and the democratic modern system." (Interview 3, governmental actor)

The support that traditional actors received from government staff might also be connected to the fact that a number of governmental interviewees were related to traditional authorities (e.g. being the daughter of a king or holding a political mandate and a dormant chieftainship).

Traditional authorities and conservancy actors use each other in their conflicts

In many cases the conflicting parties were less clearly defined. Here conflicts that involved traditional authorities and conservancy actors had members of both groups in both camps.

> "That traditional authorities are fighting through the conservancies is not a common problem, only in some conservancies. For those who have more than one leader it is a burning issue." (Interview 38, NGO)

> "Headmen use conservancies for their own fights, to gain, to convince people." (Interview 40, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

In *#Khoadi //Hoas* the researcher observed a conflict where both, conservancy actors and traditional authorities, were described as using the other group to improve their own position. Conflicts of local traditional authorities were mingled with national-level political struggles. At the time of the field study the conservancy committee was strongly taking sides. Researchers, MET staff and committee members described the local conflict as the clash between a local headman that was strongly involved in conservancy matters right from the beginning and a new chief[102] who, while living in the conservancy, was seen as a "Windhoek player". While the headman lived in Anker (where most of the powerful conservancy actors came from) and was described as member of the central power-group, the chief lived in the remote North of the conservancy where people in general seemed to feel less ownership of the conservancy.

On the national level the chief was part of a group of Damara chiefs that wanted to reduce the Damara King's power to merely representative functions. Even though he said that he did not belong to any political party, local public saw him as SWAPO supporter while Damara King Justus Garoëb was the leader of the UDF opposition party. The chief continuously criticised the conservancy committee, e.g. for acting without appropriate consultation of the local public. Conservancy actors and parts of the traditional authorities campaigned against the new chief. During the field stay the conflict grew more and more severe with members of the local community holding a meeting to try and remove the chief from his position. A MET representative observed:

> "Traditional interests and political party conflicts are intermingled. The traditional side is not so much of a problem but the political difference between committees and traditional authorities, like in #Khoadi. There is a power struggle between Ernst (headman) and Max (chief). The committee is busy choosing sides between

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[102] In the traditional hierarchy a chief is above a headman.

these old men. They started on their own but the conservancy comes to make use of one traditional leader. Now he (Ernst) thinks: 'I have good support from them'; but the conservancy just wants to gain interest. I tell conservancies to stay out of the matters of traditional authorities. Max is the recognised chief, he can write to the president: 'They do not recognise me, they let the PTOs[103] be signed by someone else'. The conservancy can only lose there, the President listens to traditional authorities. They have more power than us, the MET." (Interview 3, governmental actor)

At the feedback meeting in #Khoadi //Hoas committee members clearly took sides:

"The conservancy always worked with Ernst. (…) Max comes very late for dinner and wants to eat. You (researcher) came when these issues of power were fought about. There was a meeting were people wanted to remove Max Haraseb. The community ordered king Garoëb to dismiss Max. He comes late and breaks our achievements. (…) He stays in Windhoek for weeks." (Conservancy committee #Khoadi //Hoas at feedback meeting)

By the end of the field research a conflict resolution was nowhere in sight. One interviewee expressed his relief that this conflict only escalated after the registration of the conservancy, because it would have been able to cause severe damage to the application process. This case can be seen as an example of a lack of working conflict resolution mechanisms. The procedures applied on the ground seemed rather ad-hoc. In a situation of institutional insecurity and changes it remained unclear who was in charge for a decision on a higher level. The conflicting parties used the respective institutions in an opportunistic way. While the traditional authorities generally recurred to traditional institutions, they also used democratic measures (community meetings, collecting signatures) to achieve their goals. Researching this conflict while it was actually happening proved to be a difficult task and the answers collected were obviously biased by the interests of the conflicting parties. Central government was generally described as reluctant to interfere with local-level conflicts.

"People in Africa generally try to avoid conflict, it is seen as something very negative because there are few constructive mechanisms to cope with it, little between 'everyone agrees' and 'war'. Government does not know how to handle conflict on the ground." (Interview 16, NGO)

Ehi-Rovipuka also hosted a conflict between traditional authorities. But this conflict did not seem to be intermingled with conservancy matters. The conflict evolved around the legitimate successor of the late headman (Keephas Muzuma) who had been a strong proponent of the conservancy. Two of his relatives claimed to be the rightful new headman. While this caused

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[103] "Permission to occupy" the document needed to occupy and use land in communal areas.

serious disagreement within the traditional authorities, interviewees agreed that conservancy matters remained untouched. They gave several reasons:

- There were no political conflicts between the two traditional authorities.

- Both traditional leaders were local actors who favoured the conservancy.

- Both were part of the same family, so while they disagreed strongly about the successor of the late headman, they still shared the same social ties.

- The conservancy integrated representatives of all fractions in the conservancy committee.

One community member explained why the conflict of traditional authorities did not impact on the conservancy.

> "The conservancy is not affected by the conflict of traditional authorities as all are pro-conservancy. When we selected the committee Gottfried (one of the conflicting traditional authorities) elected the chairman. Conservancy and headmen are similar things. If you are a headman you get money from government every month. There are no politics in the conservancy. All traditional authorities follow the same party." (Interview 51, community member Ehi-Rovipuka)

But this quote also shows that conflict resolution might also mean compromising on democratic principles (traditional authority chooses the chairman of the conservancy).

5.5.4.2 Multi-actor conflicts concerning benefit from tourism

The argument above shows the significance of mutual respect and symbolic recognition for the mitigation of conflicts in CBNRM. But this is not to belie that interviewees saw the distribution of expected material benefits as a central motor of conflict. This was obvious on the local level when it came to meat distribution. But the direct consumptive use of wildlife provided only a small benefit compared to the potential and actual benefits from tourism. So while the conflicts about meat were mainly limited to local-level actors, conflicts about tourism benefits showed a more complex actor constellation, including regional and national actors.

Situated between the two field-study conservancies is *Hobatere*, a concession area hosting a private tourism venue of scenic beauty and abundance of wildlife. Hobatere was an issue of local, regional and national interest, with various stakeholders following their respective agendas. When the issue was discussed, it seemed that rumours, facts and strategic answers were mingled and the directions of the ongoing processes were still unclear.

As it had been part of the Grootberg Ward that constitutes the #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy, the local conservancy actors wanted to include the profitable concession area into their conservancy right from the beginning. Following government recommendations it was not included into the application but negotiations with the concession holder started as soon as the conservancy was registered. After long negotiations with the concession holder, when a contract about co-operation and benefits for the community was finally close to being signed, the process was stopped by outside actors. Different interview-partners saw either the MET or the Damara King Justus Garoëb as the main protagonist stalling the process. Justus Garoëb wrote a letter to stop all further negotiations about Hobatere that did not include the traditional authorities. In an interview he said:

> "Sometimes leaders of NGOs conflict with traditional authorities. NGOs do not have a legal standing in the area so they use conservancies against traditional authorities to gain power over land. (…) Power over land lies with the chief. Sometimes NGOs want more power over land than the chief." (Interview 10, traditional authority)

Government on the other hand was said to be interested in a moratorium until a concession policy was put into action. Some interview-partners stated that one reason for the government to stop negotiations was the yet unfinished plan to establish a contractual people's park, including Hobatere. But also plans to make Hobatere a rhino sanctuary were mentioned. In this context it was said that some government officials did not think that local communities could properly manage these prestigious animals. Some interview-partners stated that parts of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism disagreed with the broad devolution of power through CBNRM and tried to "save" at least small parts of the area and keep them under ministry control. Another concern mentioned was that of fairness. Some MET staff, traditional authorities and members of other conservancies said they would like to see broader distribution of the benefits from Hobatere. Four possible ranges were given: Benefits could go to the #Khoadi //Hoas conservancy, to all neighbouring conservancies of Hobatere, to the whole Damara community or to the whole Damara traditional authority.

The position of the Damara traditional authorities in this conflict remained unclear throughout the interviews. Committee members of #Khoadi //Hoas stated that right from the beginning the local traditional leaders had been supportive of the inclusion of Hobatere into #Khoadi //Hoas. There were go-ahead letters of the Damara King at the beginning of the negotiations but then there was

a letter to stop all further negotiations just when the signing of a contract was close. Some interview-partners hinted that King Garoëb wanted to secure the income for the Damara Royal House to strengthen his own position. When other conservancies like Ehi-Rovipuka stated their interest in Hobatere, that move was described as reflecting a conflict between NGOs. Some interview-partners said that here NNF (#Khoadi //Hoas) and IRDNC (Ehi-Rovipuka) struggled for territory.

This unresolved conflict slowed down the potential economic development of the area. The concession holder saw his plans to extend the tourism operations with the help of a foreign investor stalled, as this actor preferred to hold back his investment until the situation was cleared. During the field stay the researchers observed first government efforts to develop a clearer institutional background. A broad consultation process was started to develop a concession policy that would be a guideline to solve the conflicts around concession areas and conservancies.

When this research was undertaken the applicable institutions for such a multi-layer conflict were not clear. Interviewees saw government treating matters of concession areas in an unpredictable ad-hoc manner. For the actors in the field it seemed as if government had not yet decided about the relationships between conservancies and concession areas. The *aims* and *strategies* of the different actors remained unclear for other actors and were subject to frequent changes. The *rights* and *responsibilities* of the actors were also neither apparent nor well-defined. It was rather that conflicting parties flexibly referred to those existing and pre-independence institutions that backed their own position. This forbade reliable planning for both conservancies and tourism actors and thus interfered with a further economic development of the area.

5.5.4.3 Simmering conflict between NGOs and MET

The responsibilities and roles of some NGOs and MET staff in CBNRM were described as overlapping as both were seen as facilitators and control organs of the conservancy. This should not belie the fact that both actors derived their power from broadly different sources. NGOs are characterised by their potential to provide funding (see Chapter 5.3) while a special characteristic of governmental actors is their legislative power.

While the NGOs could use financial restrictions as sanctioning instrument, the MET had the option to remove the rights given to the conservancies if they did not act according to the

legislation. A situation of shared aims and different resources could either lead to co-operation with a division of responsibilities or to competition between the actors. While the general approach chosen was co-operative, in practice interviewees from both stakeholder groups complained about the respective other one.

They described their own organisation as the one doing the most important work and the others (NGOs or MET) as basically interfering and disturbing processes. Some of the overview experts explained the history of this simmering conflict. They saw a "brain drain" from the MET towards the NGOs that mainly dated back to the time after independence. It weakened the MET and fuelled the conflict:

> "No, there is not really a more senior CBNRM person at the MET now, they had a high staff turnover with the change of Minister, that is problematic because the new people often just do not have the understanding for the project and the MET vision. Things would be far easier if there were still MET staff that were part of the visioning of the MET but they all left." (Interview 83, NGO)

> "In the post-apartheid country the guys in the programme went out of the MET into the NGOs. There is a vacuum in the MET now. The guys took their links with them to the NGOs and left a pretty ignorant MET that didn't understand the legislation. NGOs have never been regulated. (…). The historical context of power is very important to understand the whole setting. The NGO guys are arrogant and think: We did a better job when we were in power, these white guys with all their education, skills and networks." (Interview 7, researcher)

Government actors raised the issue of a loss of democratic control when NGOs grew stronger:

> "This set-up of CBNRM and NGOs versus government, if you go further that is a political situation. We have to be very careful about that. We are busy to transform communities from indigenous knowledge to foreign knowledge and expertise. (…) At this moment we cannot say communities benefit, it is still donor-driven, I wonder what will happen when the donors phase out." (Interview 3, government)

> "NGOs want to remain in the communities. They don't want the conservancies to become independent." (Interview 3, government)

On the other hand interview-partners of NGOs criticised MET actors as ineffective, weak in personnel and resources and not trusting in local communities. NGOs are influential actors in CBNRM and the data argues for their gain of influence through CBNRM (Compare Chapter 5.4). To maintain their own position, especially those NGOs exclusively focussing on CBNRM needed conservancies to be a success story. So generally NGO staff was open for constructive criticism but sensitive when it came to public exposure of weaknesses.

The MET played an important role providing the framework for conservancies but there were voices that it should be more active in the assessment and evaluation, to avoid that CBNRM is

manipulated by the intelligent and powerful in a community. Competition and a lack of trust between some MET employees and some NGO staff seemed to take a lot of energy and resources that could be used in a more constructive way. But interview-partners described that in 2002 some of the barriers between these actors had been broken down and interaction had been revived.

5.5.4.4 Summary conflicts / conflict-resolution mechanisms

The importance of conflict in CBNRM as a social process is summed up by one of the NGO staff members that were interviewed:

> "A lot of outsiders criticise that there are conflicts. Look at the conflicts. As a Namibian and as anthropologist I say: Conflicts are inevitable if you change the distribution of power. Power is taken out of the hands of colonial white elites, that is democratisation. Where traditional authorities are democratic and have the support of the people they will support the conservancy. If traditional are not sure of their power they see the conservancy as a threat." (Interview 11, NGO actor)

During the field stay the researcher made the experience that the thorough analysis of the mechanisms for conflict resolution and their application in day-to-day practice was difficult within the tight schedule of this research and with the methods chosen. For conflicts that were still virulent the researcher experienced being used as a mouthpiece for the different interests. Analysing conflicts of the past was no convincing alternative as it meant relying on the fading and biased memory of the different conflicting parties.

So the conflicts that are touched in the preceding chapter would need more time and effort to be analysed completely. But still some insights into structural characteristics of CBNRM can be gained through a closer look at these conflict constellations that were described as "typical".

The conflicts analysed seem to be aggravated or extended by institutional weaknesses:

- The relevant institutions were not comprehensive: They did not provide rules that fitted to the respective conflicts

- The institutions were not exclusive and clear-cut: More that one set of institutions could be applied to the conflict. The respective actors tended to recur to those institutions that favoured their own interest

- Some institutions were ambiguous and not precise; so two conflicting parties could interpret the same institution in their own favour.

In this situation of institutional insecurity the question of conflict resolution is more closely linked to the characteristics of the actors. This seems to be a reason why similar constellations allow for different courses of conflicts. This is especially obvious in the conflicts including traditional authorities and conservancies that were observed in both case studies.

The comparison of the power status of different actors proved to be difficult because their power was derived from different sources and exercised in different fields. When conflicts occurred, this lack of comparability turned from an academic question into a real-world problem: One common solution for conflicts of interest (e.g. distribution of limited benefits) is to ask a higher hierarchy level for a binding decision. But this solution drops out if ranking is unclear. This becomes especially apparent if stakes are high and actors come from different stakeholder groups as well as different levels (local, regional, national) and follow different institutions. A typical example is the multi-actor conflict about tourism benefits around Hobatere. Some of the overview-experts complained about a tendency of facilitating agencies to withdraw from conflict or to avoid acting as decision-making authority for lower levels. This was sometimes seen as combined with hidden agendas, unclear goals and strategies. While such simmering conflicts refrained from being completely understood by the researcher, they also tended to be difficult to solve for the actors in the field, who had to rely on rumours, suspicions and the odd piece of unrelated information about the position of the other actors. This was an effect that the researcher observed for the Hobatere conflict as well as in the simmering conflict between NGOs and MET.

6. Discussion and outlook

This chapter provides a critical discussion of the approach of this research as well as of the results gathered. This starts with a review of the theoretical concepts applied and an assessment of whether they delivered a suitable framework for the research (Chapter 6.1). The methods applied in the field were rather specific and developed specifically for this research. So Chapter 6.2 discusses whether they were applicable in the field and produced substantial data. The results of the research focus on the material and immaterial governance effects and the role that actors and institutions play in this governance field (Chapter 6.3).

6.1 How did the theoretical concepts work as backbone of this research?

Chapter 1 gives a background on the theoretical concepts used to approach the socio-political processes associated with CBNRM in Namibia. Looking back at the experience of the researcher in the field and the results accomplished, the question remains whether these concepts were particularly suitable for analysing and understanding the real-world phenomena at stake.

6.1.1 Social constructivism as a blind man's stick in intercultural research

The introduction of social constructivism in Chapter 1.1 is a brief and rather personal description of the researcher's view of the world and the effects this has on conducting socio-political research. A look on the field experience helps to answer the question of how this actually *did* influence the course of the research and the understanding of the data gathered: During the stay in Namibia the researcher interacted with people from various backgrounds in terms of culture, education and personal experience. The interviewees showed different perceptions of the world, different judgements of what they observed and some told vastly differing stories about the same issue (e.g. about where the power of powerful actors came from, whether local wildlife was rare or abundant and how evenly benefits were distributed).

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Through her constructivist approach the researcher had anticipated a diversity of pictures reflecting the heterogeneous setting. But some of the contradictions between interviewees seemed to go further than that: The researcher could not help but suspect that some interviewees consciously lied in the interviews. This means: Some of the differences did not rest on different perceptions of the world, but interviewees told things that they themselves did not believe to be true. This seemed to be especially likely in cases were interviewees told contradictory "hard facts", e.g. about the question whether meat distribution did or did not reach certain local households. So while social constructivism helped the researcher to productively cope with the irritations of intercultural research, it did not stop her from being unsettled by the suspicion of being lied to.

6.1.2   The outcome-oriented definition of power

The mainly outcome-oriented definition of power was chosen with close consideration of the presumed interview situations. Understanding power through the things that actors can achieve with power allowed discussing the concept in a down-to-earth way. Especially in the context of culturally different views of the world it proved to be helpful to root the abstract attribute in examples drawn from commonplace real-world experience of the interviewee. Different perceptions of the meaning of "power" became apparent in the discussions. Some followed a narrow definition of power comprising only legitimate decision-making authority. So it was explained that this research followed a broader definition of power as "the ability to reach one's goals in a social setting regardless of the means applied". This allowed for the inclusion of all local governance actors. This was especially important in a field of institutional complexity where the legitimacy of decision-making was not always clear and where informal means like advice and support had to be seen as strongly influential.

But this outcome-oriented approach also bore certain limitations. These became apparent in the qualitative part of the interviews and in the data-analysis. The one-dimensional definition allowed for a quantitative comparison of the power status of different stakeholder groups. But some interviewees claimed it difficult to compare power that came from such different sources as traditional legitimisation, the ability to provide funding, legal authority, charismatic personality

and democratic legitimisation. This problem is further elaborated in chapter 6.2, the discussion of the methodological approach.

6.1.3 Juggling with complexity: Understanding a game with inconsistent rules and a batch of unequal teams

Choosing actor-centred institutionalism as a general approach meant keeping an eye on actors as well as institutions. This seemed to be especially important as the actors as well as the formal and informal institutions proved to be diverse, sometimes conflicting and following a different logic. The rather euro-centric approach of the actor-centred institutionalism had to be slightly "africanised" by emphasising the special role of traditional authorities. In a present-day African state like Namibia there are actors that recur to so-called "traditional" institutions that, in fact, are only partly traditional (meaning pre-colonial) and only partly informal (meaning not written down).

North (1990) pictures actors and institutions as the players and the rules of a game. The researcher could not elude the impression that in CBNRM in rural Namibia the different teams on the green simultaneously played a number of different games, flexibly switching between the different sets of rules – each game featuring a different referee.

For a closer understanding of the situation it proved suitable to conceptualise institutions as a framework that can be changed and broken by actors. It appeared that especially where the institutions were weak (contradictory, weakly enforced, not comprehensive) the behaviour of the respective actors gained importance. So weak institutions allowed for individual entrepreneurship on the one hand and the development of exclusive power-groups on the other.

In the interaction with the interviewees it was helpful to be able to offer them a rather open conceptualisation of social processes. While some of the interviewees put a stronger emphasis on the structural aspects, others saw the individual behaviour of the actor as the most important determinant. Both found their views recognised in the research design.

But while the complexity of the conceptualisation of social development was of great help during the data collection, the analysis of data was complicated by it. This becomes especially apparent in the analysis of governance effects (Chapter 5.5).

6.1.4   Does the governance concept help coping with this complexity?

This research followed the basic idea of governance: the provision of public services is an activity undertaken by a variety of government and non-governmental actors. Taking into account that these actors can vary in different thematic fields of governance and in different areas of the world, the list of actors involved was not taken from the literature but gathered in the field research.

CBNRM in Namibia could be used as a typical example to illustrate the term "governance", as it calls for the co-operation of actors from government, NGOs, CBOs, traditional authorities and the private commercial sector. Their task is to provide public services like the protection of wildlife and the amelioration of local livelihoods. Their interaction is shaped both by their own (individual and organisational) goals and by the various formal and informal institutions.

But did the governance approach help the researcher to cope with the complexity of the socio-political processes that were being analysed? First of all it *acknowledges* this complexity instead of reducing it to a small number of easy-to-handle parameters that have little to do with the situation in the field. It allowed to frame actors as influential that did not have formal decision-making authority. And it backed a methodology where the local actors themselves were the ones to define who is involved in local governance. That allowed the researcher to approach formal and informal decision-making structures

But the clash of theoretical considerations and real-world research experience taught the researcher some modesty when it came to measuring governance development. It soon became apparent that the aspect that seemed the most interesting to the researcher, that of impacts, eluded the research designs possible with the logistic restrictions of an individual PhD project. But even with a longer time span and more funding available it remains doubtable whether the complex setting with international, national and local influences from various fields would allow for a

research that clearly isolates the impacts of specific governance action like the implementation of conservancies.

6.1.5 Resource use regimes, ownership, property

Governance is a rather general concept that can be applied to all different kinds of public services that are produced by a variety of governmental and other actors. When focussing on natural resource management, some specific features of this governance field have to be well understood. This is especially true for the Namibia context with its intermingled pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence rights to resources and its current dual system of private and communal land. For a thorough understanding of the set-up it was helpful not to concentrate on *ownership* of resources but to work out the details of the different *property regimes*, namely access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. The conservancy committees, for example, shared the right to access the area of the conservancy with everyone, they had a limited right to withdraw and manage but none of exclusion and alienation, as the communal land is state-owned.

6.2 Were the methods developed practicable in the field, and did they produce adequate data?

With the "power game" the researcher developed a methodological tool that went further than the usual questionnaire or text-based visualisation. So the field research was not only a data-gathering venture but also – to some extent – served to test a method in the field. The power-game aimed at visualising actor constellations, distribution of power and respective sources of power in a non-text-based way. This was seen as especially important in a research that included people from various backgrounds in terms of culture, education and exposure.

The experience with this method was encouraging. The mannetjies[104] helped to structure discussion with interview partners from both European and African background. Especially for those complex thinkers who named a great number of stakeholders of CBNRM (the highest

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[104] Mannetjie is Afrikaans for the diminutive of "man", a word that also slipped into the Namibian English, replacing the more complicated "board-game figure".

number of actors being named in one interview was 35!) the concrete game helped to keep the whole picture in perspective while talking about its details. Visualising the power ranking through the height of power towers made differences and similarities obvious and easy to discuss. This showed in the way that interviewees tended to make adjustments to the setting after every mannetjie was put on a tower.

The first halftime of the power game was reserved to setting up the players and collecting quantitative data concerning their perceived power status and range of action. But it also served to build the foundation for the second halftime, the in-depth discussion of the set-up. Here the power game was used as a sketch of non-verbal notes that both interviewer and interviewee could refer to. This visualisation helped the interviewer to quickly detect the typical as well as the unusual and direct her questions towards these special features. Especially when discussing sensitive issues like conflicts, the game helped to talk about the matter in a non-personal way: "I heard that this mannetjie has a conflict with that one …"

The acceptance of the game by the interview-partners was generally high: It tickled the interviewees' curiosity, made them laugh and alleviated inhibitions of those who feared that interviews were something particularly difficult. However, a small number of interviewees, though willing to try it out, criticised the method. One local researcher found it somehow beneath him to use a tool that was "designed for the illiterate in the villages" as he framed it. One member of NGO staff argued against the standardisation of complex power-relations into simple numeric codes.

Especially in reference to the legitimate criticism of the rather simple numeric code, the power game needs to be framed by two things:

- The definition of power given to the interviewee is explained with great care.

- The quantitative part of the game is followed by an in-depth qualitative discussion of the "how" and "why".

The power game is especially well suited to interview those who are involved in the governance activity or those who are close observers. The field experience showed that some interviewees had insight into specific issues but did not have the detailed knowledge needed to respond to the

power game. They were interviewed using flexible sets of interview questions according to their fields of knowledge.

6.3 What was found out about local governance and the distribution of power in CBNRM in Namibia?

The aim of this research was to analyse local governance in CBNRM in Namibia. To this end the *actors* involved were gathered and described, the relevant *institutions* were analysed and set into relationship and a number of *material* and *immaterial governance effects* were assessed. An overview of the findings is given in the following chapters.

6.3.1 The actors involved

The CBNRM actors come from different organisational and institutional backgrounds. They were mainly

- Government representatives

- NGO employees

- Private sector actors (tourism)

- Traditional authorities

- Conservancy actors (committee and staff)

- Members of CBOs

- Ordinary local people who were not part of the above mentioned groups.

One characteristic of this governance field complicated the research of power relations and local governance: Different actor groups gained their power from different sources, e.g. from legal rights, traditional recognition, material resources or personality (see Table 13). As a result, hierarchies were unclear and subject to interpretation. The judgement of the power-status of actors often varied according to the interviewees' own position and concepts. So those interviewees who saw money and material gain as a core driving force of human behaviour tended to judge the NGOs as extremely powerful. Those who took a more rights-based approach

– power as the right to make certain decisions – generally described the local community as strong actor.

Actor group	Main sources of power attributed to this group
Government representatives	**Legal authority** to change relevant legislation, to gazette and de-gazette conservancies, to set quotas and to enforce the law in case of poaching
NGO employees	**Material support** of conservancies, human resources for training, facilitation, evaluation and lobbying
Private sector entreprenneurs (tourism)	**Material potential** to make CBNRM independent of donor-funding and economically viable (not realised yet in case-study conservancies)
Traditional authorities	**Traditional legitimisation**, power over land (disputed) thus ability to block conservancy formation and tourism development, more or less respected advisors of their people, position in informal local networks
Conservancy actors	**Legal and democratic legitimisation** through conservancy legislation and constitution and (in case of the committee) democratic elections, position in informal local networks
CBOs and ordinary local people	**Legal legitimisation** through conservancy legislation and constitution as highest decision-making body in conservancies, CBOs derive power from their degree of self-organisation, position in informal local networks

Table 13: Sources of power attributed to the actors of CBNRM (own source)

6.3.2 Complementing and conflicting institutions

The various actors of CBNRM recurred to a number of formal and informal institutions. Especially remarkable and typical for many African countries is the dual system of so-called traditional and modern state institutions. These sets of rules reinforced each other regarding the overall goals of sustainable use of natural resources and the uplifting of local people's livelihoods. Both traditional and modern institutions aim at moderating individual interest against that of a broader society. This was one of the reasons why CBNRM pioneers saw traditional authorities as important partners in local resource management.

But there were crucial ambiguities in the ways that power was legitimised and hierarchies were agreed on. This can be illustrated by the unclear position of traditional authorities in CBNRM: A number of interviewees complained that the CBNRM legislation did not define the role of traditional authorities properly. So they could feel left out or disempowered. The Traditional Authorities Act (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1995) places traditional legislation

below governmental legislation. But still an MET employee describes the local traditional authorities as *stronger* than the regional MET, as traditional authorities had direct access to the president of the country. When discussing the power-relations between traditional authorities and conservancies both sides tended to see the legitimisation inherent in their *own* institutions as superior. Traditional authorities pictured themselves as guarantee for stability as they were *not* elected on a regular basis but put into their position to serve for a lifetime. They described their position as that of "fathers of the land" recurring to the traditionally strong position of a father. Conservancy committees on the other hand drew their legitimisation exactly from the fact that they *were* elected, representing the will of the local people. For some traditional authorities who called their community members "the children", being elected did not mean much.

Some interviewees hoped for central government as the ipso jure strongest actor in the country to put its foot down in case of conflicts and give clear guidelines. But interviewees suspected that the attempt to meet everyone's demands led government to avoid interfering with conflicts. Also a lack of resources (monetary and human) weakened this actor in comparison to others like some NGOs.

During the field stay, changes in the institutional framework were brought on the way[105], and it remains to be seen whether and how these manage to close existing gaps.

6.3.3   Material Governance Effects: Natural Resource Management and Benefits

CBNRM attempts to balance costs and benefits of living with wildlife and to align them so that they accrue at the same lieu. This leads to material governance goals that are twofold, ecological and economic: to improve local natural resource management and to produce material benefit for the local population.

A general observation of interviewees on all levels was that CBNRM lead to improved natural resource management. The localised poaching control was described as far more effective than centrally organised approaches. Local game guards were observed to have a better knowledge of

the field (both ecologically and socially), being less easily predictable by poachers and generally more accepted by local public than government wardens.

But game guards with close local ties were also seen in a critical light as they were subject to conflicting institutions: the conservancy constitution and the informal institutions of neighbourhood solidarity. So the researcher heard of both, game guards bending the rules in favour of poor poachers or members of their personal network and game guards being ostracised or threatened for reporting poachers of their social group.

When it came to the "hunting for the pot" of poor local residents, the antagonism between conservation and local livelihoods seemed to be rather deepened than soothed by CBNRM. Improved control prevented illegal hunting, thus diminishing the fragile livelihood of the poorer community members. At the time of the research both case-study conservancies did not produce sufficient benefits to compensate for this loss.

The CBNRM proponents advertised the concept in a way that produced high material expectations. While these had not been reached yet in the conservancies at stake it remains to be seen whether they are realistic at all. Especially with the boom of newly emerging conservancies in the last years it has to be kept in mind that only some areas carry the natural potential for a prime tourism destination and that the market for tourism facilities is not unlimited. Thus the decentralisation of natural resource management could conflict with ideals of inter-regional fairness and re-distribution. It is still open whether nature conservation could realistically be transformed into an economically viable market activity financed through tourism and hunting.

Also on the level of individual conservancies, though, fairness of distribution was a major concern. In both conservancies there were complaints that elites captured the majority of benefits and that especially those suffering most costs from living with wildlife[106] were disadvantaged when it came to benefits. Reasons given were both poor logistics and obscure, biased procedures of distribution. These problems originated from structures that left the distribution to actors belonging to the potential beneficiaries and that did not provide for effective external control. In

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[105] Communal Land Bill and a policy on concession areas (Malan, 2003, Namibia, 2003a)

this context of poverty and strong family ties such a structure tempts those in power to favour their own social group at the expense of others.

6.3.4 Immaterial Governance Effects: Participation and Conflict

Interviewees generally agreed that through the conservancies a certain degree of power had been devolved from national to local level. But the data also hints that most of this power is absorbed by the lowest organisational governance body of natural resource management, the conservancy *committee*. While the conservancy *members* were seen as actors with a strong power potential, there was the general notion that this potential was rarely realised. Reasons for this were found on both sides, in a weakly organised, ignorant and passive local population as well as in exclusive conservancy elites that tried to impede further participation. The logistics of participation were acknowledged to be difficult in a sparsely populated area with insufficient transport and communication infrastructure, though.

In both conservancies the central power-groups had originated from those actors who had been instrumental in starting the conservancy process. They were related to the pre-conservancy local elites, mainly traditional authorities in one conservancy and Farmers' Union plus state employees in the other.

Both conservancies had experienced abuse of the conservancy constitution by staff or committee members. But generally the conservancy actors seemed to follow the letters of the conservancy constitutions. Within this frame the researcher observed a tendency to act according to existing values and procedures that, while not breaking any formal rule, counteracted some of the basic principles behind CBNRM. One example would be the conservancy committee of Ehi-Rovipuka that was democratically elected under NGO supervision. Still each committee member was seen as representative of one traditional authority, and their proportion and power were well balanced reflecting the power of the respective traditional authorities in the community.

Some aspects of participation and democratic approaches to local natural resource management remained blurry throughout the interviews and in the documents. For many actors at all different

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[106] E.g. through destruction of water infrastructure by elephants and loss of cattle through predators.

levels it seemed as if "devolution as far down as possible" was a core aim, favouring grass-roots participation over representative democracy. Only some demurred that basis democracy and empowerment often meant compromising in management efficiency and that some decisions needed experts with an overview rather than community judgement. The relationship between conservancy staff and committee often remained unclear as well as the scope of the mandate of the committee.

Especially when it came to control and enforcement mechanisms it seemed helpful to have alert non-local control-organs that are ready to intervene in case of malpractice. The unclear ranking due to diverse sources of power posed a serious problem here. This was shown in the analysis of conflict resolution (Chapter 5.5.4).

Conflict is a normal feature of open democratic societies and goes along with social change and the re-distribution of power. But the researcher observed specific conflict constellations that did not promote change but resembled cold-war scenarios: Development is blocked and no-one benefits as every party blocks the advancement of the other one. The conflict about the future status of Hobatere concession area was at such a state when the researcher visited. This included as typical features:

- Institutions that were weakly enforced, conflicting and not comprehensive. Institutions were unclear or conflicting about the hierarchies of respective actors.

- High stakes or possible benefits in an area of widespread poverty and little economic potential.

- High number of actors from different organisational backgrounds and levels with different sources of legitimisation.

- Reluctance of higher ranks to interfere and give clear directions. Disagreement amongst conflicting parties about their authority.

- Complex property regimes: Authority over related resources (like game and land) lies with different actors that are subject to different institutions.

During the field stay the researcher observed an awakening debate about local governance issues in CBNRM, especially concerning a gap between committees and communities. So it will be interesting to observe how this discussion is reflected in the „second-generation conservancy phase" (Long, 2004, p.53).

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Annexes

Annex 1: List of interview partners

This is a list of all interviewees in this research. The interview number in brackets after the quotations in the text do not relate to the interviewees' positions in this list or the order in which the interviews were undertaken. The numbers are only included to show which answers were given by the same interviewee. The interviewees were assured that "nothing you will say will be connected with your name". In the case of the community members their names will not be mentioned at all to avoid complications for those who spoke about sensitive matters. This list includes formal and informal interviews. If more than one date is given, either the interview was split due to lack of time or interviewees were consulted again to discuss open questions and preliminary findings.

Name	Date	Quoted as	Occupation
Abiude Kativa	03.11. & 23.11.2002	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka	Treasurer Ehi-Rovipuka, vice-secretary of traditional authority Licius Tjigahura
Barnabas Tjindjou	20.10.2002	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka
Benhardt Tjindjumba	09.10. & 23.11.2002	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka
Gerson K. Uaroua	10.10. & 23.11.2002	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka	Chairman Ehi-Rovipuka, secretary of traditional authority Langman Muzuma, game guard
Joseph Zaongara	20.10.2002	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka
Kaupasaneua Tjeundo	19.10.2002	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka
Olga Uahimisa	20.10.2002	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka	Committee member Ehi-Rovipuka
No name	09.09.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	09.09.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	04.10.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	04.10.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	27.08.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	27.08.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas

No name	27.08.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	27.08.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	02.09.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	02.09.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	02.09.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	14.10.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	29.11.2002	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas	Community member #Khoadi //Hoas
No name	12.10.2002	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka
No name	12.10.2002	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka
No name	12.10.2002	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka
No name	12.10.2002	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka
No name	20.10.2002	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka
No name	29.10.2002	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka
No name	04.11.2002	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka
No name	04.11.2002	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka
No name	04.11.2002	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka	Community member Ehi-Rovipuka
Joseph Jorries Seiseb	04.09.2002	Conservancy committee	Chairman of the //Huab emerging conservancy
Asser Ndjitezeua	12.11.2002	Conservancy committee #Khoadi //Hoas	Chairman #Khoadi //Hoas since October 2002
Dawid Goagaseb	10.09.2002	Conservancy committee #Khoadi //Hoas	Chairman of conservancy committee #Khoadi //Hoas up to October 2002
German Muzuma	07.11.2002	Conservancy Committee Ehi-Rovipuka	Vice-treasurer Ehi-Rovipuka, acting headman of Langman Muzuma, Otjokavare
Ben Ilonga	03.09.2002	Government	Regional MET Khorixas
Hon. S. Tjongarero	03.09.2002	Government	Regional governor Kunene Region, traditional authority
John Hazam	13.08. & 10.12.2002	Government	CBNRM co-ordinator at MET
Nahor Howaseb	03.09. & 05.11. & 06.11.2002	Government	Regional MET Outjo
Rinus Mutirua	22.10.2002	Government	Regional MET Opuwo
Siegfried Gawiseb	03.09.2002	Government	Regional MET Khorixas
Siegfried Tjitjo	22.10.2002	Government	Regional MET Opuwo
Tsukhoe M. //Garoes	14.08.2002	Government	Co-ordinator of the CBNRM Support Department (CSD), MET
Abiude Karangee	30.10.2002	NGO	Freelance consultant working for NACOBTA
Amanda Horn	01.08.2002	NGO	Grants manager at NNF

Anna Davis	06.08. & 08.08.2002	NGO	CBNRM co-ordinator at NNF
Chris Brown	06.08.2002	NGO	Managing director of NNF
Colin Nott	12.08. & 02.10.2002	NGO	Institutional development unit IRDNC
David Ward	11.10.2002	NGO	Natural resource technical assistant and advisor WWF-LIFE
Garry G. Nekongo	11.10.2002	NGO	IRDNC, facilitator natural resource management
John Kasaona	22.11.2002	NGO	Deputy co-ordinator IRDNC Kunene, conservancy committee Anabib, technical advisor of traditional authority Lucky Kasaona
Lucky Kasaona	06.11.2002	NGO	IRDNC, committee member Anabib Conservancy, traditional authority
Margie Jacobson	17.10.2002	NGO	Managing director IRDNC
Norman Tjombe	16.10.2002	NGO	Legal Assistance Centre (LAC)
Patricia Skyer	14.08.2002	NGO	NACSO
Willie Boonzaaer	17.10.2002	NGO	Consultant for NACOBTA
Raymond Peters	11.10.2002	NGO	Natural resource technical assistant and advisor WWF-LIFE
Ronnie Dempers	08.08.2002	NGO	NDF
Usiel Ndavera	30.10.2002	NGO	WWF-LIFE
Alfons Musimane	05.08.2002	Researcher	Project leader of CBNRM research programme at the Multi-disciplinary Research Centre UNAM
Andrew Long	31.07.2002	Researcher	Team leader of the WILD Project
Kit Vaughan	19.08. & 14.10.2002	Researcher	Senior researcher, WILD Project Kunene region
Selma Nangula	05.08.2002	Researcher	Researcher at the Multi-disciplinary Research Centre UNAM
Bernandus Bob #Guibeb	28.08.2002	Staff #Khoadi //Hoas	Co-ordinator of environmental shepherds #Khoadi //Hoas
Gabriel Goagoseb	23.08.2002	Staff #Khoadi //Hoas	Technical advisor #Khoadi //Hoas
Helga /Howoses	30.08.2002	Staff #Khoadi //Hoas	Information liaison officer #Khoadi //Hoas
tonia Muzuma	04.11.2002	Staff Ehi-Rovipuka	Community activator Ehi-Rovipuka
Filimon Kapi	20.10.2002	Staff Ehi-Rovipuka	Field officer and committee member Ehi-Rovipuka
Pine Pienar	04.09.2002	Tourism sector	Manager of the Brandberg Community Campsite
Steve Brain	12.10.2002	Tourism Sector	Concession holder of Hobatere
Justus Garoeb	14.08.2002	Traditional authority	Damara King
Ernst Gurirab	13.11.2002	Traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas	Traditional councillor at Anker, #Khoadi //Hoas
Mariane Tsanigas	25.08.2002	Traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas	Headwoman at Erwee, #Khoadi //Hoas
Max Haraseb	09.11.2002	Traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas	Traditional chief at Marienhoehe, #Khoadi //Hoas
Michael Tulo /Gomeb	08.09.2002	Traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas	Traditional councillor and environmental shepherd #Khoadi //Hoas
Wilem #Gawabab	29.08.2002	Traditional authority #Khoadi //Hoas	Traditional councillor at Anker, #Khoadi //Hoas
Goliath Tjaveondja	21.10.2002	Traditional authority Ehi-Rovipuka	Traditional authority at Otjokavare, Ehi-Rovipuka

Licius Tjigahura	03.11.2002	Traditional authority Ehi-Rovipuka	Traditional authority at Otjetjekua, Ehi-Rovipuka
Stefanus Turutjo	12.10.2002	Traditional authority Ehi-Rovipuka	Traditional authority at Ohanyuna, Ehi-Rovipuka
Timoteus Kavetu	21.10.2002	Traditional authority Ehi-Rovipuka	Traditional authority at Otjipaue, Ehi-Rovipuka
Langman Muzuma	30.10.2002	Traditional authority Ehi-Rovipuka	Traditional authority at Otjokavare, Ehi-Rovipuka

Annex 2: List of meetings attended/facilitated

Meeting	Date	Location
Community meeting	24.08.2002	Erwee, #Khoadi //Hoas
FIRM meeting, #Khoadi //Hoas	02.10.2002	Grootberg, #Khoadi //Hoas
Benefit distribution plan preparation meeting with community-based organisations, #Khoadi //Hoas	03.10.2002	Grootberg, #Khoadi //Hoas
WWF-LIFE event book training, Ehi-Rovipuka	11.10.2002	Otjokavare, Ehi-Rovipuka
IRDNC quarterly planning meeting	15-17.10.2002	Wereldsend
AGM #Khoadi //Hoas	25-26.10.2002	Grootberg, #Khoadi //Hoas
Traditional authority meeting about leadership conflict	31.10.2002	Otjokavare, Ehi-Rovipuka
Meeting of Ehi-Rovipuka committee with chief warden of Etosha and Skeleton Coast about parks and neighbours	20.11.2002	Etosha National Park
IRDNC visioning workshop Ehi-Rovipuka	23-26.11.2002	Otjokavare, Otjomumborombonga, Otjpaue, Okovasiona
Feedback of this research to Ehi-Rovipuka staff and committee	27.11.2002	Otjokavare, Ehi-Rovipuka
Feedback of this research to #Khoadi //Hoas staff, committee and traditional authorities	02.12.2002	Grootberg, #Khoadi //Hoas
Feedback of this research to WILD Project	04.12.2002	Windhoek
Feedback of this research to NGOs and MET	13.12.2002	Windhoek