BAND 50

JAMES WESLEY SCOTT

# THE CHALLENGE OF THE REGIONAL CITY

Political Traditions, the Planning Process, and
their Roles in Metropolitan Growth Management

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
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THE CHALLENGE
OF THE REGIONAL CITY

Political Traditions, the Planning Process, and
their Roles in Metropolitan Growth Management

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SUMMARY

One of the prime motives of this international study in metropolitan management has been to contribute arguments for an "agency"-based approach to comparative urban analysis. For the purposes of this comparison, agency has been defined as the willful manipulation of urban economies and urban space in order to achieve specific development goals. Furthermore, it has been argued that cultural attitudes and political traditions have influenced not only the definition of these goals but the manner in which they have been realised. Metropolitan problem-solving and growth management were the parameters of agency used here. At the same time, the relative success in maintaining the functional importance of central cities was used to gauge the performance of urban problem-solving in Canada, the United States, and West Germany.

A "defence" of the central city is only part of the issue. Urban centrality - insofar as it involves a concentration of public services and amenities and a rational coordination of urban growth with capital investments in infrastructure - is also a matter affecting suburban areas. Moreover it involves the realisation that a metropolitan approach is essential in solving many planning problems facing individual jurisdictions, and that a robust central city and an efficient region are an asset to all communities within a metropolitan region.

In the case of Germany, senior governments have facilitated annexation, local government restructuring, and the establishment of metropolitan agencies with regional planning powers. Tax reform has achieved a relatively successful redistribution of revenues, diminishing the need for "fiscal" zoning. In addition, the federal and state governments have actively supported rapid transit, public housing programmes, and capital investment projects aimed at improving urban infrastructure. The level of senior government intervention has been remarkable. Comprehensive amalgamations of local governments, for example, were imposed by the states in the late 1960s and late 1970s, because voluntary reorganisations proved unworkable. A similar measure would be unthinkable in North America.

On the regional level, West Germany's central cities have joined - together with their suburban neighbours - service-delivery and planning agencies. In Munich's case this has resulted in a situation where the central city has strengthened its political power base within the region and can influence urban development to its advantage. However, while the suburbs have remained clearly subservient to the centre, most communities have profited from the imposition of regional planning. Frankfurt, surrounded by independent cities, has not been able to manipulate regional politics to the same degree. Nevertheless, regional governance has enhanced the locational advantages of Frankfurt, helping to maintain an efficient region and incorporating suburban communities into a larger, expanding service-sector economy.

In Canada's case the federal government and the provinces have not always operated in a consistent and coordinated manner vis-à-vis urban policy. Moreover, the provinces have not always used their police powers to the fullest in establishing regional land use planning. The reorganisation of local government has often been a compromise between amalgamation and

voluntary forms of interlocal cooperation. Certainly nothing as forceful as West Germany's jurisdictional realignments was ever attempted. At the same time, the provinces have demonstrated an important consistency in specific areas of urban and land use policy of which the protection of open space through agricultural reserves, a commitment to public transportation, and an active participation in core area redevelopment are important examples. The provinces have also "prodded" cities into accepting metropolitan governance, so that a pattern of interlocal cooperation has been established. As the experience of Vancouver demonstrates, this cooperation has survived even though political changes at the provincial level have occasionally resulted in a weakening of regional agency authority.

In the cases of Vancouver and Toronto, central city-suburb conflicts have greatly diminished due to the realisation that regional well-being is beneficial to all municipalities. This realisation was long in developing but it has reinforced metropolitan regionalism, establishing it as an important component of Canadian urban planning practise.

Finally, the United States can be said to represent an extreme case of metropolitan management. Most of America's great cities have their lobbies, their business elite, and political representatives who work to further central city interests. Indeed, as has been noted, "boosterism" and local entrepreneurship were essential in assuring the prosperity of many cities before World War II. What U.S.-American cities have lacked, however, is the active support of senior governments in developing problem-solving strategies.

While often considerable in dollar terms, federal involvement in central cities has been seldom decisive or coordinated and has generally lacked continuity. Instead, a plethora of reactive policies have coexisted, many of them with contradictory goals. Depending on the political climate in Washington D.C., these policies have been either emasculated or discontinued, some only a few years after their adoption. The states have rarely assumed an important policy role with regard to their major urban areas. Lack of funds, fear of tampering with local autonomy, and an ideological dislike of interference in municipal affairs have been among the primary reasons. At the metropolitan level, central cities and suburbs have found themselves using 19th century political mechanisms to deal with 20th century problems. Municipal sovereignty, an absence of revenue redistribution, and a lack of regional controls on zoning have intensified competition among metropolitan communities. Left largely to their own devices, the central cities have been forced to undertake expansive and often one-sided redevelopment of their downtowns. In certain areas, such as "slum-clearance" federal funds were available for a time. In other crucial areas, particularly public transit and housing, federal moneys were often insufficient. Depending on their affluence, location, or level of amenities, suburban communities have been able to market themselves successfully, attracting residents and employment through generous zoning policies.

As long as regional controls on land use remain absent and local opinion has not forced a limitation on municipal growth, many suburban communities with market potential will try to realise their development ambitions to the fullest. In the fast growing West - and particularly in

California's urban centres - housing demand has remained high. Peripheral areas of the metropolitan regions have profited from this demand and continue to grow outward. Their expansion has, in turn, fuelled development ambitions in other - often more distant or exurban - communities. In this way, a process of continuous peripheral expansion has characterised recent metropolitan development not only in California but in Seattle, Washington D.C., New Jersey, Phoenix and many other urban regions of the United States.

It would, of course, be unwise to view recent metropolitan development in the U.S., Canada, and West Germany solely on the basis of growth management and centrality issues. Economic transformation, coupled with technological change has not had uniform impacts on all urban areas. Indeed, regional economies vary greatly. While manufacturing remains important in Greater Munich, Los Angeles, and Toronto, it is much less so in the Vancouver and San Francisco areas. Such differences in the sectoral makeup of metropolitan economies, as well as varying demographic trends, might also help explain why different responses to growth have developed in different urban regions - a possibility which undoubtedly complicates international comparisons.

The U.S.-American metropolis - represented here by the expansive urban regions of California - appears to represent a uniquely extreme case of urban decentralisation. In the game of urban growth and economic expansion, those areas within the U.S.-American metropolis able to market themselves successfully have prospered. Less fortunate core areas have been faced with decline, disinvestment, abandonment, and, ironically, increasing public service burdens. This hole in the metropolitan doughnut has few counterparts elsewhere. This is demonstrated by the vitality of Canadian central cities and the perseverance of urban centrality in West Germany. Furthermore the process of continuous outward is seldom as pronounced as in metropolitan regions of the United States.

These and other considerations indicate that caution is urged in generalising comparative metropolitan development. The pitfalls involved in a selected study of only a few urban areas are considerable - particularly if these areas are considered representative of certain national developments. By the same token there is ample evidence that enough consistency can be discovered in growth management and metropolitan problem-solving to justify the degree of generalisation employed in this study. Furthermore there is another important justification for the methodology used here. One of the principal objectives of this comparative analysis has been to argue a case for qualitative, agency-based approaches to urban studies. Using such methods, it has been hoped to demonstrate that important variations in international (or, for that matter, national) urban trends can be observed and, at least partially explained.

At a time when "convergence" and the apparent internationalisation of economic and spatial trends have tended to dominate urban studies, it would seem challenging to take a somewhat different stance. Indeed, despite the global nature of various economic, technological, and spatial phenomena, evidence indicates that certain patterns of spatial *divergence* are intensifying.

In conclusion, there seems little merit in elevating metropolitan areas in the United States to a model representing an ultimate stage in international urban development. We might, however, envision future patterns of spatial convergence under a scenario in which U.S.-American cities actively regulate their growth utilising public transit, revenue distribution, and a variety of regional measures. Indeed, the contradictions of growth management in the United States might provoke a revolutionary policy response. U.S.-American metropolitan areas might then develop more along Canadian and European lines.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die Stadtentwicklung in den westlichen Industrieländern ist von Suburbanisierung und "Zentralitätsverlust" der Kernstädte gekennzeichnet. An die Stelle von Manufaktur und Schwerindustrie, einst Träger von wirtschaftlicher Expansion und Städtewachstum, ist die Dienstleistungs- und Freizeitindustrie getreten, die neue Standortfaktoren wichtig werden läßt und die Arbeitsmarktstruktur gravierend verändert. Dabei haben insbesondere neue Kommunikationstechnologien die traditionellen Standortvorteile der Kernstadt erheblich geschwächt. Gleichzeitig haben boomartige Nachfrageschübe nach Wohnraum eine Ausdehnung der Bautätigkeit in den städtischen Peripherien notwendig gemacht. Diese Entwicklung kann als "funktionelle Dezentralisierung" innerhalb der Stadtregion beschrieben werden, die sich im Zuge sogenannter "postindustrieller" sozioökonomischer Transformation weiter verstärken wird.

Jede Gesellschaft (und jede Stadtregion) muß auf die Auswirkungen dieser Transformation (erhöhte Wohnraumnachfrage, schnelles Wirtschaftswachstum, starkes Dezentralisierungspotential neuer Technologien, drohender Bedeutungsverlust der Kernstadt) reagieren. Wir betrachten im Rahmen dieser Arbeit räumliche Entwicklungen als "kulturelle" Antwort auf solche Veränderungen. Denn während der ökonomische und technologische Wandel ein eher universelles Phänomen darstellt, unterscheiden sich doch die Strategien zur räumlichen Handhabung und Gestaltung von Wachstum von Land zu Land enorm. So gesehen ist die uns umgebende Realität von Suburbanisierung und Dezentralisierung eben auch das Resultat von Entscheidungen, die unter spezifischen politischen und ideologischen Bedingungen getroffen worden sind.

Unsere Arbeitshypothesen lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen:

1. Im politischen Entscheidungsprozeß finden historische, politische und kulturelle Traditionen ihren Niederschlag. Bezüglich der Stadtplanung sind dies z.B. Traditionen des Eigentumsrechts, der staatliche Interventions- und Zentralisierungsgrad und seine öffentliche Akzeptanz, sowie Zielvorstellungen der Wachstumsideologien.

2. Diese Traditionen können als Aspekte eines Entscheidungsprozesses betrachtet werden, der neue räumliche Ansprüche befriedigen will. Verschiedene Zielvorstellungen im "Wachstumsmanagement" können eine Erklärung für die unterschiedlichen räumlichen Muster darstellen.

3. Die regionale Verwaltung bildet einen integralen Bestandteil des Wachstumsmanagements. Ihr Einfluß auf Planung und kommunale Entwicklung gibt zugleich Aufschluß über den Zentralisierungsgrad und das jeweilige politische Interventionsvermögen.

4. Dabei kann die räumliche Manifestation des "Wachstumsmanagements" durch Indikatoren der Wohn- und Gewerbeflächenentwicklung und durch Struktur und Bedeutung der öffentlichen Infrastruktur beschrieben werden.

Für die Analyse der Wachstumsideologien haben wir drei westliche Industriestaaten ausgewählt: Kanada, die USA und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Dabei wurden sowohl die lokale bzw. regionale als auch die Länder-, Provinz- bzw. Bundesebene untersucht. Für die lokale Ebene wurden Flächennutzungsmaßnahmen und statistische Wachstumsindikatoren von sechs "Fallbeispielen" analysiert und verglichen: Frankfurt/M., München, Toronto, Vancouver, San Francisco und Los Angeles/San Diego. Für die überregionale Ebene ergänzt ein Vergleich staatlicher Steuerungsmaßnahmen die Analyse und Interpretation lokaler Trends. Dabei wurde vor allem die Wohnungsbau- und Investitionspolitik, den Finanzausgleich und Strukturen der Regionalverwaltung untersucht.

Die Ergebnisse der Studie unterstützen die These, daß die Stadtentwicklunsprozesse in den USA, Kanada und der Bundesrepublik aufgrund politischer Entscheidungen seit 1945 deutliche Divergenzen aufweisen - und das bei erheblichen ökonomischen und räumlichen Prozeßähnlichkeiten. Dabei ist eine Polarisierung der "Managementansätze" zur Gestaltung städtischen Wachstums in den *USA* und der *Bundesrepublik* zu verzeichnen. Während in den USA eine sehr weitgehende Dezentralisierung stattfand, geht in der Bundesrepublik die Entwicklung eher zu einer städtischen Rezentralisierung. *Kanada* liegt zwischen den beiden Extremen: hier kann bei begrenzter Dezentralisierung eine expansive Suburbanisierung festgestellt werden. In Kanada und der Bundesrepublik sind konkrete Schritte zur Beschränkung der Dezentralisierungstendenzen (und damit zur Stärkung der "Stadtherrschaft") unternommen worden - Schritte, die in den letzten Jahren Erfolge gezeigt haben.

Eine negative Folge dieser Politik ist allerdings eine Überlastung des Zentrums - mit entsprechenden Preisexplosionen auf dem Grundstücks- und Wohnungsmarkt. Das Umland dagegen ist oft unterversorgt und in der Realisierung seines wirtschaftlichen Potentials stark behindert.

In den USA haben politische Möglichkeiten der Prozeßsteuerung traditionell gefehlt. Eingemeindungen, Gebietsreformen und Finanzausgleichsmaßnahmen sind in den größten Stadtregionen zumeist ausgeblieben. Auch Regionalverbände haben wegen ihrer nur marginalen Einflußmöglichkeiten die Kernstadt nicht vor einer Dezentralisierung und Umstrukturierung schützen können. So hat sich das Umland in den USA von der Hegemonie der Kernstadt befreien können - es zeichnet sich sogar die Herausbildung neuer Pendelsysteme (im Sinne der von BERRY beschriebenen *Counterurbanisierung*) innerhalb bestehender Stadtregionen ab.

Die USA bilden damit ein Extrembeispiel von Wachstumsmanagement in Stadtregionen. Spätestens seit der Industrialisierung haben städtische Lobbys, die sich zumeist aus einer Schicht führender Geschäftsleute bzw. politischer Repräsentanten zusammensetzten, die Position der Kernstadt zu stärken versucht. Staatliches Engagement in wichtigen Stadtregionen hat häufig

Entschlossenheit, Koordination, Kontinuität und Konsistenz vermissen lassen. Man schreckte davor zurück, traditionelle Werte wie Lokalautonomie und Selbstbestimmung anzutasten. So blieben die Regierungen - vor allem auf der Ebene der Bundestaaten - vorsichtig, wenn nicht tatenlos. Dabei hat die Souveränität der Einzelstädte, der fehlende Finanzausgleich und ein Mangel an regionalen Kontrollmöglichkeiten zur Flächennutzungsplanung auch den Konkurrenzkampf der Städte untereinander intensiviert, was schließlich zu rücksichtslosem wirtschaftlichem Wachstum sowie aggressiven Sanierungs- und Flächennutzungsmaßnahmen führte. Das städtische Interesse an sozialem Wohnungsbau und öffentlichem Personennahverkehr war hingegen immer gering. So haben Vorstädte selbst die Initiative ergriffen und schließlich durch großzügige Flächennutzungsvorgaben Wohnbevölkerung und Gewerbe in ihre Gemeinden locken können. Solange in den USA eine regionale Landnutzungskontrolle fehlt, werden Vorstädte weiter auf Kosten Anderer ihre Interessen durchsetzen. Der Prozeß der Suburbanisierung wird sich fortsetzen, wenn nicht wirkungsvollere Planungsmechanismen gefunden werden und eine entsprechende öffentliche Akzeptanz mobilisiert werden kann.

Es ergeben sich also für die drei verglichenen Länder charakteristische räumliche Muster :

1. USA: Polyzentrisches Expansionsfeld
2. Kanada: Kernstadtzentrierter, "mehrkerniger" Raum
3. Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kernstadtdominierter Raum

Eines der Hauptmotive für diese internationale Vergleichsstudie über städtisches Wachstumsmanagement war, einen Beitrag zur Forschung über Funktion und Auswirkungen menschlicher Entscheidungen in der Stadtentwicklung zu liefern. Dabei ist die "Verteidigung" traditioneller Stadtherrschaft nur ein Aspekt. Zentralität betrifft auch die Vorstädte, die Region. Wir halten eine starke Kernstadt in einem funktionsfähigen Umland als wünschenswert für alle Kommunen innerhalb der Stadtregion. In einer Zeit, wo "Konvergenz" und Ubiquität ökonomischer und räumlicher Prozesse offensichtlich zu einer "Internationalisierung" der Stadtforschung geführt hat, hebt diese bewußt qualitativ angelegte Studie eher die Divergenzen hervor und bestätigt die These, daß diese sich verstärken. Es erscheint also kaum sinnvoll, die US-amerikanischen Verhältnisse als Endpunkt oder Modell der internationalen Stadtentwicklung zu betrachten. Auch die US-amerikanische Stadtpolitik wird in Zukunft wahrscheinlich Managementstrategien im Sinne einer regionalen "Kanalisation" entwickeln müssen. Vor dem Hintergrund einer widersprüchlichen aktuellen Planungspolitik erscheinen hier "revolutionäre" politische Lösungsmöglichkeiten um so wünschenswerter. Dann könnten und sollten sich die Großstädte der Vereinigten Staaten an kanadischen und europäischen Vorbildern orientieren.

RESUMÉ

L'object de cette étude est de montrer à quel point la production des modèles urbains distincts aux États-Unis, au Canada et en Allemagne (de l'Ouest) est fonction des degrés variable de centralisation dans l'organisation de l'espace urbain, et des formes diverses d'implication des gouvernements. Ces trois pays ont choisi des modes divergents de gestion de l'accroissement de leurs métropoles. Les raisons sont complexes et dépendent de facteurs politiques, idéologiques, économiques et sociologiques. Nous avons tenté d'analyser certaines de ces causes, en déterminant les "mécanismes de résolution des conflits" par lesquels ces états fédéraux ont essayé d'appréhender les mutations urbaines. Bien qu'essentiel, le plan d'aménagement du territoire n'est qu'un des multiples inconnues de l'équation urbaine. Les choix des instances fédérales, qui'ils soient relatifs aux marchés immobiliers ou agricoles, au finement des grands travaux, à la normalisation des impôts, ainsi que le degré de coopération régionale, quand il s'agit de réaliser des projets de développement à long terme, sont des paramètres tout aussi importants. Par ailleurs, les gouvernements des grandes cités ont une influence non négligeable sur le développement urbain dans au moins deux directions importantes. La première est d'obtenir de l'administration fédérale (et/ou des instances suprèmes de coordination des programmes d'aménagement) que ses sections soient en cohérence avec les besoins locaux; ceci non seulement en matière d'habitat et de réaménagement, mais aussi en ce qui concerne la plupart des services urbains qui sont en partie ou en totalité financés par les gouvernements fédéraux ou nationaux. En corollaire, les gouvernements des métropoles doivent faire le la preuve de leur capacité à mobiliser les énergies régionales, les investisseurs et l'opinion publique pour donner une légitimité à la résolution du problème régional. Les assemblés régionales ont en effet une fonction importante de médiateurs lors de conflits entre les centres urbains et leurs périphéries, et elles peuvent promouvoir une efficace coopération intercommunale.

Néanmoins, il faut insister sur le fait que ces pouvoirs des ces métropoles ne sont qu'un régulateur potentiel dans la résolution des conflits régionaux. Souvent, leur capacité à influencer le développement urbain n'existe que tant qu'un consensus régional permet d'accepter certains objectifs de développement; de même, la confiance de pouvoirs suprèmes est nécessaire. Le régionalisme spontané - le plus propice tant que l'autonomie locale est très grande - est souvent limité à des pratiques de pression et de négociation dans ses activités de règlement des conflits. Par ailleurs, les entités métropolitaines qui arrivent à s'imposer comme échelon intermédiaire dans l'echelle des pouvoirs (constituant alors un quatrième pouvoir) ont les moyens, si nécessaire, d'imposer aux municipalités des programmes de développement homogènes.

La solution aux problèmes des métropoles impose une refléxion sur l'autonomie politique locale sur les droits de la propriété individuelle. Dans les systèmes fédéraux où la souveraineté administrative de la municipalité est acquise, soit constitutionellement, soit tacitement, la centralisation de l'aménagement urbain sera particulièrement difficile a réaliser. Bien sûr, la

souveraineté absolue de la cité est une fiction: pour tout projet d'investissement urbain, les gouvernements locaux dépendent des pouvoirs suprêmes (grilles de taxations, financements), et ce surtout depuis la dernière moitié du vingtième siécle; de plus, les législations fédérales et étatiques ont établi une série de schémas directeurs et des règles administratives à l'interieur desquels les municipalités sont tenues d'opérer, il est clair que les trois pays étudiés ici ont maintenu des règles strictes dans des domaines tels que la protection de l'environnement, la qualité de l'eau, la défénse nationale et l'organisation des projets essentiels (tels que les réseaux de transport nationaux).

Pourtant, l'aménagement continue d'apparaître comme un fait qui relève du local, et sur ce plan, l'autonomie locale est autant respectée que réaffirmée en Amérique du Nord et en Allemagne de l'Ouest. Certaines raisons en sont claires: l'aménagement est un des champs de l'administration urbaine où le besoins locaux, les intérêts, les responsabilités relatives sont peut-être le plus clairement articulés. Et l'abandon des pouvoirs d'aménagement à un autre niveau de gouvernement peut signifier une perte de contrôle de la "destinée" de la communauté. Un problème important du fédéralisme est de maintenir l'équilibre entre les besoins locaux (et l'articulation démocratique entre leur écoute et les réalisations prévues) et les besoins de la societé vue dans son ensemble.

Les traditions nord-américaines d'autonomie locale et de fragmentation des métropoles contrastent de façon saisissante avec l'expérience de l'Allemange de l'Ouest. Le domaine dans lequel l'opposition est la plus tranchée est celui de la gestion du foncier. Alors que là dans les trois pays, les gouvernements municipaux ont hérité des responsabilités fondamentales dans le domaine de l'aménagement, le degré de liberté réelle dans l'usage de la terre est sans conteste plus grande en Amérique du Nord. Cependant, nous avons aussi essayé de comprendre ce qui distingue, au Canada et aux États-Unis, les traditions de règlement des conflits métropolitains, et, plus encore, jusqu'à quel niveau ces traditions differentes ont influencé le développement des grandes villes dans ces deux pays.

On verra que les trois pays étudiés ici représentent trois variantes dans les gestion des métropoles. En allant plus loin, on montrera que ces pays ont développé des approches distinctes de la problématique de l'aménagement de l'espace urbain et que, malgré de fortes ressemblances dans les orientations économiques et les représentations de l'espace, ils ont produit des profils caractéristiques, voire singuliers, d'urbanisation.

1.   F O R E W O R D

The nuclear family, homeownership, the homogeneous,
inward looking community, balkanised government and
the competitive struggle to place children in a class-
structured workforce are all socially divisive modes
of organizing life. Given these specific elements of
social fragmentation above and beyond a general
requirement to reproduce the division of labor, it is
a short step to spatial fragmentation...Ours (the
American) is a culturally unique, if not surprising
solution to the structural problem of class repro-
duction. On the other hand, spatial differentiation
is in no way incidental to the American middle-class
mode of life. Spatial and social division have evolved
hand in hand, as the particular cultural solution to
the problem of class reproduction.
    - Richard A. Walker, The Suburban Solution.

   Geographers have seldom considered the political dimension of the city and its development, despite the wide variety of theoretical and methodological approaches used to analyse urban space. Admittedly, urban historians have contributed a great deal towards understanding how political personalities and business interests have helped determine the growth of urban areas. They have also shed substantial light on the impacts national policies have had on urban development in general. Urban geographers, however, seem to have largely ignored the many implications of the political decision-making process for the spatial development of cities, often preferring more deterministic explanations.

   Much attention had been paid to the effects of structural change and technology on urban space. Unquestionably, industrial transformation and the expansion of economic activities loosely defined as the service sector have been instrumental in changing the downtowns of many cities. It is also obvious that increasing demand for housing and office space, and decentralisation of certain office-based activities, have put great pressure on suburban peripheries to accept an increasing amount of new industrial, commercial and residential construction. We submit, however, that it is not enough to concentrate solely on these phenomena if we want to explain and understand what has been happening in metropolitan areas within the last thirty years.

   This study proposes that the political dimension of urbanisation can not only help integrate many strands of geographical thought, but also provide an alternative framework for comparing and contrasting urban development on an international scale. Obviously, the political decision-

making process is much more than a technocratic cost-benefit analysis or the expression of partisan interests that happen to be in power. Political institutions have evolved through the centuries, influenced, among other things, by conflict, social unrest, reform, political philosophies and general demands on government. The question of how economic and political life should be conducted is itself a political decision, hinging in part on ideal conceptions of social order. Despite common overlying ideologies (in this case primarily liberalism), these conceptions have differed from country to country. Politics is about making choices among a variety of available options. Spatial form is also a product of choice, influenced by many individual policy and planning decisions made under specific ideological, political and economic circumstances. This comparative analysis of recent urban development in West Germany, Canada and the United States, approaches the phenomena of rapid urban growth via a "problem-solving" perspective. Rapid urban expansion and the manifold accompanying problems are seen as a challenge of the first magnitude - a challenge that must be met on a political level.

Transformational tendencies - whether economic, technological, social, or spatial - are rarely left to their own devices. On the contrary, change creates tension, necessitates adaptation, and elicits a political response to those elements of change judged as being either desirable or undesirable. This was certainly the case during the nineteenth century when North America and Europe tried their best to cope with the immense problems of overcrowding, public hygiene, social unrest, housing, and administration that accompanied the industrial city's explosive growth.

There was no universal response to the challenge of industrial urbanisation. Each nation dealt with the problems using the political and legal tools it had at its disposal. This is not to say that there was no international exchange of ideas, or that there were not many similarities between the responses of individual industrial states. What this statement does imply, however, is that a mere reliance on convergence to explain urban development glosses over important "diverging" tendencies that have greatly influenced urbanisation over the past decades.

The dramatic changes since 1945 are of a similar if not of greater magnitude than those accompanying the Industrial Revolution. An unheard of rise in living standards, the increased importance of the automobile, and expanding educational and occupational opportunities for larger segments of the population, produced a booming demand for every imaginable commodity and service. The welfare state, a response to the Great Depression, reached its full expression in the post-World War II era. With it came a strengthening of the planning process and an enlarged role for government as economic and social policy maker. In spatial terms, the period since 1945 has been characterised above all by massive suburban growth, and a socio-economic - if not functional - transformation of central cities. A complex array of factors has been responsible for all these changes including: pent-up demand for housing and consumer goods, new space and labour demands of business, the increasing importance of administrative functions within business and government, and policies deliberately aimed at promoting and directing economic growth.

This study pursues the following question: how have industrialised countries in Europe and North America, specifically the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and the United States, reacted to the post-World War II urban transformation? A comparison of trends such as those mentioned above is, of course, essential. Even more important will be determining how particular centralisation and decentralisation phenomena have been managed with respect to land-use in the three countries. By not assuming inevitable spatial outcomes as a result of technological and economic change, we can look for a differentiating mechanism of spatial development within the context of more global trends. The comparative framework used will focus on "problem-solving" and trend management and modification as instruments of urban development.

Problem-solving, as used here, is meant to include both the institutional process of decision-making, and ideological and other essentially cultural aspects of the political process that directly affect planning and land-use. Contrary to much current thought, it will not be assumed that universal trends in technological development and economic transformation are creating a unitary post-industrial urban form. Instead, the subject of attention is what distinguishes urban development in one country from urban development in another, seeking, if possible, to identify divergent patterns of urban development in North America and West Germany.

In addition to looking for spatial variety as such, another concern will be the role of political and cultural processes in shaping the modern metropolis. This study attempts a general contribution to comparative urban geography by incorporating humanistic and possibilistic concepts into a general discussion of urban change. Much urban analysis has ignored not only the uniqueness of site, but also the historical continuum in which cities and the values attached to urban space have evolved. We hope to demonstrate that the creation of urban order is a value-laden and politically intricate affair.

2. COMPARATIVE URBAN ANALYSIS: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF RECENT METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT

Urban studies have increasingly become a search for order. Many scholars maintain that processes underlying and determining urban development need to be uncovered to arrive at a more global understanding of the city. Dissatisfaction with purely descriptive methods, such as those used by the traditional school of regional geography, has contributed to the conviction that more rigorous and "scientific" methods of analysis must be applied to urban studies[1]. Regional science, an often highly abstract effort to analyse settlement space itself, aims at identifying an almost geometric kind of logic behind urban development phenomena. Critical science - most closely associated with Neo-Marxist and Neo-Weberian schools of thought - views urban development as a product of capitalist accumulation strategies and an underlying need to use political, social and economic means to protect a favourable investment climate.

Consequently, explanation based on fieldwork and local observation has often been eschewed in favour of analyses based on theories of social organisation, technological change and economic restructuring. Some of the important analytical concepts that emerged in the 1960s and 70s involve the ideas of cyclical urban evolution (oscillations between concentration and deconcentration) and of national urban systems as a basis for comparative study. The observation of a concentration/deconcentration continuum on a global scale over a long period, combined with modernisation theories has further strengthened the idea of "convergence". This, in turn, has helped focus attention on similarities among urban areas, albeit under the assumption that differences can often be ignored.

In searching for scientific (and academic) legitimacy, many geographers have thus turned to the vision of a determinant spatial science, hoping to find a higher organising principle that might among other things, explain developments in human settlement patterns[2]. This study emphasises a different approach, under the assumption that the order we observe is not all-encompassing and rational, but strongly influenced by social values, conflict, and political interpretations of what social and spatial order should actually look like. Viewed in this light, urban processes would represent a scenario of diversity, even if the basic challenges requiring action are universal in nature.

Despite the obvious differences among these analytic approaches - and despite often acrimonious debate which has ensued among their proponents - it would be a mistake to consider them mutually exclusive. Contradictory assumptions and seemingly antagonistic philosophies notwithstanding, these different approaches can complement each other in producing a more complete picture of human society, and a strengthened understanding of the processes affecting

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[1] See James Vance, This Scene of Man. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, pp.16-22.
[2] See Arild Holt-Jensen, Geography. Its History and Concepts, London: Harper and Row, 1980, pp.55-69, and Peter Hagget, Geography, a Modern Synthesis, New York: Harper and Row, 1979, pp.433-451.

human settlement. Operating from an a priori or higher order model of spatial organisation does not negate the importance of local studies concentrating on the peculiarities of a given city or region. Walter Christaller's influential central-place concept was, in fact, developed inductively - the result of countless local observations made in southern Germany. Once developed as an idealised spatial model based on empirical evidence, Christaller's central-place scheme was able to serve as a basis for many deductive studies of urban systems. Richard Preston's studies of the Canadian central-place hierarchy is an excellent example of this[3]. One must be careful, in other words, to let methodological predispositions exclude ideas or information that might enrich our general understanding of urban processes.

In his outstanding study of urban morphogenesis, James Vance espouses inductive analysis which pieces together local information within the context of general historical developments[4]. Through assembling "mosaic-like" bits of information obtained through direct observation, archives, maps, and other sources, Vance has attempted to explain urban spatial evolution as a result of economic, technological and functional change. While this approach has its own methodological problems, especially since generalisations must be made from a limited number of observations or case studies, it would appear to synthesise various levels of analysis into a relatively accurate - or at the very least coherent and informative - general scheme of things. Local phenomena, which have been largely ignored in recent geographical research, can thus be observed and analysed within a regional, national and global context. At the same time, political, cultural and ideological aspects of urban development need not be eliminated for the sake of empirical expediency. On the contrary, they can form an integral part of the general picture.

This study adopts what might be called a mosaic-style methodology. It attempts a synthesis of local information within the context of more general urbanisation trends, while at the same time allowing an in-depth consideration of administrative and institutional aspects of urban growth. Urban planning and public policy, both central to this comparison, cannot be viewed as something absolutely rational, whose problem-solving function is primarily a mechanistic reaction to harmful or otherwise undesirable phenomena[5]. It is not the objective rationality of the policy-making process that concerns us, but the ideological premises and actual outcomes of policy.

Despite a preoccupation with differing local situations, political systems and cultural attitudes, this study is not limited to a merely descriptive analysis based on case studies of several metropolitan areas. Building upon different administrative levels of comparison - the local, state/provincial and national - we hope to achieve a better understanding of urbanisation trends.

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3   See Robert E. Preston, The Canadian Central Place System, in F. Helleiner (ed.), Symposium of German and Canadian Geographers. The Cultural Dimension of Canadian Geography, Occasional Papers in Geography No.10, Peterborough: Trent University, 1984, pp.285-314. Preston has also pointed out that Christaller's main contribution was not the deterministic geometry many took to be the centrepiece of his research; instead it was the idea that urban hierarchies develop according to the relative economic, political, and strategic importance of cities.

4   See James Vance, op.cit., pp.16-27.

5   See: E. Stacey and R. Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis, New York:WW Norton, 1978, wherein a new "positivist" science of policy analysis is proposed.

In other words, we will synthesise specific data on metropolitan area development, knowledge about the intergovernmental aspects of municipal administration, and information on urban policy traditions into a more general scheme explaining recent urban development in federal nations.

2.1   URBAN CENTRALITY, URBAN EVOLUTION

The period following WWII has seen a dramatic outward growth of urban areas accompanied by a distinct shift of population and economic activity towards the urban fringe. In the process, central cities have been relatively disadvantaged compared to suburbs with regard to tax base, demographics and socio-economic indicators of well-being. At the same time, negative aspects of suburbanisation - such as sprawl, spiralling service-delivery costs, and ever-increasing traffic - have become politically controversial.

Suburbanisation and the central city's diminishing predominance appear to be part and parcel of an urban transformation process in "developed" countries such as those of North America and Western Europe. Manufacturing, once the very basis for urban industrial expansion, has been supplanted by service industries having altogether different labour and space requirements. Communications technology has helped liberate economic activities from the constraints of central-city locations. Increased demand for shelter has put pressure on the urban fringe to accommodate most new residential construction.

The outward movement from traditional urban centres has not stopped at the suburban rings of metropolitan areas. US census data from the early 1970's indicated that following the post-war suburbanisation boom a distinct growth trend was underway in areas other than greater metropolitan regions. Counterurbanisation, the term coined by Brian Berry, describes a new situation in which a general tendency towards urban deconcentration can be observed[6]. These postwar phenomena represent a reversal of the urbanisation trends that characterised the Industrial Revolution and the decades following it. A dramatic concentration of population and industrial investment has been superseded by a dispersion of population and a relative (in some extreme cases an absolute) decentralisation of industrial activity.

This general picture of deconcentration and decentralisation is complicated by another spatial phenomena whose long-term significance is still unclear. The so-called Urban Renaissance has been particularly visible in such fashionable cities as San Francisco, Munich and Toronto. High-paying service sector jobs, combined with apparent changes in values and lifestyle preferences, have revitalised core-area housing markets in those cities (often at the expense of low-income neighbourhoods), attracting new commercial investment and "upscale" retail stores, restaurants and nightlife. This upscaling (or gentrification) of the inner city has been identified with the advent of affluent young singles or childless couples who, at least in early stages of their

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[6]   See Brian J.L. Berry, The Counterurbanization Process: Urban America Since 1970, in Brian J.L. Berry (ed.), Urbanization and Counterurbanization, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976.

professional lives, prefer a genuinely urban environment to the more placid suburbs[7]. Urban revitalisation in the form of gentrification has been so pervasive that researchers have begun to discuss the possibility of a "reurbanisation" trend, thereby bringing urban spatial development full circle[8].

These observations of an urban spatial evolution over time have encouraged comparative studies on an international and highly aggregated statistical level. At the same time, theories of technological and social convergence, have tended to stress relative levels of industrial development as a determinant for urban spatial development. Taken together, the concepts of convergence and evolution have implied that as industrial transformation proceeds, and new communications and information technologies are subsequently incorporated into the economy and infrastructure, urbanisation trends will continue along a concentration/deconcentration continuum, with accompanying reurbanisation trends in central cities. As the United States appears to be farthest along this development path, the American city has often been taken as model for international urban change, a sort of final stage, as it were. Spatial differences between American and European cities are thus explained in terms of time-lags within the process of technological and economic transformation[9].

Unfortunately, it is often forgotten that economic transformation, technological revolutions, and dramatic changes in socio-economic relations and consumption patterns have been accompanied by equally important political and administrative transformations. Among the more obvious of these changes are a greater involvement of the state in economic and social matters, a reevaluation of local political autonomy, and the advent of more comprehensive planning processes.

The experience of 19th century industrial urbanisation demonstrated that existing administrative and institutional arrangements - as well as a largely laissez-faire attitude toward town-expansion and land use - were wholly inadequate to deal with rapid urban growth. In particular, the institution of municipal autonomy and local self-government, itself an achievement of a centuries-old struggle against absolutism and centralism, was severely challenged by the overwhelming social and environmental problems accompanying urbanisation. This challenge continues today although, perhaps, with less political and social salience.

In many respects, urban development has become synonymous with metropolitan development. Already in the previous century processes of rapid economic growth had caused neighbouring industrial cities in the Ruhr, the English Midlands, and elsewhere to expand and form interdependent regions or conurbations. The development outward of suburban fringe communities was also well under way by the end of the 19th century. In more recent times, the

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[7] See Martin Gellen, Migration and Urban Revitalization: The Case of San Francisco, Working Paper No. 394, Institute of Urban and Regional Development (University of California), 1982, for a discussion of life-cycle and lifestyle factors behind the new urban renaissance.

[8] For an interesting discussion of development cycles, see Gerhard Braun, Theoretical Aspects of Complex Urban Transition, unpublished IGU Paper (Pamplona), 1986.

[9] See: A. Rodriguez-Bachiller, "Discontiguous Growth and the New Urban Economics," Urban Studies, 1986 (2). p.100.

process of suburbanisation and decentralised economic development has acquired a new intensity and spatial quality. Far-flung communities, many of them dominated by farming only years before, have become part of vast urban regions, enmeshed in a complex metropolitan network of economic, social, political, and environmental relationships. We can, in fact, speak of the growth of regional cities within which administrative boundaries between communities have lost much - if not all - of their practical meaning.

Canadian political scientist Hugh Whalen, writing in 1960 on the changing role of local governments, deemed them as insufficient to deal with complex metropolitan problems on their own:

> "Local self-government as it exists in most industrial democracies today can no longer be considered a major instrument of control. In an era of expanding communities, growing mass publics, and intricate and rapidly expanding technologies, mechanisms of democratic control must be located at the vital centres of power of each national community[10]."

From the view point of rational and efficient problem-solving, Whalen's comments are accurate in many respects. They were also written at a time when faith in "scientific" planning (particularly in the U.K. and other European countries) was reaching its apex. Still, the persistent issue of local political control and territorial rights has proved intractable. Every planning and problem-solving strategy devised to respond to the challenges of urban growth has had, in one way or another, to respect and adapt to some basic form of local sovereignty.

Metropolitan service districts and other forms of regional governance have been introduced during the 20th century to address these new political and administrative realities. The geographic relevance of metropolitan governance lies in its function as a vehicle of urban growth management. Three aspects of metropolitan politics would appear especially salient. These are 1) the conflicts of interest between inner-city and suburban areas, 2) the issue of intraregional disparities and rivalries and, 3) interrelationships between national, state, and regional urban land use and development policies[11]. Metropolitan governance presents us with a scenario similar to that of federalism. Both involve a trade-off between local political sovereignty and the extent of central government authority. Both entail a balance between local economic development ambitions and social needs and those of society-at-large. Metropolitan governance also raises the question of how to maintain a well-functioning and attractive urban environment. If we identify the central city's role as a focal point of social life and pacesetter of economic development as a positive aspect of our urban culture, then the maintenance of central city vitality would seem to be a desirable political objective. However, given the difficulties of inner-city areas to adapt to economic change and the enormous pressures on fringe communities to accommodate new

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[10] Hugh Whalen, "Ideology, Democracy, and the Foundations of Self-Government," Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science 26(3), 1960, p. 394.

[11] Ken Young , Governing the London Region: The Metropolitan Experiment, 1956 - 1990, synopsis and outline of a forthcoming publication, January, 1990.

residential, commercial, and industrial development, an active policy of inner-city renewal and metropolitan land use regulation would appear to be required.

The maintenance of urban centrality is not achievable through regional intervention alone. In almost all cases, senior governments must supply legislative frameworks, funds, and policies to address not only global economic issues but local development problems. Still, there remains the question of whether or not the administrative and political tools and the political will to regulate metropolitan development exist. Federalism, basically a compromise between the centralising logic of infrastructural and administrative efficiency and the demands for decentralised, locally-oriented political action, provides an excellent background within which to compare attempts at such metropolitan area management.

2.2   CULTURE, HUMAN AGENCY AND URBAN ORDER

Deterministic explanations necessarily and automatically imply that the human element of urban change is of secondary importance. More often than not the roles of culture, political ideologies, and historical traditions have been deemphasised, if not discounted altogether. For a number of reasons - both practical and theoretical - deterministic science has proved unsatisfactory in analysing the complex and problematic nature of urban development. Concern with a general spatial logic, whether of an economic or technological character, or whether involving a "biotic" adaptation to changes in technology and the economy, inevitably blurs important distinctions in the development of different urban areas. Furthermore, urban problem-solving - which clearly lends itself to comparative analysis - is difficult to deal with if embedded in a rigid, universal scheme of urban change.

A common theme among much comparative urban research is that technology and industrialisation have played an overwhelmingly dominant role in determining urban outcomes. In many cases the existence of a liberal free- market economy is taken for granted. Capitalism, in fact, would seem to be interpreted as a natural order within which spatial segregation, concentration, decentralisation, and other urban phenomena occur. This viewpoint is especially prevalent in the ecologist school. Researchers such as Kasarda have argued that interventionist tinkering with land markets or with the urban fabric itself serves only to distort temporarily the inevitable patterns produced by the interaction of society, technology, and the economy[12].

Furthermore, Daniel Bell's influential concept of post-industrialism suggests an end to ideology as technology (and not the mode of production) becomes the prime determinant factor behind social and spatial change[13]. In other word, class consciousness within society has been broken

[12]   See John Kasarda, New Urban Policies for New Urban Realities, in Gerd-Michael Hellstern, Frithjof Spreer, and Hellmut Wollmann (eds.), Applied Urban Research. Towards an Internationalization of Research and Learning (Proceeding of the European Meeting on Applied Urban Research, Essen, 02-04 October, 1981), Bonn: Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumordnung, 1982, pp.5-13.

[13]   David Ley, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, New York: Basic Books, 1973.

down by a revolutionary break with industrial culture[14]. However tenuous, the belief that technological progress has made ideological conflict obsolete, and that capitalist society in its present form represents a kind of higher-order objective reality, has arguably supported a deterministic vision in comparative urban studies.

The new urban sociology, as it has been called, attempts to bridge the theoretical gap left by determinism, while maintaining the normative thrust of critical science. While there is some debate as to the formal title of the relatively recent approach - the more interdisciplinary term "urban political economy" has been suggested as an alternative - it can be generally described as an attempt to fuse critical analyses of capitalism and Max Weber's concepts of conscious human intervention or agency into an alternative theoretical consideration of urban change[15]. One aim of this approach to urban analysis is to resolve the conflict between "determinant structure" and "human agency". A typical "structuralist" argument is that the human ability to act out of free will is severely constrained by tangible and intangible factors that govern proximity and access to urban resources. It can be argued however, that human agency itself creates these structures, in the form of social and physical constraints. Michael Peter Smith writes:

> "the subjective meanings given to the social world by knowledgeable human agents, and the ideologies and forms of political practice that follow from these meanings, are themselves powerful constraints upon social action[16]."

Sociologists such as Ray Pahl have made the role of public intervention within capitalism, and particularly within "welfare state types of society", their principal focus of investigation[17]. Using the Weberian concept of a bureaucratic élite operating autonomously within a given economic logic, they proposed that administrative gatekeepers to urban resources and services (or managers) create patterns of social inequality independent of those due to class conflict[18]. As Pahl has explained, "urban managerialism" is primarily an attempt to study urban change and conflict in direct relation "to the specific nature of the particular type of capitalist society concerned"[19]. The territorial injustices caused through the allocative power of planners, urban service authorities, and other "mediators between urban populations and the capitalist economy," are as

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[14] See David Ley's remarks on the postindustrial thesis in "Liberal ideology and the postindustrial city", Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 2: 238-258, 1980. In it he contrasts Bell's technological determinism and contention that industrial class struggle has been eliminated by modern society with Jürgen Habermas' idea of an advanced capitalist society responding to crises brought about by revolutionary changes in economic life.

[15] See C.G. Pickvance, The Structuralist Critique in Urban Studies, in: Michael Peter Smith (ed.), Cities in Transformation. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Vol.26. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984.

[16] Michael Peter Smith, Urban Structures, Social Theory and Political Power, in Michael Peter Smith (ed.), op.cit., p.15.

[17] Ray Pahl, Whose City?, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1975, pp.234-264.

[18] See Rex and Moore's study of housing allocation practises and ethnicity in Birmingham, J. Rex and R. Moore, Race, Community and Conflict. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

[19] Ray Pahl, op.cit., p.275.

indicative of political ideology and elitist values as they are of an inadequate response to changes in technology and the division of labour[20].

To summarise, the new urban sociology is an attempt to combine more global elements of urban change, such as technology and political economy, with the peculiarities of culture, values, and modes of political and social control. It is Mark Gottdiener's claim that traditional urban ecology and dogmatic, deterministic political economy are giving way to "inquiry concerned with agency and structure and the state logic of control"[21]. If this statement can be given credence, then it would appear that the role of culture and, beyond that, the role of the state and its agents as "managers" of spatial order, should be given greater attention.

Adherents of the new urban sociology have argued that human intervention in the process of capital accumulation and in the resolution of social conflicts is the principal force behind urban development in capitalist countries. Far from being a narrowly defined and strictly ideological body of thought, new urban sociology embraces a wide spectrum of critical inquiry, and, as Mark Gottdiener has pointed out, has increasingly looked to cultural interpretations of space in order to explain human action[22].

An emphasis on the role culture has played in urban development implies the assumption that cities are a creation of conscientious human decisions. The underlying logic behind such decisions is not viewed as merely a question of economic and political necessity, or of adaptation to technological change or even to environmental circumstances. According to proponents of the cultural approach, human decision-making is first and foremost a search for possible alternatives: it is a response to necessity that is rarely predetermined and only partly conditioned by outside factors. Culture is what gives both form and content to these decisions.

Having stated these general assumptions, however, the task of defining and interpreting the significance of culture remains. Arriving at an all-encompassing definition of the term culture is, in itself, laden with difficulties. Here we are dealing with the totality of common experiences, traditions, values, and inherited ideas of a people, passed down and modified through generations and, in the process, often given new meanings. Furthermore, once it is understood what is meant by "culture", its relevance to the comparative study of cities must be clearly stated.

Agnew, Mercer, and Sopher have written that:

> "consideration of the city in a cultural context implies an emphasis on the practices and ideas that arise from collective and individual experiences. The practices and ideas are not themselves uniquely urban but derive from the social, economic, and political situations that have shaped group and individual existence. In turn, the practices and ideas - in short "culture" - have shaped urban worlds[23]."

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20   Ibid, p.284.
21   Mark Gottdiener and Joe R. Feagin, The Paradigm Shift in Urban Sociology, Urban Affairs Quarterly, 24(2),1988, p. 184.
22   Mark Gottdiener, Culture, Ideology, and the Sign of the City, in Mark Gottdiener and Alexandros Ph. Lagopoulos (eds.), The City and the Sign, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp.202-218.
23   John Agnew, John Mercer, and David Sopher (eds.), The City in Cultural Context, Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984, p.1.

Culture, therefore, is not an abstract and strictly mental construct but firmly anchored in day to day life; even those human activities that appear to be guided by common-sense, practical considerations or economic logic are embedded in culture. Raymond Williams has suggested that culture can be best conceived as a "signifying system" in which symbols derived from common experiences create a recognisable order that permeates social and economic relationships[24]. Mercer and Goldberg have stressed the interrelationships between culture (expressed as a set of values or world view) and human experiences (in this case social, economic, and political life)[25]. Because these experiences - and in effect, the creation and recreation of culture - are place specific, Mercer and Goldberg argue that urban systems develop interreactively with world view and cultural values.

Amos Rapoport has emphasised certain definitions of culture which appear to have been useful in the area of comparative cultural geography. Based on Redfield's concept in which culture represents "the total equipment of ideas and institutions and conventionalised activities of a people", Rapoport concludes that the sharing of image and value systems comprising a world view are principal elements of cultural identity[26]. Furthermore, Rapoport states that culture manifests itself most clearly through the decisions that govern human activities with regard to the greater social, economic and physical environment. Consequently, the creation of shelter is a problem that begets a cultural response:

> "A house is a human fact, and even under the most severe physical constraints and with limited technology, man has built in ways so diverse that they can be attributed only to choice, which involves cultural values[27]."

If one accepts Rapoport's theoretical framework in which choice becomes the active vehicle (or at least the most spatially relevant vehicle) of culture, then it follows that the attempt to explain consistency in decisions affecting land use will help achieve a more general understanding as to why different cultural landscapes manifest such diverse spatial patterns.

Traditionally, landscape geographers have studied urban form within a cultural context. To quote Pierce F. Lewis' axiom of landscape as a clue to culture: "the man-made landscape - the ordinary run-of-the-mill things that humans have created and put upon the earth - provides strong evidence of the kind of people we are, and were, and are in the process of becoming. In other words, the culture of any nation is unintentionally reflected in its ordinary vernacular landscape"[28]. While also concerned with functional and technological aspects of human environments, it is the symbolism of the landscape - the physical codes related to cultural

24 Raymond Williams, The Sociology of Culture, New York: Schocken Books, 1982.
25 John Mercer and David Goldberg, The Myth of the North American City, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986.
26 Amos Rapoport, House Form and Culture, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969, p.48.
27 Idem.
28 Pierce F. Lewis, Axioms for Reading the Landscape, in D.W. Meinig (ed), The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes, New York: Oxford, 1979, p.15.

meaning - which P.F.Lewis, D.W. Meinig, Yi-Fu Tuan, and others have primarily sought to decipher. The study of cultural landscapes has also provided insights into environmental "cues" (to use Rapoport's term) as symbols of class identity and status.

This is especially relevant for "meritocratic" North America, where membership within a status group is generally indicated by consumption patterns. In the cases of Vancouver and New York, Duncan and Duncan have established that certain elements of the traditional English landscape serve as conspicuous and identifiable cultural images for an Anglophile élite[29].

More recently, a critical urban semiotics approach has been suggested as a method to analyse cultural space and the social meaning of space within the context of (capitalist) ideology. Mark Gottdiener writes:

> "the urban image must be read as an ideology, as a gesture with a past, as an outcome of a class society propelled by powerful forces of development and change. This sign is produced by economic and political forces, such as property law, as well as cultural expressions. The study of the city image, then, compels us to investigate the struggles for control of space and the manner in which certain ideological representations succeed while alternatives fail to materialize..[30] "

Gottdiener's class-specific conceptualisation of spatial control may not be entirely applicable to this comparative study. Nevertheless, he raises certain crucial issues. One of them is that of prevailing ideological representations which determine the creation of spatial - and thereby urban - order and which consistently defy replacement by "alternative" visions. The other regards the role political processes play in defining how control over physical space is to be exercised. Thus, culture, ideology, and the political decision-making process would appear to be inextricably intertwined. In this case, they could be defined as the basis by which social, economic, and spatial order is created and maintained.

2.3   PLANNING, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY

We have mentioned Max Weber's concern with the rationalisation of economic and political life through the development of administrative bureaucracies. As Weber observed, these "agencies" are centres of problem-solving expertise and decision-making authority whose control function has consistently increased within the evolution of capitalism. From a basic methodological level, it has been argued that Weber's concern with the city was not primarily motivated by the desire to develop an urban sociology as such. On the contrary, Weber saw in the city a reflection of wider social, economic, and political arrangements. Unlike other scholars who

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[29]   James S. Duncan and Nancy G. Duncan, A Cultural Analysis of Urban Residential Landscapes in North America: the Case of the Anglophile élite, in: John Agnew, John Mercer, and David Sopher (eds.), The City in Cultural Context. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984. pp. 255-288.

[30]   Mark Gottdiener, Culture, Ideology, and the Sign of the City, in Gottdiener, M and Lagopoulos, Ph. (eds.), op.cit., p.216.

have sought to understand urban phenomena through a precise observation of the city itself (such as the followers of the so-called Chicago School), Weber focused his attention on urban functions within an historical and comparative context. This is clearly demonstrated in Weber's Die Stadt in which he defines the characteristics of "ancient", "mediaeval", "patrician", and "plebeian" cities with respect to power structures and economic and social relationships[31].

If we combine concepts of agency, managerialism, and of the city as reflection of society at large, we can perhaps better understand how cultural values and norms relate to the political decision-making process. This, in turn, might allow us to arrive at an appropriate theoretical framework in which political and administrative processes, such as planning, can be seen as spatially relevant vehicles of values, ideology and tradition. Bertrand Badie writes:

> "The sociological construction of a concept of culture indicates precise theoretical guidelines for the analysis of political systems. Under the assumption that cultural codes - that is to say the systems of meaning which have developed historically - exert control over the transformation of social and political processes, it is hypothesised that such codes allow the definition of the content and context of different social "objects" which characterise every meaningful social space[32]."

These sociological concepts would appear to be helpful in expanding geographical theory based on the role of political decision-making processes. The planning process, so often dismissed as an effective agent of spatial transformation in itself, should be seen for what it is: as a transmitter of cultural values and an instrument of decision-making power. Planning is furthermore a reflection of a more general political order and, as such, is an expression of social and spatial control. We have discussed how urban space can be interpreted in terms of socially relevant visual codes or cues. Rapoport and others have shown, for example, how anglophile suburban space, readily identifiable through architectural and other environmental images, designates status, identity and cultural nostalgia. It remains for the planning bureaucracy, however, to ensure that this "positive" spatial expression of community and status persevere.

Viewed in this light, the planning and other political decision-making processes cannot be interpreted merely as a reaction to economic, technological or "structural" phenomena. On the contrary, they represent a willful creation of space in accordance with accepted norms and ideologies and within the organisational guidelines set by an existing economic and political order.

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[31] Max Weber, The City, translated by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958.
[32] Bertrand Badie, Culture et Politique, Paris: Economica, 1986, p.85

To quote Rapoport once again:

"Planning and design on all scales - from regions to furniture groupings - can be seen as the organization of space for different purposes and according to different rules, which affect the activities, values and purposes of the individuals of groups doing the organizing. At the same time, space organization also reflects ideal images representing the congruence ... between physical space and social space[33]."

2.4 CONSTRUCTING A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK

There can be no doubt that the philosophical debate generated by the determinism - free will dialectic has greatly enriched urban geography and urban studies as a whole[34]. However, as Agnew, Mercer and Sopher have suggested, a consideration of culture can bridge important gaps left by other comparative approaches to urban analysis[35]. Urban ecology, concepts of "European evolutionism" (or convergence), as well as theories that interpret urban development as a component of the capitalist political economy involve schematic and often deterministic interpretations of urban change. They have proved inadequate in explaining spatial variety and deviations from postulated norms - deviations that might well be caused by cultural peculiarities.

It is not our intention to dismiss deterministic explanation, outright while extolling the analytical virtues of cultural approaches. As we have seen, for example, the "structure-agency conflict" is not as irresolvable as it might seem. Agnew et al have pointed out however, that comparative studies based on cultural analysis do enjoy an important methodological and philosophical advantage. Not only do they open up a wealth of information (both in terms of variety and quantity) often disregarded for the sake of empirical expediency, but they also encourage critical self-examination of our own assumptions and scientific knowledge, themselves often a product of culture[36].

Within this study we will not compare the cultures of Canada, West Germany, and the United States per se; this would be too ambitious an undertaking. Instead, our attention will be focused on human institutions that deal with the problems of urban society. These institutions, we assume, are carriers of traditions and values and, as such, approach issues at hand with distinguishable cultural orientations. While certain objective and rational criteria will doubtless guide institutional action, it is our contention that political ideologies, legal traditions, and the historical role of the state in shaping institutions also form basis of such action. We contend further that the institutional and administrative frameworks that have evolved from country to country, represent problem-solving mechanisms that have greatly influenced urban growth. In view of the

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33 Ibid, p. 179.
34 Michael Peter Smith, Urban Structures, Social Theory and Political Power. In: Michael Peter Smith (ed.), Cities in Transformation, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984, pp.9-27.
35 John Agnew, John Mercer, and David Sopher, op.cit
36 Ibid.

pervasiveness of administrative bureauracies, the planning function, and state involvement in local affairs, it would appear that institutional action is increasingly determining urban outcomes.

A comparative study of metropolitan areas as diverse as Vancouver, Munich, and San Diego is obviously fraught with methodological difficulties. The idea that selected metropolitan areas within a specific country can be seen to be representative of its urban areas also presents problems. On one hand, different economic circumstances, historical development patterns, policy decisions and growth rates cannot be ignored. On the other hand, however, the level of generalisation necessary for this study does not allow for an in-depth analysis of all these factors. In addition, this comparison deals primarily with urban development since 1945, thereby running the risk of underplaying spatial trends influenced by earlier developments. As far as spatial structure and topography are concerned, these urban areas vary greatly. The San Francisco Bay Area and Greater Frankfurt are polynucleated urban realms with several large core areas. The Toronto-Centred Region and Greater Vancouver are polynucleated but with clearly dominating central cities. Munich, on the other hand, is a classic example of a large primate city surrounded by a ring of small communities.

These difficulties notwithstanding, these appears to be ample justification for attempting a tri-national comparison of metropolitan area development based on these urban regions. For one thing, the planning mechanism coupled with increased central government intervention in urban affairs have attained great importance in all post-war social-welfare states. The economic, social, and infrastructural transformation of urban centres already described demonstrates a certain consistency, if not uniformity, within Europe and North America - a consistency which indicates that problems accompanying urban growth are by no means isolated phenomena but are commonly shared by all "advanced" industrialised nations. These urban growth problems will unquestionably differ from country to country in terms of severity and relative importance. Just the same, they are problems that must be addressed. Metropolitan area problem-solving and/or the anticipation of problems accompanying urban growth is a task that all societies face and whose execution will very much depend on the political and organisational possibilities for action.

The three countries represented in this study, the USA, Canada, and West Germany, are industrialised, federal states. The urban regions under consideration here have all experienced rapid economic growth accompanied by extensive suburbanisation and a dramatic transformation of their downtown areas. More importantly, the following case studies are part of an attempt to compare how countries with different federal arrangements have dealt with metropolitan problems. In other words, this international comparison will focus on the political regulation of suburban land use and the maintenance of urban centrality.

Theoretical motives for focusing attention on the land-use decision-making process have been described in the previous chapter. There remains, however, to develop an analytical framework with which to view land-use decision within a comparative context. As implied by the culture/ideology/political process "complex" we have synthesised here, the principal issues of

concern are 1) the growth rationale behind planning decisions, and 2) the conditions and restrictions within which local land-use policy must operate.

The fact that the planning process is performed through widely varying organisational and hierarchical means would seem to indicate that the application of a rigid structural comparison of planning policy decisions is not feasible. At the same time, the interaction of local, regional, and higher levels of decision-making authority is precisely the process we are interested in. "Regional focus", "ideology", and "intervention" will be identified as primary components of the land-use decision-making process. As these are obviously parts of a greater whole - in this case, characteristics of overlying social values, legal traditions, and national political structures - it would seem that these three broadly defined factors must be analysed at a more global level. This global level could then serve as the general, overlying context within which land-use policy at the local level might be studied.

Once having determined how the global factors of regional focus, intervention, and land use ideology manifest themselves in an international comparison, we can move to the more specific subject of metropolitan area planning as illustrated by the selected case studies. At the local/regional level we will then examine how land-use decisions made by certain individual communities relate to regional planning goals, state/provincial/federal interventionist policies, and economic growth issues.

An equally important step is to specify the kinds of problems we will be dealing with. This requires the assumption that we may speak of urban phenomena that are experienced universally. It would indeed seem that in one way or another, every urban region facing rapid economic expansion, a shift toward fringe areas, and increasing demand for all kinds of shelter, has had to react. The time period we will be dealing with coincides with the advent of mass suburbanisation and the rapid peripheral expansion of metropolitan areas. We are interested in this phenomenon and its consequences for public policy and planning rather than in counterurbanisation, reurbanisation, or gentrification. Consequently, we will examine basic decisions concerning the delivery of urban services, the future extension of infrastructure, the supply of buildable land, and the coordination of urban transport systems with land-use.

The principle assumptions underlying this comparative study is that urban spatial development can be analysed in terms of the "management" of change. Although certain economic and technological trends appear to be universal, the strategies employed to deal with them - to shape growth in a manner deemed acceptable - have varied greatly from country to country. In other words, the forms suburbanisation and decentralisation have taken have not been unilaterally determined by the automobile, or the requirements of new service industries, but have also been a products of choice - of planning and other policy decisions made under specific ideological, political, as well as economic circumstances. The working hypotheses used in this study can be summarised as follows:

1. Cultural values, political traditions, and "world view" are embodied in political decision making structures and ideology. They can de defined by: a) the degree of political centralisation within a political system and the degree of acceptance of intervention in the planning process, b) legal traditions with regard to property rights, c) policy goals at various levels of government with relation to urban economic development (job growth and sectoral expansion) and spatial expansion.

2. Degrees of centralisation and state intervention, legal traditions, and attitudes toward spatial growth can be seen as part of a decision making mechanism by which new spatial demands are accommodated. Industrialised nations dealing with rapid urban growth since 1945, have had to implement a variety of policies, planning restrictions, and, in some cases, growth incentives to promote urban development in a manner perceived as being politically acceptable. Urban growth management entails the accepted means of resolving metropolitan area problems and can help explain spatial patterns that have evolved in conjunction with suburbanisation and decentralisation.

3. Regional governance is an integral part of the "growth management mechanism" we are proposing here. Its influence over metropolitan development is an indicator of relative degrees of restrictive planning and political centralisation.

4. Indicators of the spatial outcomes generated by urban growth management frameworks can be found in: a) infrastructural policy, e.g. transport, water, energy, and policies regarding the location and administration of regional infrastructural facilities, b) residential land use policies as indicated by densities, housing types, forms of tenure, and allowances for affordable housing, c) commercial and industrial land use policies with regard to relative location, densities, employment potential measured in jobs, and the regional breakdown of available office space.

Having formulated these working hypotheses, we can expand on a more general concept of urban development that posits the maintenance of a strong central city in urban society as a possible policy orientation. The maintenance of centrality - of central city domination within the interdependent metropolitan region - continues to be a goal of great social, economic, and political importance. This remains true despite attempts to promote regional development through certain decentralisation efforts (e.g. Greater London and the New Towns strategy). However, the defense of the central city, both as economic magnet and a functionally diverse centre of social activity, has been possible only insofar as the administrative and institutional frameworks have allowed it. In other words, the active policy support of central city domination is an important area of comparative urban investigation.

We can now ask the question to what extent different countries - in this case Canada, West Germany, and the United States - have reacted to universal trends of economic and technological

change in ways that have minimised the loss of central city importance and the decentralising effects of peripheral growth.

If we can succeed in partially answering this question, we might gain insights into the ways economic and technological factors of change interreact with deliberate human action in determining urban spatial evolution. We might also be able to put U.S.-American urban development into better comparative perspective. For many reasons the convergence approach appears to be a facile and insufficient basis for analysing metropolitan development worldwide. Indeed, it is likely that divergences will reveal more about recent urban spatial trends in industrialised nations than has as yet been assumed.

3.   PLANNING AND LAND-USE IDEOLOGY
IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA
AND GERMANY

The three countries involved in this study, Canada, the USA, and the Federal Republic of Germany, are democratic federal states. The development of representative government in these three countries has, of course, run very different courses. The United States - a republic for over 200 years - was able at an early stage to break away from British colonial rule and to establish an indigenous form of popularly elected government. Canada's political system, inherited from the British without a revolutionary break, evolved more slowly into the federal arrangement that prevails today. However, it shares with the United States a long tradition of democratic government. The Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, is of recent creation and represents a permanent break with the authoritarian and dictatorial states that preceded it. Not surprisingly, the degree of political centralisation within these three federal systems varies greatly.

Federalism as a political system can, at its most basic, be understood as an alternative to centralism. Crucial to federalism is the maintenance of a degree of political, economic, and administrative independence of individual states within a larger nation-state[1]. At the same time, Federalism implies the attempt to provide ideal guarantees of individually and territorially defined liberties. Daniel Elazar writes:

> "As a political device, federalism can be viewed more narrowly as a kind of political order motivated by political principles that emphasize the primacy of bargaining and negotiated co-ordination among several power centres as a prelude to the exercise of power within a single political system and stress the virtues of dispersed power centres as a means for safeguarding individual and local liberties[2]."

The decisive issue in federalism is the degree to which actual decision-making powers have been relegated to regional and local levels of government. Admittedly, this can involve contradictions: federal nations such as the United States of Mexico and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are obviously more dominated by their capital cities than are such traditionally centralist states as France and Italy. Federalism cannot be reduced to the simple relationship of centralisation versus decentralisation, since elements of both will be found in any nation-state that considers itself "federal".

Smiley and Watts have classified federal systems according to two ideal institutional forms,

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[1]   See the definition of federalism as formulated by Ivo Duchacek, in Comparative Federalism. The Territorial Dimension of Politics, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970, pp.191-201.

[2]   Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism. International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan, 1967. p.8

pluralistic and parliamentarian[3]. In Smiley and Watt's view, the *pluralist* federation is an attempt at dispersion of political authority not only among central and state institutions, but also within the centre of political power itself[4]. This system is most clearly evident in the separation of powers and bi-cameral system of the United States. Parliamentary federalism, such as that encountered in Canada and West Germany, concentrates political authority within central institutions, while at the same time guaranteeing considerable state/provincial autonomy.

Federal systems, designed to accommodate different regional needs and tempers within the political framework of the nation-state, have created new areas of conflict by establishing a multi-level form of government. As Wiltshire notes, all governments in a federal setting are legitimate and at least theoretically enjoy almost absolute discretion in those areas and with those decision-making powers assigned them[5]. The necessary attempt at exact definition of the political "interface" where one sovereign area of jurisdiction begins and another ends - and the attempts to resolve conflicts arising from jurisdictional uncertainties - lie at the centre of intergovernmental relations. Not surprisingly, federalism's division of powers provides unlimited potential for intergovernmental and interregional rivalries.

The imposition of an effective and long-term *national* planning regime on such federal arrangements is exceedingly difficult, and has met with varying degrees of success in different federal countries. A multitude of problems face the planning process in countries such as Canada, the United States and West Germany. Linkages between regional, national and international economies, and in the labour, energy and resource base, form an interconnective network overlain by a fragmented jurisdictional map. The allocation of economic resources and the setting of planning priorities is thus divided among various levels of government, all of which contend for popular legitimacy and are jealous of their decision-making prerogatives. The goal of efficiency and autocracy in planning process clashes head-on with the political ideas of personal freedom and local autonomy[6].

Jurisdictional fragmentation and the conflict between local political autonomy and senior government authority are thus vital aspects of the planning process[7]. The responsibility for community land-use planning, by its very nature an area of great local concern, has, by and

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[3]   Donald V. Smiley and Ronald L. Watts, Intrastate Federalism in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985. p.40.
[4]   Ibid.,, p.41.
[5]   Kenneth Wiltshire, Planning and Federalism: Australian and Canadian Experience, St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1986.
[6]   Ibid.
[7]   See Wilhelm Dreier, Raumordnung als Bodeneigentums- und Bodennutzungsreform, Köln: Verlag J .P. Bachem, 1968. Drier offers an interesting analysis of liberal ideology, the development of individual property rights, and conflicts that ensued with the evolution of the planning process.

large, been delegated to municipal governments in all three countries. There is, however, great variation in the degree to which senior governments in Canada, the United States, and West Germany intervene in local planning matters to promote a more general social well-being. Local political autonomy may appear to some to be a chimera due to the global nature of economic and technological change and the fiscal dependence of municipalities on state and federal governments. This assumption ignores the fact that local political interests and voter pressure often do not necessarily operate along lines of economic or administrative rationality. For these reasons it is important to analyse the degree to which local interests and political decision-making power are safeguarded by the three political systems. In other words, we must attempt to determine where and how the federal systems of Canada, the United States, and West Germany draw the line in weighing the rights and privileges of individuals and communities against those of society-at-large.

3.1   THE ROLE OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

Apart from the federal aspect of land-use planning, the other general political factor to be considered is the role of state intervention and liberal economic ideology. This is, in part, a reflection of the relative importance attached to private property and the ways in which conflicts involving property rights and land tenureship are dealt with. More generally, these often contradictory forces define the extent to which government intervention in economic and social affairs is considered acceptible.

Implicit in liberal ideology is the idea that economic life represents an independent and rationally motivated sphere of action shaped by a "natural" social order[8]. In this view, the market, being at the centre of economic life, operates according to its own logic of supply, demand and competition. It cannot tolerate interference from powers "outside" its sphere of operation. The idea that government has no business regulating economic life originates from 18th and 19th century beliefs that commerce, industry and progress had defeated the old feudal and autocratic order by virtue of their superior rationality.

The famous German scholar of constitutional law, Carl Schmitt, described the optimistic "liberal spirituality" which pervaded the 1800's in the following terms

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[8]   A good discussion of general ideologies and their manifestation in the United States can be found in Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare, American Ideologies. The Competing Political Beliefs of the 1970s, Chicago: Markham, 1971.

"Crucial (to this concept) is the combination of the humanistic, moralistic, and intellectual ideals of the18th century...with economic-industrial and technological developments of the 19th. "The Economy" was viewed to be the vehicle by which this in fact exceedingly complex process had unfolded; economy, commerce, industry, technical perfection, freedom, and rationalisation were perceived to be peaceful allies - peaceful despite a vigorous offensive against feudalism, reaction, and the police-state and as such were held to exist in contradistinction to war and violence[9]."

Liberalism can be characterised by both a moralistic and ethical "pathos" and an underlying belief in the neutrality and basic rationality of the marketplace. This, of course, is primarily a description of liberalism in its purest "laissez-faire" form - a liberalism which predates the 1920s. Almost all industrialised democracies have since developed "welfare-state" economies that attempt to achieve a redistribution of social wealth, while maintaining as free a market economy as possible. The tension persists between social democratic concepts of social equality (in America, confusingly enough, called "liberal") and conservative beliefs in economic expansion has. Liberalism as an ideology continues to exert a profound influence on the development of public policy and, as a result, on planning.

At the same time, the concept of liberalism helps us locate traditions of political intervention and the role of private property rights within an historical and comparative analysis of urban planning. In this respect, Canada, the United States, and West Germany - with more or less liberal market economies - have had diverse experiences. Great differences in social legislation, economic regulation, redistributive mechanisms of tax revenues, and general public policy bear this out.

Planning decisions often involve a *taking* of either certain rights to use property, or of property itself. This is almost always done in the name of the public good, although speculative interests are also often involved. At the same time, the issue of forcibly depriving an individual of property and/or land-use rights goes against the ideological grain of liberalism. Just compensation for lost rights, avenues of legal appeal, and public planning forums are some of the safeguards of individual rights that have been institutionalised in most industrial democracies. What is important however, is the degree to which individual property rights can be protected through *institutional* means.

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[9]   Carl Schmitt, Begriff des Politischen. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1932, p.74

3.2   THE UNITED STATES: A DISPERSION OF POWER

In developing the United States Constitution of 1787, which defined the contours of a new political federation, the Founding Fathers studied the works of political thinkers such as Locke, Hobbes, and Montesquieu. They were also able to draw upon their own knowledge of English Common Law and the evolution of the British parliamentary system[10]. In the end, the arrangement that was agreed upon was that which best seemed to meet the requirements dictated by the territorial interests of the 13 states[11]. An intricate system of checks and balances was created based on separate executive and legislative branches, an independent jurisprudence, guarantees of states rights and, above all, precise legal definitions of political rights and responsibilities embodied in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. To avoid divisive conflicts between the states and central government, all decision-making powers not specifically defined as being within the jurisdiction of the national government were, according to the Constitution, relegated to the state governments.

Territorial dispersion of political decision-making power was accompanied by an institutional separation of powers at both federal and state levels of government. Here again, influenced by the ideas of Locke and Montesquieu, the Founding Fathers subscribed to the idea that there could be no liberty where executive, legislative, and judiciary powers were united in a government or an individual[12].

The original intent of the Constitutional Framers was to limit the powers of central government. These were explicitly defined as areas of overall national concern, such as defence, minting, taxation, central bank functions (or finance), and international relations. By giving the states their own independent court systems (bound, of course, to uphold the U.S. Constitution) and authority over local administration, education, public safety, and other local matters, it was believed that the role of the federal government could be kept within safe limits. This was, of course, not to be. Starting with the Civil War - itself a conflict over the right of individual states to secede from the Union - these functions delegated to the national government began to take on new dimensions.

America's ascendancy to the status of an imperial power after 1865 assured it an increasingly important diplomatic and military role in the world, and particularly on the American continent. This necessarily enhanced the prestige and influence of the federal government. The necessity of central government intervention in the wake of the Great Depression established Washington D.C. as regulator of financial markets and provider of subsidies.

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[10]   See Albert Fried, The Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Traditions in American Politics, Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1968.

[11]   See Roger Gibbins, Regionalism, Territorial Politics in Canada and the US, Toronto: Butterworths, 1982, p.120.

[12]   See George W. Carey, The Separation of Powers, In: George J. Graham and Scarlett G. Graham, Founding Principles of American Government. Two Hundred Years of Democracy on Trial, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977, pp. 98-134.

Finally, the wide variety of social, ethnic, ecological, and infrastructural problems facing urban society have required the federal government to intervene, producing an astounding array of programmes and legislation; the protection of minority rights, job safety, freeway construction, housing subsidies, massive investments in water and energy projects, environmental safety standards, and farm price supports are only some examples of these[13].

The enhancement of the U.S. federal government's role has not necessarily meant a diminution of state and local governments to insignificance. Instead, the federalist pattern in the United States is one of interaction between federal, state, and local prerogatives, and allows a large measure of decision-making discretion at the local level. The term Cooperative Federalism, coined during the New Deal, refers to the sharing of political responsibilities and joint administration of public policy among federal, state, and local levels of government[14]. The states are not only responsible for administering federal programmes, as well as executing their own, but are constitutionally empowered to deal with local area government and administration. Almost without exception, however, the states have followed the principle of "local home rule" and turned over most local responsibilities to community governments[15].

3.2.1 The Perserverence of Local Autonomy

Local political autonomy, also referred to as the principal of "local home rule", has enjoyed a long tradition in the United States. Local autonomy, here defined as the municipal right to decide issues of local importance, has been firmly embedded in the development of American popular democracy since independence. In the early 19th century rights of incorporation and municipal government were guaranteed by state governments as a means of ensuring the maintenance of local democracy. The US-American concept of local autonomy, in which the community represents the fundamental unit of democratic government, has its roots in a political culture that observers such as John Harrigan describe as individualistic and moralistic[16]. This indicates, on one hand, an ideology in which central government is viewed as antagonistic and potentially demagogic. On the other hand, it is a political culture embued with romantic visions of an ideal, direct, and interactive democracy, based on the neighbourhood and the town meeting. As Bollens and Schmandt note, local home rule has much to do with the attempt to establish Jeffersonian direct democracy at the municipal level[17]. This despite the fact that modern urban society has little in common with the New England agricultural township of which Thomas Jefferson spoke.

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[13] For an interesting discussion of the advent of Roosevelt's New Deal "regime" see Arthur Schlesinger Jr, The Coming of the New Deal, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958.

[14] See John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis, New York: Harper and Row, 1982, pp. 149-151.

[15] See, Jon C. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph. City Government in America, 1870 - 1900. Baltimore, 1984, pp. 103-131.

[16] John Harrigan, Political Change in the Metropolis, Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1981, p.236.

[17] John C.Bollens and Henry Schmandt, op.cit., p.380.

Suburbanisation in the Unites States has, to a great extent, been fuelled by this political ideal. Americans in their millions have turned their backs on the city, making sure, at the same time, that the suburbs remain independent:

> "Suburbs are politically distinctive because of their quest for political autonomy, for a government that is small enough and close enough to home that average citizens can have an impact on it...(it is) an attempt to recreate Jeffersonian democracy at the fringes of the city[18]."

As in most other industrialised nations, increased service demands on U.S. local government have had to be compensated for by transfer payments. As with other countries of Anglo-Saxon origin, local finances in the United States are heavily dependent on locally generated taxes. Property and sales taxes are the principal sources of local revenue although the relative contribution of property taxes varies regionally - in New England they make up between 80 - 90% of local revenues while in California the figure lies around 35%[19]. The federal and state governments administer an impressive array of grant programmes in order to help finance such things as infrastructure, education, and environmental measures. Most grants targeted for local governments (about 80%) are conditional and require adherence to certain procedures and/or planning standards. Senior governments have also increased their direct presence in municipal affairs through environmental legislation and transportation planning (e.g. interstate freeways). Despite a strong federal presence, local governments still play a very important role within the political system of the United States. In particular, cities have retained considerable administrative power in vital areas such as land-use planning, annexation policy, and the fixing of local tax levels (property and sales tax). It is hard to exaggerate the importance of local decision-making power over land-use.

One consequence of this "home rule" rule tradition for the U.S. planning process is the fragmentation - or "Balkanisation" - of land-use decisions in metropolitan areas. Effective long-term regional planning, or even the establishment of other forms of metropolitan administration have rarely been formally institutionalised in the United States[20]. Territorial reforms aimed at rationalising service areas and incorporating suburban areas within the jurisdictions of central cities have never been coerced. As a result, except for a short period before the 1920s, large-scale annexations of sovereign municipalities have remained a political impossibility. Instead, the most expedient political method of creating urban service economies of scale has been the creation of special districts - "mini-governments" whose jurisdictions are strictly limited to single administrative functions and which are accountable to the local electorate. Special districts are

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18   Robert Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958, p.14.
19   John C. Bollens and Henry Schmandt, op.cit., p.206.
20   Some of the exceptions are St.Paul Minneapolis, Indianapolis, and Dade County, Florida. However, these attempts at effective regional governance are limited in scope and have been helped by the fact that they occurred within large, single counties.

established through voter consent and deal with such areas as education, water, sewerage, firefighting, and rubbish collection. By keeping special districts as single or limited function institutions, the "big government" issue which otherwise stymies regional planning can be skirted. As some argue, they offer an acceptable alternative to local control because of their "big business" operating structure and removal from wider partisan politics[21]. In this way, a limited albeit fragmented form of regional government has developed in metropolitan areas of the United States within the context of local home rule.

3.2.2   The Limits of Intervention: Attitudes, Ideologies, and the Role of the State

US-American political culture is characterised by exceptionally liberal interpretations of individual liberties and the regulating role of the state. This is despite the fact that the United States is unquestionably a welfare state and a nation in which the federal and state governments possess broad decision-making powers. While laissez faire - laissez aller exists today in the United States only as an ideology, its influence can still be felt within the economic, social, and political order. The issue of individual property rights and local sovereignty over the use of land has, for example, greatly effected the development of U.S.-American planning practise.

John Locke, the English philosopher whose thoughts on the separation of political power so influenced the Founding Fathers, understood individual property rights as being something natural and inalienable. Ideological bonds between land (property) and freedom appear to be something very American. In his analysis of the national land policy established during the American Confederation (in the shape of the 1785 Land Ordinance and 1787 Northwest Ordinance), Daniel Elazar states that land, abundant as it was, became a "guarantor of liberty"[22]. Assuming more or less equal opportunities of access to frontier lands, these ordinances established the 640 square acre grid as the basis for township creation and homestead apportionment. Furthermore, according to Elazar, the political goals of these ordinances included 1) the establishment of owner-occupied homesteads as the fundamental unit of settlement, and 2) a territorial determination of governmental jurisdictions and political power. In other words, the development of post-revolutionary American settlements progressed within the context of a land-ownership based definition of personal freedom and democracy.

This permissive interpretation of property rights has remained influential in the United States to the present day. Limitations of these rights are often taken to be an attack on personal

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[21]   John Harrigan, op.cit., p.288.
[22]   Daniel J. Elazar, "Land and Liberty in American Civil Society", PUBLIUS: Journal of Federalism 18(Fall) 1988, pp.1-29.

freedoms and, therefore, pursued reluctantly. Government at the local and senior level is empowered to obtain, and restrict the use of, private property if the interests of the community-at-large are served (eminent domain) Indeed, municipalities will make use of compulsory purchase powers of privately-owned land, if necessary to realise essential development goals. In contradistinction to Canada and West Germany, however, property owners in the U.S. can take legal action against such decisions. Zoning and other planning decisions - strictly administrative in Canada and West Germany - are adjudicable in the U.S. and can be judged according to fairness, appropriateness, and whether or not basic rights have been "taken"[23].

Besides this emphasis on individual property rights, the ability of the state to influence planning and other municipal affairs in the United States has been conditioned by a traditional mistrust of central government. This, in turn, tends to reinforce ideological beliefs in the necessity of local home-rule.

George Lefcoe, an accomplished community planner, is not alone when he suggests that:

> "the best rationale for local government autonomy is that it fosters individual choice. All governments are coercive, using force or the threat of force to exact taxes and to compel compliance with rules of conduct. By allowing many local governments to exist within the same region, if taxes or regulations become oppressive in one place, individuals and firms may relocate to a more congenial jurisdiction[24]."

Indeed, the decentralised system of government in metropolitan regions resulting from persistent local home-rule traditions in the U.S. has been likened by an influential group of urban economists to an open marketplace for services. According to this concept, municipalities act as producers of local services and goods (education, housing, etc.) which are then offered to consumers who are free to choose the community whose "bundle of services" best suits their needs[25]. This theory assumes that a maximum of decision-making freedom (public choice) can be guaranteed through the pursuit of self-interest on the part of the marketers of services (municipalities) and consumers (home-seekers). Local autonomy thus engenders a healthy competition between municipalities and maximises benefits for all concerned. The public choice concept is, in effect, a powerful argument against fiscal equalisation and administrative consolidation in metropolitan areas. Its supporters claim it allows an adequate, and considering

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23 See S.E. Corke, Land Use Controls in British Columbia. A contribution to a Comparative Study of Canadian Planning Systems, Centre for Urban and Community Studies. Research Paper No.138, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1983, pp.2-4 for a concise description of the "taking"-issue and how American interpretations differ from those applied in Canada.

24 George Lefcoe, California's Land Planning Requirement. The Case for Deregulation, California Law Review, (44) 1981, p.9.

25 This concept of public choice urban economics largely stems from the work of Charles M. Tiebout: see, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy (64) 1956, pp.416-424. See also, Robert Bish and Robert Kirk, Economic Principles and Urban Problems. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974.

US-American local home-rule traditions, democratically acceptable "framework for negotiation, adjudication, and deciding questions that effect..diverse public interests"[26].

The distinguished urban historian Sam Bass Warner has spoken of an American tradition of privatism whose essence lies in an emphasis of individual freedom and a personal drive to accumulate wealth[27]. Indeed, urbanisation in the United States seems to have occurred within an "environment of private opportunity". While this was also true in Germany and Canada, what appears to have particularly characterised U.S.-American events is an almost exclusive reliance on private wealth and beneficent institutions set up by the rich to deal with urban social problems. Mistrust in "big government", based in ideological tradition and fuelled by corruption scandals in high places, severely limited any attempt to alleviate urban problems through administrative means.

As a result, early twentieth-century urban reform was characterised by a mechanistic and bureaucratic approach to local administration. In concentrating on rational management and "technical" issues, and in particular on improving the business climate, it was felt that corrupt power-politics could be avoided. Unfortunately, this approach ignored the fact that there could be political solutions to urban social problems - even worse, it did not recognise social problems as an issue city government had to address[28]. This pattern was broken only when the Great Depression necessitated greater central government intervention and the inclusion of a social agenda in urban policies.

Generally, it seems justifiable to assert that direct senior government intervention in urban land use and community development issues has never been a favoured or widely used option for American cities. To quote Robert Wood, "the choices of the residents of the metropolis (have been) limited to two: grassroots democracy of big business - no other vehicle is trustworthy in the United States"[29].

3.2.3 Early Responses to Urban Problems.

American cities experienced social unrest, fiscal crisis, substandard worker housing, and unsanitary conditions like those of European cities. Jacob Riis' essay on East Side Manhattan slums, How the Other Side Lives, published in 1892, bears this out[30]. Nevertheless, planning as a social and political responsibility of government developed rather late in the United States.

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26 Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout and Robert Warren, The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas. A Theoretical Reply, American Political Science Review, (55) 1961, pp.831-842.
27 Sam Bass Warner Jr., The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968.
28 See Melvin G. Holli, Varieties of Urban Reform, in Alexander B. Callow Jr. (ed.), American Urban History, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, pp.210-225.
29 Robert Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958, p.84.
30 See Sam Bass Warner's The Private City, op.cit., for a depiction of the ills of the American industrial city - in this case, Philadelphia.

For the major part of the 19th century, city planning in the United States limited itself to basic gridiron surveying, with allowance for open spaces and parks[31]. In many respects this was a simplified version of the Prussian Fluchtliniengesetz, the principal objective being the determination of future urban expansion by its street pattern. The 1811 street plan for New York was the most extensive example of the use of such grids[32]. Unlike in Germany where Prussian, and later national, legislation required property owners to relinquish sections of their land for public thoroughfares and open spaces, such street extensions were subject to legal restrictions in the United States. Most state courts upheld the primacy of landowner rights and did not recognise municipal authority to require mandatory reservation of private land for public needs[33].

While certain reform-minded planners envied Germany's ability to mandate municipal expansion plans well in advance of future development, such a degree of senior government intervention in local affairs lacked a general political consensus until well into the 20th century[34]. Also unacceptable was the idea that government should be actively involved in land and housing markets in order to improve urban living conditions. Such intervention was considered an unconstitutional violation of individual freedoms. This, in turn, drastically limited the possibilities of planners to actually implement those city plans that they had painstakingly worked out[35]. And yet, American urban reforms of the early 20th century did achieve a great deal. City management had been professionalised, many of the worst manifestations of political corruption eliminated, and city government had evolved into a complex administrative bureaucracy. In recognition of this greater local political consciousness, the states granted many cities home-rule charters and established the popular initiative as a decision-making instrument[36]. However, those theorists of urban reform who prevailed interpreted the role of urban government in terms of rational, efficient management and not in the management of social welfare[37].

Instead of dealing with social problems head-on, early city planning attempts in the United States directed their energies toward schemes of physical urban "improvement". One manifestation of this necessarily indirect planning was the concept of aesthetic renewal which culminated in the famous "City Beautiful" movement. In the first decades of this century, The City Beautiful enjoyed great popularity as a planning model because it addressed a need for

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[31] Anthony Sutcliffe, op.cit., pp.91-94.
[32] Ibid, p.92.
[33] Mel Scott, op.cit., pp.5-6.
[34] Ibid, pp.131-132.
[35] This is particularly ironic considering the innovative spirit of America's nascent planning profession.
[36] The urban reform movement referred to here is much too complex to deal with in a few short sentences. However, the influence of the Progressive movement, which, among other things, sought to free government from the influences of special-interest groups, should be mentioned. See, for example, Blake McElvey, The Emergence of Metropolitan America, 1915 - 1966, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968, pp.9-10. For a good general discussion of Progressivism see Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, Progressivism, Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson Inc.,1983.
[37] Melvin G. Holli, op.cit., p.222.

aesthetic order, grandeur, and distinctive urban architecture[38]. It was supported by the business élite who saw in it a means to emulate the grace of European cities[39]. Moreover, it was hoped that physical beautification would invigorate working class morals and persuade immigrants of the benefits of the American way of life[40]. Except for two large projects - those of Washington and Chicago - civic beautification was primarily restricted to the areas around town halls (civic centres) and, as such, had only a limited overall impact on urban development[41]. Conceptually, however, the City Beautiful was influential as a planning approach that was minimally interventionist and particularly amenable to speculative business interests.

3.2.3.1 Zoning: Avoidance of Nuisance, Protection of Property Values

Until the early 20th century, US-American cities lacked a legislative or administrative instrument with which to regulate urban land use. Addicke's *Staffelbauordnung* for the city of Frankfurt had been in effect a good 25 years before New York passed the first comprehensive zoning ordinance in the United States in 1916. The innovative element of zoning legislation lay in conferring police powers allowing municipal governments to subdivide urban land into narrowly defined "activity zones". The zoning instrument not only allowed a separation of functions (residential, commercial, industrial, mixed) but also determined building densities and lot sizes. As many planning scholars have pointed out, however, zoning in the United States was not primarily conceived as means of regulating land use for the public good. Instead, zoning ordinances were motivated by a desire to banish unwanted activities from upper-class residential and retail areas[42]. Understandably, zoning by itself proved an insufficient means by which to combat urban blight and other problems. On the contrary, it was utilised by the affluent as a discriminatory response to rapid urban change - a way of keeping noisome industries, minorities and the urban poor out of their neighbourhoods and communities. In 1926 zoning was upheld by the courts as a police power in the precedent-setting case of Euclid v. Amber Realty Company precisely because it was seen as protecting property rights and property values[43]. Once this precedence had been established, zoning spread rapidly. By 1936, 1322 cities (or 85% of all incorporated municipalities in the U.S.) had adopted zoning ordinances[44].

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[38] Arnold Whittick (ed.), Encyclopedia of Urban Planning, New York: McGraw-Hill, p.1092.
[39] Anthony Sutcliffe, op.cit., p.97.
[40] Idem.
[41] Arnold Whittick (ed.), op.cit., p.1092.
[42] Mel Scott, op.cit., pp.152-155. It should, however, be mentioned that zoning in Germany was, to an extent, a similar case of property value enhancement as it coincided with a boom in bourgeois housing and city-expansion planning. Haussmann's restructuring of Paris and the Ringstraße of Vienna served as examples of "urban upgrading" through functional and socio-economic segregation.
[43] John Bollens and Henry Schmandt, op.cit., p.175.
[44] Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, New York: Oxford, 1985, p.242.

Since the 1926 court decision that confirmed the constitutionality of zoning, controversies surrounding its use have dominated municipal land use issues. Theoretically at least, zoning allows communities to determine economic development, neighbourhood character, and urban design according to local needs and desires. The other side of the coin is that zoning permits the spatial differentiation not only of different land use but also of socio-economic groups. Babcock and Bosselmann, two recognised experts on zoning, have reminded us of the words used to justify the constitutionality of zoning in Euclid v Amber: "...in the last analysis the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate them according to their incomes and situation in life"[45].

In addition, zoning has allegedly contributed to competitive struggles among municipalities for greater tax revenues. If the original intent of zoning was to prevent a dangerous or unhealthy mix of industrial and residential land use, its actual use oftentimes appears to promote local economic and social interests. Danielson and Doig suggest that suburban land use policies can generally be described as a benefit-maximising and cost-minimising strategy[46]. As such, one of the aims of zoning is to protect property values and when possible, enhance them. This of course limits allowances for land uses and socio-economic groups that might negatively affect community image. The result is often to exclude lower-income groups from local housing markets and to "export" unwanted land uses to other communities. Various zoning restrictions can achieve this aim, among them the designation of minimum lot-sizes for single-family houses, maintaining low overall residential unit densities and restricting multi-unit housing to the core area. Thus, for better or for worse, zoning has become the most important municipal development instrument. As a tool that allows a maximum of local discretion in land-use planning issues, it has remained of particular importance for U.S.-American planning practise.

3.2.3.2 The Frustration of a Comprehensive Urban Policy

Zoning allows a great deal of municipal control over the use of land. However, it is clearly insufficient in dealing with problems not of a strictly "technical" nature. The provision of affordable housing, neighbourhood improvement, a balance between employment growth, residential development, and recreation space, and indeed all aspects of urban development which require well-defined long-term plans can only be addressed through specific *policies*. This has unfortunately proven to be the weak spot in U.S. American planning practise. Neither Progressivism, the legislative impetus of New Deal reforms nor the sheer scope of post-WWII metropolitan expansion succeeded in introducing a global approach to urban area problems.

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[45] Richard Babcock and John Bosselmann, Exclusionary Zoning, New York: Praeger, 1973, p.28.
[46] Michael N. Danielson and Jameson Doig, New York. The Politics of Urban Regional Development, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, p.68.

The establishment of municipal planning bodies empowered to make zoning decisions was gradually accepted in the 1920s and 30s. However, the implementation of zoning as an instrument of a more comprehensive form of social and physical planning proved a difficult matter. In fact, attempts to extend municipal planning powers into peripheral areas and establish metropolitan agencies responsible for coordinating municipal land-use decisions, planning on a metropolitan scale met with considerable hostility. Thanks to the efforts of enthusiastic planning reformers, metropolitan and regional planning concepts were circulated and the idea of a long-term master plan publicised[47]. 1920 marked, for example, the establishment of the Regional Plan Association of New York (RPA), a citizens group concerned with future housing, transportation, and zoning issues[48]. This association hoped, among other things, to limit an increase in automobile traffic and skyscraper construction in order to maintain neighbourhood integrity and livability. A regional plan was produced that due to its entirely advisory nature had little or no effect on actual developments. One serious problem facing the RPA was a lack of broad citizen interest in its regional activities and suburban mistrust of its intentions - a problem which the association even today must deal with[49].

Still, the principal stumbling block was a lack of enabling legislation empowering city governments to territorially extend their zoning and planning powers. Despite the successful drive for urban reform, state legislatures refused to grant central cities any regional administrative powers. McKelvey has mentioned that Cleveland's and Cuyahoga County's attempt to create a Metropolitan Parks Commission in 1915, as well as Chicago's effort to establish a regional sanitary district in 1917, were slapped down as unconstitutional by state courts[50]. The states' refusal to support metropolitan area planning essentially spelt victory for suburban political interests[51]. As metropolitan areas continued to grow, suburban resistance to annexation and other forms of political control left the central cities increasingly surrounded by independent and often hostile local governments.

Annexation, one commonly used method for establishing municipal control over outlying areas, showed a certain promise until around the turn of the century. Teaford explains that suburban communities tolerated - even welcomed - annexation by the central city as long as the new services provided by the city represented a considerable increase in urban amenities[52]. However, once suburban areas were able to supply their own services, and were wealthy enough to set their own rate of taxation, annexation was perceived to bring only higher taxes, meddling

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[47] Mel Scott,op.cit., pp.198-210.
[48] See Michael N. Danielson and Jameson W. Doig, New York. The Politics of Urban Regional Development, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, pp.146-148.
[49] Idem.
[50] Blake McKelvey, op.cit., pp.9-10.
[51] Whereby affluent suburbs had the most to gain from political independence from the central city.
[52] Jon Teaford, City and Suburb, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, esp. pp.32-63.

big-city government, and big-city social problems. Inevitably, the clamour for local autonomy proved stronger than central city interests.

The period between 1890 and 1920 saw rapid territorial growth of the principal U.S.-American cities. After 1920, annexations became rare, occurring primarily in the sparsely settled western states[53]. Generally speaking, annexation in the United States appears to have been largely motivated by boosterism and a desire for "bigness"[54]. One good example of this is the spectacular growth experienced by Los Angeles up till the 1930s. Spurred by Mulholland`s Owens Valley water project, a series of annexations took place intended to make Los Angeles one of the greatest cities in the United States[55]. Eventually, Los Angeles's annexation policy was broken down by suburban resistance and the realisation that "bigness" also brought considerable administrative and political burdens[56].

3.2.4 A New Role for Government: the New Deal

Despite the political defeat of metropolitan planning, there was no lack of reform-minded intellectuals in the United States. Lewis Mumford, Catherine Bauer, and Frank Lloyd Wright were just some of the prominent thinkers whose main concern was the maintenance of "human scale" and a livable urban environment[57]. The sociologist, Howard Odum advocated "regional-national social planning" as a means through which social inequities, rural-urban conflicts, and racial discrimination could be combated[58]. Founded in 1923, the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) provided a forum for many of these social, political, architectural, and environmental ideas. Unfortunately, the RPAA and its activities were largely ignored. The apparent successes of urban industrial capitalism - particularly in the 1920s - seemed to make any sort of strategic regional or social planning irrelevant[59].

This changed dramatically with the collapse of President Hoover's New Economic Era. Business had failed to maintain its promise of ever-increasing growth and the incumbent government was at a loss to reverse the situation. The severity of the Great Depression required a

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[53]   Detroit, Cleveland, and Baltimore annexed a considerable amount of territory between 1900 and 1930. After 1940, however, annexations in northeastern metropolitan areas were most uncommon. Meanwhile, aggressive annexation policies contributed to rapid postwar urban growth in the West. Prime examples are Houston and Dallas, Texas.

[54]   See Carl Abbott, The New Urban America, Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities, Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1981, p.50.

[55]   See Richard Bigger and James Kitchen, How the Cities Grew. Los Angeles: University of California (Bureau of Governmental Research), 1952.

[56]   Ibid, p.192.

[57]   The author warmly recommends Donald L. Miller (ed.), The Lewis Mumford Reader, New York: Pantheon, 1986. This volume contains many revealing essays written by Mumford on architecture, urbanism, and technological society.

[58]   See John Friedmann and Clyde Weaver, Territory and Function. The Evolution of Regional Planning, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979, pp.37,39.

[59]   Ibid, p.47.

clear response from the federal government. Indeed, it was the only power in the land that had the fiscal and legal capacity to address the situation. By the early thirties, one third of the population was unemployed. The potential for social upheaval was great and the need for stabilising policies urgent. With Franklin Delano Roosevelt's election in 1932, a complex series of welfare, public works, and urban redevelopment programmes known as the New Deal was inaugurated. Job creation, a stimulation of private investment, the construction of new affordable housing, and the establishment of a national pension plan were among President Roosevelt's immediate objectives. Members of the RPAA were recruited to work in a variety of urban and regional projects, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Rural Electrification Administration, the U.S. Housing Authority, and the Resettlement Administration[60].

The New Deal signalled North America's first attempts at regional planning and comprehensive urban development. As Mel Scott has pointed out, Roosevelt was deeply interested in physical aspects of conservation, land reclamation, and in the development of public utilities[61]. Under his administration, regional resource development and urban renewal became cornerstones of federal public policy. The National Planning Board, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Resettlement Administration, the Federal Housing Administration, and other public agencies were thus created during the first years of the Roosevelt presidency. Regional planning concentrated on large infrastructural projects, such as the Grand Coulee Dam, and "river basin development", of which the TVA was the most prominent example[62]. Urban policy concentrated primarily on slum clearance, mortgage insurance, infrastructure, and the provision of emergency housing. Unfortunately, while the New Deal was clearly successful in its regional development projects - perhaps too successful in the eyes of conservationists - the issue of urban development was not addressed, nor could it be addressed, in a similarly decisive manner.

In 1933 the Public Works Administration was established. This agency provided billions of dollars for the construction of airports, highways, water projects, sewer systems, and other infrastructural projects, predominantly in urban areas. The following year, the National Housing Act was passed, establishing the Federal Housing Association (FHA). Under FHA programmes, mortgage insurance and subsidised home loans was guaranteed in order to boost construction and promote home ownership. This legislation was followed in 1937 by the United State Housing Act, which placed the housing construction operation of the Public Works Administration under a federal public housing agency, the U.S. Housing Authority. The sheer legislative momentum of Roosevelt's first years in office seemed to augur well for comprehensive urban planning and redevelopment policies. New Deal legislation and the war economy greatly enhanced the economic and planning role of the federal government. Many of the New Deal programmes were earmarked for urban areas. And yet, taking stock of national urban policy in 1946, very little

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[60] Ibid, p.30.
[61] Mel Scott, op.cit., pp.300-301.
[62] For a good discussion of the river basin development concept and its application during the New Deal years, see John Friedmann and Clyde Weaver, Territory and Function, The Evolution of Regional Planning, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, pp.62-79.

remained that could have promoted comprehensive city-regional planning or public housing schemes.

The reasons for the failure to maintain and enlarge urban policy were manifold. For one thing, there was a lack of a coordinated approach to the New Deal's urban Programmes. Housing, site planning, and infrastructural projects were fragmented activities, divided up among a variety of public agencies and executed largely independent of one another[63]. The lack of a holistic approach to urban development indicates that many New Deal Democrats did not perceive the city as presenting a special set of social, economic, and political problems[64]. More importantly, however, business lobbies, notably real estate and construction industry associations, mustered all their political clout to torpedo public housing legislation and metropolitan planning[65]. Together with their conservative allies in Congress, business interests forced Roosevelt to compromise much of the New Deal's social agenda. Once the war had finished, it was understood that emergency housing construction would be terminated, national planning agencies abolished, and public works programmes wound down[66].

Roosevelt's New Deal regime established a permanent federal role in public policy. It also created a welfare system that has remained basically intact to the present day. In the area of national urban policy and metropolitan planning, however, it attempted to tackle an issue that was too controversial and too laden with ideological conflict to resolve. Conservative resistance to urban liberalism but also divisions within the Democratic Party and structural barriers such as local autonomy ended the planners' dreams of a comprehensive national urban policy. Fungiello writes

"To attain the objectives of comprehensive planning nationally would have required not only the cooperation of private enterprise but also decisive political action fundamentally reordering the structure of cooperative federalism. State and local governmental relations would have had to be reformulated to provide for metropolitan or city-region government. Interstate compacts allowing greater flexibility for metropolitan self-determination would have had to be negotiated. This would have required the active encouragement of Washington, the consent of the state legislatures, and the willingness of municipalities to experiment. By 1945 comprehensive planning was an idea without a program or movement, without effective political organization, without broad popular party strength behind it, and without leadership[67]."

Once the option of annexation was no longer politically and/or economically feasible in the United States, attempts at metropolitan reorganisation along more "federative" lines were launched. As we shall see later, although a great deal of energy was devoted to producing

[63] See Philip J. Fungiello, The Challenge to Urban Liberalism, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1978, p.248.

[64] See H.V. Savitch, Urban Policy and the Exterior City. Federal, State, and Corporate Impacts upon Major Cities, New York: Pergamon, 1979, pp.88-89.

[65] See John Mollenkopf, The Contested City, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, pp.69-72.

[66] Ibid, pp.68-69, 103.

[67] Philip J. Fungiello, op.cit., pp.249-250.

advisory plans for regional action, in most cases the only solution that proved politically feasible was the creation of special purpose-single function metropolitan districts[68]. Municipal governments have been reluctant to give up administrative and political decision-making powers. As a result, metropolitan government in the United States has depended primarily on intermunicipal agreements, mutual arrangements for urban service delivery.

3.3   CANADA: PARLIAMENTARY FEDERALISM AND PROVINCIAL PLANNING INTERVENTION

If the American federalist innovation was the dispersion of decision-making authority within all levels of government, then Canada can be credited with being the first country to combine a parliamentary cabinet system of government with genuinely federal institutions. In contrast to the United States, where a revolutionary break with the British Crown necessitated debate and experimentation to create a new democratic form of government, Canada maintained a so-called Britannic continuity with her political institutions evolving under the strong influence of Westminster. As a result, strong central government, embodied in British imperial rule, and best exemplified by "provincial dominance" has never ceased to be an important characteristic of the political system of Canada. According to the British North America Act of 1867, government in Canada, both at provincial and Dominion level, was to be structured according to the parliamentary model of a joint legislative and executive subject to the directives of a ruling majority. However, the existence of regional rivalries and, most importantly, the conflicts between French and English Canadians, required that the Canadian Founding Fathers institutionalise regional representation within the Dominion. This meant that legislative powers would have to be so distributed that the Dominion government in Ottawa and the provinces could deal with national and regional concerns respectively[69].

The powers thus given to the federal government in Ottawa were basically the same as in the United States. Among these were national defence, the minting of currency, foreign relations and "indian affairs". By design or default, the provinces were made responsible for administrative tasks of mainly local concern. Ultimately, the original intention to maintain a strong central government (even at the expense of provincial authority) within a federalist setting was thwarted by political conflicts and internal developments. This is in contrast to the case of the United States where Washington D.C.'s role has expanded above and beyond the one foreseen by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.

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[68]   See Paul Nolte, Eingemeindungen und kommunale Neugliederungen in Deutschland und den USA bis 1930, Archiv für Kommunalwissenschaften, (1) 1988, pp.29-31. It should also be mentioned that senior governments have also created single-purpose districts, most notably in the areas of environmental protection and strategic infrastructure (water projects, highways).

[69]   See Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions. A Comparative Study in Institutions, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952, pp.21-49.

Unquestionably, regionalism has been the one most important factor effecting the development of the Canadian political system. French-English antagonisms, the conflicts of interest between industrial Ontario and the agrarian West, and disparities in regional standards of living have all threatened national political cohesiveness. As a result, there has been a steady reversal of the roles of federal and provincial government. The national government in Ottawa - initially intended to dominate the provinces to assure Canadian unity - has diminished in overall importance, while the provinces have become powerful and centralised administrative entities[70]. Today, the provinces are responsible not only for education, health, transportation (except for certain national projects) social and labour-related legislation and other areas, but also jealously guard their authority over land-use and municipal affairs.

For these and other important reasons, intergovernmental relations in Canada are rather unique. While the overall significance of intergovernmental transfers as a portion of provincial and local budgets is greater in Canada than both these countries, Canadian provinces have rejected outright direct federal transfers to, and even federal administrative relations with, municipal governments. Local government has thus been effectively excluded as a political partner in Canadian intergovernmental federalism. In addition, the vast majority of federal provincial transfers have had to be unconditional or semi-conditional. These arrangements have strengthened provincial sovereignty over a wide area of public policy, requiring most federal funds to be funnelled through *provincial* programmes and reinforcing municipal dependence on the provinces[71].

3.3.1 Canada: Municipal Affairs and the Provinces

Centralist traditions should not obscure the fact that Canada is also heir to a long Anglo-Saxon tradition of local self-government. As in the United States, it was felt that municipalities should be empowered to decide issues of local importance and guide their own development. As such, the role of local autonomy (particularly in land-use planning) in Canada should not be underestimated. As Magnusson and Sancton point out, however, the British system of local government was, in large part, a transferral of burdensome tasks and financial responsibilities to local jurisdictions[72]. Greater local responsibilities and decision-making powers were, in turn, granted in exchange for loyalty and services to central government[73].

Unlike in the United States, where rights of municipal incorporation were established shortly after independence, local government in Canada had to be created by central government decree.

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[70] See Ronald L. Watts, Divergence and Convergence: Canadian and U.S. Federalism, in Harry N. Scheiber (ed.), Perspectives in Federalism. Papers in Governmental Studies, Berkeley: University of California (Institute of Governmental Studies, 1987, pp.179-214.

[71] Idem.

[72] Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton, City Politics in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, p.4.

[73] Idem.

Consequently, it was not viewed so much as a vehicle for establishing democracy at the "grass-roots" level as an expression of practical administrative necessity in order to satisfy basic urban needs[74]. As in Germany, municipal government during early colonial rule (until about 1832) generally existed in the legislative and judicial institution of the magistrate, who was directly appointed by representatives of the Crown. By 1849, when the first provincial municipal act was passed (in Ontario), all the large Canadian settlements had incorporated[75].

By the end of the 19th century, local government in Canada had nevertheless evolved into a powerful instrument for municipal economic development and had assumed important responsibilities in maintaining health standards and public safety, as well as guaranteeing the provision of urban infrastructure[76]. The burdens on local government, however, rapidly increased as municipal administration faced the complexities of rapid industrial development and urban growth. As in the U.S., Canadian local government was unable to deal with all its responsibilities without greater sources of financial and technical support. Furthermore, political fragmentation caused by a proliferation of independent municipalities, created a barrier to the improvement and rationalisation of urban service delivery[77]. This created pressure for the consolidation of local authority and led to a series of large-scale annexations of suburban areas in the 1920s and 30s. The Great Depression paralysed municipal economies so that by the time the economy began to expand, central authorities were able to emerge much stronger than before.

A slow transition from direct colonial rule to parliamentary federalism unquestionably marked the development of municipal government in Canada. Furthermore, the constitutional arrangements contained in the British North American Act did not include any municipal rights to establish local government. Instead, these powers, and all others not explicitly delegated to the Dominion government in Ottawa, were given to the provinces. Technically, this arrangement was very similar to the one provided for by the American Constitution. Nevertheless, as Hodge notes,

> "While this superior role of the province is true in such other federal states as the United States and Australia, in Canada what is significant is the alacrity with which provincial governments perform their role. The development both of local government and, subsequently, community planning institutions, bear this stamp of paternalism by the province[78]."

In short, the responsibilities left to local government in Canada were rather limited. Conceived less as "forums of popular democracy" than as efficient providers of services to property owners, municipalities were largely restricted in their local administrative activities to such tasks as road construction, water supply and the provision of basic infrastructure. At the same time, the decline

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[74] Gerald Hodge, Planning Canadian Communities, Toronto: Methuen, 1986, pp.113-118.
[75] Idem.
[76] See Alan F.J. Artibise, Boosterism and the Development of Prairie Cities, 1871-1913, in G.A. Stelter and Alan F.J. Artibise, Shaping the Canadian Urban Landscape: Aspects of the Canadian City Building Process, Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1982.
[77] Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton, op.cit., p.28.
[78] Gerald Hodge, op.cit., p.116.

of urban autonomy in Canada must also be attributed to the need for senior government intervention to stabilise local government finances. Traditionally, the financial basis of local government has been very limited; taxing powers could be applied only to local property[79]. This, in turn, has hampered the ability of municipalities to amplify the provision of services and has increased local dependence on provincial aid. Some observers have seen the steady increase in municipal dependence on equalisation schemes and direct provincial aid for the funding of infrastructure and public welfare programmes as a crucial step in the loss of autonomy[80]. Greater intervention in areas of infrastructure, public services, and social welfare almost always been followed by an expanded provincial role in town planning, development control and housing[81].

3.3.2   Traditions of Interventionism

In contrast to the egalitarian character of US-American political ideology, the Canadian Fathers believed in the necessity of government by *responsible* members of society as they were seen to be best suited to fulfill the task of ruling *for* the people. It has been often said that if "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" have been the basic values of civil society in the United States, then the Canadian counterparts have emphasised "order, efficiency, and good government"[82]. Fear of political tyranny and "big government" have obsessed US-American political culture since the Revolution. Canadians appear to have lacked such a deep mistrust of governmental authority despite numerous regional rivalries and conflicts between Ottawa and various provincial governments[83].

Undoubtedly, different popular attitudes toward the role of government constitute one principal contrasting feature of the democratic regimes which developed in Canada and the United States. Smiley and Watts have commented on these differences from a decidedly Canadian point-of-view

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[79] Local property taxes still make up over 80% of local tax revenues in Canada although fees, compulsory contributions and other revenue-generating schemes can be used to enhance municipal finances. For a short but concise comparative survey on local government finance in OECD countries (of which Canada is a member), see OECD, Managing Urban Change, Vol. 1 Policies and Finance, Paris: OECD, 1983, pp. 109-117.

[80] See: John H. Taylor, Urban Autonomy in Canada: its Evolution and Decline, in, Gilbert Stelter and Alan J. Artibise (eds.) Power and Place in Urban History, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986, p.278.

[81] Idem.

[82] For a concise discussion of comparative studies on U.S.-American and Canadian values see Michael A. Goldberg and John Mercer, The Myth of the North American City, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986, pp. 12-31.

[83] See Reg Whitaker, Images of the State in Canada, in Leo Panitch (ed.), The Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp. 28-68.

"Like Britishers, most Canadians believe that government should have both the capacity and the will to govern. It is chicken-and-egg question to ask whether this belief is a result of responsible government or its cause. The American political system is based on contrary premises. Although the U.S. formula asserts popular sovereignty, there is a complex of institutional obstructions to the formation of popular majorities. And within the system itself, there is an intricate system of checks and balances. It seems that the Americans assume that those who possess power have inherent and ineradicable impulses to challenge both individual rights and the general welfare and therefore that limits must be placed upon their authority[84]."

Although Canada has developed along unquestionably democratic lines, an overriding concern with the ideals of liberty and democratic government did not characterise Canadian constitutionalism. According to Alexander Bradey, federation in Canada

"was not the child of an aggressive democratic impulse or a powerful mass pressure. The colonial leaders, although they championed self-government, shrank from anything like a levelling democratic polity[85]."

Bradey suggests further, that the Canadian preference of an efficient and well-functioning government was reinforced by fears of factious popular democracy

"The Canadian Founding Fathers were determined to possess a strong central government, and indeed some hoped that their projected system would ultimately evolve into a unitary regime...The long and acrimonious controversy from the days of Jefferson over states rights, culminating in the tragic schism of war made Canadian leaders anxious to learn from the mistakes of their neighbours[86]."

More immediate and practical reasons underlay the need for a strong central government: Canada required powerful and visible political institutions because the push for economic development mandated erection of national trade barriers, and construction of a national transportation network to promote settlement of the vast western regions. At the same time, Canada was forced to meet the challenge of an aggressive United States[87].

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[84] Donald V. Smiley and Ronald L. Watts, Intrastate Federalisn in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985, p.31.

[85] Alexander Brady, op.cit., p.42.

[86] Ibid, p.43.

[87] Kenneth McNaught, The Penguin History of Canada, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988, p.124-182.

3.3.3   Roots of Canadian Planning

The development of the planning process in Canada parallels U.S.-American experience in many respects. The urban growth problems accompanying industrialisation were unquestionably similar. Slums, poor sanitary conditions and overcrowding were well documented for Toronto and Montreal[88]. Local government inability to deal with the emerging urban problems created pressure for planning legislation in Canadian cities[89]. As in the case of the United States, however, zoning enabling legislation arrived late as the need for local government intervention in land use issues was only slowly recognised.

"Boosterism", the very essence of American urban entrepreneurship, was also very much a part of Canadian urban development. In Prairie cities such as Saskatoon, Regina, and Calgary, as well as in the ports of Victoria and Vancouver, local economic initiative and promotion was responsible for considerable growth in the years between 1880 and 1913[90]. Boosterism in Canada, in fact, appears to have had strong ideological undertones, promulgating the belief that the economic health and welfare of cities were a product of civic pride and initiative, and the of financial acumen of its influential citizens[91]. Economic changes after 1913, in particular the drop in wheat prices, had a disastrous effect on the prairie provinces, signalling a general end to boosterist euphoria.

Unlike the United States, in Canada the decidedly local orientations of urban affairs were soon modified by provincial action. The provinces moved with considerable alacrity to pass legislation allowing municipalities to prepare community plans. Starting in 1912, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Alberta all passed planning acts, and within the next ten years four other provinces followed suit. The planning frameworks that developed in Canada borrowed characteristics of both U.S.-American and British practise. Zoning, as perfected in the United States, was adopted for actual local land use plans. Unlike the case in the United States however, early local zoning ordinances in Canada were embedded within more general planning statutes, resembling those defined by British legislation[92].

Indeed, the British Housing and Town Planning Act of 1909 provided a model for the first provincial planning acts in Canada. Gerald Hodge mentions that early Canadian planning legislation adopted three basic concepts from the 1909 act: 1) the confinement of planning to land in suburban or fringe areas with development potential, 2) the requirement of compensation for the taking of property or loss in property values, and 3) the requirement of senior government

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[88]   See Shirley Spragge, A Confluence of Interests: Housing Reform in Toronto, 1900 - 1920, in Alan F.J. Artibise and Gilbert A. Stelter (eds.), The Usable Urban Past, Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979, pp. 247-267.

[89]   See Gerald Hodge, "The Roots of Canadian Planning," American Planning Association Journal 51(1), 1985, pp.8-22.

[90]   See, Alan F.J. Artibise (ed.), Town and City. Aspects of Western Canada's Urban Development, Regina: University of Regina, 1981.

[91]   Ibid, pp.229-230.

[92]   For a discussion of American and British planning stereotypes that have influenced Canadian planning practise, see S.E. Corke, op. cit., pp.1-4.

approval of all community planning[93]. The first Canadian zoning by-law was enacted in 1924 by the city of Kitchener, Ontario. Most Canadian municipalities quickly followed suite. The use of zoning in Canada was consistent with the basic guidelines established by U.S.-American practise - principally as a guarantor of neighbourhood integrity and segregator of urban land uses. Nevertheless, the lack of explicit reference to or emphasis of property rights in the Canadian constitution allowed Canadian zoning legislation to guarantee greater municipal planning powers than in the United States.

Individual property rights, so crucial to the U.S.-American concept of democracy, were neither taken for granted nor elevated to great ideological heights in Canada. Qadeer reminds us that, in Canada, it is ultimately the Crown (and by political inheritance, the province) who has ultimate authority over issues of land use and property rights[94]. Herein lies a crucial legal - and ideological - difference between Canadian and US-American definitions of police powers over urban land:

> "The fact that the fountainhead of the bundle of rights in land is the legislation enacted by provincial legislatures has more than a symbolic value. It means that public regulations which define a tenurial framework can be modified through legislative authority without being subjected to the judicial test of the legitimacy of police powers - as is the case in the United States[95]."

The first Canadian zoning by-law was enacted in 1924 by the city of Kitchener, Ontario. Larger cities, such as Vancouver and Edmonton soon followed suite. Generally, the use of zoning in Canada was consistent with the basic guidelines established by U.S.-American practise; it was conceived principally a guarantor of neighbourhood integrity and a segregator of urban land uses. Nevertheless, the lack of explicit reference to or emphasis on property rights in the Canadian constitution - the British North American Act - allowed Canadian zoning legislation to guarantee greater municipal planning powers than in the United States[96]. Whereas in the United States zoning powers have been restricted by the "taking" issue and adjudicability, the main legal concern relating to Canadian zoning practise remains whether or not zoning ordinances are "discriminatory in pursuing the public interest[97]. However, it should be mentioned that the only

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[93]   Gerald Hodge, Planning Canadian Communities. Toronto:Methuen, 1986, p.121.
[94]   Mohammed Qadeer, The Evolving Urban Land Tenure System in Canada, Institute of Urban Studies (University
        of Winnipeg) Report No.10, 1985, p.9.
[95]   Ibid, p.9.
[96]   Gerald Hodge, op. cit., p.223.
[97]   Idem.

Canadian city to have established a full-fledged - and permanent - planning department before 1945 was Toronto. As a result, zoning by-laws remained for quite some time the only real urban land use planning instrument in Canada[98].

3.3.3.1 Social Progress and Functionalism: a Canadian Outlook

As many scholars have observed, the Canadian concept of planning has incorporated both British and U.S. planning ideas. On one hand, *utilitarian ideals* of clearly British origin have provided for a broad social content in Canadian planning. On the other hand, U.S.-American preoccupations with technical efficiency and functional optimising has greatly influenced community zoning by-laws[99]. In discussing the evolution of Canadian planning, the name of Thomas Adams is often mentioned. Adams, a native Scotsman, founded the Town Planning Institute of Canada in 1914. With him he brought both invaluable experience gained by working within Ebenezer Howard's Garden City movement and a philosophy of the social responsibility of planning[100].

The so-called utilitarian ethic championed by Adams - the idea that the "aim of society should be to produce the greatest good for the greatest number" - affected the development of Canadian planning in several ways. Some influential utilitarian principles included 1) the idea of planning as a tool of social progress, 2) the idea that rational solutions to social problems could be found and, 3) an acceptance of government intervention should it prove necessary to further the public good. These ideas are in keeping as well with the apparent Canadian "emphasis" of order and efficiency as principles of good government[101]. Gunton points out, for example, that Canadian planners by and large rejected the City Beautiful concept so popular in the United States as a response to urban problems[102]. Instead, Canadian planners concentrated on establishing an administrative and legislative framework for general but technically efficient community planning.

Considering the preoccupation not only with order and efficiency but also with general community welfare, it is not surprising that Canadian planning practise has augmented its technical repertoire with legislative tools allowing greater local land use control than in the United States. Development control, originally a British innovation, was introduced into Canada in the 1950s. It allows a lot-by-lot review and regulation of land use above and beyond that

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[98] Matthew Kiernan, Urban Planning in Canada: A Synopsis and some Future Directions, Plan Canada 30(1), January 1990, p.12.

[99] See P.J. Smith, The Principle of Utility and the Origins of Planning Legislation in Alberta, 1912 - 1975, in Alan F.J. Artibise and Gilbert A. Stelter (eds.), The Usable Urban Past, Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979, pp.189-204.

[100] See Walter Van Nus, Towards the City Efficient: The Theory and Practise of Zoning, 1919-1939, in Alan F.J. Artibise and Gilbert A. Stelter (eds.), The Usable Urban Past, op. cit., esp. p.240-242.

[101] See P. J. Smith, op.cit.

[102] Thomas I. Gunton, The Ideas and Policies of the Canadian Planning Profession, 1909 - 1931, in Alan F.J. Artibise and Gilbert A. Stelter (eds.), The Usable Urban Past, op.cit., pp. 180-181.

allowed by zoning: the height, volume, function, and architectural design of individual buildings are thus subject to close administrative scrutiny[103].

3.3.3.2. Bureaucratic Control and Provincial Paternalism

In comparing North American planning systems one must not overlook the decidedly bureaucratic nature of Canadian planning. The regulating role of senior governments in Canada is, in fact, quite similar to that found in most European nations. Municipalities, the most important land use planning actors in the United States, are the also the principal administrators of community planning in Canada. The vast majority of subdivision plans and zoning by-laws are matters of local concern. Through zoning and development control, Canadian municipalities enjoy even greater discretionary powers then their U.S.-American counterparts. However, unlike in the United States, community planning in Canada is controlled and reviewed by the provinces who, in turn, determine the legislative, administrative and institutional framework. The Canadian provinces' supervision of local land-use planning is effected through ministries or special offices responsible for municipal affairs. These provincial institutions review and approve zoning ordinances, subdivisions, annexations, municipal incorporations, and general community plans. The Canadian constitution has left to the provinces the role of "arbiter" of community interests. This makes them both the ultimate legislative authority and mediators between the development community and local planning interests.

After WWII, the provincial governments became increasingly involved in administrative restructuring efforts, with the intention of rationalising metropolitan area service delivery and planning. Starting with Manitoba (Winnipeg), enabling legislation providing for the creation of regional districts and metropolitan government was adopted in all Canadian provinces. Canada's experience with metropolitan government will be dealt with in more detail later but it should be noted here that the provinces, unlike the U.S.-American states, have accepted their responsibilities for urban affairs and have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to find regional solutions for urban problems. This, of course, has often tended to reinforce the paternalistic character of provincial-municipal relations in Canada, and has been accompanied by a further erosion of local autonomy. In certain cases, provincial governments have limited the powers of regional districts, fearing local usurpations of provincial political authority. British Columbia's conservative government under Premier van der Zalm, for example, eliminated many of the administrative responsibilities of the Greater Vancouver Regional District.

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[103] J. Barry Cullingworth, Urban and Regional Planning in Canada, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987.

These extraordinary provincial powers over local affairs appear to be supported by a general consensus in Canada on the desirability of effective bureaucratic supervision of planning. Hodge maintains that the regulatory role of the provinces is not only accepted but seen as necessary to ensure a rational and technically efficient planning process[104].

3.3.4 Housing and Urban Policy Development in Canada

As in the United States, federal and provincial government urban policy activity developed largely as a response to the Great Depression. Emergency and wartime housing programmes were established in the 1930s to accommodate workers and stimulate economic growth. At the same time, rent controls were introduced and, in the 1940s, large subsidies were provided for public housing and homeownership schemes[105]. The National Housing Act of 1944 allowed the Canadian federal government to assist private banks in guaranteeing mortgage loans and in providing default insurance for home loans[106]. This legislation stimulated housing construction much in the manner of the FHA programmes in U.S. urban areas. In 1945 the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act created a federal Crown Corporation, the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) responsible for the administration of all federal housing programmes.

As noted above, there is no constitutional allowance in Canada for a decisive federal government role in community planning and other land-use issues. This resembles the situation in the United States but, as we shall see, contrasts sharply with the West German federal arrangement. Nevertheless, Ottawa plays an important supplementary role as formulator of structural policy, supplier of project funds and adviser. The Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation, as the CMCH was renamed, has been instrumental in funding new urban housing bearing close to 50% of development expenditures. Despite its fiscal importance, its active political role is limited by the provinces who are responsible for the formulation and execution of actual housing policy. Some provinces, such as Ontario, have pursued a variety of programmes aimed at increasing the stock of low income housing and promoting homeownership.

In general, Canada's federal government and provinces have been - much more successful in promoting low-income housing programmes that their U.S.-American counterparts. While local resistance to public housing has been considerable, a general consensus - particularly at the federal level - has permitted the establishment of a well-functioning and well-funded housing policy[107]. Intergovernmental tensions and financial problems have provided important setbacks,

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[104] Gerald Hodge, Regional Planning in Canada, Journal of the American Planning Association, 51(1) Winter 1985, p.22.

[105] See Albert Rose, Housing Policy in Canada, 1940 - 1968, Toronto: Butterworths, 1980, pp.27-29.

[106] George Fallis, Housing Programs and Income Distribution in Ontario, Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1980, p.15.

[107] Albert Rose, op.cit, pp.30-36.

and Canadian housing policy is in the process of reevaluation. The future of Canadian housing policy will depend on renewed provincial commitment and the willingness of metropolitan areas to accept neighbourhood "densification" and a variety of measures aimed at increasing the supply of low-income housing.

3.4   FEDERALISM, INTERVENTION AND LOCAL AUTONOMY IN GERMANY

1871 marked the creation of a unified German state. That was the year when the various kingdoms and principalities, previously only contractually associated through customs agreements, became members of an *Imperial* federation. By the time Unification was achieved, the absolutist order that for so long had characterised German political and economic life had made important concessions to the entrepreneurial class and property owners. Parliamentarianism and the sharing of power among members of the ruling class had been established. Nevertheless, unlike the case of the North American democracies, autocratic control of the political decision-making process remained a feature of the German parliamentary government until well into the 20th century.

As Gordon Craig states, the 1871 imperial constitution drawn up by Prince Bismarck was,

> "a document that would provide the legal basis for the kind of national government desired by public opinion and economic interests, while at the same time preventing the resultant state from following the route taken by the U.S....The basic purpose of the constitution, in short, was to create the institutions for a national state that would be able to compete with its neighbours, without, however, sacrificing, or even limiting, the aristocratic-monarchical order of the pre-national period[108]."

A.J.P. Taylor is even more blunt on this point, contending that the struggle between crown and parliament, which in England and France resulted in the definitive victory of representative government, ended in Germany with the success of the former[109]. According to Taylor, while the 1871 constitution had definite federalist characteristics which respected the traditionally fragmented political geography of Germany, it more or less guaranteed Prussian hegemony and the domination of the Prussian monarch who had now become German emperor[110]. At the same time, the constitution severely restricted the power of Parliament to initiate legislation. Ultimate political responsibility lay with the imperial chancellor, himself responsible only to the monarch. In short, the first German parliamentary federation - an imperial federation - was a nation

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[108]   Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1866-1945, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, p.39.
[109]   A.J.P. Taylor, the Course of German History, New York: Coward McCann, 1946, p.189.
[110]   Ibid, p.117.

centrally controlled by the King of Prussia. The imperial chancellor was the immediate agent of the monarch (Kaiser by hereditary right) and his political legitimacy depended solely on the crown.

Military defeat in 1918 resulted in the fall of the monarchy. Replacing it was Germany's first federal and democratic republic. However, the legitimacy of the so-called Weimar Republic was successively undermined by inner turmoil, hyperinflation, humiliation at the hands of the victorious powers, war reparations, and, finally, the Great Depression. In January 1933, the National Socialists took control.

After Germany's surrender and occupation following WWII, the Allied powers set about revitalising and democratising German administration and political life. A central German government was established in the western zones on October 1949 and a new constitution, the so-called Basic Law (Grundgesetz), came into being. Article 20 of the Basic Law established the federal composition of the new West German state with 10 state (Länder) governments and a national government in the provisional capital of Bonn. This also established the parliamentary system of West Germany as a bicameral-cabinet system. Legislative and executive functions are thus executed by one body, the Bundestag, which is elected nationally every four years. An upper house of sorts, the Bundesrat, was constituted in order to introduce territorial representation at the state level. The Bundesrat is made up of non-elected extraparliamentarian state representatives and is empowered to review legislation passed by the Bundestag. Although it can debate legislation and, in certain cases, delay its passage, the Bundesrat cannot be said to have real veto powers[111].

If the original intent of the Allies and those Germans who worked out Germany's Basic Law was to create a largely decentralised nation with an emphasis on state/local autonomy. One of the principal aims of the Allies was to promote the development of self-government. This was to be done from a "ground-up" principle starting with municipal administration and working up to the state level[112]. In fact, however, the events following 1949 dramatically changed the actual relationships between Bonn, the Länder, and municipalities[113]. As in the United States, "cooperative federalism" was championed as a means of tackling problems and issues requiring a wider range of political, financial, and legal action. To a much greater degree than in the U.S., however, cooperative arrangements strengthened the federal government's role as general policy maker and increased federal involvement in the affairs of the individual states. A good example of this are the so-called mutual responsibilities (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) which were created under a 1969 modification of the Basic Law in allowing the federal government to work with the states in realising certain projects of national importance[114].

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[111] See Eckhard Jesse, Die Demokratie der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1986, pp.42-50.

[112] See, Hans Ulrich Behn, Die Bundesrepublik. Handbuch zur staatspolitischen Landeskunde, München: Günter Olzug Verlag, 1974, p.43.

[113] Ibid, p.106.

[114] Ibid, p.120.

Among the mutual responsibilities are:

1. the development of institutions of higher learning,
2. the improvement of regional economies,
3. the improvement of the agricultural sector and protection of coastal areas,
4. educational planning,
5. the promotion of research institutes and projects of greater national importance.

Within this cooperative context, the federal and state governments are required by law to operate in a manner that best promotes the wider interests of the nation ("Bundestreue") and to work together much more closely than their Canadian or U.S.-American counterparts. Intergovernmental activity can thus be seen in the various Standing Conferences of Ministers, coordinating commissions, and advisory councils which bring together state and federal administrators on a wide variety of issues[115].

Legislative competencies have gradually shifted in favour of the federal government, despite guarantees of state self-government enshrined in the Basic Law. However, the increasing importance of Bonn as legislator and definer of policy frameworks has been facilitated by explicit constitutional provisions. Article 73 establishes areas of exclusive federal competence (defence, minting, international relations, etc.), Articles 72 and 74 provide for "competitive" jurisdictions between the states and the federal government (in which federal legislation can be evoked to supersede state law if deemed necessary), and, finally, Article 75 gives the federal government the power to pass general framework legislation (e.g. national land use planning, education, and environmental protection)[116]. The de-facto situation in the present-day West German federal state is one in which the federal government has the lion's share of legislative powers whereas the execution of laws, and the adjudication of issues hinging on these laws are primarily state matters.

Municipal affairs is one area where state governments have retained a dominating influence despite considerable federal intervention. In Germany, as in Canada, the states have been very active in influencing governmental organisation and land-use planning. Educational standards and administration is another such area of state competence. Furthermore, the states have a great deal of autonomy in defining economic and regional policies, although often within the general framework of national policy or intergovernmental consensus.

It is the municipal level, however, that has the weakest link to the federal system of West Germany. Local government is only indirectly represented through the state delegates to the Bundesrat. While the largest cities, such as Munich and Frankfurt have considerable clout due to

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[115] Eckhard Jesse, op.cit., pp. 61-63.
[116] Ibid., pp. 61-63.

their economic and administrative importance within the individual states, all cities (except, of course, the city-states of Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin) are subject to the dictates of state governments.

3.4.1 Local Autonomy and Municipal Affairs in West Germany

Just as autocratic traditions hindered the development of a stable democratic German state, so was the struggle for municipal self-government and local political autonomy a long battle against absolutist and centralistic authority. Until the 19th century, German cities were subject to the dictates of royalty and feudal lords unlike the cities which developed in the United States (and, to an extent, in Canada) under circumstances conducive to the development of local home rule. The destructive Thirty-Years War (fought between 1618 and 1648) served, furthermore, to undermine the economies of the most important mediaeval cities, thereby eliminating the political freedoms that had been achieved up to that point[117].

Only until the absolutist order was seriously challenged by the Enlightenment was it possible to proceed in Germany with political reforms allowing greater urban autonomy. Concessions had to be made to the new bourgeois class that was clamouring for guarantees of individual property rights. At the same time, the need for an effective unified system of urban administration was recognised.

Thus, municipal self-government in Germany had its beginnings towards the end of the 18th century - in the era of transition from absolutist to constitutional rule based on citizen participation. The reforms penned by Freiherr vom Stein at the start of the 19th century and which greatly influenced the Prussian Municipal Code of 1808, were motivated by a belief in technical progress and the necessity of a dispersal of political power[118]. Although a champion of progress and personal liberties, Stein was not sympathetic to Anglo-Saxon liberalism and its emphasis of individualism and personal accumulation of wealth as a vehicle of freedom.

Despite the reforms, however, attempts to institutionalise local government met with little success in the 19th century. The central authorities maintained overriding powers and limited local control to areas of a basically technical nature. Even after Unification in 1871, there was no constitutional guarantee of local self government. However, the increasing severity of urban problems caused by rapid industrialisation and excessive housing speculation, did prompt the imperial and state governments to allow municipalities greater administrative and police powers,

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[117] See Anthony Sutcliffe, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
[118] See Hans Peters, Handbuch der kommunalen Wissenschaft und Praxis, Vol. 1. Berlin: Springer, 1956, pp.77-82.

particularly in urban planning. Not until the monarchy fell, and the Weimar Constitution of 1919 was drawn up, were municipal rights to self-government enshrined in national legislation[119]. At the same time, however, the Weimar government vastly increased the scope of central government intervention in urban affairs. More aware than the old autocratic order of the technological and industrial evolution affecting German society, the Weimar republic delved into areas of infrastructural investment, social planning, and administrative reform[120] .

During the twelve years of National-Socialist rule (1933-1945), municipal administration was largely reduced to an organ of central political and ideological control. Interestingly enough, the most comprehensive German municipal act was passed in 1935 and continues more or less, to serve as model legislation today.

The Federal Republic of Germany, created in 1949, reestablished guarantees of local government, anchoring them in Article 28 of the Basic Law or constitution. This article stipulates that municipalities have the right to tend to all matters concerning the local community. At the same time, they do this under full responsibility for all decisions[121]. The actual responsibilities of municipal government include such public services as gas, water, recreational facilities, parks, and, in larger cities, transportation (although often in cooperation with the state governments and the national railways). In addition, certain administrative tasks, such as resident registration, matters concerning foreigners, and the issue of personal documents, have been delegated by federal authorities to the municipalities. Last but not least, land use planning and zoning, although subject to considerable senior government control, are also matters of local discretion[122].

Despite the constitutional guarantees of local autonomy mentioned above, German municipalities cannot be said to represent an independent or even very influential tier of government. Indeed, they are clearly subordinate to state governments, who are constitutionally required to regulate municipal affairs, and who define and draw up city charters. Municipalities possess little real legislative authority; local land use plans and ordinances must be approved by the state governments, and must adhere to uniform standards set by federal and state legislation.

Jesse contends that idealistic concepts of local autonomy, in which the community represents the "grassroots" basis for democracy, have given way to more realistic and dispassionate assessments of the role of local government within the German political system

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[119]   Ibid, p.100.
[120]   See Paul Nolte, op.cit., p.27.
[121]   Municipal charters differ from state to state, reflecting the different historical and political developments which have characterised urban administration over the years. See, for example, Christian Engeli and Wolfgang Haus, Quellen zum modernen Gemeindeverfasssungsrecht in Deutschland, Berlin: Kohlhammer, 1975.
[122]   Eckhard Jesse, op.cit., pp.66-68.

"the supposed immediacy and directness of the decision-making process (at the community level) have revealed themselves to be a utopian ideal. The assumptions that a non-partisan representation of local interests would overshadow party politics is as well removed from reality...The municipalities are not extraterritorial entities within the nation-state but are part of the larger democratic system. As the spheres of political activity at federal, state, and local levels are intimately intertwined, municipal politics will be incorporated more and more within a larger territorial setting[123]."

As in most other industrialised countries, German municipalities have had great difficulties in financing the social and physical infrastructure needed to maintain a well-functioning community. Locally generated taxes, especially business taxes, have often been insufficient to cover the expenses of municipal government. A certain degree of fiscal equilibrium was introduced in 1969 through tax reforms establishing a redistributive mechanism - primarily through the pooling of income and business taxes. This reform, however, has proved insufficient in view of increasing administrative responsibilities and soaring local service costs. The inevitable result has been a higher degree of local government dependency either on direct transfer payments and federally or state funded programmes.

In response to the increasing fiscal pressures on local governments to provide urban services, major territorial reform (Gebietsreform) in the late 60s and early 70s rationalised urban service areas through amalgamation, annexation, and the creation of larger "catchment areas" for tax revenues[124]. Before 1968, there were over 25,000 separate cities, townships and villages, with varying degrees of administrative control. The reform reduced the number to about 8,500[125]. The number of counties (Kreise) and cities independent of county government (kreisfreie Städte) was also reduced. In some cases, the "new" municipalities that have emerged as a result of annexation and amalgamation are quite large; Göttingen in Lower Saxony, for example, increased its physical size by 43 square kilometres.

A further step in the direction of local government rationalisation, involved the introduction of regional government and service agencies. Regional governance was partially instituted in certain urban areas long before 1930. Thus the Siedlungsverband Ruhr was created in 1911, and Greater Berlin in 1920. This corresponded to similar urban reorganisations carried out in France and Great Britain. However, as we shall see, the real push for effective regional government in Germany, however, took place in the early 1960s. Generally speaking, the principle effect of metropolitan reorganisation was to join municipal administrations together in solving regional problems, although clearly at the expense of local decision-making prerogatives.

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[123] Ibid, p.67.
[124] See Kurt Sontheimer and Hans H. Röhring (eds.), Handbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München: Pieper, 1977, pp. 325-330, for a short summary on territorial reform.
[125] Eckhard Jesse, op.cit., p.68 (table 23:Verwaltungsgliederung)

3.4.2 Interventionism: Social Market Ideology and the State

German planning legislation from 1871 to 1919 reflected liberal concepts of property rights and land use prerogatives. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon democracies, Germany never really questioned the need for central government intervention. Indeed, liberalism as a wider political and social order was basically defeated through the process of Unification: an interventionist, paternalistic, and centralised parliamentary monarchy prevailed[126]. Prince Bismarck's social legislation of the 1880s was indicative of a will to intervene actively in the marketplace in order to maintain social order and neutralise socialist opposition. The Sozialversicherung (Social Security) proclamation of 1881 can be seen as the beginning of comprehensive legislation in this area[127]. In 1883 social health care for workers was established, the following year social accident insurance was instituted, and in 1889 insurance benefits for the aged and invalids were guaranteed by law. These laws appear not to have been a product of an awakening social conscience among the ruling and moneyed classes, but were more a response to a growing threat of worker unrest and political opposition. Thus was established the concept of a *stabilising* social policy quite different from that seen in England or North America. The state, supported by property owners and the industrial bourgeoisie, presented the working class with social benefits as a token of its "generosity." Not only would the proletariat thus be convinced of the necessity of a strong state, but it would learn to identify the state as the benefactor[128].

As in most other welfare states, however, German social policy has evolved into an active element of the economic, social and political order. Employment policy, which began in the Weimar period as unemployment benefits legislation, has, for example, become an important "system-structuring" element. The Employment Development Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) of 1969 not only regulates unemployment insurance but promotes job creation, retraining schemes, and the dissemination of job market information. The economic system which has developed in West Germany can be described as a synthesis of liberal economic freedoms and principles of social justice and equality[129].

The architects of this new economic order belonged, to a great degree, to the "neoliberal" school around Walter Eucken and the University of Freiburg. These so-called Ordoliberals were innovative in the sense that they incorporated the concept of political "direction" and

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[126] For a rewarding historical analysis of liberalism's defeat in Germany, read the self-critical writings of one of the more important liberal parliamentarians of the time, Hermann Baumgarten, Der Deutsche Liberalismus. Eine Selbstkritik, Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1974(reprint).

[127] See Gerhard W. Brück, Allgemeine Sozialpolitik, Köln: Bund Verlag, 1976. pp.22-30.

[128] See Ibid, pp.30-31.

[129] See Frank Pilz, Einführung in das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München: C.H. Beck, 1977, p.248.

"management" (Lenkungssystem) within more classical liberal thought[130]. Central management of the economy and broad restrictions of individual property rights were rejected outright as dictatorial and inefficient. By the same token, the Ordoliberals realised that traditional unregulated free-market orientations resulted in monopolies, cartels, and a restriction of competition. Laissez-faire capitalism was also rejected because of the dangerous social tensions and political instability it had engendered in the past[131].

An economic policy of "market-order" was therefore considered to be preferable. Competition would be kept open by vigilance of the market and economic growth, and increasing standards of living would be assured through a diffusion of wealth-creating opportunities. Three main postulates underlay Walter Eucken's "ordoliberal" model of such a social market economy. The first principle, in which individual liberty was to be upheld, visualised a maximum of individual civil and economic rights. The second called for a systematic and clearly defined economic policy that would determine industrial relations, sectoral policies, and cooperation between government and various economic actors. Eucken's third principle confirmed the necessity of strong central government institutions to coordinate policy effectively, guarantee social legislation, and act as a watchdog or "market police" to ensure the maintenance of open competition[132].

This kind of interventionism has continued to be a strong factor in the development of West Germany's social market economy. Of course, there has been no universal and uncontested smooth or uniform consensus regarding the incorporation of social policy into the political, economic, and social order of the Federal Republic. Conservatives represented by the Christian Democrats, champion a social capitalism based on individual responsibility and a more or less corrective form of social policy intervention. The Socialists (Social Democrats) have generally emphasised active strategic planning and political intervention in order to achieve social policy goals[133]. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that Germany's social market system has had no lack of critics, particularly from left-wing circles, who have questioned the actual social content of the economic order.

Regardless of ideological interpretations as to the efficacy and fairness of the system, the social market economy has dominated economic and political life in the Federal Republic for over 40 years and is likely to continue to do so. What characterises this system as peculiarly German and thereby distinguishes it from North American welfare states is its comprehensive and institutionally cohesive nature. This is enforced by the clear hierarchy of political responsibilities in Germany's federal system; central government is not only able to define broad policy frameworks but also to enforce the proper execution of policy at state and local levels. Thus, on

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[130] See Wolfgang Stützel, Christian Watrin, Hans Willgerodt and Karl Hohmann (eds.), Grundtext zur sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Volume 1, Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, 1981. The term Ordoliberal derives from the mediaeval concept of Ordo, a natural harmonious order which men should strive for. In this sense, Ordoliberalism posits the existence of an ideal social and economic equilibrium in which all individuals are free to compete at the marketplace.

[131] Kurt Sontheimer and Hans H.Röhring, op. cit., p.665.

[132] Idem.

[133] Gerhard Brück, op.cit, p.308.

the one hand, social policy has been integrated within economic policy, while on the other hand effective coordination between all levels of government assures the maintenance of truly *national* policies.

In summary, it appears that Germany's social, political, and economic system has attempted to promote general well-being and equality of opportunity while maintaining the dynamic elements of capitalism. Economic efficiency and high productivity coupled with close governmental surveillance of the market have thus characterised German interventionism. As Horst-Friedrich Wünsche writes, the goal of this interventionism - at least in theory

> "is not to apportion the products of an efficient economy to those who lack these products but to promote, nevertheless, social harmony. This is to be achieved through a "social order" in which everyone can enrich himself through the market process[134]."

3.4.2.1   The Role of Land Ownership Rights

Individual land ownership and land use rights is one of the most sensitive aspects of planning. Germany's social market system guarantees and respects basic property rights, but at the same time allows curtailment or termination of these rights if required by the public interest. Herein lies a further distinction between the forms of state intervention in North America and in West Germany. It is a distinction based on economic ideology and the historical treatment of land rights.

Although liberal interpretations of property rights have been very influential in the development of German planning legislation (for example the so-called Kreuzberg verdict of 1881), there appears to have been a general agreement among the politically influential classes as to the stabilising role of state intervention[135]. The Fluchtliniengesetz and other planning laws introduced in the second half of the 19th century were very permissive, allowing municipal police powers over construction only where the immediate interests of hygiene and public safety were involved (Gefahrenabwehr). The grave problems that stemmed from this permissiveness made it clear that changes would be essential to allow a greater degree of political determination of urban development. While this same realisation was not lost on North American politicians and planners who were struggling with similar problems, Germany reacted sooner and much more decisively. The most obvious reason for this appears to have been a lack of political resistance to state intervention.

As mentioned before, Anglo-Saxon interpretations of the role of individual property rights were incorporated with a "liberating" and politically progressive content which did not catch on

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[134] Horst-Friedrich Wünsche, Welcher Marktwirtschaft gebührt das Beiwort "sozial"?, in: Karl Hohmann, Dietrich Schönwitz, Hans-Jürgen Weber and Horst-Friedrich Wünsche (eds.), Grundtexte zur sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Volume 2, Stuttgart: Gustav Fischer, 1988: p.27.

[135] Anthony Sutcliffe, op.cit., pp.35-36.

in the Germany of the 19th century. Indeed, property rights have never been "taken for granted" in Germany in the way that they continue to be in the United States and, to a lesser degree, in Canada. Although the Federal Republic's Basic Law guarantees fundamental property rights, it also emphasises social responsibilities attached to these rights and allows powers of confiscation and expropriation if they serve greater social interests (Article 14). Article 15 of the Basic Law explicitly allows the "socialisation" of land, natural resources, and means of production if deemed necessary in the greater public interest. A taking of property rights is, however, also viewed as a negative power and due compensation must be provided (Entschädigungspflicht). With respect to property rights vis-à-vis the larger public interest, the actual text of Article 15 of the Basic Law is revealing. Regarding land ownership rights it specifically states that "because land is both non-reproducible and indispensable, property rights over land can be subject to particularly broad restrictions in the interest of society at large."

As we hope to demonstrate, there are numerous examples in West German planning legislation where property and land use rights are narrowly defined and restricted. The Town Planning Act (Bundesbaugesetz), for example, allows the use of police powers to an extent that would be unthinkable in Canada or the United States. One of these powers is the designation by municipal government of a protected urban fringe (Außenbereich) in which conversion and construction is generally forbidden.

3.4.2.2   German Traditions of Planning Intervention

It has already been noted that liberal ideology did influence early German planning legislation although it was not as universally accepted as in North America. This is evidenced by such court decisions as the "Kreuzberger Urteil" which established that police powers in land-use planning were only allowed in cases where hygiene or public safety were at issue. In interpreting the Town Extension Act (Fluchtliniengesetz), for example, this meant that the land between designated future thoroughfares was basically given over to private interests. Consequently, plans worked out to facilitate a rational and orderly expansion of urban areas became the basis for an unprecedented boom in speculative housing construction.

James Hobrecht completed his design for the expansion of Berlin in 1862. It was an exemplary master development plan creating a network of large avenues (ca. 30 metres in width) and subdividing land into oversized blocks to minimise the need for future street construction. Hobrecht's plan, however, contained no indications as to construction densities or the location of open space and parks. Private builders exploited the "superblock" concept by constructing immense tenement complexes with very high housing-unit densities[136].

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[136] For an excellent description of Berlin's speculative expansion see Werner Hegemann, Das steinerne Berlin. Berlin: Ullstein, 1963.

Such tenement-barracks (Mietskasernen) provided a bare minimum of open courtyard areas while covering entire city blocks. Urban amenities, such as public squares and parks, were generally neglected. This neglect can be still be seen today in the Berlin boroughs of Neukölln and Kreuzberg. As these speculative construction projects proliferated, public criticism and outright protest began to mount, along with accusations that the apparent victory of business interests signified the end of city planning as a guarantor of public welfare[137].

More rapidly than other industrialised nations, e.g. England, France, or the United States, Germany introduced important reforms to counter negative aspects of rapid urban growth. At first, attempts to improve the urban environment and provide decent housing for the working classes came from private and semi-private associations, such as the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) and the Verband deutscher Architekten- und Ingenieurvereine (Union of German Associations of Architects and Engineers)[138]. Among the most important innovations these groups helped promote was the establishment of comprehensive land-use planning. In particular it was urged that crude guidelines like those required by the Fluchtliniengesetz be replaced by "differential construction plans" establishing maximum building heights and densities according to land-use zones.

The city of Frankfurt adopted the first such zoning or Staffelbauordnung in 1891, at the behest of its mayor, Franz Adickes. Adickes, member of the Verband deutscher Architekten- und Ingenieurvereine, was an example of the many influential professionals who were able to enter municipal government in the late 19th century. As the influence and responsibilities of these salaried experts grew within city councils (Magistrate), general land-use and physical planning gradually became institutionalised in Germany. By 1910 almost all German states had passed legislation enabling local governments to designate land for communal uses as well as for streets and utilities, and to zone future growth areas[139]. In addition to changes in the more technical aspects of town planning, German reformers also called for more effective social policy in dealing with urban ills - particularly in addressing the housing problem. Here again, private and semi-private professional organisations were active. While the struggle against powerful speculative interests was not by any means won, groups such as the Association for Housing Reform (Verein für Wohnungsreform) and the German Garden City movement were influential in developing the concept of decentralised housing for the working-class[140].

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[137] See Hans Herzfeld, Berlin als Kaiserstadt und Reichshauptstadt, 1871 - 1945, in Hans Herfeld, Ausgewählte Aufsätze, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1962, pp.281-313.

[138] See Anthony Sutcliffe, op. cit., pp.23-27.

[139] See Gerd Albers, Der Städtebau des 19. Jahrhunderts im Urteil des 20. Jahrhunderts, in Wulf Schadendorf (ed.), Beiträge zur Rezeption der Kunst des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, Munich: Prestel, 1975: 63-71, as well as Dorothea Berger-Thimme, Wohnungsfrage und Sozialstaat: Untersuchungen zu den Anfängen staatlicher Wohnungspolitik in Deutschland (1873 - 1918), Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1976.

[140] See Kristiana Hartmann, Die Deutsche Gartenstadtbewegung: Kulturpolitik und Gesellschaftsreform, Munich: Heinz Moos Verlag, 1977. So-called worker's housing schmemes were only partly realised, however, as much cooperative and other social housing schemes proved to be too expensive for workers to rent.

Between 1873 and 1920, comprehensive municipal planning made gains in Germany that surpassed efforts elsewhere. Innovations pioneered in Germany served, in certain cases, as examples for planning ordinances in other countries. The zoning mechanism, closely associated with North American planning practise, was, for example, developed from the Staffelbauordnung[141]. Social reform ideals played a more critical role in the development of German city planning than they did in North America. Two important political factors seem to have been responsible for Germany's progressive attitude towards land-use regulation. As noted above, Germany along with other European nations, inherited a pre-industrial tradition of state interventionism. More importantly, however, after 1871 Germany appears to have been willing to tolerate social reform and land use regulation, despite the predominant laissez-faire outlook of the times. This was possible because land and planning reforms attracted support from the middle-class as well as the working classes.

3.4.3 Metropolitan Planning until 1945

By 1920, Germany could be recognised as having contributed greatly to the innovation of city planning. Most importantly, Germany succeeded both in a relatively early establishment of municipal authority to regulate land use and in creating planning instruments that permitted fairly comprehensive and orderly planning. The first decades of the 20th century also marked German attempts at city-region or metropolitan area government and land-use planning. There was no lack of intellectual support for metropolitan governance and planning, but political resistance to such plans had to be reckoned with. Within Germany, and particularly within Prussia, political and ideological anti-urban sentiment remained strong in rural areas. Fear of a further incursion of industrial society and urbanisation into traditional agricultural areas, together with a hatred of urban socialism, helped forge a conservative coalition against annexation[142]. While the consent of rural counties was not required for annexation proceedings, the political lobby of rural interests made such action impossible without negotiation and generous compensation. This rural-conservative lobby, supported by the agrarian traditions of Prussian aristocracy, dissolved after 1919 and the end of the monarchy. The way was thus opened for greater social-democratic political action based on principles of social equality and a desire for basic administrative reform[143].

Germany's early attempts at metropolitan reorganisation were in large part attributable to a perceived need to create a framework for orderly suburban development well in advance of actual future growth[144]. Not surprisingly, Berlin was the first city where such a "metropolitan solution" was tried. In 1920, the Prussian government approved the Greater-Berlin Act (Groß-Berlin-

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[141] See, Mel Scott, op.cit., p.89.
[142] Paul Nolte, op.cit., p. 27.
[143] Idem.
[144] See Gerd Albers, op.cit.

Gesetz) which ordained the amalgamation of 8 urban municipalities, 59 rural municipalities, and 17 villages into a political union with a decentralised form of municipal government[145]. The Greater-Berlin Act replaced the "special service district" (Zweckverband) created in 1911 to consolidate transport planning and urban service delivery (water, sewage) in the Berlin region. Primarily for political reasons, amalgamation was chosen rather than direct annexation, which it was feared would create a socialist majority[146]. Thus, a borough system of administration was established instead of a monolithic central city government[147].

Other metropolitan area organisations were created before WWII, including the Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk (Ruhr Mining-Region Association) in 1920, the Verband für den engeren mitteldeutschen Industriebezirk (Central German Industrial Region Association) in 1933 and Greater Hamburg in 1937. Although these forms of metropolitan and regional governance were basically a sort of spatial extension of traditional city planning, they were crucial in establishing a foundation for comprehensive and long-range metropolitan planning in Germany. Fürst and Hesse see in the creation of the Ruhr Regional Association a particularly important precedent for metropolitan governance[148]. They have emphasised three innovative characteristics of the Ruhr Association which have been particularly relevant to German planning, these are 1) the role of local initiative in establishing the Association, 2) the maintenance of local administrative autonomy and, 3) senior government involvement as advisor and arbiter in issues of regional interest. Generally speaking, the centralist tendencies of metropolitan reorganisation that were started during the Weimar period (1919-1933) have been upheld by the Federal Republic.

It is interesting to compare early expansion and annexation trends in the United States with those in other industrialised nations such as Germany. As Paul Nolte points out, annexation in Germany was promoted not only by different means but for different reasons[149]. As in the cases of Berlin (1920) and Hamburg (1937), national and state government intervention at the behest of municipal politicians decreed the amalgamation of major cities with their outlying areas. It also appears that "objective" and more or less functionalist motivations provided the impulse for metropolitan reorganisation in Germany[150]. At any rate, well before 1945 a precedent for administrative reorganisation and amalgamation had been established in Germany. This contrasts sharply with the U.S.-American experience in which local sovereignty still strongly influences problem-solving in metropolitan areas.

After the national-socialist takeover in 1933, municipal affairs and planning came under

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[145] Christian Engeli and Wolfgang Haus, op. cit., p.586.
[146] Idem.
[147] Berlin represents even today a model of urban government reorganisation. Unforunately, its example was not to be followed in the other great cities of Germany. There, centralism with a clear subordination of local subareas prevailed.
[148] Dietrich Fürst and Joachim J. Hesse, Landesplanung. Schriften zur Innenpolitik und Verwaltungspolitik, Düsseldorf: Werner, 1981, p.5.
[149] Paul Nolte, op. cit., pp.14-41.
[150] Ibid., p.23.

rapidly centralised political and administrative control. Local government was thus subject to direct central authority by means of the Führer-principle, in which representatives of the national government in Berlin were appointed to supervise local affairs and standardise administrative procedures[151]. A powerful comprehensive planning board, the Reichsstelle für Raumordnung, was created to coordinate planning at all administrative levels. Despite certain positive initiatives, planning in the Third Reich was primarily used to strengthen national-socialist control of political, economic, and social life[152]. Economic planning served military aims - facilitating rearmament and preparations for offensive warfare. Community planning was used to promote nationalistic and chauvinistic aims, most importantly the enhancement of German "settlement areas" not only in Germany proper but in Eastern Europe as a whole.

3.4.4 Developments after 1945

After the human and economic disaster of WWII, planning in Germany was devoted to the immediate task of emergency reconstruction (Wiederaufbau), the main priorities being housing and basic urban infrastructure. Reconstruction laws (Aufbaugesetze) were passed to expedite planning cooperation between the states and municipalities and remained in effect until the situation had stabilised[153].

In 1960, the reconstruction laws were replaced by comprehensive national legislation, producing the Town Planning Act (Bundesbaugesetz). Among the aims of the Bundesbaugesetz (hereafter: BBauG) was to formally establish an administrative framework in which municipal development plans were required to conform to objectives designated by the states. The BBauG contains definitive and detailed guidelines regulating municipal land use plans, guaranteeing, at the same time, a measure of local autonomy in land-use decision making. One crucial aspect of the BBauG is the restrictions on municipal annexation and development of peripheral land stipulated by paragraphs 34 and 35. This, in effect, amounts to federal legislation protecting agricultural and fringe lands from the speculative conversion that would otherwise result from market pressures. Five years after passage of the BBauG, federal land-use planning legislation was adopted which has since required the application of comprehensive development guidelines.

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[151] Hans Peters, op. cit., pp.103-105.
[152] Akademie für Raumforschung und Landseplanung, Handwörterbuch der Raumforschung und Raumordnung, annover: Curt R. Vincentz, 1970, p.1722.
[153] Idem.

4. URBAN POLICY AND THE NATURE OF URBAN CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

There is nothing arbitrary in choosing 1945 as the starting point for this study. Metropolitan development has obviously progressed within an historical continuum and, as we have hoped to illustrate in the foregoing chapters, has been influenced by tradition, political reform and evolving planning frameworks. The periods before and after WWI, however, present us arguably with two very different urban development situations, particularly with regard to the relative position of the central city in urban areas, and the spatial distribution of land uses within metropolitan regions.

The dramatic developments characterising urbanisation in the last 45 years have been well documented. Rapid growth in personal incomes, consumer spending, housing and baby booms, coupled with redistributive social policies, have resulted in what may be called "mass" events: mass suburbanisation, mass tourism and recreation, and mass consumption. These developments are indicative of a generalisation of wealth and of an expansion in demand on a scale heretofore unheard of. The acceleration of technological and economic structural change since 1945 has been equally spectacular. This has manifested itself most conspicuously in the expansion of the "service" sector at the expense of labour-intensive manufacturing and agriculture, and has been evidenced by the proliferation of office towers and business parks[1]. It is, furthermore, a generally accepted truism that advances in communications and data-processing technology have contributed to the erosion of central-city locational advantages. As a result, trends of economic decentralisation have accompanied a rapid suburbanisation of population - phenomena that, together with a variety of other factors, have produced the interdependent *regional* city.

Recent urbanisation is not only a question of a general movement to the suburbs, or of decentralisation. It is also a story of growth and decline, of technological innovation, structural obsolesence, and attempts at adapting to rapidly changing economic situations and the changing needs of society. During the last 45 years, urban expansion has proceeded at a rate never before experienced. This has been accompanied by increasing demands on government to facilitate orderly growth, and an expansion of the regulatory role of planning. Postwar urbanisation has been characterised not only by a new dimension of urban problems, but also by the development of political responses, of active state intervention in trying to solve these problems. Generally, industrialised nations have shared similar problems with regard to central city transformation, suburbanisation, and spatial decentralisation. Metropolitan regions experiencing rapid and continual economic growth present a special, rather prevalent, type of problem area.

The OECD has enumerated three general processes that have influenced urban economies: 1) the internationalisation of the world economy, 2) a shift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive

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[1] Here we are adhering to the definitions that Daniel Bell has popularised: Bell has indicated that "postindustrial" transformations have resulted in a contraction of the agricultural sector and a relative decline in manufacturing. Service industries, on the other hand have expanded, transforming not only the division of labour but the spatial requirements of business.

forms of production, and 3) the growth of the service sector, in particular of financial services, health, education, and administration[2]. The term "postindustrialism" has often been used to describe these and similar changes in urban industrial society[3]. Postindustrialism can be described as a "liberation" from social and economic categories that developed during the industrial era[4]. This basically means a departure from ideas of rigid class-identity, from the belief that progress is inherently good, and from the preoccupation with the city as the nexus of social, political, and economic life. The postindustrial categories that have taken their place can thus be described as "individualism," "personal responsibility," and, in spatial terms, "decentralised development".

While one can disagree with the premises of the postindustial thesis, and can argue that it overemphasises the importance of service sector industries and new technologies, postindustrialism allows us to incorporate interdependent phenomena of recent urban change within a more general conceptual framework. John Mollenkopf maintains that postindustrial transformation has been responsible for two major changes in urban societies and economies: (1) a relocation of industrial capacity and population, and (2) an "organisational revolution" associated with service sector expansion and the advent of multinational corporations[5]. According to Mollenkopf, the result has been the creation of a new metropolitan form, one maintaining traditional economic and political functions, but unlike the compact pre-war city, regional in scope, administratively fragmented, and made up of distinctive socio-economic realms[6]. This is, of course, most evident in metropolitan areas of the United States where political "balkanisation" and income differentials between wealthy suburbs and traditional inner-city neighbourhoods have reached extreme levels. Still, the metropolitisation of urban growth and change is clearly an international phenomenon.

Structural change, rapid growth and decentralising tendencies have been accompanied by a variety of urban problems, some largely financial and technical, such as the extension of infrastructure and maintenance of urban services. At the same time, suburban expansion, a dramatic increase in commuter traffic, and environmental degradation on a metropolitan level, have, in many cases, contributed to a deterioration of the quality of urban life. More often than not, the central cities have suffered most. This is vividly evidenced by the deterioration of inner-city housing, and the lack of recreational and open-space amentities in many metropolitan areas worldwide[7]. Moreover, the sectoral transformation of the urban economy - particularly in the United States - has led to an increased marginalisation of blue-collar workers and ethnic

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2   OECD, Managing Urban Change. Volume 1, Paris: OECD, 1983, pp.69-73.
3   Often overused, the term "postindustrialism" has received much criticism. See, for example, James Simmie, Beyond the Industrial City?, Journal of the American Planning Association, Winter 1983, pp.59-76. Simmie suggests that the concept of corporatism offers an alternative to the postindustrial idea that the service economy is fuelling urban change. Corporatism as used by Simmie, refers to changes in industrial management and organisation that have affected the division of labour and the structure of urban economies. Furthermore, Simmie supports his thesis with evidence that a shift from services to goods is taking place, underscoring the importance of manufacturing in national economies.
4   Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986, pp 19-20.
5   John Mollenkopf, The Contested City. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983. pp.36-39.
6   Ibid, p.36.
7   See OECD, op.cit., p.72.

minorities. The problems facing regions and cities that must deal with rapid structural change can be said to be more or less universal. But the picture of recent urban change is complicated by changes in regional economies, that have brought about rapid economic growth and also contributed to the collapse of certain industrial areas and conurbations. Thus urban decline has been as much a feature of post-war industrial society as the "metropolitan" phenomena of suburbanisation and decentralisation.

Figure 1 Shifts in Urban and Rural Population Growth in the United States, 1800 - 1980
Source: BERRY, Urbanization and Counterurbanization in the United States, 1980, p.16.

Indeed, in older monostructured areas these changes have had more severe effects than elsewhere. Cities such as Detroit, Pittsburg, Hamilton (Ontario), Glasgow, Dortmund and Essen have all suffered a decline in their traditional industrial activities without being compensated through growth in service-sector jobs[8]. Moreover the inheritance of an obsolete urban fabric and blight due to industrial abandonment have created environmental and image problems hindering the revitalisation of these areas.

Urban regions experiencing overall industrial decline are an extreme- if common- case of recent urban change. Declining urban areas have also become a political issue of the first magnitude: great sums of money and an exhaustive body of social and regional policy have been devoted to the regeneration of these areas. Central government commitment, as well as policy results, have varied considerably from country to country.

Economic restructuring and metropolitan expansion have also created their share of problems in areas enjoying overall economic growth. Suburban expansion has generally occurred at the expense of the central cities, which suffer from a disproportionate lack of environmental amenties. The changing demands of business, high land costs in downtown location, neighbourhood resistance to redevelopment, coupled with the "pull" factors favouring suburbia, have potentially put central cities at a great competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the urban fringe. The extreme examples of Los Angeles or Houston demonstrate the extent to which inner city decline can occur amid general economic expansion[9].

Recapitulating the urban phenomena discussed here, it can reasonably be argued that suburbanisation and decentralisation are among most important events of the last 45 years. The dispersion of population and economic activity has inevitably meant a decline of the central city's traditional importance. This has, in turn, been accompanied by an accelerated socio-economic segregation within the expanding metropolitan area. If we go beyond this general picture, we encounter a process of advanced decentralisation or "counterurbanisation", as Brian Berry termed it, in which an absolute deconcentration of population and economic activity takes place. Counterurbanisation, to the extent that its existence has been confirmed, has contributed to the growth of the rural fringe of metropolitan areas, of smaller cities, and, in certain cases, of rural "exurbs" far beyond the commuter zones of urban areas[10]. In accordance with convergence theory, counterurbanisation has been hypothesised to follow phases of economic and technological development and has even been interpreted by some as a form of "end" or "mature" stage of urban development[11]. While the counterurbanisation process has signified a more or less

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[8]   See Jean Marie Cernecq and Alistair McDonagh, The Future of Regions and Cities of Traditional Industry in Europe: Some Thoughts Drawn from the Second RETI Conference, Leeds, U.K., September 1985. Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Sciences, 408 (Nov.), 1986, pp.177-187.

[9]   See Robert Fisher, Urban Policy in Houston, Texas, Urban Studies, 26, 1989, pp.144-154.

[10] See, Brian J.L. Berry (ed.) Urbanisation and Counterurbanisation, op.cit. In the early 1970s this phenomenon was already confirmed for some European countries and the United States.

[11] See, Peter Hall and John Hay, Growth Centres in the European Urban System. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.

general shift of urban growth to smaller urban areas (e.g. in West Germany) absolute deconcentration appears to be a characteristically U.S.- American phenomenon[12] .

Finally, despite central-city and general urban decline, so-called "renaissance" trends have also been observed, which at least partially compensate for the loss of urban centrality. These trends include the expansion of downtown financial districts, the reinvigouration of downtown retailing, and the notorious gentrification of inner-city neighbourhoods. San Francisco, Toronto, Vancouver, and Munich are prime examples of these trends. The urban renaissance phenomenon is clearly "post-industrial" as it owes its existence to the rapid expansion of finance-related and other professional services, as well as sociological, socio-economic, and life-cycle components[13].

4.1   URBAN POLICY- ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER   URBAN SPACE

Structural economic transformation and a perceptible change in social relationships and the urban environment have necessitated a greater need for coordinated urban policy. The problems at hand involve both decline - particularly in the central city - and new growth created by changing economic opportunities. Over the last 45 years, a wide range of programmes, policies, and legislative measures have been enacted in industrial nations to deal with urban change.

Roy Drewett, together with collegues at the Vienna Centre, has categorised urban policy in Europe in relationship to different stages of urban development (See Table 1). As we can see from this table, urban policy instruments can be roughly divided into two groups: aspatial policies directed towards structural processes affecting urban change, and area-specific policies which address spatial aspects of urban transformation. According to the OECD, urban policies have been generally directed towards the following problem areas:

1) housing and environmental deterioration,
2) deconcentration and suburbanisation,
3) urban economic regeneration,
4) easing and avoidance of social conflict[14] .

Aspatial policies generally involve aid programmes for housing construction and improvement, urban infrastructure, rent control, economic development schemes, jobs training, investment incentives, and other measures. Area-based policies (as defined by the OECD) are those which address the problems of sprawl, specific urban amenities and services, and the quality of life both in core areas and the urban fringe.

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[12]   See Brian J. L. Berry, Urbanization and Counterurbanization in the United States, Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science, 451, September 1980, pp.13-20.
[13]   See Martin Gellen, op.cit.
[14]   OECD, Managing Urban Change. Volume 1, Paris: OECD, 1983, pp.68-75.

Urban policy as it has developed in Western Europe and North America, is a mix of aspatial and area-based policies. However, the degree of emphasis put on one or the other of these approaches has varied widely from country to country. Equally variable has been the combination of interventionist government programmes and "free-market" mechanisms in national urban policies.

Arlette Heymann-Doat has commented that

"The State will frequently intervene within the urban political arena in order to promote conditions favourable to liberalism, to accentuate certain tendencies and prevent them from floundering. At the same time, however, the State develops its apparatus and authority - one might say side-by-side - with the workings of the economy[15]."

As we hope to demonstrate, the willingness of the State to intervene in the urban marketplace depends to a great extent on political ideologies and the administrative and institutional frameworks that have evolved within the respective nations. Policies, both spatial and structural, pertaining to central city transformation and urban fringe development are what primarily concern us here. Based on the relative emphasis on spatial and interventionist policies, we can see how different countries have attempted to retard urban decline and manage decentralising growth trends. We can also determine to what extent certain countries have developed what might be called a comprehensive urban policy.

4.1.1 Revitalisation and the Urban Fringe

The policy areas that relate most directly to the problems we are dealing with involve the urbanising metropolitan fringe and, to a lesser extent, the functional integrity of the central city. This, of course, encompasses a wide range of policy instruments, many of them not necessarily directed to specific areas of metropolitan regions. Returning to OECD categories, urban revitalisation policies can be grouped into three areas of action: 1) housing policy, 2) economic regeneration of the city, and 3) urban land management and redevelopment[16]. Policies which affect and have affected peripheral land conversion and suburban expansion can be categorised as 1) land reserve policies, 2) subdivision controls, and, in certain cases, 3) new towns and subcentres policies. The land reserves category is, in itself, rather broad: this can include the protection of agricultural lands and open space, the reservation of land for future urban utilities and infrastructure or the maintenance of regional parks. In addition, a wide range of social and infrastructural policies have had both direct and indirect effects on developments in the central

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[15]   Arlette Heymann-Doat, Analyse Comparée des Politiques Urbaines, in Arlette Heymann-Doat (ed.), Politiques Urbaines Comparées, Paris: Editions à le enseigne de l`arbre verdoyant, 1983, p.180.

[16]   OECD, op.cit., pp. 76-90.

Table 1   Stages of Urban Development and Policy Responses as Defined by the Cost of Urban Growth Project

Source: DREWETT, 1980, pp.72-73.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT STAGE			
URBANIZATION	URBANIZATION/SUBURBANIZATION	SUBURBANIZATION/DESUBURBANIZATION	DESUBURBANIZATION AND INTERMETROPOLITAN DECENTRALIZATION
DEVELOPMENTS			
Heavy growth of cores due to immigration Construction of new residential quarters in the core unity of living and working Expansion outside historical city center, rise of a national metropolis or a dispersed system of equivalent cities, filling up of municipal land area Underdevelopment of services	Migration from the country to the core as well as from the core to ring Construction of new residential areas at the core fringe and in suburban places, with segregation of living and working Qualitative improvement of city life via greenery, public utilities, and amenities Expansion of municipal land area Start of reconstruction of historic town quarters	Stronger suburbanization across larger area Outmigration and decline of urban population Segregation between living and working as well as between living and central urban provisions New houses only in suburban ring Functional expansion of the city over a larger rural area Slowing down of growth of larger cores	Growing population in medium-sized agglomerations Stagnating house building in suburban places Increased outmigration of households from core to ring and from city and suburbs to smaller agglomerations Decrease in immigration to agglomeration Decline of number of households in the agglomeration Decline in demand for high-quality housing Increasing number of housing units is demolished Population decline in suburban places, accelerated population decline in city
PROBLEMS			
Shortage of houses Construction of qualitatively bad houses High density of population Insufficient level of amenities Social and hygienic effects of unity of living and working Environmental pollution and lack of space Considerable differences in welfare level between urban and rural areas	Competition between living and working in the city center Rising land prices in the city Shortage of cheap, payable houses Qualitative decline of provisions related to living in the city Increasing scale of urban life with rising depersonalization Rising pollution of air and water in congested urban areas	Loss of residential function in the core Losses in public utilities and amenities Segregation and ghetto forming of population groups Deterioration of historical parts of the core Slums in older core quarters, continuing reconstruction of the center Monotony of life in suburban ring Administrative and financial problems Degradation of urban environment	Leveling off of urban hierarchy Increased segregation and ghetto forming of population groups Increased number of empty houses, open spots in city Increased criminality
OBJECTIVES			
House construction for urban labor force Provision of urban amenities Improvement of urban quality of life Densification of housing by urban growth (flats, high buildings)	House construction for urban population in suburban areas, esp. private one-family houses Amenities within reasonable distance of residential quarters Modernization of city centers Decrease of house density Canalization of welfare levels in towns and between towns and rural areas	Pattern of urbanization according to housing desires, but with preservation of traditional cities Bundled deconcentration of people within functional urban regions More people living in the city center	Improvement of service sector in suburban places Stimulation of residential function of city center Improving housing conditions for local population Maintenance of metropolitan functions Improving the supply of low-order facilities Limits to further decrease of house density in central city Improvement of urban quality of life
POLICY INSTRUMENTS			
Government aid for house construction Social housing act Qualitative improvement of urban environment laying out of parks, green belts, garden cities, public services Corrections of urban boundaries Expansion of urban jurisdiction	City reconstruction, demolition of old living quarters and construction of new ones outside the town Measures to bundle suburbanization new-town or growth-nuclei policy Promotion of a large-scale administrative structure for city and suburb In Eastern Europe uniform housing standards, standardization of housing production	Stimulation of housing in inner city by subsidies in land costs, expansion of amenities, and restoration of old parts Measures to curb suburbanization, intensified growth-nuclei policy by special financial means and permit system City renewal, environmental protection, construction of accessible recreation areas Reorganization of urban-regional administration	Attraction of high-order facilities in suburbs, like hospitals, warehouses, and cultural amenities Creation of low-rent housing Restoring houses in use for offices to original residential destination Extension and creation of urban greenery where possible Increase in the police force

NOTE With reference to the example of "Living" in cities

city and the urban fringe. Ironically, these policies have often contributed to the very problems of decline and suburban sprawl that subsequent planning has been forced to deal with.

Strategies of urban core-area renewal aim to improve the investment climate, quality of services, physical infrastructure and general livability of cities. Blight, most visible in the physical degradation of the housing stock, is generally seen as a product of disinvestment that, in turn, contributes to a "push" effect favouring suburban areas or other regions. Obsolete and/or disused industrial plants often occupy large chunks of core-area land blocking economic regeneration. The same frequently applies to old infrastructural facilities. A "recycling" of inner-city land that, at the same time, promotes a general enhancement of the livability and locational attractiveness of the central city is, therefore, a logical redevelopment goal. Based on policies that have been utilised in the last thirty years, we can summarise urban revitalisation measures as follows:

1) Housing policies: these are measures that attempt to preserve and/or increase low-cost housing stock while, at the same time, promoting privatisation schemes for middle income families. A mix of socio-economic groups resident in the inner city is among the primary aims of these policies.

2) Economic regeneration: in order to enhance the locational advantages and overall competitiveness of the central city economy, tax credits, investment incentives, and other forms of enterprise support have been employed. Job-training and retraining schemes have been inaugurated to improve labour-market conditions. Furthermore, area-based incentives, such as the inner-city enterprise zone scheme, have been launched in a variety of urban areas - particularly in Britain and North America.

3) Land policies: here, a variety of measures affecting availability, attractiveness, and the general use of urban land have been combined to facilitate redevelopment while maintaining a balanced functional mix within the central city. In this area, direct government intervention in providing the necessary infrastructure, in land assembly, and in preparing blighted or derelict land for redevelopment has proved essential[17].

Policies addressing suburban areas can be generally described as housing subsidy and capital investment programmes. North America has led the way in financing mass suburbanisation through a variety of mortgage insurance schemes, the extension of water and sewer services, freeway construction programmes, and other measures. In the United States, low-interest home loan guarantees provided developers great opportunities to expand their operations with relatively little financial risk. New Towns policies, such as those developed in England and Sweden, have puposely created "suburban" growth poles to counteract the overconcentration of population and

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[17]   The information used here has been taken primarily from OECD Sources. Particularly useful were Managing Urban Change, Volumes 1 and 2, Paris: OECD, 1983.

employment in the capital cities and other large urban areas. New Towns policies were not actively pursued in North America or in West Germany.

4.1.2 The Search for a Metropolitan Perspective

We have already touched upon the subject of administrative reorganisation in urban areas. This has been important not only in lowering service-delivery costs and improving local government efficiency, but has also proved essential in tackling urban problems of regional importance. Metropolitan government, while a relatively recent phenomenon in North America, has been a commonly used tool in Europe. The pioneering examples of Berlin and the Ruhr region have already been mentioned. In Holland, local government reorganisation was already carried out before WWII: the widely-acclaimed 1935 extension plan for Amsterdam resulted in wide-scale annexations of neighbouring communities[18]. Other classic examples of metropolitan reorganisation and the regionalisation of planning in Europe are Greater London, Greater Stockholm, and Paris.

Unlike in North America, European countries have also vigourously pursued a policy of general administrative reform. In the UK, for example, legislation drastically reduced the number of local governments in 1972. The same occurred in West Germany, where between 1968 and 1972 local governments were amalgamated and reduced by about 65%. This, in turn, has facilitated the establishment of regional bodies in all urbanised areas of the Federal Republic. Whereas the outright annexation of suburban municipalities by larger cities is no longer a practical administrative option, regional governance has generally not been stymied by local government autonomy.[19]

The development of regional governance in Europe contrasts in several ways with that in North America. While Canada has instituted metropolitan planning and administration in virtually all urbanised areas, the degree to which police powers and decision-making authority has been transferred to regional bodies varies greatly. Generally speaking, local governments have remained the primary political actors in the management of land-use issues albeit under close supervision of the provinces. Similarly, metropolitan planning in Canada often depends on suasion and voluntary cooperation among municipal governments. Regional administrative authority is, in many cases, limited to technical areas in order to avoid controversial conflicts of political responsibility. However, the provincial governments do step in to fill the "vacuum" that would otherwise ensue between local and regional planning coordination. Furthermore, it must be

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[18]   Annette Robet-Müller and Jacques Robert, L'Evolution de la Planification locale aux Pays-Bas. In: Arlette Heymann-Doat (ed.), op.cit., pp.95-121.

[19]   Exceptions to this "rule" are the city-states of Hamburg and Bremen where due to a particularly difficult intergovernmental situation, (Hamburg's hinterland lies in two different states, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony) regional bodies similar to those of Munichs's and Frankfurt's have not materialised.

acknowledged that voluntary intermunicipal planning cooperation has worked relatively well in Canada, as the experience of Vancouver, British Columbia clearly demonstrates.

The situation in the United States presents yet a different picture. We have already discussed how persistant traditions of local autonomy and a continuing "balkanisation" of urban administration have hindered the establishment of regional government there. With certain notable exceptions, metropolitan governance in the United States is limited to specific functions, such as utilities and park maintenance, and cooperative arrangements between municipalities for the delivery of basic services. Oftentimes a multitude of single-function special districts will proliferate within greater metropolitan areas, each responsible for specific subareas. This is generally desired in order to avoid the creation of "superagencies" whose existence might be regarded as detrimental to local autonomy.With regards to planning, voluntary adherence to guidelines set by advisory bodies (councils of government) and negotiated agreements between municipalities present the only real means of attaining a certain regional orientation. Unlike in Canada, where the provinces often act as promoters of regional planning and providers of important services, the state governments in the United States have remained largely aloof, refusing, it would appear, to take an active role in metropolitan affairs.

4.1.3 The Maintenance of Urban Centrality

Sprawl, environmental degradation, and a shifting of investment from the central city towards suburban areas, are among the major urban growth problems we have been discussing in this study. What we are dealing with, in other words, are the negative aspects of suburbanisation and decentralisation. Facile as it may sound, the solution to these problems would seem to lie in a defense of the central city's economic and functional dominance within a larger metropolitan region. At the same time, a concentration of new growth around specifically designated outer centres would tend to limit the space-wasting effects of sprawl and infrastructural inefficiencies of decentralised development. The maintenance of urban centrality and avoidance of space-intensive peripheral growth are not new planning goals.

The ubiquitousness of urban renewal strategies, growth-pole concepts, and the basic cost/benefit logic of optimising infrastructural investment indicate that the planning community in most industrialised nations have attempted to preserve central city predominance while saving agricultural and open space from mass development. The actual outcomes of metropolitan growth indicate that, in many cases, these planning goals have proved unattainable. As we shall try to demonstrate, the principal reasons for such planning failures have been a lack of political willingness to actively influence spatial developments and insufficient institutional and administrative means to effect land use regulation.

5.   METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: CALIFORNIA'S URBAN GROWTH PHENOMENON

By the time the United States found itself in the midst of the Second World War its industrial cities had already begun to experience revolutionary changes in their economies and spatial organisation. Starting in the 1920s, population and employment growth gradually shifted towards newer suburban areas at the same time that the tertiary (or service) sector and newer manufacturing activities began to displace traditional heavy industries. In addition, mobilisation of the U.S. economy during World War II set a process of internal migration in motion which would accelerate the urbanisation of western states. These economic and spatial trends characterise what many interpret as the *postindustrial* transformation of the U.S.-American city.[1] This transformation, which eventually resulted in mass suburbanisation, decentralisation, and the social isolation of the central city, did not occur overnight. However, the period following 1940 witnessed a dramatic acceleration of these phenomena. Public works programmes, the war economy and the advent of "high-tech" defence industries, federal subsidies of home ownership, and the expansion of private and public bureaucracies were among the many factors at work.

5.1   SPATIAL SHIFTS AFTER 1940

World War II brought an end to mass unemployment. It also meant huge defence contracts for shipbuilders, aircraft manufacturers, electronics firms, and other industries. In response to new employment opportunities millions of citizens moved to industrial centres -- most notably in California, Washington, and other points west. Metropolitan areas expanded rapidly, some gaining almost 15% in population between 1940 and 1943.[2] Black migration increased steadily, changing forever the ethnic composition of many western and northeastern cities.[3]

Although several eastern states had already experienced population loss due to interstate migration before the 1920s, the trend of "rust belt" decline began in earnest during economic mobilisation. Huge public works projects, such as Hoover Dam and the Golden Gate Bridge, and other public subsidies provided through Roosevelt's New Deal programme generously benefited California, its industries, agriculture, and cities[4]. They started a pattern of regional subsidy which, together with enormous defence contracts, ensured steady economic and urban growth in the "sun-belt" up to the present. The post-war growth experienced in older northern industrial cities never approached that of San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, or Phoenix. Moreover, after 1960, the rate of metropolitan growth in such cities as, New York, Philadelphia, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh declined rapidly. By 1970, these and other older industrial centres were experiencing considerable population losses.

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1   See, for example, John Mollenkopf, op.cit., pp.12-46.
2   See Philip J. Fungiello, op.cit., pp.11-12.
3   Ibid, esp. pp.25-26.
4   See Peter Wiley and Robert Gottlieb, Empires in the Sun. The Rise of the New American West, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1982, pp.3- 29.

and Pittsburgh declined rapidly. By 1970, these and other older industrial centres were experiencing considerable population losses.

Table 2 Growth of Metropolitan Areas in the United States (1000s)

	1950	1960	1970	1980
New York	9,576	10,726	11,632	10,881
Los Angeles	4,152	6,039	7,042	7,478
Chicago	5,178	6,221	6,975	7,104
Philadelphia	3,671	4,343	4,824	4,717
San Francisco	2,136	2,649	3,109	3,251
Boston	3,065	3,358	3,710	3,663
Cleveland	1,533	1,909	2,064	1,899

Source: William Frey and Alden Speare Jr, Regional and Metropolitan Growth and Decline in the United States. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1988, Appendix E.7A.

This regional shift in urban growth was accompanied by an equally dramatic expansion of the suburban fringe of central cities. Large-scale suburbanisation characterised all urban areas of the United States regardless of region. Spurred by mortgage insurance and low-interest loans supplied by the Federal Housing and Veterans Administrations (FHA and VA), suburbanisation was, in large part, a result of the largest home ownership programme ever undertaken[5]. The accelerated construction of urban and interstate freeways in the 1950s and 1960s contributed considerably to this outward development of metropolitan areas. Well before 1970 most central cities, even the largest such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, found themselves outnumbered by their surrounding suburbs (See Table 3).

Industry had already begun to relocate to the suburbs by the beginning of the twentieth century. As with population suburbanisation, however, it intensified markedly during the post-war years. In response to the peripheral expansion of metropolitan areas, retailers invested heavily in new suburban stores and shopping complexes. As Peter Muller has noted, the regional shopping centre symbolised a definitive break of retailers and suburban consumers with downtown[6] .

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[5] For an excellent account of federal subsidies and "the suburban dream," see Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier. The Suburbanization of the United States, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp.195-218.

[6] Peter O. Muller, Contemporary Suburban America, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980, p.121.

Table 3   Metropolitan Area Population Changes, Central City
           Percent Shares, 1940 - 1980.

SMSA*	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980
New York	74,5	82,4[1]	72,6	67,9	65,0
Los Angeles	57,2	53,5	46,8	45,0	44,5
Chicago	74,3	69,9	57,1	48,3	42,3
Philadelphia	60,4	56,4	46,1	40,4	35,8
San Francisco	64,1	54,3	41,8	34,6	31,3
Boston	34,6	26,1	20,8	17,3	15,4
Cleveland	69,3	59,7	45,9	36,4	30,2

* SMSA = Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
[1] Population gains due to annexations.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts 1950; Population
Census 1960; William H.Frey and Alden Speare Jr., 1988, idem..

Table 4   Suburbanisation of Economic Activity in Selected SMSA's

SMSA	Total suburban share SMSA jobs		Suburban share retail sales		Suburban share manufacturing	
	1960	1970	1963	1973	1963	1973
New York	28,8%	35,9%	32,9%	55,2%	19,1%	53,4%
Los Angeles	47,8%	54,3%	58,7%	60,0%	63,9%	64,0%
Chicago	32,3%	47,5%	43,1%	56,8%	41,0%	57,4%
Philadelphia	37,0%	51,8%	56,6%	66,7%	50,5%	59,3%
San Francisco	44,9%	50,5%	52,0%	63,3%	53,3%	62,3%
Boston	55,5%	62,2%	68,8%	76,3%	71,8%	78,2%
Cleveland	28,3%	46,0%	45,2%	69,0%	39,7%	51,3%

Adapted from Muller, 1980, p.121.

5.1.1   Economic Transformation: the "Organisational Revolution"

Economic change in the central cities has also fuelled the process of suburbanisation. In addition to its importance as a financial centre, the inner city has become the locus of burgeoning public and private administrative bureaucracies. This has been due to the expansion of corporate

headquarters, increasing federal and state government activities, and rapid growth in all manner of services. Corporations have centralised the most important decision-making aspects of their operations while relocating manufacturing in the suburbs. More recently, so-called back-office activities, such as bookkeeping, have also been moved to peripheral office locations. The proliferation of central offices in downtown areas has created a market for "advanced corporate services" ranging from advertising, legal counselling, and market consulting to computer graphics and interior design[7].

Government employment has increased substantially since the New Deal was inaugurated in 1933. During the postwar era, however, the federal and state governments drastically increased spending on urban programmes and education. This opened up many job opportunities, particularly in the central cities. Federal, state, and local agencies have been created to deal with matters such as, health, education, housing, welfare, employment, and environmental protection. By 1974 government - federal, state, and local - had provided a total of over 9 million new jobs[8].

The boom in administrative and services employment has not compensated for job losses in manufacturing, nor has it helped cities with a predominantly industrial tradition. While the downtowns of San Francisco, Boston, and New York have profited handsomely, other places such as, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Oakland, are still struggling to find a new economic role.

5.2. A NATIONAL URBAN AGENDA: THE NEW DEAL AND ITS LEGACY

Before the onset of the Great Depression, there existed no real urban policy worthy of the name in the United States. In accordance with traditions of privatism and local initiative, the welfare of U.S. cities was overwhelmingly dependent upon "boosterism" and the entrepreneurial talents of the business élite. Economic collapse, however, shattered faith in private enterprise's problem-solving capabilities. Franklin Delano Roosevelt won an overwhelming victory in 1932, promising to turn the nation's fortunes around with a concerted effort of government and business at economic recovery. The New Deal was born and a flurry of emergency legislation aimed at job-creation, physical renewal, and the maintenance of minimum living standards followed.

Initially, the New Deal was quite idealistic in tone, proclaiming social equality as a political and economic goal, and intending to profoundly reform the capitalist system. In the areas of urban development and housing it promised the inauguration of comprehensive national policies and greater land use planning control. Soon, however, more conservative forces within the Democratic Party, as well as powerful business lobbies, softened the social reform element of New Deal legislation. It was made clear that emergency legislation adopted to mobilise the U.S.-American economy for war would not necessarily be tolerated in peacetime. Above all this meant

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[7] The term advanced corporate services - also employed by Mollenkopf - stems from Robert Cohen, The Corporation and The City, New York: Conservation of Human Resources Project, 1979.

[8] U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929 - 1974, Washington, D.C.: BEA, 1975, Table 8.6.

that national planning agencies, such as the National Resources Planning Board, and the most "radical" interventionist policies in housing and land markets, and would be brought to an end[9] .

The New Deal did, however, establish a certain social agenda in public policy. While public housing and national land use planning attempts were successfully challenged by conservatives, Roosevelt's social welfare programmes remained intact. In addition, the New Deal established a permanent role for government in the formation of economic, social, environmental, and other areas of policy. Nevertheless, for proponents of comprehensive and socially equitable urban development (and redevelopment), events after 1945 proved disillusioning. In 1946 the Republicans took control of both houses of Congress. President Truman, who was attempting to consolidate New Deal housing and urban renewal programmes, saw most of his ambitious housing strategy shot down. Federal rent controls were terminated and a massive cooperative housing plan for lower-income families was defeated. Furthermore, authorisations in the 1949 Housing Act that would have provided 810,000 federally subsidised public housing units were drastically reduced, so that by 1952 only 85,000 units were near completion[10] .

The Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953 - 1960) did not champion government intervention in housing and land markets. Indeed, the general mood in the United States after 1945 was not very supportive of fundamental social reform. War mobilisation had effectively ended unemployment. Pent-up demand for consumer goods, and in particular of housing, was now one of the primary concerns of public policy. Conservatives responded to post-war consumerism by redirecting government intervention away from social programmes and towards stimulating economic growth[11]. Thus, public policy in the 1950s emphasised, among other things, home ownership programmes and capital investment projects in infrastructure - particularly in the construction of a national freeways network. The Eisenhower years were also characterised by a strong commitment to support the role of private enterprise in urban development. The 1954 Housing Act shifted the focus of urban redevelopment form the federal to the local level which, in Mollenkopf's opinion, "allowed downtown businesses, developers, and their political allies, who had little interest in housing, to use federal power to advance their own ends"[12]. While not eliminated, public housing programmes were withheld funds in order not to compete with private developers[13] .

As Savitch has indicated, the clearance of inner city land for commercial use was the primary aim of Eisenhower's urban redevelopment policy[14]. At the same time, requirements to set aside redeveloped land for residential use were relaxed. This, in effect, meant that housing policy was largely turned over to the cities themselves. Strapped for funds, however, the cities increasingly

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[9]   See John Mollenkopf, op.cit., pp.68-69, 103.
[10] Richard O. Davies, Housing Reform during the Truman Administration, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1966, pp.127-130.
[11] See John Mollenkopf, op.cit., pp.109-111.
[12] Ibid, p.117.
[13] H.V. Savitch, Urban Policy and the Exterior City. Federal, State and Corporate Impacts upon Major Cities, New York: Pergamon, 1979, p.98.
[14] Idem.

emphasised *revenue-enhancing* uses, viewing lower-income housing as a heavy economic burden[15]. By 1963, 25 per cent of all cities receiving funds for clearance projects provided by the 1949 Housing Act had not undertaken any residential redevelopment whatsoever[16]. Moreover, most of the cities with provisions for residential redevelopment had concentrated on "upmarket" housing in an attempt to attract high-income earners to the city centre[17]. Thus, by the early 1960s, national housing policy as established by New Deal legislation had been subsumed by local redevelopment concerns.

The Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson represented an attempt to resuscitate New Deal social objectives. They expanded programmes targeted towards inner city areas and, most importantly, increased public housing authorisations. The 1961 Housing Act set aside $2,5 Billion for this purpose. In 1965, President Johnson established a federal agency, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), entrusted with public housing, renewal projects, and a variety of urban grant programmes. Additionally, the Johnson administration inaugurated the so-called Community Action Program in a bid to reinvigorate social and political life in inner city areas.

And yet, despite this frenzy of federal activity in urban affairs, no comprehensive or coordinated urban policy as such was used to guide government action. New departments were created to handle new programmes but nothing resembling a national land use policy
or inner city renewal concept emerged. To make matters worse, those areas of urban land-use planning most affected by federal policies - e.g. housing and redevelopment - suffered from a clear lack of interagency cooperation and programme coordination. Scott Greer and David Minar have illustrated this problem

> "urban renewal may be at the mercy of powerful federal agencies over which it has no control. The federal highway program may site a cloverleaf in the middle of the urban-renewal area, may displace thousands of householders and completely disrupt the urban renewal relocation operations, and may hold up the sale of urban-renewal land months while officials decide where access ramps should go. Meanwhile, FHA may co-operate with the highway program in stimulating dispersion to the suburbs while urban renewal struggles to revivify the central city[18]."

By Nixon's second term of office (1973-1974), many of these urban programmes were in retreat. Under Reagan, they suffered even more. Conservative rule during the 1980s has seen a "devolution" of urban policy to the state and local level. Responsibility has been decentralised, but without a commensurate increase in local funding. For this and other reasons, the states have

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15   Ibid, pp.99.
16   Urban Renewal Administration, Urban Renewal Project Characteristics, December 31, 1962, Washington D.C.: Urban Renewal Administration, 1963, pp.19-49.
17   Reported by William G. Grigsby, Housing and Slum Clearance: Elusive Goals, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1964, p.110.
18   Scott Greer and David W. Minar, The Political Side of Urban Development and Redevelopment, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1964, p.67.

proven unwilling to take up the slack left by federal retrenchment. Comprehensive urban policy seems a more distant possibility now than it ever was during the postwar era.

William G. Grigsby has summarised the urban policy dilemma in the United States

"The most serious barrier to the realization of housing goals is the conflict between central city and suburb. To survive, the city must diligently pursue and cater to the institutions, businesses, and income groups that provide public revenues. Suburbs, in their own way, must do the same. As a consequence of this competition for ratables, housing for lower-middle income families has lost its priority in the city and has been positively resisted in the suburbs. In stepping into the struggle between these rival political jurisdictions, the federal government has had three options vis-à-vis the central city: subsidize projects intended to strengthen the economic base of the city, thus increasing the capacity of the city to deal with its housing problems; emphasize subsidies for housing and let the city chart its own economic course; or, as finally turned out, leave the choice of alternatives to the city. Had the second option been selected, it is possible that both the short-term welfare effects and the long-run impact on urban structure and costs of renewal would have been more favorable[19]."

Divisions of power at all levels of government is something quite typical of the political culture of the United States. Jurisdictional fragmentation at the local level and a lack of interagency coordination within the federal government appear to have been one major result of these traditions. However, if anything can be said to have harmed the cause of urban renewal and metropolitan planning in the United States, it is this diffusion of policy.

5.3   THE SEARCH FOR A REGIONAL FOCUS

While on the national level urban policy was fragmented through a variety of housing, redevelopment, social, and infrastructural investment programmes, local attempts to improve the planning and administration of growing metropolitan areas gained momentum. The realisation that urban needs would increasingly have to be dealt with on a regional level was not new, but it was rapid postwar metropolitan growth that brought this issue to the fore. Metropolitan area problems and their administrative solutions were debated widely. Academics, planners, and representative of all levels of government studies various possibilities of establishing metropolitan governance. Precedents had already been set in Europe and, starting with Metro Toronto in 1953, in neighbouring Canada.

Writing in 1960, Stanley Scott commented on the absence of a "process of government" to deal with a host of urban issues on a regional scale[20]. Scott also criticised the fact that most

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[19]   William G. Grigsby, op.cit., p.118.
[20]   Stanley Scott, Metropolitan Problems and Solutions, in Stanley Scott (ed.), Metropolitan Area Problems. Report of the Pacific Coast Conference on Metropolitan Problems, Berkeley: University of California (Bureau of Public Administration), 1960, pp.7-8.

administrative functions, such as transportation planning, park maintenance, law enforcement, water supply and treatment, and housing, were still divided up among a multitude of municipal governments or, at best, were performed by single-purpose agencies[21]. Furthermore, as far as planning was concerned, volunteer organisations and professional groups advocating metropolitan problem-solving had no real powers beyond the influence and expertise of their members.

During the 1950s and 60s attempts to reorganise local government and institute *formal* metropolitan administration were renewed. Several means of consolidating local government were tried. Among these were the amalgamation of cities and counties, municipal federation, and the consolidation of urban service districts. Annexation, a traditional means of unifying local jurisdictions within a single city government, had already ceased to be an alternative in mature metropolitan areas and was generally limited to younger western cities[22]. However, reorganisation attempts soon ran into considerable local resistance. A less controversial option than actual rearrangements of local jurisdictions has been to establish contractual agreements between municipalities for specific urban services. In this way, larger cities - and in some cases private companies - can be hired to deal with such functions as, sewage treatment and rubbish disposal[23]. Cooperative interlocal agreements have also proven attractive. Here municipalities can agree to pool resources in establishing service authorities for a wide variety of administrative functions. Interlocal agreements have frequently included the establishment of "unified" school, fire and water districts, as well as jointly operated hospitals, jails, and sports facilities[24]. In some cases, municipalities have relinquished functions to county governments. While this has not been a popular option - and one prohibited in most states - fiscal pressures have made it attractive for several communities[25].

These arrangements are convenient in that they - at least theoretically - improve the provision of urban services while maintaining local political autonomy. However, they cannot be seen as a substitute for comprehensive metropolitan area problem-solving. For this, agencies with a wide range of decision-making powers over an entire urban region are necessary. Attempts to institute regional governance and planning on a larger scale have run into trouble on the local home rule issue. As a result, relatively few reorganisations of local governments in metropolitan areas have succeeded in the United States.

While developments in the 1960s held out a certain promise of greater popular acceptance of regional government, reorganisations were generally limited to smaller SMSA's and areas with only one or two counties. City-county consolidations were carried out in Baton Rouge (1947), Nashville (1962), Jacksonville (1967), Indianapolis (1969) and Lexington (1972). Other metropolitan reorganisations retained local governments: Florida's creation of Metropolitan Dade County (1957), which includes greater Miami, involved a two-tier (city and county) arrangement

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[21] Ibid., pp.1-8.
[22] See John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, op.cit., pp.303-309.
[23] Ibid, pp.348-349.
[24] Idem.
[25] Ibid, pp.357-359.

while St. Paul-Minneapolis (1967) opted for a three-tiered (city, county and regional) governmental structure. Only one of the above reorganisations, that of Indianapolis, was created by unilateral state government action[26]. In all other cases, local consent - primarily through the initiative and referendum process - was required[27]. This is one of the major reasons why metropolitan governance involving an actual transfer of powers has progressed little since the early 1970s. Instead, America's urban areas have opted for more or less voluntary forms of regional planning and have chosen to let single-function metropolitan districts assume responsibility for specific services.

Generally reluctant to impinge upon local government autonomy, the states have not been very active in establishing regional controls on land use. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this rule. California's Coast Commission - established in 1975 by popular referendum - is a state agency charged with the protection of California's coastline from encroaching urban development[28].

In the state of Oregon, where environmentalist policies have been a long-standing tradition, a Land Conservation and Development Commission was established in the mid-1970s to create and manage "greenbelt" zones around urban areas. In addition, growth management legislation has been recently established in Georgia, New Jersey and other states although it appears that these measures fall short of actual land conservation policies.

5.3.1 Intergovernmental Volunteerism: an American Response?

Starting in the 1950s an altogether different form of metropolitan governance was promoted. Responding to the lack of a regional political forum within which mutual problems could be discussed and approached, several urban areas considered the creation of councils of local government. Conceived as voluntary associations of local governments, they were intended to promote interlocal cooperation and a regional outlook on urban affairs. The first Council of Governments (COG) was established in 1954 for the Detroit area[29].

COGs were subsequently created in Greater Seattle (1957), Washington D.C. (1957), the San Francisco Bay Area (1961), and other metropolitan areas. Starting in the mid-1960s, federal policies helped the spread of COGs throughout the entire country. Grants covering operating costs and the elaboration of regional plans were offered to metropolitan councils. More

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[26] York Wilbern, Unigov: Local Government Reorganization in Indianapolis, in, Kent Mathewson (ed.), The Regionalist Papers, Southfield, Michigan: Metropolitan Fund, Inc., 1978, pp.48-70.

[27] For a good discussion of the referendum process and its effects on metropolitan reorganisations, see Stanley Scott and Victor Jones, Foreword to C. James Owen and York Wilburn, Governing Metropolitan Indianapolis, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985, pp.xvii-xxxv.

[28] See Stanley Scott, Governing California's Coast, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976.

[29] For a summary of the development of COG's, see Royce Hanson, Metropolitan Councils of Government, Washington D.C.: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 1966.

importantly, the disbursement of a variety of federal funds was made contingent upon COG reviews of grant applications.

Councils of Government in the U.S. vary somewhat in their activities and structure. Nevertheless, all can be defined as advisory agencies made up of local representatives and that study regional solutions to problems such as, traffic, water supply and treatment, waste disposal, parks and recreational area planning, pollution control, and housing. This form of voluntary intergovernmental cooperation theoretically provides a vehicle for more comprehensive metropolitan area problem solving. As Henry Schmandt has pointed out, however, regional volunteerism can only function if local communities take full advantage of the opportunities it provides and if federal and state governments assume certain administrative and financial responsibilities to support regional planning and service delivery[30]. In 1969 the federal government adopted the A-95 review process in an effort to bolster regional planning attempts and interjurisdictional cooperation in metropolitan areas[31]. The A-95 process established that state officials and regional "clearinghouses" must review local applications for federal grants. In most but not all cases, COG's have adopted the role of clearinghouse. Between 1965 and 1975 a wide range of urban programmes were established by the federal government providing funds for capital projects, environmental protection, housing, planning studies, and other activities. By 1977 over 200 different programmes administered by a multitude of federal agencies were covered by the A-95 process[32] .

The indirect channelling of federal funds through metropolitan "clearinghouses" clearly enhanced the status of COGs during the 1970s. However, the A-95 process has done nothing to directly address comprehensive regional decision-making. Oftentimes, the review process has been a mere formality - made up of locally elected officials, COGs are under pressure to expedite distribution of federal moneys. As Schmandt confirms, COGs have also been reluctant to withhold grant approvals as a method of forcing municipalities to adhere to regional planning recommendations[33]. Fiscal retrenchment and the cancellation of many urban programmes since 1980 have accentuated the weaknesses of intergovernmental volunteerism. COGs still lack any police powers over land use and urban development. No comprehensive and coordinated urban policy existed at the federal level. What constructive housing, jobs, and development grant projects that were created have been eliminated under Reagan's and Bush's New Federalist regimes - urban policy is, in effect, being devolved to the state and local levels[34] .

The success of metropolitan administration and planning in the United States is thus overwhelmingly dependent on a local willingness to cooperate and on the existence of a general consensus as to what development goals should be aimed for. In all fairness, COGs have

[30]   Henry J. Schmandt, Intergovernmental Volunteerism Pro and Con, Kent Mathewson (ed.), op.cit., p.16.
[31]   A-95 refers to an administrative circular released by the United States Office of Management and Budget.
[32]   Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations, The Federal Role in Regionalism, Kent Mathewson (ed.), op.cit., p.201.
[33]   Henry J. Schmandt, op.cit., pp.21-22.
[34]   The term New Federalism originated during Richard Nixon's presidency and expressed conservative attempts to "decentralise" urban policy and thereby neutralise Democratic power bases in the inner cities.

accomplished a great deal in bringing regionalism and metropolitan planning to public attention. They have done this through detailed studies of regional economies and land uses, carefully prepared regional plans, painstaking public relations work, and a commitment to comprehensive urban problem-solving.

5.3.2 Federal Retrenchment, State Inactivity: A Power Vacuum

Beginning in the late 1970s. budget cuts began to decrease the amount of federal money available to the cities in form of development grants, renewal projects, and social welfare programmes. This was accompanied by a gradual shifting of responsibility for urban policy to the state and local levels. Reaganism and the intensification of "New Federalist" concepts brought with them a considerable curtailing of federal involvement in urban development issues. Instead of direct aid, the federal government has championed local initiative and the establishment of inner-city "enterprise zones[35]". Economic growth through local entreprenuership is thus seen as a vehicle of central city revitalisation - an ironic return to the *privatism* of earlier days.

The states have appeared unwilling to fill the policy void left by federal retrenchment, nor have they been provided with additional funds for urban programmes. None of this has bidden well for metropolitan government in the United States. Commenting on its own experiences, Puget Sound Council of Governments explained the dilemma

> "When PSCOG was rich with federal money and courted by all, consensus was not necessary. The federal government imposed its wishes on regional planning, and capital projects were built according to whether federal money was forthcoming. Now that Reagan's New Federalism is in full force, giving states more responsibility (but less money) for planning initiatives, local interests perceive the leadership vacuum and have entered into a capital planning and land-use free-for-all[36]."

In California, the fiscal problems facing urban policy have been exacerbated by popular initiatives limiting property tax levels and state government spending. Proposition 13, which passed in 1978, drastically reduced municipal and county government revenues through the imposition low ceilings on property tax assessments. This measure has, in effect, made housing - especially low-income housing - unattractive. As a result, many city and county governments in California have intensified "fiscal zoning" practises, in the hope that attractive commercial and industrial development will bolster their finances[37] .

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[35] See, for example, George E. Peterson and Carol W. Lewis (eds.), Reagan and the Cities, Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute Press, 1986.

[36] Municipal League Foundation, Puget Sound Council of Governments: A History; Issue Brief of the Municipal Leaue Foundation (Seattle, Washington) III(1), January 1987, p.5.

[37] See David Dowall, The Suburban Squeeze, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984, pp.14-22.

Metropolitan governance as it has generally developed in the United States, has not been of great influence in urban land use issues. COGs have tried to steer clear of controversial areas such as social welfare policy and development controls in order not to disturb interlocal relations. Lacking police powers and taxing authority, they cannot function as a redistributive instrument or promote a regional sharing of the benefits and burdens of urban development. Furthermore, volunteerism has not succeeded in appreciably reducing municipal rivalries and suburb-central city tensions. Different communities have different priorities, not all of which may be seen to be of regional pertinence. In the fragmented metropolis of the United States local particularism has not completely overshadowed regional identity, but it has neutralised many attempts at interlocal cooperation. Henry Schmandt writes

> "This differentiation in problem situations is generally greatest between the central city and the suburbs as a whole. Many concerns of regional significance, such as congestion, blight, fear of personal safety, and racial conflicts, have their primary locus in the core municipality. Regardless of what the actual situation may be, most suburban officials (and residents) perceive the central city as having a set of problems which are peculiar to it and largely of their own making. They are therefore fearful of involving their communities in any cooperative arrangements, much less governmental reorganization, that might require them to bear a share of the responsibility for the amelioration of such conditions[38]."

In conclusion, despite certain promising developments and initial impulses given to metropolitan government by the A-95 process, it has become clear that metropolitan planning is far from being achieved in the United States. Conflicts of local development interests continue to dominate the political arena. As a result, different subareas of the metropolis pursue different development and land use policies despite COG attempts to establish general regional planning guidelines. Inner city policies concentrate on aggressive renewal and commercial redevelopment. The urbanising periphery generally continues to realise its market potential as provider of new land for industrial, commercial, and residential development. Meanwhile, as we shall see in the cases of the San Francisco Bay Area and Southern California, more mature suburbs struggle to attract "quality" development and limit the extent of future growth. Finally, opposition to regional governance remains strong in suburban areas. Fear that jurisdictional reorganisations could result in a loss of community identity and livability have encouraged suburbanites to support local approaches to urban growth management[39].

This pattern of regional "balkanisation" is most likely to be broken by the problems of urban development itself. Environmental degradation, especially traffic and increased air pollution, has become a burning issue in many urban areas. The metropolitan areas of the United States, particularly in the west, will continue to expand as long as new housing markets can be opened

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[38] Henry J. Schmandt, op. cit., p.23.
[39] See Mark Baldassare, Citizen Support for Regional Government in the New Suburbia, Urban Affairs Quarterly, 4(3), March 1989, pp.460-469.

and developers can turn a profit. The pressure for action resulting from sprawl, congestion, and a perceptible loss in the regional quality of life will perhaps force municipalities to cooperate an a scale never before attempted.

5.4 THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA: REGIONALISM IN A NINE-COUNTY SETTING

The nine-county region centred around the city of San Francisco has expanded continuously for the last 50 years. Industrial growth during WWII was followed by innovations in electronics and computer technology, and heavy federal subsidies in the form of defence contracts in the 50s and 60s. This enriched local firms and acted as a catalyst for regional economic expansion in "high-tech" areas. San Francisco's importance as a first-order corporate and financial centre has been another important economic catalyst. Several regional office space markets for "back-office" activities, a wide variety of advanced corporate services, and, in some cases, corporate headquarters, have emerged. Apart from this, the San Francisco Bay Area enjoys a pleasant climate, excellent recreational opportunities, and a rich cultural heritage. All of these factors have enhanced the region's attractiveness and have no doubt contributed to its rapid growth.

More so than in the cases of Frankfurt and Toronto, the SFBA is a polynuclear urban realm with several large cities. Due to topographic circumstances and early difficulties in surface communications, no primate city developed that was able to dominate the region[40]. Alongside San Francisco stand Oakland with its heavy industries and port and San Jose, a huge dormitory city in the heart of Silicon Valley. The San Francisco region is so extensive - it contains nine counties and four SMSAs (S.F.-Oakland, Santa Rosa, Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, and San Jose) - that it is listed as a Standard Consolidated Statistical Area[41] .

5.4.1 Suburbanisation and Regional Fragmentation

Since the 1950s, the San Francisco Bay Area has experienced more or less permanent peripheral growth. South San Francisco and the Eastern Bayshore were the suburban growth areas of the early 50s. Then "booming" subdivision-style expansion lasted in Santa Clara, Marin, and San Mateo Counties from the late 1950s to the 70s. Throughout the 80s, peripheral areas in Contra Costa, Sonoma, Solano, and Alameda Counties have grown extensively and will provide

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[40] An excellent description of this polycentric development in the SFBA can be found in James Vance, Geography and Urban Evolution in the S. F. Bay Area, Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies (University of California), 1964.

[41] This statistical designation refers to metroplitan areas containing at least two SMSAs that are closely associated functionally and economically. At least one of the SMSAs must include a population of over 1 million. This definition was introduced in 1975 in order to facilitate statistical studies of growing urban centres. An SMSA is defined as an urban county with at least one city over 50,000 inhabitants.

new housing opportunities for years to come. As a result of this continued suburban growth trend, many municipalities have not only grown physically but also have developed into regional employment centres in their own right. Between 1965 and 1975 - a period of rapid economic growth - the regional employment share of the two core cities, San Francisco and Oakland, decreased from 41% to 34%[42] .

Table 5   Suburban Physical Expansion: Santa Clara County
(in sq.kilometres)

	1950	1970	1975
Palo Alto	11,5	40,3	40,3
San Jose	27,5	218,2	235,8
Santa Clara	7,8	18,1	29,6
Sunnyvale	9,8	35,3	6,6
Unincorporated	1945,6	1646,4	1619,2

Source: Santa Clara County Planning Department, Estimated Areas of Cities,
Santa Clara County, 1950-1975. Info No. 556, June, 1975.

While its overall regional importance as employer has diminished, San Francisco still remains pacesetter for the office space market. During the 1970s, close to 45% of the region's total office construction took place in San Francisco's downtown[43]. While this share decreased during the 1980s, S.F. remains the most single important - and attractive - office space market in the Bay Area. Within the last 5 to 10 years, however, it is the younger suburban periphery that has been showing the largest increases in office-related employment. Between 1970 and 1979, total office space in central and southern Contra Costa County grew from 165,000 to 1,006,500 square metres - an increase of almost 700%[44]. Almost half of this total was due to construction in the town of Walnut Creek. In addition, a number of large business parks were either built or under construction in Contra Costa and Alameda Counties during the 1980s. One of them, the so-called Bishop Ranch project, is planned for a total of 29,000 employees.

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[42]   Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), San Francisco Bay Area Profile, San Francisco: ABAG, 1979, p.125.

[43]   ABAG,   Bay   Area   Office   Growth,   Working   Papers   on   the   Region's   Economy,   No.1, Oakland: ABAG, 1981, p.18.

[44]   Ibid, p.52.

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Figure 2   **Map of the SF Bay Area, Showing Extent of Urbanisation as of 1980**
Source: PEOPLE FOR OPEN SPACE, n.d.

Table 6   Employment Growth in Regional Employment Centres,
           1965 - 1978.

| | Total Employment | | Regional Share | |
	1965	1978	1965	1978
East Bay[1]	186,000	330,400	17%	15%
Livermore	12,400	22,800	1%	1%
"Silicon Valley"[2]	267,700	521,400	17%	23%
San Francisco	400,800	439,000	24%	19%
Santa Rosa	26,100	46,500	2%	2%
Walnut Creek-Concord	32,000	64,800	2%	3%

Percentages have been rounded off to the nearest decimal point.

[1] East Bay includes Oakland, Berkeley, and Alameda.

[2] The towns of Mountain View, Palo Alto, San Jose, Santa Clara, and Sunnyvale.
Source: ABAG, ABAG Projections 1979 Data Base.

Economic growth has, of course, had rather severe drawbacks. Among these are congestion, air pollution, sprawl, and a loss of rich agricultural land. Northern Santa Clara County, once an area of orchards, has become almost completely urbanised as a result of growth in and around Silicon Valley. As in many U.S.-American urban areas, commuting is increasing in absolute terms and in length. For a number of reasons, housing and job opportunities have been developing in different parts of the region, creating an unfortunate spatial imbalance. Because this separation of jobs and new housing will most likely continue, the regional traffic outlook appears quite dismal.

Experts have warned for years against the negative effects of uncontrolled peripheral development. The idea of a regional growth strategy has been often suggested but never acted upon. Unfortunately, despite a great deal of interlocal cooperation with the SF Bay Area, municipalities have chosen to address land use issues as a purely local matter. Thus each municipality deals with growth problems in its own way, either as a result of citizen initiative or city council planning decisions. Fragmentation is exacerbated in the SFBA by the existence of nine counties, none of which are large enough to assume a politically dominant role within the region. The local COG, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), has done a commendable job in bringing regional land use issues and growth effects to public attention. As is generally the case with voluntary agencies, ABAG's lack of police powers to enforce regional development guidelines has deprived it of real political influence. With several notable

exceptions, attempts to create powerful regional planning bodies have failed. Although written in 1968, the comments of Scott and Bollens are quite applicable to the present situation

> " Several attempts to achieve comprehensive governmental reorganization by creating some kind of general purpose (or multipurpose) government in the region have met with failure. The existing local governments have viewed such proposals as a threat to their autonomy, if not to their existence. This attitude, bolstered by the persistent Jeffersonian-Jacksonian tradition of the political primacy of <u>local</u> governments has defeated all efforts at comprehensive reorganization[45]."

5.4.2 The Evolution of Regional Government in the San Francisco Bay Area

Regional governance in the Bay Area, as in virtually all metropolitan areas of the United States, has developed within the context of "local home rule" traditions. For this reason, it has been a gradual and piecemeal process. Although the goal of a comprehensive planning agency has not been achieved, Bay Area regionalism has scored several successes, particularly in the area of environmental protection.

Proponents of regional planning had ambitious projects in mind. Local organisations such as the Commonwealth Club and the Regional Plan Association spent a great deal of energy in the 1920s publicising regional development ideas[46]. Transportation, water supply, sewage disposal, and land conservation were among their main concerns. Under its chairman Frederick Dohrmann, the Regional Plan Association warned repeatedly of the dangers of sprawl and of the need for concerted action on a regional level to prevent an irreplaceable loss of agricultural lands[47]. State legislation in 1927 provided for the establishment of city, county, and regional planning commissions and the preparation of comprehensive master plans. However, a lack of local interest, funding difficulties, and uncertainties as to the legality of regional plans frustrated the Regional Plan Association's attempts. The association was disbanded in 1928[48].

The idea of comprehensive metropolitan planning was ahead of its time. Forty years were to pass before a regional planning commission would undertake a similar effort. However, Bay Area regionalism continued to progress in a gradual manner. In 1923 a first important step was taken in the development of Bay Area metropolitan administration. In this year, the East Bay Municipal Utilities District (EBMUD) was established by popular referendum to consolidate water supply

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45 Stanley Scott and John C. Bollens, Governing a Metropolitan Region, the San Francisco Bay Area, Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies (University of California), 1968, pp.8-9.
46 Ibid, pp.188-201.
47 Ibid, p.195.
48 Ibid, pp.200-201.

for Alameda and Contra Costa County[49]. This was followed by the establishment in 1928 of the Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District. These measures, as well as the Eastbay Regional Parks District created in 1934, involved the compulsory purchase of private property in order to provide areawide services.

During the rest of the 1930s and throughout the 1940s little action was taken to create further regional service agencies. However, in 1949, state legislation provided for a breakthrough of considerable dimension. The California Water Quality Act established a statewide pollution control agency with regional boards monitoring local water quality[50]. Thus the first truly regional service body, the San Francisco Regional Water Quality Control Board, was created. As T.J. Kent points out, this legislative action helped break ground for the creation of various regional agencies as it emphasised the *technical*, rather than political, nature of regional problem-solving[51]. During the 50s, the state created several other regional agencies, among them the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission (1951) and the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District (1955).

Local initiative has played an important role in establishing a limited degree of regional planning. In 1969, the state legislature invested the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) with police powers to regulate the use of the bay and bayshore lands. The creation of BCDC was facilitated by a well-orchestrated mobilisation of environmentalist sentiment, intense lobbying by local politicians of the state legislature, and a general consensus to protect what most citizens saw as a unique natural area[52]. The Bayshore had been the object of various municipal "reclamation" projects and hundreds of hectares had been lost to residential, industrial, and commercial development. By the time BCDC stopped development, 34 different land fill projects were planned by rapidly growing communities in Alameda and San Mateo Counties[53] .

The establishment of a regional land use planning entity proved much more difficult. Once issues not perceived as strictly "technical" were involved, particularly those relating to private lands and their development, or the question of local planning sovereignty raised, then regionalism became very controversial indeed. While the protection of bay wetlands from development found broad political support, it was a different matter altogether to establish *general* regional controls on land use. The first attempt to set up a Bay Area planning district was defeated in 1957 in the state legislature[54]. Four years later, however, the counties and cities of the

[49] Mel Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area. A Metropolis in Perspective, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp.180-181.

[50] See T.J. Kent Jr., Open Space for the San Francisco Bay Area: Organizing to Guide Metropolitan Growth, Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies (University of California), 1970, p.16.

[51] Idem.

[52] Information supplied by Stanley Scott, Assistant Director of the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 17 December, 1989.

[53] Ira Michael Heyman, Using and Saving the Bay, Harriet Nathan and Stanley Scott (eds.), Toward a Bay Area Regional Government, Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies (University of California), 1968, p.145.

[54] For the different reasons why - primarily a lack of information over the intentions of such a district - see ABAG, Regional Home Rule and Government of the Bay Area, San Francisco: ABAG, 1966.

Bay Area created a voluntary council of government to address regional planning issues. The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), composed of local government officials as well as nonelected citizens, has since concentrated its efforts in studying the regional economy, patterns in land use development, regional housing needs, and, most significantly, developing long-range planning guidelines.

In 1970, ABAG presented its Regional Plan. This document was essentially an action programme against sprawl and argued for the development of a "city centred region"[55]. The plan contained proposals for a belt of permanent open space within and around the region, and for the controlled outward development of suburban areas. At the same time, ABAG stressed the importance of achieving a local jobs/housing balance in order to limit commuting and to enhance the functional diversity of suburban municipalities. A future reliance on regional rapid transit was emphasised in order to connect core areas with the suburban realm. This was seen both as an alternative to automotive traffic and freeway construction, and as a means of keeping older inner cities tied into the regional economy[56]. Although a well-designed and creative plan, ABAG's regional development scheme was somewhat discredited by its exaggerated prognoses of future population growth[57]. The Regional Plan anticipated a Bay Area population of 7,500,000 by 1990 - almost 2,500,000 more than the latest estimations indicate. More importantly, the plan suffered from the characteristic weaknesses of volunteerism. ABAG, of course, did not, nor does it today, enjoy any real measure of police power over land use. Thus the realisation of the Regional Plan would have depended almost entirely on municipal cooperation. Very few cities, however, were prepared to throttle residential or commercial development for the sake of a voluntary plan and the seemingly vague vision of a "livable" region.

In general, ABAG is seen by municipal officials as a "paper tiger" - at best a good statistical bureau, at worst a long-winded political farce[58]. ABAG, however, has not been alone in suffering stiff suburban criticism. In 1985, the planning director of Contra Costa County, Anthony Dehaesus, attempted to consolidate all local area planning entities into a single agency. This failed due to intense municipal opposition. The then mayor of San Ramon, a rapidly growing community in the southern part of the county, spoke for many local residents in commenting that "outsiders" were not able to appreciate the specific problems and interests of individual communities[59]. A more moderate proposal in which municipal and county-level planning (in Contra Costa) would have been coordinated through an intergovernmental "liaison" office was similarly turned down[60].

Local home rule, community identity, and mistrust of senior government institutions, whether voluntary or not, has long characterised the political atmosphere in Bay Area suburbs. Despite

[55] ABAG, Regional Plan 1970:1990, Berkeley:ABAG, 1970, pp.15-22.
[56] Ibid, pp.18-19.
[57] Interview with Eddie Peabody, Director of Planning, City of Danville, 23 August 1985.
[58] This was the more or less unanimous impression I received in various interviews with local officials, planning advocates, and business representatives.
[59] Donna Hemmila, Deheaesus Opposes Regional Planning, Contra Costa Times, 20 September, 1985.
[60] Sharon Bernstein, New Idea: Unify City, Contra Costa Planning, Contra Costa Times, 11 December, 1985.

apparent agreement over the necessity of interlocal planning cooperation, fear of a loss of political autonomy has motivated virtually all communities to find their own separate approaches to urban development and other land use issues. The nine counties, responsible for unincorporated Bay Area lands, have often chosen different policy directions in approaching urban growth. Furthermore, their record of cooperating with municipal governments over planning decisions has been mixed. Several Bay Area counties have promoted intense development of their rural fringes in order to capture greater revenues - a practise often at odds with municipal growth concepts. In the view of former Walnut Creek city manager Thomas Dunne, the regionalist dilemma lies in the necessity of greater cooperation and compromise and the impossibility of allowing "big government" to step in and regulate land use[61].

While this maintenance of a home rule status quo has preserved a high degree of local autonomy, it has resulted in severe regional jobs/housing imbalances, sprawl, and a deterioration of environmental quality.

5.4.3 Suburban Growth Policies in Santa Clara County

Santa Clara County, the southernmost county within the Bay Area SCSA, provides a perfect example of rapid suburbanisation in urban areas of the American west. Before 1945 the county was largely agricultural: its largest city, San Jose, included somewhat more than 92,000 inhabitants. While World War II brought general economic prosperity to the San Francisco Bay Area as a whole, the development of semiconductor technology and growth in defence-related electronics industries dramatically transformed Santa Clara County. A research, development, and industrial production complex grew around Stanford University and rapidly expanding electronics firms in Palo Alto and Santa Clara. Aided by billions of dollars in defence and NASA contracts, this complex evolved into the industrial region known as Silicon Valley[62].

Growth in Santa Clara County has been more or less continuous despite economic downturns in the 60s and 70s. This is largely due to the expansionist and pro-growth policies that most communities adopted. Suburban sprawl and a variety of related problems came to the fore in the late 60s, questioning the desirability of steady economic expansion. Silicon Valley - Slurbia, as Karl Belser termed it - became a byword for all that was ugly and "anti-urban" in American cities[63]. Commute times had been increasing to intolerable levels so that 2 to 3 hour drives to and from work were becoming normal. Housing prices skyrocketed, open space disappeared almost completely in much of the north county, and, as a result of land market pressures and local development policies, new jobs and housing were created in different parts of the county.

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[61] Interview with Thomas Dunne, City Manager, Walnut Creek, 19 August, 1985.

[62] An excellent study of the development of Santa Clara County's Silicon Valley, and the role defence-related industries played in it, can be found in Anne Saxenien, Silicon Chips and Spatial Structure, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, Working Paper No. 345, Berkeley: IURD (University of California), 1981.

[63] Karl Belser, The Making of Slurban America, Cry California, 15(4), Fall 1970, pp.1-21.

The spatial imbalance between job opportunities and most new middle-income housing has been the cause of traffic congestion, environmental degradation, and great inequalities in local revenues.

5.4.3.1   The Regional Jobs/Housing Imbalance

In 1969 the Planning Policy Committee of Santa Clara County published a critical analysis of local zoning practises. Among other things, it mentioned that very little affordable housing had been built or was under construction in rapidly growing employment centres of the county[64]. County planners attempted to persuade local officials to adopt more balanced zoning in order to distribute jobs and housing more evenly within the region[65]. They also recommended that steps be taken to ensure that housing development be intensified and to allow a greater mix of densities and land uses. Unfortunately, speculative pressures on land, the promise of increased revenue from new employment, and citizen dislike of apartment and other high-density housing proved stronger that arguments for "balanced growth." Housing - particularly lower-to-middle-income housing - was in unequal competition with commercial and industrial development. Economic investment was strongest in the north (centred around Palo Alto, Santa Clara and Sunnyvale); here housing activity was greatly reduced.

Between 1977 and 1979, 140,000 new jobs were created in Santa Clara County. During the same period only 33,000 housing units were completed[66]. County housing officials estimated that by 1990 over 100,000 persons employed in the county would not be able to find housing there[67].

Table 7   Jobs/Housing Imbalance in Santa Clara County, 1975

	Residents	Housing Units	Employment
North County[1]	335,100 29,3%	129,000 32,9%	243,100 48,5%
Central and East[2]	655,700 57,3%	214,000 54,5%	210,000 41,9%
Western Foothills[3]	99,700 8,7%	32,000 8,3%	28,000 5,7%
South Valley[4]	24,000 2,1%	7,600 1,9%	7,100 1,4%
Rural Areas[5]	29,000 2,6%	9,300 2,4%	12,500 2,5%

[1] Palo Alto, Mountain View, Sunnyvale, Santa Clara, Cupertino

[2] San Jose, Milpitas, Campbell

[3] Los Altos Hills, Los Altos, Saratoga, Monte Serrano, Los Gatos

[4] Morgan Hill, Gilroy   [5] Unincorporated areas

Source: Santa Clara County Housing Task Force, 1979, p.3.

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[64] Planning Policy Committee of Santa Clara County, Zoning and Housing, San Jose: County Department of Planning, 1969.

[65] Ibid, pp.82-85.

[66] Anne Saxenien, op. cit., p,91.

[67] Santa Clara County Housing Task Force, Living Within Our Limits, San Jose, 1979, p.5.

County officials also called attention to the fact that municipal rezoning policies had considerable reduced the amount of land available for residential development. According to Housing Task Force estimates, rezoning for commercial and industrial uses resulted in loss of 417,000 potential housing units[68].   The situation was exacerbated by the fact that many "dormitory" communities (e.g. Monte Sereno, Los Gatos, Los Altos Hills) were decreasing allowable housing densities. The case of Sunnyvale in north county was quite typical. Sunnyvale's General Plan of 1972 made it clear that the city would not be able to appreciably increase housing densities or zone more generously for residential development[69]. In the 1950s the city had adopted a strategy by which business taxes would make up over 60% of local revenues leaving to other communities the task of accommodating regional housing demand[70]. In addition, lands originally zoned for multi-family housing were rezoned in 1972 in order to decrease densities and limit residential construction. Despite continued requests by county officials to intensify housing development, there have been few indications that Sunnyvale will soon abandon its exclusive zoning practises.

The cumulative effect of "mercantilist" and exclusive zoning in the north of the county has been to force increased development pressure on San Jose and other municipalities. New jobs have intensified housing demand and this is being met more and more in southern parts of the county. San Jose has traditionally functioned as the South Bay's largest housing market. However, recent drives to reinvigorate San Jose's downtown and to intensify economic growth will limit the city's future ability to provide housing[71]. San Jose's aggressive redevelopment plans are part of an attempt to correct the city's overemphasis on physical expansion and residential development. Some promising new cooperative projects designed to coordinate regional transit and housing are on the horizon. However, should San Jose resort to the same mercantilist policies employed by north county cities, then the jobs/housing imbalance will intensify and development pressure will increase on peripheral communities.

5.4.4   Contra Costa County

Contra Costa County lies in the eastern section of the San Francisco Bay Area. The westernmost portion of the county (including the cities of El Cerrito, Kensington and Richmond) forms part of the older urban core, the rest of the county, however, is separated from the core area by the Berkeley Hills. Central and eastern Contra Costa County began to urbanise in the 1940s but it was not until the 1960s that full-fledged suburbanisation took place. Starting in the late 1970s, this part of the region has experienced growth pressures of similar intensity to those in Santa Clara County. Once characterised by dormitory communities, Contra Costa County - particularly the central and southern portions - has developed into a polynucleated employment

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68   Santa Clara County Housing Task Force, Housing: A Call for Action, San Jose, 1977.
69   City of Sunnyvale, General Plan 1972, p.III-4.
70   City of Sunnyvale, General Plan 1957, p.10,
71   City of San Jose Planning Department, General Plan 1975. Amendments 1975-1980, San Jose: City of San Jose, 1980, p.58.

particularly the central and southern portions - has developed into a polynucleated employment centre of regional importance. Along Interstate Highway 680, large business parks have been erected that today headquarter Western Electric, Toyota of America, and most of Standard Oil's management-level operations. In the latter part of the 1980s, Bank of America moved its "back-offices" from downtown San Francisco to Concord. The neighbouring community of Walnut Creek has become one of the Bay Area's largest office space markets.

5.4.4.1   Municipal Development Strategies: "Exclusive" Growth

The community development strategies used during the last ten years by municipalities in Contra Costa County can be roughly fit into three categories. These are, 1) selective economic growth,   2) exclusive residential growth and, 3) expansive residential development. Geographically speaking, new employment centres are concentrated in the central areas of the county while expansive residential communities are to be found in the eastern periphery. Exclusive residential communities tend to be older affluent suburbs located in the central county. It should be mentioned that these three categories only serve to describe tendencies. Indeed, most communities have employed a mixture of all three strategies.

The City of Concord appears to have been somewhat of an exception in that it has not only promoted commercial development but has attempted to provide a wide variety of new housing. Growing rapidly from a semi-rural town of 10,000 souls in the mid-50s to a city of over 100,000 in the 80s, it has vigorously - if not recklessly - pursued a policy of economic expansion. The 1963 General Plan established that commercial and industrial zoning was to develop the city into an important regional employment centre[72]. The East Bay's first regional shopping mall, Sunvalley Centre, was built here. After Concord began to run out of buildable land, the city concentrated its planning energies on "downtown" redevelopment and the intensification of land use where possible[73]. The General Plan of 1982 established that the "Downtown Business and Employment Area" be redeveloped to allow for office space construction and high-density housing. The area immediately adjacent to the Bay Area Rapid Transit station was earmarked for large office projects. Only a few years later, Bank of America moved its "back-office" operations to this site.

Concord's aggressive redevelopment policy has been at least partially motivated by higher business tax revenues and the promise of large developer contributions to local finances. Many of the city's expensive social programmes have either directly or indirectly financed through downtown growth[74]. David Dowall has commented that, despite heavy commercial zoning,

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[72] City of Concord, General Plan 1963.
[73] City of Concord, General Plan 1982. Part 1: Development, Land Use.
[74] Alan   Ehrenhalt,   Trade - Offs   that   Fuel   a   City's   Growth,   "This World" section of the San Francisco Examiner, 10 July, 1988.

Concord has tried to develop as much residential land as possible.[75] Unlike most other suburban communities in the county - and the Bay Area as a whole - the city has allowed much high-density residential construction in the form of apartment buildings, condominiums, and multi-family townhouses. In fact, of the more than 9,000 future housing units included in Concord's 1984 housing programme, only 1143 were to be single-family homes[76]. Concord has criticised the more restrictive attitudes of it neighbours in relation to land use densities and housing types[77]. Despite much citizen opposition, the city has committed itself to increasing its supply of rental and moderate-income housing[78] .

While Concord has attempted to balance economic expansion with a commensurate provision of housing, the development strategies of most communities in central Contra Costa have exacerbated jobs/housing disparities in the region. Several of these communities, such as Orinda, Moraga, Alamo, and Lafayette, are among the most affluent in the Bay Area. Orinda, a dormitory community straddling Highway 24, has allowed basically no medium-or high-density housing within its jurisdictions. Local fear that the county would permit the construction of apartment houses or increases building densities led to the incorporation of the town in 1985[79]. 95% of Orinda's land area is residential and large-lot zoning is the rule[80]. The 1972 General Plan determined that a maximum of 1714 housing units would be constructed on 800 hectares of remaining land - a halving of existing allowable housing densities[81]. By "liberating" itself from county planning control, Orinda has hoped to maintain it homogeneous, village character. Moraga and Lafayette, two neighbouring communities, are also "exclusive " communities, allowing very little high-density construction outside of small "downtown" areas. Lafayette incorporated in 1968 in reaction to county proposals for multi-family housing development.

Further east, the city of Walnut Creek has experienced a rapid expansion in service employment and of its downtown office space capacity. By 1980 it had become the eighth largest office space market in the Bay Area. Walnut Creek's aggressive policy of commercial and industrial development began in the mid-1960s - largely in response to Concord's extensive commercial growth strategy[82]. This has meant intensive development of the downtown area, particularly in the vicinity of the Rapid Transit Station. Within the core, zoning has permitted high building densities and a decidedly urban mix of commercial, residential, and office space[83] .

[75]   David Dowall, The Suburban Squeeze, op.cit., pp.62-84.
[76]   City of Concord, General Plan 1982, op.cit., pp.10-11.
[77]   See City of Concord, Central Area Economic Study, 1982.
[78]   Interview with Peter Hirano, Planning Director, City of Concord, 24 September, 1985.
[79]   Elliot Diringer, A Vote on Whether to Form a "City of Orinda", San Francisco Chronicle, 04 March, 1985.
[80]   County Planning Department of Contra Costa, Orinda General Plan, 1972, Martinez: County of Contra Costa, 1972, and U.S. Census of Population, 1980.
[81]   County Planning Department of Contra Costa, op.cit., p.30.
[82]   Ruth and Krushkov, Walnut Creek Core Area General Plan, 1966, San Francisco, 1966.
[83]   See City of Walnut Creek, General Plan, 1982.

Table 8   Jobs/Population-Ratios in Selected Communities Central Contra Costa County, 1970 - 1985

	Population			Employment		Ratio	
	70	80	85	80	85	80	85
Concord	85,164	103,255	105,200	33,370	39,500	.31	.33
San Ramon	4,084	22,356	25,100	5,329	9,800	.24	.39
Walnut Creek	39,844	53,643	58,100	37,513	42,500	.70	.73
Livermore	37,703	48,394	52,100	16,726	19,800	.35	.38
Pleasanton	18,328	35,160	40,750	9,090	13,000	.26	.34

Source: Cynthia Kroll, Responses to Suburban Employment Growth, p.47; US Population Census 1970.

While very high housing densities have been allowed in this central development area - 125 units per hectare in some cases - Walnut Creek is determined to maintain the single-family neighbourhood quality which characterises most of the city[84]. This decision has limited Walnut Creek's ability to provide housing for persons employed within its jurisdictions. The city's own estimates indicate that by 1990, 15,000 new jobs will have been added while population will increase by only 9,000. ABAG and other regional planning associations have criticised Walnut Creek's policy of economic expansion without providing sufficient housing - in particular affordable housing - for workers. City officials have reacted to such criticism by stating that the idea of a jobs/housing balance is unrealistic and runs contrary to "market logic"[85].

In all fairness to Walnut Creek's city government, citizen opposition to residential rezoning is perhaps the most important stumbling block to a change in housing policies. Reacting to increased traffic and "big-city" growth, a local group, Citizens for a Better Walnut Creek, succeeded in putting a "slow-growth" initiative on the November 1985 ballot. Measure H, as the initiative was known, passed, putting a moratorium on all commercial and office projects larger than 3300 square metres and all residential housing with more than 30 units in the downtown area or 10 units in other sections of the city[86]. Measure H made the lifting of this moratorium contingent on a number of conditions, most importantly traffic improvements[87]. This was an unrealistic demand: acting on its own, the city had little means to relieve commuter traffic congestion. After some legal uncertainties as to the legality of Measure H, the state supreme court upheld it in 1987, forcing the city to make appropriate changes in its new general plan[88]. The Walnut Creek initiative has had important repercussions on local planning policies. "Slow growth" has become a political watchword for the preservation of neighbourhood identity, environmental quality, and a

84   Interview with Gary Binger, Chief Planner, City of Walnut Creek, 19 September, 1985.
85   Interview with Thomas Dunne, Manager, City of Walnut Creek, 19 August, 1985.
86   Andy Jokelson, Walnut Creek curbs growth, Oakland Tribune, 06 November, 1985.
87   Kathy Bodovitz, Walnut Creek Law's Influence on State, San Francisco Chronicle, 09 August,1988.
88   Andy Jokelson, Judge Throws out Walnut Creek's Growth Measure, Oakland Tribune, 20 January, 1987, and Kathy Bodovitz, op.cit.

"suburban" way of life. Using "direct democracy," citizens have turned to the referendum and initiative to force changes in municipal zoning and planning or to prevent their communities from growing at a rate considered inappropriate[89] .

Southern Contra Costa and northern Alameda county - especially the communities alongside Interstate Highway 680 - have become the latest area to experience rapid office space and commercial growth. Since 1980, the towns of San Ramon and Pleasanton have developed into regional employment centres in their own right.

The area around San Ramon, known as the San Ramon Valley, is one of the most affluent of the San Francisco Bay Area. Personal incomes in Danville and Alamo are among the highest in the SCSA and home prices hover well above the already inflated East Bay average[90]. This part of the county has always been an exclusive residential area: to a greater extent than elsewhere single-family homes on large lots characterise the local housing market. At the same time, the San Ramon Valley has grown rapidly in the last 20 years. Between 1970 and 1985, the municipality of San Ramon experienced a sixfold increase in population. Within the same period, neighbouring Pleasanton more than doubled in size.

Office space construction has intensified in the San Ramon Valley along the so-called I-680 corridor. By 1983, 4,600,000 square metres of office space were available in Pleasanton, while another 4,200,000 square metres had been built in the vicinity of San Ramon and Danville[91]. Two large projects, Bishop Ranch near San Ramon and Hacienda Business Park in Pleasanton, have become or will soon be major employment centres in the Bay Area. Hacienda Business Park, the larger of the two, is planned for completion by 2000 and will accommodate almost 4,000,000 square metres of office space and approximately 36,000 jobs[92]. Bishop Ranch, now built out, offers more than 2,000,000 square metres of office space and can accommodate a total of approximately 29,000 workers[93]. Its attractiveness has been enhanced by the presence of large corporations such as, Standard Oil and Pacific Bell Telephone. By September 1988, Bishop Ranch could boast of an enviable 9% vacancy rate[94] .

Ironically, this recent "boom" in office construction has occurred in a part of the Bay Area notorious for its exclusive zoning practises. Citizen opposition to Bishop Ranch and Hacienda Business Park was intense. Still, developers were able to use the fragmentation of regional planning authority to their advantage and get their projects built. In the case of Bishop Ranch, local entrepreneurs succeeded after much effort in convincing the County to allow quality office

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[89] See James Scott, Bürgerinitiativen gegen Wachstum. Direkte Demokratie und Kommunalpolitik in Kalifornien, Archiv für Kommunalwissenschaft, 29 (1), 1990, pp.50-69.

[90] Contra Costa County Planning Department, Economic Report for the Greater San Ramon Valley Planning Area, Martinez, 1984.

[91] Cynthia Kroll, Employment Growth and Office Space along the 680 Corridor: Booming Supply and Potential Demand in a Suburban Area, Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, Working Paper 84-75, Berkeley (University of California), 1984, p.7.

[92] Bradley Inman, Business Parks: the 2nd Wave is Coming, San Francisco Examiner, 18 September, 1988.

[93] Bradley Inman, How a Father and Son Led the Exodus form S.F., San Francisco Examiner, 25 September, 1988.

[94] Idem.

development in unincorporated - and therefore county administered - San Ramon Valley land[95]. One Contra Costa County supervisor explained later that the county was committed to employment growth in newer areas in order to minimise commuting and promote economic expansion, and therefore agreed to approve the Bishop Ranch proposal[96]. Against the will of the city of San Ramon and despite the bitter complaints of local homeowners, a 234 hectare area of unincorporated land bordering San Ramon's city limits was converted into a regional business park. In order to meet future housing demand, the communities on the I-680 corridor would have to greatly increase residential densities and allow more construction. This is not to be. Due to strong neighbourhood-level resistance, San Ramon, Pleasanton, Danville, and almost all municipalities in the region cannot or will not radically change zoning policies[97]. While San Ramon is not directly responsible for Bishop Ranch, Pleasanton has willfully refused to increase its housing stock to anticipate future demand generated by Hacienda Park's employment potential[98].

Continued zoning restrictions have intensified jobs/housing imbalances in the San Ramon Valley area. 1986 ABAG estimates prognosticated a shortage of 12,000 housing units by 1990. These figures have proven too optimistic: newer estimates foresee overall shortages of over 400,000 units in Alameda and Contra Costa County alone within the next ten years[99].

5.4.4.2   Expansion Continues Unabated

Continued economic expansion is creating new regional employment centres in the suburban areas of Contra Costa and Alameda counties. Housing, especially affordable housing, is not being produced in quantities and densities to satisfy demand in these areas. Local "slow-growth" movements, ever-increasing lot prices, and traditions of exclusive zoning have maintained the low-density, semi-rural character of most residential neighbourhoods.

The result is that renters and first time homebuyers must look farther and farther afield for suitable housing. Already by 1981 ABAG, the main official voice in favour of regional a jobs/housing balance, could testify to the problem

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[95] In the words of Larry Orman of People For Open Space, (in an interview on 21 September 1987), the county apparently believed that "realising developer's dreams was more important than balanced growth."

[96] Bradley Inman, op. cit.

[97] Interview with Eddie Peabody, Director of Planning, City of Danville, 24 September, 1985.

[98] Interview with Chandler Lee, Director of Planning, City of Pleasanton, 24 September, 1987.

[99] Frank Viviano, New Regional Spirit Springs Up in Bay Area, San Francisco Chronicle, 08 February, 1989.

" the core of the region is establishing housing at a rate substantially lower that ABAG's goals, while the outlying areas of East Contra Costa and South Santa Clara are exceeding those goals by 13 to 35 % ... too much housing is being constructed at the fringes of development, and not enough is being constructed closer in near jobs and already existing public services. In addition, a high percentage of the new construction in the two areas has been single-family housing[100]. "

The rural fringe has, in effect, opened itself up to urban development. For example, Byron, an unincorporated community located in southeast Contra Costa, and with less than 1000 inhabitants, applied in 1986 for radical zoning changes in anticipation of booming housing demand[101]. Other unincorporated communities of eastern Contra Costa, such as Discovery Bay, Oakley and West Pittsburg, have been identified by county planners as recent housing development "hot-spots" (see map). Together with the cities of Antioch, Brentwood, and Pittsburg, the East County accounted for almost one-third of total housing starts in Contra Costa between 1980 and 1986[102].

Table 9 Growth Prognoses for East County Communities

	1980	1984	1990	2000
Antioch	42,683	46,570	57,500	79,800
Brentwood	4,434	5,142	10,900	23,600
Oakley	7,089	9,200	15,200	n.a.
Pittsburg	33,034	38,595	53,100	56,600

Source: Oakland Tribune, 25 April, 1985.

Many farmers and other landowners in the East County are eager to sell their lands to developers. The county, unfortunately, has no real open space policy to prevent widescale conversion. In 1985 an attempt was made by the county to impose a building moratorium on 28 hectares of ranch lands. This measure, although merely intended to give county planners time to evaluate a variety of development proposals for the lot, was fought vigorously and eventually thrown out by the County Board of Supervisors[103].

Eastern Contra Costa is only one area of the greater Bay Area where rapid peripheral growth is occurring. Besides Santa Clara, the counties of Napa, Solano, and Sonoma are experiencing considerable housing development activity. Sonoma County, which grew by 16,5% between 1980 and 1987, will have a 2005 population of almost 500,000 according to ABAG and county

[100] ABAG, Housing Activity Report No.3, Oakland: ABAG, 1981, p.50.
[101] Tracy Butler, Byron Eager to Shed County Bumpkin Image for City Slicker, Contra Costa Times, 20 March, 1986.
[102] Contra Costa County Community Development Department, Growth Trends, 1987. (Prepared for the Comprehensive General Plan Review Program), Martinez: County of Contra Costa, 1987, pp. 49-53.
[103] Frank Wootten, East County Building Ban in the Works, Oakland Tribune, 25 September, 1985, and Board Rejects Building Ban in East County, Oakland Tribune, 23 October, 1985.

estimates[104]. Pressure has been put on small farm owners in Sonoma by the county government: present zoning policies are in the process of revision in order to eliminate "right-to-farm" clauses and thus expedite subdivision and urban development in unincorporated areas[105].

Furthermore, Bay Area suburbanisation has not stopped at the borders of the nine counties defined within the San Francisco SCSA. Manteca, Modesto, Ripon, Tracy, and other communities located in San Joaquin County, have become providers of housing for Bay Area workers within the last ten years. San Joaquin County lies within California's Central Valley and most of the communities affected by Bay Area "spillover" are a good 75-100 kilometres distant of Silicon Valley and the I-680 corridor[106]. Local planners attribute most of the recent population increases (see Table 10) to Bay Area demand for affordable housing[107].

Table 10   Bay Area "Overspill" and Population
            Growth in the Central Valley

	1980	1987
Manteca	24,925	37,000
Modesto	106,105	142,168
Patterson	3,900	6,000
Ripon	3,000	6,500
Tracy	18,428	27,294
Turlock	29,291	34,750

Source: US Population Census, 1980; California
Department of Finance estimates for January, 1987.

5.4.4.3   Renewal of the Core

True to U.S.-American patterns, social problems. ethnic conflicts, and redevelopment burden are primarily concentrated in San Francisco and the Oakland area. Unfortunately, the interests of the Bay Area's older cities are not well represented on a regional level. This is not due to a purposeful discrimination of the core area as such, but rather to a lack of ability to influence industrial location decisions within the region and the impossibility of redistributing tax revenues among suburbs and central cities. Furthermore, the central cities are burdened by obsolete infrastructure, large areas with old substandard housing, and the basic problem of generating new industrial employment. San Francisco has been fortunate as a result of its burgeoning service sector and importance as a financial centre and corporate location, although this has not helped all

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[104] Jay Gamel, County Growth Debated, 11 August 1989, Sonoma Index-Tribune.
[105] Ron Sonenshine, New Pressures on Sonoma County Farms, 16 January, 1989.
[106] See Cynthia Kroll, Metropolitan Spillover and California's Central Valley, Institute of Business and Economic Research, Working Paper 85-106, Berkeley (University of California), 1985.
[107] John Flinn, Bay Area Spreads into Valley, San Francisco Examiner, 19 July, 1987.

socio-economic groups in the city. However, Oakland and other core area communities (e.g.
Emeryville and Richmond) have not been able to find a new economic role to compensate for job
loss in manufacturing and in the commercial sector (retailing).

San Francisco's political and business élite recognised already in the 1940's that aggressive
redevelopment - particularly in modernising industrial zones, expanding the financial core and
making residential areas more attractive - would be essential if the city were to compete with new
suburban communities for employment and population[108]. Starting in 1948, city council began
designating specific "blighted" districts for redevelopment. The first neighbourhood to be affected
was the Western Addition, a largely black section close to San Francisco's downtown. However,
redevelopment of older residential neighbourhoods floundered due to legal and financial
uncertainties; when redevelopment programmes began in earnest in the latter half of the 1960s,
they sparked off violent reactions which sent political shock waves through the city[109]. Several
large redevelopment projects initiated in San Francisco's core area have included high-density
residential zones, new shopping complexes, hotels, and a considerable expansion of the
downtown financial district. An interurban freeway network was begun that, among other aims,
would have connected the Bay and Golden Gate Bridges. Before local opposition stopped freeway
construction, several hundred acres of inner-city land had been eliminated.

In pursuing revenue enhancing redevelopment, San Francisco has greatly expanded its
downtown office core. The "blighted" area south of Market street, has more recently been
targeted for office space development, and in conjunction with the controversial Yerba Buena
project, accommodates a convention centre and a large hotel complex. Between 1965 and 1983
more than 12,000,000 square metres of office space had been built in downtown San Francisco.
Planning forecasts estimated that by the year 2000 another 8,000,000 could be added to the
downtown core[110]. San Francisco's redevelopment strategy has been aimed at maintaining a
competitive edge over suburban office locations. While this strategy has succeeded in helping to
secure the city's office sector pre-eminence, it has not prevented the exodus of several
corporations - most notably Bank of America, Pacific Bell Telephone and Chevron USA. At the
same time, citizens' movements against downtown growth have capped office space development.
An initiative passed in 1985 limits the amount of allowable office construction to 320,000 square
metres a year.

Attempts were made by local business interests to enhance downtown San Francisco's
locational attractiveness and accessibility through the promotion of a regional rapid transit
system. The Bay Area Council, an organisation representing the city's most prominent firms,
lobbied state and local governments for political and financial support of the idea[111]. While the
idea of a nine-county Bay Area Rapid Transit or BART system won the support of state

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[108] See Mel Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area. A Metropolis in Perspective, Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1985 second edition), pp.288-289.

[109] See John Mollenkopf, op.cit., pp.180-190.

[110] San Francisco Department of City Planning, The Downtown Plan, San Francisco: The City and County
of San Francisco, 1983,p.8.

[111] John Mollenkopf, p.159.

legislators and regional organisations, such as ABAG, many county and municipal officials were suspicious that a transit system centred on San Francisco would disadvantage their areas[112]. The acceptance of BART required a popular referendum in each of the counties which would have been served by the system. Marin and San Mateo counties were not very supportive and eventually rejected BART. In the end, the BART system served only three Bay Area counties: San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa[113] .

5.4.4.4   Prospects for Regional Problem-Solving in the Bay Area

Continuous peripheral growth poses severe limits the solution of environmental, fiscal, traffic, urban service and other regional problems. ABAG has warned that if trends continue, commuting from peripheral areas into the San Francisco Bay Area SCSA will increase eightfold by 2005[114]. If these estimates are to be trusted, more than 235,000 persons will be on Bay Area highways *in addition* to those commuting within the Bay Area. This would bring traffic to a general standstill. Basic services such as, as primary education and firefighting, have not been able to keep up with growth-generated demand. Communities, strapped for revenues, have increasingly turned to developer fees as a way of paying for schools[115]. Despite rapidly increasing populations in the Bay Area, firefighting capacities have not been extended. Growth has outstripped Contra Costa's ability to pay for and staff local fire departments[116]. Growth in peripheral areas is also hurting established transit systems. BART, a heavy rail system centred on San Francisco's downtown, has been losing ridership due to a shift in commuting activity eastwards[117]. Expanding suburban employment hubs have also affected East Bay bus systems and transbay bridge districts, depriving them of important market shares[118] .

Accompanying, and directly related to these problems, are the issues of sprawl, housing shortages, air and water quality, and the general livability of the metropolitan region. Up to now, attempts to deal with metropolitan problems have been fragmented and limited in scope. Local planning and plebiscitary efforts to control growth have rarely addressed regional issues and have often "exported" development pressure to other communities[119]. However, indications are

[112] Information supplied by Stanley Scott, op.cit.
[113] Ibid. The BART issue hinged on a 1/2 cent sales tax increase in the counties to be served. Marin and San Mateo saw this as subsidising a project that would benefit the central city at the their expense.
[114] Roland de Wolk, Study: Housing Crunch to Create Commuter Nightmare by 2005, Oakland Tribune, 13 February, 1987.
[115] Richard Colvin, The Classroom Building Room: Developers Balk at Paying the Tab. Oakland Tribune, 01 March, 1987.
[116] Michael Taylor, Growing Burden of Firefighters, San Francisco Chronicle, 18 November, 1985.
[117] Benjamin Seto, Corporate Migration Hurting Bay Area Transit, Oakland Tribune, 21 September, 1986.
[118] Ibid.
[119] See James Scott, op. cit., pp.18-20, for a short documentation of the effects of Petaluma's housing construction limits.

mounting that the scope of urban problems in the Bay Area is breaking down political resistance to regional cooperation.

Despite the failure to achieve a degree of regional planning coordination, much less metropolitan governance, attempts to establish a Bay Area-wide agenda for transportation, open space, housing, water supply and other urban issues have intensified. These efforts are largely local initiatives, spearheaded either by lobbies, such as the Greenbelt Alliance, or voluntary commissions made up of public officials and private citizens. Members of the business community has also been active in publicising regional issues and supporting greater planning cooperation. The Bay Area Council, represented by almost 300 corporations, supports the philosophy that comprehensive land-use planning and housing policies are in the self-interest of private enterprise as they can help maintain a well-functioning and attractive economic environment[120]. In Santa Clara County, major manufacturers have formed a task force dealing with transportation, housing, and other regional problems. In addition to the activities of non-governmental groups, it appears that interlocal cooperation based on negotiation may promote area-wide planning in rapidly growing parts of the Bay Area.

Bay Vision 2020, a new voluntary *regionalist* association, exemplifies this change of attitude. The membership of Bay Vision 2020 is composed of business leaders, academics, public servants, planning professionals, and other experts on regional problems. Local particularism has no place in the work of the Bay Vision commission as elected officials do not directly participate[121]. The first commission meeting took place in December, 1989. By the end of 1990, Bay Vision will present a report documenting possible futures for the San Francisco Bay Area and recommendations for the maintenance of a livable and economically viable region. In a sense, Bay Vision 2020 duplicates regionalist attempts spearheaded by ABAG and local politicians in the 60s and 70s. At no other time, however, has a similar degree of consensus existed between rival interests (e.g. environmentalists, local politicians, government officials, developers, and business representatives) as to the necessity of effective regional problem-solving[122] .

At the same time, intermunicipal cooperation on traffic issues has begun to show some promise. Recognising that community development patterns have spillover effects on neighbouring areas, several cities have discussed possible zoning changes to limit job growth[123]. In 1987, a measure was passed in Alameda County authorising a 1/2 cent sales tax increase for transit improvements. The revenues generated by this tax are divided up by subareas and jointly administered by municipal governments. This has forced communities to talk to each other on traffic. abatement and development issues[124]. Local planners see in tax-sharing a vehicle for expanded cooperation on a variety of regional matters. Generally, though, such measures are

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[120] Interview with Brigitte Le Blanc of the Bay Area Council, San Francisco, 02 September 1985.
[121] N.N., Creating a Vision of Region's Future, Oakland Tribune, 11 January 1990.
[122] Frank Viviano, op.cit.
[123] David Newdorf, Four CC Towns to Discuss Traffic, Contra Costa Times, 02 March 1982.
[124] Interview with Chandler Lee, Planning Director, City of Pleasanton, 24 September 1987.

restricted to the county level: As yet no regional administrative entity in the Bay Area possesses taxing authorities within all nine counties.

Another regionalist perspective has materialised in the form of negotiated interlocal agreements based on compromise between developers, municipal officials, citizens, regional, and, if necessary, senior governments. So-called Multiple Advocacy approaches to metropolitan problem-solving have been analysed by planners at San Jose State University[125]. Don Rothblatt has cited the relatively successful attempt of Silicon Valley business interests (represented by the Santa Clara County Manufacturing Group) in persuading municipalities to address the jobs/housing imbalance[126]. ABAG and another regional agency, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, have also demonstrated an ability to reconcile contending interests in Santa Clara County. The approval of a light rail system centred on San Jose's downtown as well as intermunicipal agreement on other transit improvements was engineered by these two bodies[127]. Such strategic negotiation based on public-private partnerships and compromise would seem to function well within the fragmented U.S.-American metropolis.

However, even enthusiastic supporters of "Multiple Advocacy" approaches warn that they are no substitute for centralised regional planning. Without clear leadership - i.e. an active state role - many regional problems will continue to be addressed in a piecemeal manner and, at best, on a subregional level[128].

In conclusion, it appears reasonable to speculate that the overwhelming problems facing the Bay Area (as well as other metropolitan areas in the U.S.) will force local governments to accept stronger regional government. As environmental concerns mount and traditional approaches to environmental protection flounder, the state government will need to assume a greater and more comprehensive regulatory role. Don Rothblatt has conjectured that, at least in this respect, urban areas in the United States might even become more like their European counterparts[129]. American local governments may have to be dragged "kicking and screaming" into a system of metropolitan governance and planning, but if this proves necessary, accept it they must.

5.5   SOME OBSERVATIONS ON SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: AN EXEMPLARY FAILURE OF METROPOLITAN REGIONALISM

The urban areas that have developed around the southern California cities of San Diego and Los Angeles, are extreme examples of recent metropolitan expansion in the United States. More so than in the case of San Francisco, federally subsidised capital projects, freeway construction, and

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[125] Donald Rothblatt, Planning the Metropolis: The Multiple Advocacy Approach, New York: Praeger, 1982.
[126] Interview with Don Rothblatt, Urban and Regional Planning Department, San Jose State University, 12 October, 1989.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Rebecca Truden, The Incentives and Disincentives for Regionalism: A Case Study of the Golden Triangle Task Force, Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley, December 1989.
[129] Interview with Don Rothblatt, op.cit.

rapid economic growth have helped produce an urban realm dominated by suburban communities. The issue of growth management and regional problem-solving has been no less salient in Southern California than it has in the San Francisco Bay Area. Indeed, concentrated in the six urbanised counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Diego, San Bernadino, and Ventura are over 15,000,000 people - more than half of California's total population.

The history of urban development in Southern California is much too complex and varied to be dealt with here. However, certain features of recent urban growth in this vast region should be mentioned.

The city of Los Angeles and its surrounding areas began to experience rapid growth already in the 1920s. Between 1920 and 1930, the population of Los Angeles County grew from 936,000 to 2,208,000[130]. The discovery of oil, the availability of water (thanks to Mulholland's Los Angeles aqueduct), a pleasant climate, and the city's strategic location as a West Coast port all contributed to this boom[131]. The completion of massive water projects also allowed Los Angeles to physically expand well into the 1940s through the annexation of adjacent areas. Hopes for the establishment of effective regional planning were high in the 1920s, but planning attempts could not keep pace with actual development. Growth was explosive and occurred in an erratic manner. Los Angeles's expansion foreshadowed the problems regional governance would experience in southern California. Rapid employment and population growth, coupled with speculative development, and a severe fragmentation of planning authority appear to have made low-density sprawl an inevitability.

Mel Scott has adequately summed up the situation

> " the combination of unprecedented immigration, excessive real estate speculation, and the necessity of expending enormous sums just to provide highways, sewers, storm drains, schools, and other essentials almost inevitably shattered the great expectations of the planners. Before they could prepare zoning ordinances, get-rich-quick developers opened residential subdivisions in some areas that might more appropriately have been used for manufacturing, and industrialists pounced on acreage that should have been given over to homes. Fields that should have been saved for parks were cut up into small lots and sold...The whole coastal plain developed with such a low density of population that investors lost interest in a rail rapid transit system[132]."

Los Angeles's neighbour to the south, San Diego, began to expand with the advent of World War II and the increasing military importance of southern California. Aerospace industries, naval and air force facilities, and electronics led San Diego's postwar "boom[133]." Growth accelerated in

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[130] Mel Scott, American City Planning, op.cit., p.208.
[131] See Peter Wiley and Robert Gottlieb, op.cit., pp. 104-110.
[132] Mel Scott, op.cit., pp. 209-210.
[133] City of San Diego Planning Department, Background Summary: City of San Diego Growth Management Program, San Diego: City of San Diego, 1986, p.3.

the 1960s as suburban development intensified in peripheral areas of the city and in unincorporated areas of the county.

The Counties surrounding southern California's two core cities - in particular Orange and San Bernadino - were not long in following the trend of rapid suburbanisation. During the 1950s, residential development in northern Orange County and western San Bernadino County exploded as the construction industry met booming demand for single-family homes near jobs in Los Angeles. FHA housing loans coupled with the completion of a vast metropolitan freeway network fuelled this urban expansion[134].

Table 11	Population Growth in Southern California, 1920 - 1960				
Counties	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960
Los Angeles	936,455	2,208,492	2,785,643	4,151,687	6,038,771
San Diego	112,248	209,659	289,348	556,808	1,033,011
Orange	61,375	118,674	130,760	216,224	703,925
San Bernadino	73,401	133,900	161,108	281,642	503,591
Riverside	50,297	81,024	105,524	170,046	306,191
Ventura	28,724	54,976	69,685	114,647	199,138

Source; U.S. Population Census, 1940 and 1960.

By 1965, Richard Preston could speak of a "giant, sprawling, super-city" in Southern California, made up of six dominant urban "cores", and countless smaller municipalities[135]. The cores identified by Preston were: Santa Barbara, Ventura-Oxnard, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove, San Bernadino-Riverside, and San Diego.

5.5.1   Some Contradictions of Rapid Growth

The reasons for Southern California's spectacular development are multifarious. Many of these reasons relate to the so-called Sun-Belt factor in which national growth patterns have shifted in favour of Western states. Indeed, much has been made of the fact that Sunbelt growth has accompanied the decline of traditional industrial regions in America's Northeast. Federal capital investment projects, in particular dams, aqueducts, and freeways, the rise of new defence and aerospace industries, aggressive local "boosterism" and, as a cumulative result, mass inmigration from other areas of the nation, were instrumental in facilitating this new urban growth[136].

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[134]   See Edward P. Eichler and Marshall Kaplan, The Community Builders, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967.

[135]   Richard E. Preston, Urban Development in Southern California Between 1940 and 1965, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 58 (Sept/Oct.), 1967, pp. 237-254.

[136]   See Alfred J. Watkins and David C. Perry, Regional Change and the Impact of Uneven Urban Development, in David C. Perry and Alfred J. Watkins (eds.), The Rise of the Sunbelt Cities, Beverly Hills and London: Sage, 1977, pp.19-54, for a critical analysis of Sunbelt growth.

However, the prosperity and economic vitality of Southern California does not hide the fact that its urban expansion has also been characterised by socio-economic disparities, central city decline, environmental degradation and many other all-too-typical metropolitan problems. Pockets of poverty have developed in core areas of Los Angeles, Long Beach and San Diego. The downtowns of Los Angeles and Long Beach have also suffered a dramatic decline that has only been partially compensated by commercial and office redevelopment projects.

In the meantime, the most aggravating concerns to suburban inhabitants of this vast region are traffic congestion, air pollution, and loss of community identity. Local opinion polls show that the a majority of Southern Californians - particularly those who live in more affluent communities - are in favour of restricting growth[137] .

Despite Southern California's stereotypical image of representing all that is new and dynamic in America, it has adhered stubbornly to very old traditions of local political autonomy and planning sovereignty. Thus, the urban regions around Los Angeles, Long Beach, and San Diego present a jurisdictional map that is as fragmented and balkanised as anything in the Northeastern United States. Attempts to manage expansive growth are almost exclusively limited to the local level where either city council ordinances or citizen initiatives have established construction moratoria, permit quotas, and density restrictions.

Table 12   Population Growth in Southern California Counties, 1980 - 1987

County	population increase 1980 - 1987	% increase	population 1987
Los Angeles	926,100	12.4	8,403,500
San Diego	378,900	20.3	2,240,700
Orange	260,700	13.5	2,193,600
San Bernadino	272,200	30.4	1,167,200
Riverside	223,000	33.6	886,200
Ventura	90,100	17.0	619,300
Total	2,151,000	16.1	15,510,500

Source: U.S. Population Census, 1980; California Department of Finance estimates, 1987. Figures rounded to the nearest 100.

Increasingly, new growth is shifting towards peripheral areas of urbanised counties in Southern California. Towns such as Walnut and Palmdale in northern Los Angeles County, and Victorville and Palm Desert in Riverside County are among the fastest growing communities in California[138]. New Community projects, such as the so-called California Springs development in Los Angeles County, are either in planning stages or under construction. When completed, California Springs will accommodate 35,000 homes and 24,000,000 square feet of commercial and office space[139].

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[137] According to San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) (Board of Directors Agenda Report No.R-75 of July, 1987) 75% of residents in the Greater San Diego region believe growth is occurring too fast. However, only 27% thought that government should actively limit development.

[138] Tim Schreiner, California's Suburban Cities Taking the Lead in Growth, San Francisco Chronicle, 11 June 1986.

[139] Dick Turpin, Self Contained Town Planned, Los Angeles Times, 26 February, 1989,

The development, located about 100 miles to the north of Los Angeles, is conceived as a self-contained, self-financing enterprise.

5.5.2 The Fragmentation of Metropolitan Growth Management: Municipal Strategies to Regulate Development

As in the case of the San Francisco Bay Area, the lack of regional coordination in land-use planning has provoked a multitude of local responses to urban growth. Although limits on new housing, commercial, and industrial development are usually engineered by local governments, they are increasingly being imposed through popular initiatives and local referenda - the product of citizen opposition to rapid change and traffic congestion[140]. In 1988, 21 such initiatives were voted on in Southern California; of these 10 were contested in San Diego County, 6 in Orange County, 3 in Riverside County, and 1 in Ventura County[141].

While not all citizen initiatives have been successful, their proliferation is symptomatic of a "slow-growth" sentiment that it sweeping California and several other states. Most such initiatives have been initiated in well-established suburban areas. However, they have been also frequently used in the core areas of Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco. The "slow-growth" issue has, in fact, recently generated severe political conflict in the Los Angeles area. Thomas Bradley, the city's black "pro-growth" mayor, has actively pursued a policy of commercial and office space intensification not only in the downtown but in several of Los Angeles's local communities. This policy has provoked angry reactions from many of the more affluent, and predominantly white, neighbourhoods[142]. In November 1986, Proposition U, the so-called reasonable growth initiative, was accepted by Los Angeles' electorate. This measure has succeeded in reducing commercial and industrial development although its ostensible goal, the limitation of traffic congestion, will almost certainly not be achieved[143]. Sponsored by wealthy West Los Angeles communities, the reasonable growth measure has been met with hostility in poorer areas of the city, such as Watts and Inglewood. Representatives of these communities have complained that growth control is a luxury that only rich areas can afford; in the black neighbourhoods of Los Angeles, employment growth is seen as the only solution to grave social and economic problems[144].

The initiatives conundrum underscores the fact that coordinated, long-range planning has been stymied by an extreme fragmentation of the land-use decision-making process. Too many local governments are involved, the number of which is increasing as peripheral communities opt for

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[140] See James Scott, Bürgerinitiativen gegen Städtewachstum, op.cit., pp.57-59.

[141] N.N., Growth Battles: Results in Four States, Initiative and Referendum: The Power of the People, Winter 1989, p.4.

[142] William Boyarsky, State's Urban Areas Come of Age, California Journal, October 1987, pp.480-484.

[143] Interview with Jene McKnight, Planner, Los Angeles County Planning Department, 26 August, 1987.

[144] Dean Murphy, Poverty Areas, Slow-Growth Advocates Not Natural Allies, Los Angeles Times, 01 August 1988.

incorporation. The regional Council of Governments, SCAG (Southern California Association of Governments), is a six-county body representing widely diverging interests. As a result, SCAG's ability to generate regional planning consensus is severely limited[145]. Riverside and San Bernadino Counties, for example, have been experiencing "1960s-style" rapid growth (see Table 12) primarily in large-scale residential subdivision development. These areas are becoming new bedroom communities of Los Angeles and particularly of West Los Angeles County, where employment is concentrated[146]. Representatives of new "boom" communities such as San Bernadino and Fontana are unequivocally "pro-growth" and unwilling to submit the development ambitions of their cities to regional planning dictates. SCAG have recognised the political realities of the land-use planning process and have taken a "realistic" stance towards their coordinating activities. Realising that they cannot influence development policies at the regional level, SCAG do not attempt to limit growth but rather channel it in ways that allow for a better jobs/housing distribution, improved air quality, and less freeway congestion[147]. Figure 3 indicates that great regional disparities in development activity exist. The jobs/housing imbalance is exacerbated by the vast extension of Southern California's commuter belt.

Southern California's urban counties have not played a decisive regional planning role. Only one county, that of San Diego, has adopted a growth management plan aimed at timing the pace of industrial and residential development[148]. Both the counties of San Diego and Orange attempted to fuse municipal and county planning authorities in 1988. Submitted to the voters in the form of initiatives, these county-level regional planning propositions were defeated. In a study of these ambitious planning initiatives, Mark Baldassare confirmed that despite the gravity of traffic congestion and other growth-related problems, stubborn traditions of local autonomy and a fear of regional "superagencies" doomed both county proposals[149].

5.5.3 Conflicts in Growth Management: The City of San Diego and its County

The city of San Diego has been quite innovative in the areas of urban growth management. Continuous suburban growth coupled with increasing service demands, particularly for the provision of school facilities, severely taxed the financial resources of the city and special districts. This led to a reevaluation of city planning policies in the 1970s, culminating in the so-called Growth Management Programme[150]. San Diego's Growth Management scheme was not designed to stop residential growth but to *time* it in accordance with the availability of

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[145] Interview with John Oshimo, Senior Planner, Southern California Association of Governments, 25 July 1988.
[146] Interview with Jene McKnight, op.cit.
[147] Interview with John Oshimo, op.cit.
[148] SANDAG, op.cit., p.5.
[149] Mark Baldassare, Citizen Support for Regional Government in the New Suburbia, Urban Affairs Quarterly, 25(1), 1989, pp.460-469. Reference to *superagencies* mine.
[150] City of San Diego Planning Department, Background Summary, op.cit., pp.11-13.

Figure 3 Jobs-Housing Balance in Southern California (SCAG Planning Area)
New dormitory suburb areas are in black. Western Riverside and San Bernadino
Counties are particularly active.
Source: SCAG, 1984.

urban services and to assure the maintenance of open space reserves within the city. At the same time, the core area - or Centre City as planners have named it - was to be vigorously redeveloped at higher densities[151]. The Growth Management concept was formally incorporated into San Diego's General Plan in 1979.

In executing growth management, San Diego planners have divided the city into three areas - the urbanised, planned urbanising, and future urban zones. The Future Urbanising Area represents a large undeveloped section of the city that is to remain an agricultural preserve until housing needs necessitate the subdivision of new land. In the Planned Urbanising zone, residential construction is permitted under the condition that new services and public facilities be financed and maintained largely by revenues generated from development activities. This liberates the city from additional servicing burdens and frees up moneys for use in core area renewal[152]. Indeed, San Diego has invested considerable effort in creating new housing opportunities and reinvigorating retail activity in the downtown area. The Centre City Development Corporation has planned several large housing projects, both at market rates and subsidised for low-income individuals[153]. However, the much publicised Horton Plaza is the centrepiece of downtown redevelopment. This retail complex has attracted four major department stores and a multitude of smaller shops into the core area, thereby giving downtown San Diego an important competitive edge against suburban shopping malls[154]. Redevelopment also involves several prestigious hotel projects and a convention centre.

The timing of new residential development coupled with strategic renewal has worked relatively well in San Diego. Unfortunately San Diego's example has not always been followed either by other cities in the county of San Diego or by the county government itself. The issue of fiscal zoning has emerged in explaining the county's relatively lax policy on industrial development permits. Strapped for operating funds, the county has been reluctant to extend services to areas which show little promise in generating substantial revenues[155]. This has meant a policy directed towards facilitating industrial growth, often just outside the San Diego city boundaries. For this reason, conflict has ensued between the county and San Diego over growth policies[156]. The city has criticised the county's permissive and often inefficient handling of development planning. Furthermore, as the county is not able or willing to improve urban services to residential areas, communities have been given an incentive to incorporate and take matters in their own hands[157]. In all fairness it must be mentioned that the county has tried to promote the coordination of municipal and its own development policies. In addition, the county

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[151] Ibid, p.14.
[152] Ibid, p.15.
[153] George A. Colburn, San Diego: Beyond Spit and Polish, Planning, 51(11), November 1985, p.10.
[154] Laura Evenson, San Diego. Glittery New Shopping Mall the Key to Redevelopment in this Downtown, Oakland Tribune, 21 July 1987.
[155] City of San Diego Planning Department, Background Summary, op.cit., pp.30-31.
[156] Interview with Ken Sulzer, Executive Director of San Diego Association of Governments, 18 August 1987.
[157] Interview with Glen Sparrow, Professor of Urban Planning, San Diego State University, 18 August 1987.

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Figure 4   San Diego Urban Region (City and County)
Source: SANDAG, 1984.

North County -- West (4)

East County (6)

North County -- East (5)

11

16

1

14

6

12

4

North City (1)

13

15   East Suburban (3)

5

Cities

1 Carlsbad
2 Chula Vista
3 Coronado
4 Del Mar
5 El Cajon
6 Escondido
7 Imperial Beach
8 La Mesa
9 Lemon Grove
10 National City
11 Oceanside
12 Poway
13 San Diego
14 San Marcos
15 Santee
16 Vista

8

Central (0)

9

10

3

2

7   South Suburban (2)

**SAN DIEGO REGION
INCORPORATED AREAS AND
MAJOR STATISTICAL AREAS**

— **Major Statistical Areas**

has "lobbied" for the creation of a regional growth management plan containing provisions for revenue redistribution[158]. Despite ongoing efforts to strengthen regional planning in San Diego county, growth management remains a local matter, dealt with in different ways by individual communities. The San Diego Association of Governments has been a visible supporter of regional cooperation and serves as a forum for interlocal conflict-solving. Lacking police powers, however, SANDAG cannot impose any planning guidelines or development requirements on any local government. Furthermore, no one can control events outside of San Diego county, where residential growth has accelerated in recent years. Indeed, it appears that new Riverside County communities like Rancho California, California Oaks, and Rancho Viejo together with older towns, such as Temecula, will provide a vast supply of low-density housing for people employed in the San Diego area. Located alongside Interstate Highway 15, these communities are well placed to absorb excess housing demand. As in the case of the San Francisco Bay Area and Greater Los Angeles, peripheral urban expansion will magnify the extent of metropolitan problems but, at the same time, will fragment further the land use decision-making process.

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[158] Interview with Kaare Kjos, Chief of Planning Division, County of San Diego, 20 July 1988.

6. METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA

Until the post-war period, land use planning in Canada was by and large a local matter. As in the United States, municipal zoning had remained the only planning tool developed to any real extent although, as mentioned earlier, provincial legislation and a somewhat more restrictive interpretation of property rights allowed, at least theoretically, for more forceful land use regulation. The burgeoning urban problems caused by rapid growth after 1945 elicited a reappraisal of the planning process. Robinson has indicated that during the post-war years, provincial governments appear to have responded to new planning challenges by reclaiming crucial powers over land use originally given them by the British North American Act but subsequently delegated to municipal governments[1]. One of the principal means instituted to control metropolitan area development was the establishment of regional administration.

Provincial governments have played a decisive role in this development. Starting in the 1970s provincial governments initiated legislation expressly designed to regulate agricultural and fringe land conversion and institutionalise regional planning. The federal government, while constitutionally limited in its planning powers, also helped put urban area problems on the political agenda and established various programmes addressing inner-city redevelopment, housing, and revenue disparities.

6.1 RECENT URBAN POLICY IN CANADA

In 1944, Canada's federal government released the Curtis Report which urged the need for direct government intervention in housing and social and physical planning to compensate for past neglect of various urban problems[2]. Among other means, this was to be achieved, through slum clearance and the assembly of urban land for new development. One of the programmes established in the wake of the Curtis Report was the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (the name later changed to Canadian Mortgage and Housing). The CMHC was created in to increase the availability of mortgage credit and subsidise low-cost housing. As elsewhere, after years of depression and war-rationing pent-up housing demand in Canada called for a prompt policy response. Similar to the case of FHA legislation in the United States, easy housing credit and mortgage insurance programmes stimulated the construction industry and fuelled rapid suburban growth in Canada's major metropolitan centres[3].

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[1] Ira M. Robinson, Trends in Provincial Land Planning, Control, and Management. in William T.Parks and Ira M. Robinson (eds.), Urban and Regional Planning in a Federal State. New York: McGraw- Hill, 1979. pp.204-227.

[2] Matthew J. Kiernan, "Urban Planning in Canada: A Synopsis and some Future Directions," in Plan Canada (30)1 January 1990. pp.11-22.

[3] Ibid, p.12

Between 1945 and 1964 there was a strong federal commitment to homeownership but public housing programmes suffered from poor intergovernmental cooperation. The 1944 National Housing Act, its amendment in 1954, and review in 1964 were based on the assumption that a federal-provincial-local partnership would be sufficient in sharing the costs of housing provision[4]. Unfortunately, the provinces were inexperienced in defining housing policy as they were relative newcomers to the business of urban development. Municipalities, on the other hand, had to deal not only with stiff neighbourhood opposition to "slum clearance" and public housing but also with the huge financial burdens of providing urban services[5]. By Trudeau's victory in 1968, this traditional approach to low-income housing had fallen from grace - only 5% of annual housing starts were attributable to public housing. Thus, a flurry of federal and provincial activity in urban development - particularly in housing programmes - followed. This was evidenced by Ottawa's attempt to strengthen and clarify its urban development role by creating a Minister of State for Urban Affairs in 1971. At the same time, the provinces, most notably Ontario, enacted a wide range of housing and neighbourhood improvement legislation.

With regard to the inner-cities, legislation of the 1940s and 1950s concentrated on clearance-style urban renewal in which older housing made way for low-income developments of generally much higher unit densities[6]. Efforts to promote the economic reinvigoration of downtown areas were intensified. Municipal, provincial, and federal aid succeeded in attracting vast amounts of private investment into inner-city areas. Thus the intrinsic value of downtown locations helped compensate for the pull of suburban areas. For a time, the demolition of old neighbourhoods, often in connection with large capital investment projects in transportation infrastructure (e.g. expressways), was increasingly emphasised as the supply of buildable urban land dried up. This approach was abandoned, however, as local resistance to clearance and "densification" grew. Perhaps learning from the negative experiences with freeway revolts and from the disastrous results of redevelopment in the U.S., Canadian cities chose to minimise transformation by clearance of the urban fabric.

Canadian planning legislation and practise evolved dramatically during the 1970s, acquiring a definite environmentalist quality and emphasising more comprehensive approaches to land use regulation. "Bulldozer"-style urban renewal was in disrepute, making way for citizen participation and neighbourhood-level planning[7]. Meanwhile, there was an increasing concern with the urban fringe and rapid suburban growth. Perhaps again learning from developments in the U.S., Canadian politicians and planners intensified efforts to control sprawl and the loss of open space.

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4   Albert Rose, Housing Policy in Canada, 1940 - 1968, Toronto: Butterworths, 1980, pp. 29-41.
5   Ibid, p.32.
6   Idem.
7   See Frank Lewinberg, "Neighbourhood Planning: the Reform years in Toronto," in : Plan Canada, 27 (2), 1987, pp.40-45.

6.1.1 Provincial Legislation and Planning Priorities

Until the 1950s and 1960s, the provincial governments' planning and land use control responsibilities basically concerned the following:[8]

a) the enactment of Planning Acts establishing the guidelines for municipal land use planning,
b) land use and subdivision plans in unincorporated areas,
c) the establishment of Municipal Boards with which to review and approve local land use plans,
d) enabling legislation for the creation of regional bodies charged with land use planning and service delivery and, in some cases (e.g. Ontario), subdivision plans, zoning by-laws, and official plans,
e) provision of infrastructure and major facilities such as, roads, water supply, sewerage, etc.,
f) the control of public (Crown) lands and forest and mineral resources.

Despite this impressive catalogue of administrative responsibilities, it was felt that, in addition, certain kinds of provincial jurisdictional competency would have to be emphasised to deal with land issues that involved environmental quality and the protection of agriculture. Qadeer argues that since 1970 two overriding trends have characterised land use control in Canada[9]. The first is a more interdependent and global (i.e. regional and national) municipal planning outlook. The second, and obviously more controversial, trend relates to the "social meaning of land" that appears to be evolving together with changing forms of urban living and the increasing dependency of private land upon public services. Indeed, in the 1970s there was a clear reorientation of Canadian planning practise, buttressed by new provincial legislation, took place. A spate of environmental and land use acts followed (see Table 13), targeted at rural areas, the protection of parks and urban open space, and the maintenance of environmental quality.

While in the United States a considerable body of environmental legislation was also enacted, it did not really touch upon the issue of urban fringe land and the protection of agricultural lands. The Canadian provinces, on the other hand, have been quite active in the area of land use regulation, and, in one form or another, have instituted land reserve legislation.

Canadian provincial legislation of the 1970s was revolutionary in creating a framework for comprehensive regional planning and establishing land reserves as a tool of urban and rural

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[8]   Ira M. Robinson, op.cit.
[9]   Mohammed Qadeer, The Evolving Land Tenure System in Canada, Report No.10, Institute of Urban Studies (University of Winnipeg), 1985, pp.33-34.

planning. This was accompanied by a rethinking of municipal planning practise, in which the community or neighbourhood unit became a primary focus.

Qadeer writes,

> "the concern that underlined Canadian urban practise in the 1970s was the dissatisfaction with the urban fringe. Issue of strip development, the diffusion of bungalows in the countryside, excessive service demands arising from inefficient forms of development, and despoiling of amenities dominated the regional planning agenda. While the peripheries were suffering problems of uncoordinated development, city centres were being transformed into highrise fortresses of condos and offices. Neighbourhoods were gentrified, and low-income housing squeezed out[10]".

If the 1970s were characterised by a rebirth in provincial interest in land use control and municipal affairs, they also witnessed an inability of federal government initiative to establish a *national* urban policy. The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, created by Ottawa in 1971, was to act as a coordinator of provincial planning legislation, administrator of urban programmes, and as a research and information office on planning issues. From its inception, however, the provinces viewed the MSUA with great suspicion, fearing an erosion of their authority over municipal affairs. Recognising the intractability of provincial resistance to a national planning role, the federal government disbanded the MSUA in 1979[11]. This also marked an end to federal attempts to apply financial leverage on the provinces through planning and general development grants. To this day, almost all federal transfers to the provinces are made unconditionally. The provinces, in turn, are responsible for the formulation of urban development programmes.

In Canadian municipal affairs the weak federal presence has contrasted sharply with the increasingly regulatory and bureaucratic attitude of the provincial governments. It is difficult to determine to what extent local government autonomy has been curtailed by recent provincial legislation. Undoubtedly, the review process and establishment of regional development guidelines have subjected community land use planning to close provincial scrutiny. The case of Alberta is a clear illustration. After the 1971 elections, in which the Progressive Conservatives defeated the "laissez-faire" oriented Social Credit Party, concepts of "balanced growth" and controlled development began to dominate urban planning in Alberta[12]. As a result, provincial agencies strengthened their activities in land use matters. Particularly important was the Department of Environment's role as designator of so-called Restricted Development Areas (RDAs). The RDA instrument, in many respects similar to a greenbelt policy, allowed the

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[10] Ibid, pp.21-22.
[11] Elliot J.Feldman and Jerome Milch, Coordination or Control? The Life and Death of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, in Lionel D. Feldman and Katherine A. Graham (eds.), Politics and Government of Urban Canada. Toronto: Methuen, 1980, pp.246-266.
[12] Lionel D. Feldman and Katherine A. Graham, Intergovernmental Relations and Urban Growth: A Canadian View. In Lionel D. Feldman and Katherine Graham (eds.), op.cit., pp. 202-218.

"freezing" for development of belts of land around urban centres, reserving them for open space, parks, and agriculture[13].

Alberta's Planning Act of 1977 provided for regional plans and required regional planning commissions to prepare them. The guidelines set down by this legislation included 1) the provision for present and future land use and development of the planning region, and 2) the regulation of land use and development[14]. Furthermore, the Planning Act requires municipal land use by-laws to conform to regional policies which include the designation of future growth areas while, at the same time, protecting "strategic" lands for a variety of urban uses[15].

Regional plans have only been in place since the early 1980s. Because this period was characterised by slow economic growth their effects are still difficult to determine. Nevertheless, other hand, the bureaucratic procedures established before the slowdown, such as RDA designation and zoning review, have insured a strong provincial role in determining the development of Alberta's cities. Calgary's development, for example, has been affected by the decisions of various provincial agencies. These include 1) the Department of Transportation, which determines location, form and timing of urban transport projects, 2) the Department of Environment, which decides which peripheral lands are to be excluded from development, and 3) the Alberta Housing Corporation and the Department of Public Works and Housing, which has a potentially vital role of establishing and managing land banks[16].

Moreover, in Alberta's major cities the development of suburban land is fraught with numerous bureaucratic obstacles, including an extremely long development permit and zoning review process. Critics of the process have complained of "too much red tape" and an exaggerated planning emphasis on *regulation* in the public interest[17]. Many scholars and planning professionals have suggested that Alberta adopt a more negotiative and adaptable approach to planning, relying on public-private cooperation. This reflects an intellectual strand in Canadian planning thought that advocates greater flexibility and local discretion without allowing U.S.-style uncoordinated growth[18]. Although not every Canadian province is as rigorous with fringe development as Alberta, virtually all of them closely supervise the zoning and development permit process. Thus, it appears that provincial intervention in land use issues has supported more restrictive interpretations of property rights. According to Qadeer, land tenure in Canada is being redefined with public authorities increasing their powers to influence land use, control subdivision, and restrict rights to ownership[19].

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[13] Ibid.
[14] Michael Gordon and J. David Hulchanski, The Evolution of the Land Use Planning Process in Alberta, 1945 - 1984. Research Paper 156, Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies (University of Toronto), 1985. p.29.
[15] Ibid.
[16] See City of Calgary, Development and Policy Constraints. Working paper No.2, September, 1976.
[17] See Gordon and Hulchanski, p.32-34.
[18] See, for example, Matthew J. Kiernan's exposé on recent Canadian planning developments, "Urban Planning in Canada: A Synopsis and Some Future Directions," Plan Canada (30)1, January 1990, pp.11-22.
[19] Mohammed Qadeer, op.cit., 33-34.

Table 13	Provincial Planning Legislation in Canada, 1970 - 1983
Alberta	The Planning Act (1977)
British Columbia	Land Commission Act (1973) Environment and Land Use Act (1971/ 1979) Municipal Act (1979)
Manitoba	The Planning Act (1975)
New Brunswick	Community Planning Act (1973)
Newfoundland	Urban and Rural Planning Act (1970)
Ontario	The Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act (1973) The Planning Act (1983)
Prince Edward Island	The Planning Act (1974)
Quebec	Land Use Planning and Development Act (1979)
Saskatchewan	The Urban and Rural Policy and Development Act (1978)

6.1.2 A Synopsis of New Provincial Planning Instruments

As we have seen, during the 1970s the provinces greatly expanded their authority over land use matters. Instead of merely supervising the municipal planning process according to traditional zoning practise, provincial governments adopted a more global and comprehensive view of land use. Provincial legislation and policies have given particular emphasis to 1) the preservation of agricultural land, 2) the protection of special environment areas and, 3) the regulation of land development at the urban fringe. Thus, the provinces have, at least theoretically, provided themselves with the necessary planning framework to control urban expansion.

Ontario's Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act of 1973 include all three kinds of particular emphasis noted above. The act's function is to protect Niagara fruitlands from conversion and to preserve environmentally sensitive areas along the Escarpment. In doing this, the 1973 Act severely restricts the ability of municipalities along Ontario's "Golden Horseshoe" to annex adjacent lands[20]. In British Columbia, the Land Commission Act of 1973 authorised the

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[20] See J. Barry Cullingworth, Urban and Regional Planning in Canada, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1986, pp.318-323.

establishment of Agricultural Land Reserves (ALRs) throughout the province. Particular attention has been paid to the fruitlands of the Okanagan Valley and the agricultural areas bordering the Vancouver and Victoria urban areas[21]. Approximately 4.5 Million hectares of land are included within all of B.C.'s ARLs. In Alberta's case, Restricted Development Areas have been created to protect special natural areas and watersheds and to establish belts of open space around Edmonton and Calgary[22].

6.1.3 Urban Redevelopment and the Provinces

Fear of uncontrolled suburban sprawl and environmental degradation, and of an irretrievable loss of rich agricultural land, led to the enactment of broad planning legislation in the 70s and 80s. Meanwhile, central city economies were severely affected by the postwar expansion of suburbia and the shifting of new capital investment towards growth areas on the urban fringe. Downtown retailing lost a good share of the market, older neighbourhoods deteriorated as a result of disinvestment, and the central city's tax base had diminished considerably. As in other industrialised nations, the question of how to recycle disused urban land and reinvigorate the inner-city economy became a central planning issue in Canada.

In the 1960s such attempts took the "clearance" approach with its emphasis on drastically increased housing densities, the physical expansion of downtown business centres, and enhanced accessibility by automobile. Citizen resistance to clearance, however, forced planners and politicians to consider other strategies. As Kiernan points out, a solution was found in the "recycling" of abandoned industrial areas, in effect converting urban blight into a positive asset[23]. Attractive opportunities for residential, commercial, and selected industrial developments were to be created by the reclamation of derelict land. On the other hand, however, the vast sums needed to accomplish recycling projects and to the need to secure private investor participation, meant that local governments alone would have generally been unable to make these projects work. Instead, state support for urban redevelopment was mustered in the form of public (Crown) corporations. Through these public corporation instruments, local, provincial, and federal governments have been able to provide investment capital for public sector objectives. Public corporations also appear to have succeeded in their goal of attracting private investment for urban redevelopment.

Since the early 1970s, a series of spectacular urban redevelopment projects have been undertaken in such cities as Toronto, Vancouver and Calgary. These have primarily involved the

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[21] See S.E. Corke, Land Use Controls in British Columbia. A Contribution to a Comparative Study of Canadian Planning Systems. Research paper No.138, Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies (University of Toronto). April, 1983.

[22] Michael Gordon and J. David Hulchanski, The Evolution of the Land Use Planning Process in Alberta, 1945 - 1984, Research Paper No.156, Centre for Urban and Community Studies (University of Toronto), 1985, pp. 24-25.

[23] Matthew J. Kiernan, op.cit.,p.16.

reclamation of disused waterfront lands and railroad yards, and have helped spark investment booms in downtown areas. A federal crown corporation, the Harbourfront Corporation, was created to develop a large area of Toronto's waterfront. For all intents and purposes, this redeveloped land is an extension of the burgeoning downtown area, and includes hotel complexes, residential highrises, shops, and office space. Vancouver's False Creek and B.C. Place projects are on an even larger scale, providing space for thousands of medium- to high-density housing units, shopping and restaurant complexes, office buildings, and other uses. British Columbia's B.C. Place Ltd., and a federal agency, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, have been instrumental in the realisation of these mammoth redevelopment schemes, together the largest downtown redevelopment attempted in North America[24].

In addition to the active investment role of governmental agencies exercised through public corporations, the provinces have been directly responsible for the extension and maintenance of urban rapid transit. Vancouver's SkyTrain, the light rail systems of Calgary and Edmonton, and Toronto's integrated network of subways, light rail, buses, and commuter trains, have been funded and to a great extent operated by the respective provinces. These transit systems appear to have had a beneficial effect on downtown economies. Moreover, working in conjunction with municipal planning goals, they have promoted the development of clearly defined urban subcentres.

One conspicuous effect of recent urban "recycling" policies has been the overshadowing of city planners by provincial agencies and in some cases, by federal agencies. In the opinion of some observers, the sheer magnitude of redevelopment in cities like Vancouver and Toronto has helped shift the focus of Canadian planning once more towards the growth of downtown areas[25].

6.1.4 The Regional Response:Metropolitan Governance and Regional Districts

The regional consequences of urban growth were not ignored before 1945, but only after World War II was a truly metropolitan orientation of Canadian urban policy achieved. The reasons for this have been mentioned. On one hand, the idea of metropolitan government required a redefinition of governments' active role in land use and a strengthening of government intervention. On the other hand, post-war suburbanisation helped "push" urban growth problems into the peripheries of major Canadian cities, forcing a clear administrative response.

Between 1941 and 1961, the population of Canada's major cities more than doubled, the lion's share of growth occurring in the suburban fringe areas. Post-war economic expansion, coupled with the baby boom and several waves of immigration provided for steady growth into the 1980s.

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[24] The now defunct Quarterly Review, published by the City of Vancouver Planning Department, offered frequent progress reports on the development of these and other major redevelopment projects.

[25] Matthew J. Kiernan, op.cit., p.17

The rates of metropolitan expansion remained high during the first post-war decades: within one census period (1956 to 1961), Montréal's metropolitan population increased by 45%, Toronto's by 38% and Vancouver's by 35%. As Table 14 shows, the years between 1961 and 1976 saw a veritable construction boom in the younger suburban fringe. This suburban growth trend, especially in the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area, has continued throughout the 1980s, albeit at a slower pace. Paralleling developments observed elsewhere, the suburban expansion of the 50s, 60s, and 70s was accompanied by low population growth rates in the major cities, and in some cases by dramatic losses.

Table 14   Metropolitan Area Population Change in percent 1961 - 1976.

	Toronto	Montréal	Vancouver	Calgary
Central area	-12.5	-38.3	9.6	-4.3
New Suburbs	123.5	80.0	99.3	154.9
CMA	53.6	32.9	47.6	68.4

Source: STATISTICS CANADA, Perspectives Canada III, Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1981, p.194.

Canada's municipal governments were incapable of dealing with the problems caused by rapid suburban expansion and central city decline. The new services required by suburban growth communities, including schools, roads, public safety, and sewerage, required capital investments on a scale hitherto unknown by most local governments - and particularly beyond the financial means of the exploding commuter towns[26]. Municipal governments were also unprepared for the large administrative and financial burdens imposed by the decline of the central cities. Disinvestment, tax-base erosion, and a marked deterioration of infrastructure called for new comprehensive policies on transit, redevelopment, public housing and other matters.

Most public officials saw that these growth-related problems were interdependent, and that consequently land use decisions made within the expanding metropolitan areas would have interjurisdictional impacts[27]. There remained, however, the question of how to reform the operation of local governments in order to institutionalise a *metropolitan* administrative mechanism. As in the United States, jurisdictional fragmentation characterised Canada's urban local government. Although there was not and still is no U.S.-style "local home rule" tradition in

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[26] See, for example, Albert Rose, Problems of Canadian City Growth, Ottawa: Community Planning Association of Canada, 1950.

[27] Hodge (Planning Canadian Communities, op.cit., p.284) mentions that rational development considerations also necessitates interjurisdictional cooperation. Due to the high costs of commercial and residential development projects, more often than not linked to capital investments in transport and other infrastructure, proper location within metropolitan areas of such projects is essential. Furthermore, the funding of such projects requires a sharing of financial and infrastructural resources among communities.

Canada, nevertheless it had generally been accepted that the sovereign municipalities would provide community services and deal with land use issues[28].

By 1945, however, Regional planning associations had already been established in many major Canadian cities. In 1938, for example, Vancouver, together with six other municipalities, created the Lower Mainland Regional Association to provide an interjurisdictional forum on land use issues. In 1943 Manitoba created an advisory agency for the capital city area, the Metropolitan Planning Commission of Greater Winnipeg. Similar agencies based on voluntary cooperation between municipalities were inaugurated in Edmonton and Calgary in 1950[29]. These planning associations produced many important studies and made land use recommendations to local governments, but their lack of a political mandate or of executive powers limited their influence over urban development.

The first successful initiative to restructure metropolitan government was undertaken by Ontario, who after three years of study, acted to created the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto in 1954[30]. This, in fact, was the first true metropolitan government to be inaugurated in North America. Ontario's solution to the problem of reorganising local government operation was to establish two tiers of administrative competence within Metro Toronto. This arrangement allowed individual municipalities to retain their own governments, while a regional body, Metro Toronto, assumed responsibility for planning, recreation, water supply, and other regional functions. Locally elected officials (municipal council members) were selected to serve on the regional council thus assuring a federative form of governance within which, at least theoretically, both local and regional interests could be addressed[31].

The principal dilemma in the creation of metropolitan government concerns the need to centralise certain administrative functions while, at the same time, retaining decentralised aspects which allow greater citizen participation within the decision-making process. However, it seems that in most cases, the provinces were looking to create a more efficient form of metropolitan administration and not to establish new levels of government that might challenge their authority[32]. This appears to have been one of the main reasons for the creation of federated metropolitan governments. Although Toronto's two-tier approach has served as a model for

[28] Furthermore, under the influence of the U.S. municipal reform movement, local government in Canada had been essentially "depoliticised" - limited to the rational and efficient administration of local affairs and removed from the sphere of partisan politics.
[29] Hodge, op.cit., p.285.
[30] John Dakin, Toronto: A Federated Metro, in H. Wentworth Eldredge (ed.) World Capitals. Toward Guided Urbanization, Garden City, New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1975, pp.207-245.
[31] Idem.
[32] Warren Magnusson, Introduction: The development of Canadian Urban Government, in Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton, City Politics in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, p.30.

several metropolitan reorganisations in Canada, it has been criticised for its apparent inability to allow local governments and citizens to have a greater say in regional matters[33]. Toronto's two-tier alternative has not, however, been the only one employed in the reorganising of Canada's metropolitan areas. In Edmonton and Calgary, single-tier forms of government have been created by annexation and by the consolidation (amalgamation) of local governments in Winnipeg. Still another variant has developed in the Vancouver region, where independent municipalities, regional districts, and a largely administrative regional body, the Greater Vancouver Regional District, exist side-by-side.

The degree of political centralisation and central city domination of metro governments varies considerably among Canada's metropolitan areas. Nevertheless, one feature of metropolitan governance appears to be common to all Canadian cities - that of the supervisory and regulatory presence of the provincial governments. Contrasting Canadian experience with that of the United States, Scott and Jones characterise Canada's urban government reform process as a "top-down" approach, with the provinces having the last word in controlling policy initiatives[34]. In the U.S., attempts at metropolitan government have had to be locally initiated, are generally subject to municipal referenda, and have not been actively supported by state governments[35]. More so than Britain, Germany, and other European countries, however, in Canada there has been a general consideration of local interests and concerns in the establishment of metropolitan governance. This is witnessed by the multitude of regional approaches that have been adopted. Moreover as we shall see, despite the clear legal mandates for metropolitan government, voluntary cooperation as still an important component of Canadian regional governance and planning.

Finally, another important aspect of metropolitan governance involves conflicts of interest between central cities and their suburban municipalities. While an equalisation of fiscal policy and a pooling of financial reserves is one important goal of metropolitan administration, suburban municipalities often see such policies as a vehicle of central city hegemony. At the same time, the suburbs have been accused of elitism and selfishness, profiting from big-city services and

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[33] See Meyer Brownstone and T.J. Plunkett, Metropolitan Winnipeg. Politics and Reform of Local Government, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, pp. 173-174, for an interesting, if opinionated, discussion of metropolitan reorganisation in Canada. According to Brownstone and Plunkett, traditional conservative concerns with efficiency and economy have characterised these reorganisation attempts. This concern manifested itself in the form of metro government adopted in Toronto, a two-tier system designed to rationalise service delivery and to incorporate local participation and a limited sense of local autonomy within a larger urban region. However, as the authors argue, the tendency has been one of increased centralisation of the decision-making process, hindering local access to the political arena. They have contrasted this arrangement with Winnipeg's unitary system which, as they see it, is more sensitive to citizen opinion and allows greater involvement at the neighbourhood level.

[34] Stanley Scott and Victor Jones, Foreword to Meyer Brownstone and T.J. Plunkett, Metropolitan Winnipeg.., pp. xxvi-xxvii.

[35] As discussed in Chapter 3, state governments in the United States are often limited by their constitutions in their powers to reform or restructure local governments. A popular referendum is generally required for territorial reorganisations, making the amalgamation of separate municipalities into "regional" bodies exceedingly difficult. Indeed, as Scott and Jones have observed, "Making a voter's referendum the basic vehicle for decision-making largely absolves the state governments of legal responsibility for restructuring their metropolitan regions. The states often interpret this as also excusing them from moral or political responsibility as well." Stanley Scott and Victor Jones, op.cit., p.xxix.

amenities, while apparently refusing to share regional social, environmental, and economic burdens. We have seen this to be a motivation for suburbs to preserve local autonomy and to maintain the fiscal fragmentation of U.S. urban areas.

Contrary to these concerns of suburban communities, however, Canadian experience seems to indicate that metropolitan government has not meant an overwhelming domination of central cities in regional matters. The legislation creating the Greater Vancouver Regional District was greeted with considerable trepidation by many member communities. Studies analysing the operation of the GVRD have, nevertheless, tended to show that the city of Vancouver never dominated or attempted to dictate development policy within the regional board[36]. Indeed, the evidence seems to indicate that regional governance has benefited inner-city areas without discriminating against suburban communities.

Meyer and Plunkett argue that the creation of Unicity in Winnipeg helped reduced conflicts of interest between the central city and suburbs. In addition to the unification of planning, fiscal, and development policy, Winnipeg's Unicity system has promoted a general appreciation of the regional benefits of downtown redevelopment and the improvement of older neighbourhoods. The Unicity council allotted considerable sums to suburban capital investments, but it also launched a decisive attempt to halt central city decline. This could not have occurred without the approval of suburban council members who, after all, represent the interests of suburban taxpayers[37]. In the case of Metro Toronto and Greater Vancouver, similar patterns can be observed. This is not to say that all suburban - central city conflicts have been solved through regional administration, but regional governance does appear to have mutually beneficial effects that have helped maintain economically viable and livable urban areas in Canada.

6.2   METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT IN VANCOUVER:
        COOPERATIVE ACTION FOR BALANCED REGIONAL GROWTH

The advent of metropolitan government in Greater Vancouver did not bring universal acclaim at the outset. When the regional body now known as the Greater Vancouver Regional District was created in 1967, member municipalities feared a new level of government would allow the City of Vancouver to gain political dominance politically and the ability to dictate development in the region[38]. These early fears of regional governance subsided quickly, however, and the result has been a rather successful form of intermunicipal cooperation in land use planning issues.

With a 1986 population of about 430,000, Vancouver proper is Canada's eighth largest city. The greater Vancouver region is Canada's third largest Census Metropolitan Area, comprising 1,380,729 inhabitants at the time of the 1986 census when British Columbia's total population

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[36] B.C. Minister of Municipal Affairs, GVRD Review Report, March,1984.
[37] Meyer Brownstone and T.J. Plunkett, op. cit., pp.167-172.
[38] B.C. Minister of Municipal Affairs, op. cit., 1984.

was under 2,900,000. These figures emphasise the Vancouver region's overwhelming economic and political importance of for the province. (Note: the Vancouver Region as defined by local government membership in the present metropolitan body (Greater Vancouver Regional District), is somewhat smaller than its Census Metropolitan Area comprising 15 municipalities and 3 unincorporated electoral areas.)

6.2.1 Suburbanisation and Regional Visions of Development

Typical of Canada's western cities, Vancouver owed its establishment and early existence to the Canadian Pacific Railroad, and the exploitation of primary resources, primarily wood. Thanks to a buoyant local economy, and the CPR's aggressive development policy for the vast areas of land it owned along the Fraser River, Vancouver expanded considerably in the late 19th and early 20th centuries[39]. The city's economic ascent of the was marked by its transformation into a centre of investment capital, supply, and administration for Canada's timber industry, and as the nation's principal western port. Today, Vancouver possesses a solid, diversified economy, and is an important focal point of international investment in Canada - particularly for "Pacific Rim" states.

The transformation of Vancouver's economy to one in which service industries predominate (e.g. finance, health, trade, administration) took place early in this century[40]. By 1961, various service activities provided three-quarters of central city employment (see Table 15). Before 1945, the city of Vancouver overwhelmingly dominated British Columbia's urbanised Lower Mainland[41]. In the years between 1921 and 1941, Vancouver's share of regional population hovered around 75 percent. The next largest city, Burnaby, which had experienced considerable growth nevertheless had barely 8 percent of the regional total. This situation changed rapidly, however, in the years of economic expansion after World War II. As jobs increased rapidly - particularly in the downtown district - Vancouver's suburban neighbours exploited their considerable land reserves to allow new housing construction. By 1951, the suburban boom was well in progress and planning experts were justifiably concerned over a frenzy of uncontrolled outward growth.

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[39] For an interesting discussion of Vancouver's development see, Walter Hardwick, Vancouver, Don Mills, Ontario: Collier Macmillan Canada, 1974, pp. 1-24.

[40] For a discussion of this transformation and diversification of Vancouver's economy, see L. D. McCann, Urban Growth in a Staple Economy: The Emergence of Vancouver as a Regional Metropolis, 1886 - 1914, in L. J. Evenden (ed.), Vancouver, Western Metropolis, Victoria: University of Victoria, 1978, pp. 17-41.

[41] The term Lower Mainland refers to the Fraser river plains of Southwestern B.C. Since the capital, Victoria, is located offshore on Vancouver Island, the rest of the province is known as "mainland" British Columbia.

Figure 5   Vancouver Region as Defined by GVRD Membership (1986):

Belcarra	North Vancouver City	Vancouver	Electoral Area B
Burnaby	North Vancouver District	West Vancouver	(Loco/Anmore)
Coquitlam	Port Coquitlam	White Rock	Electoral Area C
Delta	Port Moody	Electoral Area A	(Bowen Island)
Lions Bay	Richmond	(University	
New Westminster	Surrey	Endowment Lands)	

Greater Vancouver Regional District

Table 15   Greater Vancouver employment according to
                sector, 1961 - 1986

	1961	1986
Goods sector (total)	25,7%	21,4%
Manufacturing	17,0%	12,4%
Construction	5,9%	6,3%
Service industries (total)	74,3%	78,6%
Business and Personal Services	23,1%	15,4%
Trade	17,7%	18,6%
Transportation/ Communications	10,3%	9,9%
F.I.R.E.	4,7%	7,3%
Accommodation/ Gastronomy	3,8%	8,0%

Source: Statistics Canada, 1961, 1986. GVRD Technical Advisory
Committee, 1987.

The Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, a governmental advisory body created by the province in 1949, undertook to define regional development guidelines. In a 1954 study, the LMRPD warned of a "metropolitan problem" generated by insufficient administrative manageability of rapid urbanisation[42]. The principal sprawl-related concern of the LMRPD was not so much motivated by fears of environmental degradation or loss of open space as of considerations of cost-efficiency and rational service delivery[43]. At the same time, attention was directed to the tax burdens of farm areas, the property values of which were soaring as residential development boomed. The LMRPD recommended an economically rational and politically feasible metropolitan solution to regional administrative problems. It was argued that the regionalisation of specific municipal responsibiilties (water, health, sewerage, etc.) could avoid untenably high development costs and an expensive duplication of service delivery efforts[44]. Federation appeared to be the solution, under an alternative that allowed local governments to maintain local autonomy in purely local matters while surrendering to a regional body those responsibilities best managed on a metropolitan-wide basis.

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[42]   Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, The Greater Vancouver Metropolitan Community. A Preliminary Factual Study, New Westminster, April, 1954.

[43]   See Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, Economic Aspects of Urban Sprawl. A Technical Report, New Westminster, May, 1956.

[44]   Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, The Greater Vancouver.., pp.30-32.

Table 16   Suburbanisation Trends in the Vancouver Region, 1951-1961 (Population change
and regional shares of total inhabitants)

	1951	%	1961	%	1971	%
Vancouver	344,800	66,3	354,500	46,5	429,800	41,4
Inner Suburbs[1]	134,800	24,0	226,600	27,4	294,600	29,0
Outer Suburbs[2]	82,500	14,7	179,400	21,7	303,900	29,6

[1] Burnaby, New Westminster, North Shore.
[2] Coquitlam, Delta, Port Coquitlam, Richmond, Surrey
Figures rounded off to nearest 100. 1971 figures include University Endowment Lands
Source: Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, The Greater Vancouver Metropolitan Community, 1954,
Appendix A.; Census Canada 1961; City of Vancouver Planning Department, Vancouver Plan Monitoring Program.
Information Update P1, June 1988.[45]

Attempts to institutionalise regional governance were, however, hampered by inadequate provincial legislation and municipal indifference. The LMRPB warned of an Ontario-style solution, with the province unilaterally imposing regional government on its member communities, but local governments felt little obligation to comply with the Board's regional planning recommendations[46]. In fact, regional government limited itself to creating of single-function special districts to deal with water, sewerage, health, land use, and regional parks[47]. Municipal membership was voluntary in all but the health districts, and in the LMRPB, which lacked executive authority. This situation remained basically unchanged until 1965, when provincial legislation established regional districts throughout British Columbia.

6.2.1.1   The LMRPB and the Regional Plan

The Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board never acquired urban service or other administrative functions - these continued to be performed by special districts. By the time it was abolished and replaced by the GVRD in 1967, however, the LMRPB had produced an Official Regional Plan (ORP) which continues to influence development in Greater Vancouver. Approved in 1966, the ORP sought to regulate future suburban development while improving existing

[45]   The 1961 data reflect an increase in size of the Vancouver region thus additionally decreasing Vancouver
regional share and increasing that of the suburbs.

[46]   Compare the "writing on the wall" mentioned in the LMRPB report, The Greater Vancouver.., p.32, with Paul
Tennant, The Evolution of Regional Government in Greater Vancouver: 1914-1979. (Draft edition),
Vancouver, B.C., 1980 p.23. The decisive role of the province in unilaterally legislating regional government
cannot be underemphasised. As long as municipal autonomy and voluntary participation characterised
regional planning coordination attempts, no comprehensive, long-term solution was in reach.

[47]   The first such district, the Greater Vancouver Water District, was created in 1925, providing service to
Vancouver, South Vancouver, and Point Grey.

amenities[43]. Paramount among the ORP's preservation goals was and is the limitation of new construction in farmland areas, the southern floodplains, and in environmentally sensitive sites. The ORP's development "enhancement" goals have been to improve transportation, promote economic diversification, help farm economies, and expand recreational opportunities[44].

Due to rapid suburbanisation in the municipalities to the south (Richmond, Surrey, and Delta), the ORP was primarily concerned with regulating land conversion at the urban fringe. Its regulatory thrust notwithstanding, the ORP did not meet much municipal resistance. One reason for this is the wording of the B.C. Municipal Act wherein official regional plans are to be of a general nature, lacking exact land use designations, and suggesting but not prescribing action in realising land use goals[45].

6.2.1.2 The Greater Vancouver Regional District and the Livable Region

Confirming the view that a certain paternalism characterises provincial-municipal relations in Canada, these is every indication that metropolitan government for Greater Vancouver (as well as regional governments elsewhere in British Columbia) was unilaterally imposed through provincial initiative[46]. Paul Tennant has mentioned that there existed scant local demand in the Greater Vancouver area for regional government; municipalities appeared satisfied with the operation of single-function districts and were not necessarily eager to give up administrative responsibilities to a huge and politically dominant metropolitan corporation[47]. In addition, provincial policy had traditionally respected local autonomy and local opinion and did not appear willing to support curtailing the power of local government[48].

Nevertheless, 1964 appears to have marked a decisive change in the provincial attitude towards regional governance. Civil servants in the Ministry of Municipal Affairs had voiced concern over future urban development in the province and had suggested a policy of rationalising services and providing guidelines for orderly growth[49]. The next year, legislation was passed to begin creating regional districts within the province. Regional districts, as defined by the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, are agencies of government through which "existing municipalities within a region, in cooperation with unincorporated areas, can deal effectively with regional problems as well as furnish municipal-type services to small unicorporated communities and rural areas within the

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[43] GVRD Technical Advisory Committee, Challenges for a Contemporary Statement of the Livable Region Strategy, September, 1987, p.9.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Municipal Act (1976 consolidation), pp. 795-798.
[46] The term paternalism is not used perjoratively here. What is meant is a provincial supervision and vigilance of municipal affairs that can, if necessary, involve the use of police powers to regulate development.
[47] Paul Tennant, The Evolution of Regional Government in Greater Vancouver: 1914 - 1979. (Draft version). Vancouver, B.C., 1980, pp. 21-23.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.

regional district"[55]. The Fraser-Burrard Regional District, created to cover the area of Greater Vancouver, was renamed in 1968. By 1972, the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) not only had assumed responsibility for hospitals, water, sewerage, and parks, but also had received a variety of urban planning functions including housing, transit, and regional land use. This happened without a great deal of local municipal resistance, partly because special district consolidation was generally uncontroversial but also because the *confederal* arrangement that was instituted retained sovereign local governments[56]. The member municipalities of the GVRD were to work together in areas of regional importance while, at the same time, retaining their local autonomy to deal with local needs and interests and to promote local participation in regional politics.

The Official Regional Plan, inherited from the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board, served as the basis for the GVRD's most ambitious and potentially contentious objective: the formulation of an attractive long-term metropolitan development policy. Whereas the main thrust of the OPR had been to *prevent* unwanted development while enhancing regional amenities, GVRD concerns were to define areas of policy action that would actively promote OPR goals. Thus the so-called Livable Region strategy took shape, inaugurated in 1971. Before the official Livable Region Programme (LRP) was approved by the GVRD in 1975, much attention was paid to involving citizens in developing priorities and identifying principal problem areas. General policies were defined, but were kept general enough not to arouse municipal suspicion of planning coercion by the regional government[57].

The LRP includes a wide array of policy objectives, but its principal development aims are:

1) the promotion of Regional Town Centres in decentralising employment opportunities within the region,

2) the regulation of future development in order to protect open space and to provide for parks and recreation areas,

3) pursuing a stategic transport planning approach in which public transit axes positively influence future development,

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[55] B.C. Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Technical Guide for the Preparation of Official Settlement Plans, Victoria, 1979, p.2.

[56] H. Peter Oberlander and Patrick J. Smith, Governing Regionally of Regional Governing: Conflict or Disinterest in Metropolitan Vancouver, Paper presented at the Metropolitan Regions Group Conference, University of California, Berkeley, November, 1989, p.9.

[57] Paul Tennant, op cit, p.55, chides the LRP for being so flexible that any outcome could be interpreted as having been according to plan. He sees the GVRD as being so worried about maintaining a favourable political consensus, that they are all too willing to accommodate local political sensitivities. As later experience has shown, however, (Tennant wrote these comments in 1980) such accommodation payed off after the B.C. government eliminated the GVRD's executive powers. By that time, a good working relationship had been established between the regional agency and its member municipalities.

4) distributing the burdens and benefits of growth among regional municipalities,

5) ensuring a wide variety of housing types and tenures in order to meet different needs[58].

One of the principal regional land use goals defined by the GVRD was (and is) the prevention of low-density suburban development in the rich agricultural lands south of the GVRD, particularly in Surrey, Delta, and Richmond. Instead, new development was to be encouraged in areas with less valuable agricultural land - primarily in the western part of the region - while new development opportunities in the built-up areas of Greater Vancouver were to be created. The Livable Region plan has, to a considerable degree, been able to achieve these goals through a variety of means.

Provincial action in excluding large undeveloped areas from subdivision has been vital. Equally as important, however, has been the generally cooperative behaviour of the region's largest municipalities and an acceptance of the Livable Region's principal objectives. At the same time, it must be noted that the continuous rapid growth prognosticated for the 1970s and beyond did not materialise due to a downturn in the economy towards the end of the 70s. In fact, the Livable Region estimates for Greater Vancouver's 1986 population exceeded actual increases by more than 210,000[59]. While recession temporarily reduced the political salience of the suburban sprawl issue, recent growth trends again indicate considerable development pressure in fringe areas.

6.2.1.3 Town Centres and Directed Growth

Vancouver's core area has retained the most important regional concentration of employment, commercial, and retail activity. Despite enormous population growth in the suburbs, the downtown and Broadway areas of the central city continue to dominate the region's economic life. Thus by the 1970s two long-term phenomena were troubling both planners and local politicians: 1) continuing growth of "bedroom", or commuter, suburbs, and 2) the sustained increase in downtown jobs. Increased traffic was only one of the concerns, as these developments were also expected to cause loss of neighbourhood identity, gross regional disparities in urban amenities, and increased pressure on inner-city land markets[60]. In developing its Livable Regional Programme, the GVRD directed attention to regional imbalances in the distribution of jobs and working residents (see Table 17). The situation was most marked in the newer "sprawl" areas, such as Delta and Surrey and the Northeast sector, which had basically become dormitory suburbs for the core area.

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58 GVRD, The Livable Region 1976/1986. Proposals to Manage the Growth of Greater Vancouver, Vancouver, 1975.
59 GVRD, Challenges for a Contemporary Statement of the Livable Region Strategy, Sept.1987, p.13.
60 See the policy statements in the GVRD`s Livable Region 1976/1986,,op cit.

Table 17   Regional Shares of Employment in GVRD Planning Areas, 1971.

	Employment	% of region	ratio jobs/ residents
Vancouver/ University Endowment Lands	251,299	58,9	1:0,7
Burnaby/New Westminster	67,723	15,9	1:1
North Shore (West Vancouver, City and District of North Vancouver)	31,795	7,5	1:1,7
Northeast Sector (Coquitlam, Port Coquitlam, Port Moody, Loco-Anmore)	17,061	4,0	1:1,8
Richmond	25,806	6,0	1:1
Delta	8,439	2,0	1:1,8
Surrey - White Rock	23,892	5,6	1:1,5

Source: GVRD, Livable Region Program 1976/1986, p.17.

To reverse overcentralisation trends in employment and jobs/residents imbalances, the GVRD suggested the promotion of regional town centres along strategic transit axes. These were, in principal, to be "mini"-downtowns, bringing central city functions to the suburbs. Burnaby (Metrocentre), New Westminster, Surrey and Port Coquitlam were initially designated to accommodate regional town centres. In addition to their function as community focal points, town centres were seen as central access nodes around which housing construction could be intensified. This also meant that the regional centres policy was to be embedded in a comprehensive transportation strategy that called for future rapid transit systems to connect downtown, new subcentres, and fringe areas[61].

Generally speaking, the municipalities received the town centres idea favourably. Indeed, the decentralised growth policy catered to local political egos because it promised to enhance municipal prestige[62]. Results were slow in coming, however, due to the attractiveness of Vancouver, and the reluctance of private investors to consider peripheral locations. Massive redevelopment projects in the downtown areas increased floorspace potential dramatically, diminishing the ability of Burnaby, New Westminster and other municipalities to compete for new firms.

Government agencies and public companies did, however, take advantage of suburban sites, beginning to locate operations there in the 70s. Large public employers such as B.C. Telephone (3000 employees) and the Ministry of Labour (225 employees) moved to Burnaby, while the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (1250 employees) located in North Vancouver's new

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[61]   GVRD, The Livable Region.., p.20.
[62]   Interview in Vancouver with Walter Hardwick, 20 Sept.1988.

Lonsdale Quay project[63]. Despite these large-scale additions, the vast majority of suburban firms, however, has tended to be small (staffs of 10 or less)[64].

Table 18   Regional Distribution of Jobs in the GVRD, 1986

	Total	reg. %	jobs/residents ratio 1971	1986
Vancouver/UEL	369,500	57,2	1:0,7	1:0.8
Burnaby/New Westminster	106,000	16,4	1:1	1:1,2
North Shore	42,000	6,5	1:1,7	1:1,8
North East Sector	30,000	4,6	1:1,8	1:2,1
Richmond	42,000	6,5	1:1	1:1,1
Delta	15,000	2,3	1:1,8	1:1,9
Surrey/White Rock	41,000	6,3	1:1,5	1:1,8

Source: GVRD, Challenges for a Contemporary Statement of the Livable Region Strategy, 1987, Table 5.

The four regional centres designated to help decentralise commercial development in Greater Vancouver have not been able to grow as planned. Taken together, as of 1986 all four centres were zoned for approximately 4 million square metres of office space, or somewhat more than one-sixth of downtown Vancouver's total (23 million square metres). Furthermore, Regional Town Centre growth between 1972 and 1986 was only about one-tenth that of downtown[65]. This is partly due to slow economic growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a period of recession which affected the region and British Columbia as a whole. Many planning experts agree, however, that vigorous redevelopment of the core area has helped reestablish the locational attractiveness of the downtown, diminishing the appeal of suburban office space[66]. As tables 17 and 18 indicate, between 1971 and 1986 the pace of relative job decentralisation was very slow with the central city's regional job share decreasing by only 1.7%. Concurrently, continuous population growth tended to reduce suburban jobs/residents ratios, thereby accenting the bedroom community character of Surrey, the North Shore, and Delta areas.

Still, "reurbanisation" of the core area has not reversed general suburbanisation trends within the region. The pace of suburban commercial and industrial development has picked up considerably during the latter part of the 1980s.

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[63]   Data gathered here from the GVRD's Suburban Office Development Survey of Existing Firms circulated in 1982.
[64]   Ibid.
[65]   City Of Vancouver Planning Department, The Vancouver Plan, July 1986.
[66]   Interview with John Winsor, Director of Planning, City of Vancouver Planning Department, 22 September, 1988.

6.2.1.4   The Issue of Regional Public Transit

In 1967 proposals for an inner-urban freeway system in Greater Vancouver received a definitive rejection. This fact alone is perhaps one of the principal reasons why automobile-oriented suburban decentralisation has not taken place in Greater Vancouver. Lessons from U.S.-style freeway development convinced planners and politicians in British Columbia (and also most definitely convinced Canadian planners elsewhere) that a greater support for public transit was essential for a well-functioning metropolitan region[67]. Nevertheless, Vancouver has remained a very North American city in its orientation towards automotive transport. Commercial development has been very much of the strip and avenue arterial variety, and continues to be so in fast growing suburban areas. Until recently, new suburban areas have not been particularly well served by regional transit.

The rejection of freeways as a solution to regional transportation problems meant that a public transit system adequate to handle increasing commuter traffic and service as wide an areas as possible would have to be developed. Early studies tended to show that a subway or similar heavy-rail system would be too costly to operate in Greater Vancouver. At the same time, the only visible alternative to rapid transit was large capital investment in regional roadways. For this reason, a light-rail system integrated into an extended network of buses and streetcars seemed to be the most feasible option[68]. In its Livable Region Programme, the GVRD advocated a "transit-oriented" public transportation system, comprising light rapid transit linking new Regional Town Centres with downtown Vancouver, and with ferries, suburban rail, and express bus lines feeding into it at nodal points[69]. An integrated regional rapid transit system was necessary to enable the Livable Region strategy to work as envisioned by the GVRD. The support of the province was essential, since development of an integrated transit system along these lines required considerable capital investments and improvements.

From the initial study stages, the provincial government played a crucial role in modernising Greater Vancouver's public transit system. In the mid-70s the Ministry of Municipal Affairs publicised its intentions to develop a major public transit scheme in which a light rail system would play a vital role[70]. Almost fortuitously, the province's decision to undertake huge capital investment projects in downtown Vancouver in the 1980's had important consequences for the light rail system. The downtown redevelopment drive, spearheaded by preparations for EXPO '86, endowed Vancouver's light rail project with a new economic importance, and an opportunity to improve regional infrastructure and stimulate economic development within Greater Vancouver. Although downtown expansion was not a primary goal of the GVRD's regional plan,

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[67]   This point was emphasised during talks with Walter Hardwick, Hugh Kellas, and other planning experts in the region.
[68]   See L.E. Miller, The Vancouver Skytrain, in: Wayne Attoe (ed.), Transit, Land Use and Urban Form, Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 1989, pp.135-152.
[69]   GVRD, The Livable Region 1976/1986, p.24-25.
[70]   L.E. Miller, op. cit., p.138.

and in fact conflicted with decentralisation policies, the consolidation of infrastructural and redevelopment investment did make economic sense[66].

Through the provincial transit authority (BC Transit), the government of British Columbia authorised the financing and operation of Greater Vancouver's light rail system. The system that was eventually chosen was a highly automated train developed in Canada by Venturtrans of Ontario. It was to run above grade for most of its length, using the old Canadian Pacific tunnels under the downtown area for service in central Vancouver. EXPO 86's May opening date provided a clear deadline for the start up of SkyTrain (as the system has been named). Beginning in 1986, the Skytrain system operated between the SeaBus terminal and the regional town centre of New Westminster (Westminster Quay). An extension eastwards to Surrey was completed in 1989, and a light rail line southwards toward Richmond is in the planning stages[67]. Despite citizen fear in some neighbourhoods of increased noise levels and other disruptions, the system has proved very popular, enjoying a greater ridership then first expected by its planners[68].

The cities of Vancouver, Burnaby, and New Westminster have been generally cooperative in attempting to promote mixed-use and medium to high density development along the SkyTrain axis. This is evidenced by the recent flurry of residential, commercial, and office space construction that has occurred at Metrotown station in Burnaby and at Westminster Quay. In attempting to intensify housing construction within its boundaries, Vancouver has tried to make Skytrain stations nodes of high-density housing and mixed uses, while also "sheltering" traditional single-family neighbourhoods from adverse environmental effects. The area around Joyce street station has been the object of a pilot project that if successful should be a model for future intensified development[69].

6.2.1.5   Agricultural Land Reserves: the Province as Land Use Regulator

Urban fringe development has been one of Greater Vancouver's primary planning concerns in, as it has in most of Canada's metropolitan regions. Rapid suburban growth and "sprawl"-type development in municipalities like Surrey, brought infrastructural, fiscal, and general administrative worries. Moreover the particular vulnerability of agricultural lands to urbanisation pressures was also recognised. It was clear that continued outward expansion would consume vast acreages of the Lower Mainland's best farmlands. In the 1960s, the Lower Mainland Regional Planning Board began to emphasise farmlands preservation in regional planning. By the time the

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[66] Interview with Hugh Kellas of the GVRD, 21 September 1988.
[67] Problems have been encountered in finding an acceptable route for the southern extension of regional light rail transit. Although the Cambie corridor is perhaps the easisest solution - railway right-of-way runs down alongside the avenue - neighbourhood resistance to the idea is strong.
[68] Rick Scobie, Dealing with SkyTrain Impact, in Quarterly Review (published by the City of Vancouver Planning Department) 13(4), 1986, pp.3-6.
[69] City of Vancouver Planning Department, Joyce Station Area Plan (Approved as Amended, by City Council, May 20, 1987), pp. 41-48 ; 101-106,

Official Regional Plan was finally approved in 1966, the regulation of fringe development was firmly established as a regional goal of primary importance. The ORP lacked a compulsory character, however, and was partially undermined by provincial action tending to stimulate speculative construction at the fringe[75]. After the dissolution of the LMRPB in 1968, the land preservation function of the Regional Plan was in abeyance until political changes, and the Livable Region concept, again brought the issue to the forefront. Not surprisingly, the pressures on agriculture land increased tremendously, with land prices and property taxes skyrocketing[76].

In the provincial elections of 1972, the New Democrats defeated the more or less laissez-faire oriented Social Credit Party. The New Democrats comprised a progressive party (and a liberal party in the U.S. sense of the word) that took a more interventionist stand in planning matters. Existing legislation in the form of the Environment and Land Use Act of 1971 allowed the province to place a moratorium on the conversion of agricultural lands[77]. After the 1972 elections, legislation was passed which enabled the province to institutionalise farmlands preservation in land use planning.

The Land Commission Act of 1973 provided for the establishment of regulatory bodies to classify land in British Columbia according to potential agricultural value, and to determine which areas would be closed to conversion and development. Agricultural Land Reserves (ALRs) were thus created throughout the province. Besides protecting valuable agricultural land, the principal objectives of the ALRs have been to 1) encourage farming as a way of life, 2) protect belts of open space around urban areas, 3) preserve land for future urban development (land banking), and 4) preserve recreational parklands[78]. Approximately 4,7 million hectares of land were originally included in the provincial ALR.

Less than four years after the inauguration of the Agricultural Land Commission, political changes again took place in British Columbia. In 1975, the Social Credit Party returned to power. One of the aims of the new government was to introduce a liberalisation of the land preservation policies brought in by the New Democrats. Amendments introduced in 1977 curtailed some of the powers of the Land Reserve Commissions. The most important change was the allowance of unilateral exclusions of lands from ALRs by the government without consultation of either ALR commissions or municipal governments[79]. In Oberlander's and Smith's view, this amendment has created potential for provincial abuse of the ALR instrument and subjects agricultural land protection to the political whims of the party in power[80].

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[75] See S.E. Corke, Land Use Controls in British Columbia. A Contribution to a Comparative Study of Canadian Planning Systems, Research Paper No.138, Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies (University of Toronto), 1983, pp.14-15.
[76] Idem.
[77] Ibid, p.15.
[78] Ibid, pp.18-19.
[79] John T. Pierce, The B.C. Agricultural Land Commission: A Review and Evaluation, Plan Canada 21(2), June 1981, pp.48-56.
[80] H. Peter Oberlander and Patrick J. Smith, op.cit.,p.30.

Table 19 Development of Agricultural Land Reserves, 1974 - 1981

	total designated land[1]	net change
1974	4,721,295.3 ha	-592.1 ha
1975	4,724,228.8 ha	2,933.6 ha
1976	4,722,389.0 ha	- 1,839.8 ha
1977	4,707,278.0 ha	-14,661.2 ha
1978	4,715,938.4 ha	8,660.4 ha
1979	4,710,431.4 ha	-5,507.0 ha
1980	4,704,608.6 ha	-5,822.8 ha
1981	4,689,416.9 ha	-15,191.7 ha

1. Designated ALR land refers to initially designated hectares for 1974 only.
Thereafter it is the sum of previous year and new inclusion minus exclusions
for each particular year.
Source: B.C. Provincial Agricultural Land Commission, Annual Report, 1982.

Despite the antagonistic stance of the present Social Credit government in British Columbia, the province has recognised the existence of broad public support for ALRs and has not attempted to eliminate them[81]. While there is general agreement that ALRs have done a good deal to forestall suburban sprawl, it is likely that development pressures and municipal interests will require a further relaxation of peripheral land regulation[82]. Furthermore, Regional Plan restrictions which see most ALR lands as perpetual open space have caused conflicts between the province (under SoCred rule) and the GVRD. Victoria, taking umbrage at local determination of future uses of ALRs, reacted by removing many of the police powers originally given to the GVRD in 1983.

The controversy which led to the 1983 Municipal Amendment Act - legislation which basically declared regional plans, including that of the GVRD, null and void - surrounded ALR lands located in Delta. The then Mayor of Delta attempted in 1975 to remove 616 acres of land from the ALR in order to allow residential development. After much debate, 523 acres were eventually removed in 1981 but the GVRD refused to allow the municipality of Delta to change its zoning by-laws to allow construction on these lands[83]. The issue was not so much the actual exclusion of this acreage as the fact that the planned developments did not satisfy the GVRD's regional planning housing and open space requirements[84]. Premier van der Zalm had previously threatened to force rezoning if GVRD remained intransigent on the Delta issue and, in 1983, legislation formally abolished the planning powers of all B.C. regional districts. It was argued that existing municipal plans were sufficient to meet local needs and assure effective land use planning[85].

Interestingly though, despite GVRD's loss of planning authority, Delta was persuaded not to allow construction without a careful consideration of the environmental and sprawl effects of

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81 Interview with Walter Hardwick in Vancouver, 19 September 1988.
82 Interview with Hugh Kellas, op. cit.
83 H. Peter Oberlander and Patrick J. Smith, op.cit., pp.38-39.
84 Interview with Hugh Kellas, op.cit.
85 H. Peter Oberlander and Patrick J. Smith, op.cit., p.32.

intensive development[86]. Delta finally rejected the existing development proposals in 1989. Most of the Delta acreage removed form the ALR has thus remained open space.

Admittedly, the ALR instrument has had its problems. Skyrocketing land prices and bureaucratic interference in matters of private ownership have been cited as negative aspects. For example, the city of Kelowna, located in the rich agricultural Okanagan Valley district, is severely restricted in its development by ALRs which make up almost 48% of municipal land[87]. Fruit farmers in the district, finding it hard to stay in business, have complained bitterly of not being able to sell their land to developers. According to many affected land owners the regulatory thrust of ALR legislation has allegedly sacrificed economic common sense for inflexible resource protection[88]. In the Greater Vancouver area, where the pressures on agricultural land are much greater, the ALRs have insured that large close-in and peripheral areas remain as regional open space. Surrey, Delta, and Richmond contain the GVRD's largest share of agricultural reserves (see Figure 6) which, at the same time, represents some of the best farming land in British Columbia's Lower Mainland.

6.2.2 "Densification" and Renewal: Reurbanisation of the Central City

Granville Island, False Creek, BC Place, and the Central Waterfront are names that have become synonymous with grand-scale urban redevelopment. Beginning in the early 1970s and continuing until the present, Vancouver has embarked on the largest and most ambitious effort to recycle inner-city land as yet attempted in North America. Simultaneously there has been a boom in downtown office development, and increasing pressure on inner-city land markets. Renewal in Vancouver has been promoted by the city, the province, and federal agencies such as the Canadian Housing and Mortgage Corporation. Together, the action of these three levels of government have helped attract vast amounts of private investment capital into the inner-city. The conversion of blighted industrial land from a liability to a handsome economic asset has been highly successful - in some aspects, too successful. David Ley has commented that the

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[86] Interview with Hugh Kellas, op.cit.
[87] Interview with Mayor Larry Forster in Kelowna, 7 September 1988.
[88] Land owners in the Okanagan have argued that a balance between ordered growth and resource protection and a provincial committment to an orderly planning process are needed. Farmers feel cheated as the ALR designation is not based on economics but soil quality, therefore depriving them of priveliges available to other citizens.

Figure 6   Agricultural Land Reserves in Greater Vancouver with Regard to Principal Municipalities
Source: EVENDEN, 1978, p.183.

construction of attractive, inner-city housing on False Creek greatly inflated housing demand, speculative expectations, and city housing prices[89]. Suburban office locations appear, at least temporarily, to have lost much of their competitive advantages and have floundered for lack of investor interest.

False Creek was the first large redevelopment project. It was the subject of careful investigation by the city of Vancouver between 1968 and 1972. Vancouver's downtown area, although continuously dominant within the metropolitan region, had begun to experience considerable decline by the 1950s. Growth of the suburban population, coupled with the construction of large shopping complexes in Burnaby and Richmond, helped shift private investment away from the core area[90]. The False Creek area, an inner-city industrial zone of approximately 400 hectares housing sawmills, metalworks, and dockyards, was seen by Vancouver city council to provide space for new and attractive urban amenities necessary to counteract downtown decline[91]. It was hoped that the transformation of old and blighted industrial lands would supply new possibilities for housing construction, recreation, and retail activity in the downtown.

After preliminary studies, the city of Vancouver asked the GVRD, which then had land use planning powers, to rezone the north and south shore areas of False Creek from industrial to mixed urban uses. The GVRD approved the change largely because of the potential increase in inner-city housing construction it promised[92]. During the first phases of False Creek's transformation, the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation played an important role as developer. Indeed, Granville Island and the south shore were largely built-up with CMHC funds[93].

In connection with the 1986 World's Fair, the province of British Columbia intensified its involvement in the redevelopment of downtown Vancouver. The area intended for EXPO 86 consisted of industrial lands in False Creek's north shore and was eventually to be used for a variety of urban activities. After 230 acres of land was purchased by the provincial government, the province established a crown corporation, the B. C. Place Corporation, to plan, develop, and then market land assembled for EXPO 86[94]. In addition to providing an EXPO site, the original intent of B.C. Place was to allow high-density residential towers along the False Creek shoreline,

[89] David Ley, Liberal Ideology and the Post-Industrial City, in Annals of the Association of American Geographers 70(2), pp. 246-257. Ley considers the False Creek project to be characteristic of a consumerist and liberal post-industrial ideology which has emphasised "livability", "diversity", and "pluralism" but, at the same time, created an unitended élitism that has accelerated the social and spatial marginalisation of lower-income groups.

[90] See Walter Hardwick, Vancouver, Vancouver: Collier-Macmillan, 1974, pp.43-62.

[91] Interview with Walter Hardwick, op.cit.

[92] S.E. Corke, op cit, p.28-29.

[93] Tom Noonay. Granville Island, Quarterly Review, 14(3), January 1986, p.5.

[94] Dorothy Whiting and Martha Farevaag, False Creek's North Shore: Starting Now, in Quarterly Review (published by the city of Vancouver's Planning Department) 14(3), July 1987, pp.5-6.; S.E. Corke, op cit, p.27.

Figure 7   **The False Creek Redevelopment Area including B.C. Place**
Source: VANCOUVER CITY PLANNING DEPARTMENT, n. d.

finance the construction of a huge amphitheatre, hotels, and, adjacent to these projects, establish a new office area core with approximately 7,7 million square feet of floor space[95]. These original plans conflicted both with the city's planning objectives and the GVRD's Livable Region concept. Particularly objectionable was the large increase in office and other commercial space on which the province had insisted, and the low ratio of planned social ("non-market") housing.

Since the original plans for False Creek's north shore were unveiled in 1981, the province has agreed to compromise on certain issues. Long-term redevelopment is now being dealt with on a more flexible basis and involves a greater amount of cooperation between the city and provincial agencies. The so-called North Park section of B.C. Place, which includes lands adjacent to Chinatown, will emphasise housing development, open space and parks, while also providing considerable commercial space (about 4.7 Million square metres). The large remaining areas of B.C. Place will include high-density residential, certain public buildings left over from EXPO 86, and a considerable amount of retail and commercial space. The Province is presently active in advertising the site to domestic and international investors[96]. No definitive decisions as to the final shape of False Creek's north shore have been made, but it is almost certain that high-density housing development will provide between 10,000 and 15,000 future units in downtown Vancouver[97].

At the same time that redevelopment of old industrial lands has greatly enhanced Vancouver's locational attractiveness, the traditional downtown has experienced a boom in office building construction. Over the last 15 years, the City of Vancouver has attempted to adhere to development concepts delineated in the GVRD's Livable Region policy. It appears however, that the economic growth of the central city has hindered the realisation of certain regional goals. The dynamism of Vancouver's land market has caused city planners to deemphasise downtown office development. At the same time, a long-term attempt to "densify" housing construction within suitable areas of the city has been inaugurated. The official Vancouver Plan seeks to discourage new zoning for core area office development expansion while limiting population suburbanisation through increased housing opportunities for various income groups[98].

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[95] B.C. Place Corporation, B.C. Place Report No.1., and City of Vancouver, B.C. Place Information Sheet of February 11, 1982.
[96] Ted Droettboom, Previewing Post Expo Projects, in Quarterly Review 13(4), October 1986, pp.11-14, and Dorothy Whiting and Martha Farevaag, op. cit.
[97] Interview with John Winsor, City of Vancouver Planning Department, on 22 September 1988.
[98] Ibid.

Table 20   Office Space in
              Downtown Vancouver (sq. feet)

1957	5,700,000
1964	6,646,000
1968	7,475,980
1972	9,711,600
1980	15,700,000
1982	18,000,000
1984	20,094,000
1986	22,301,000

Source: City of Vancouver Planning Department; 1986, 1987.

In the 10 years between 1986 and 1996, the city will be attempting to provide space for 50,000 additional housing units. This objective will be partially achieved by the planned high-density projects in False Creek and elsewhere, but a rezoning of older residential areas will be necessary to allow for more medium-density zoning within the city. About 70% of Vancouver's total land is zoned for single-family dwellings. Additionally, with housing prices increasing rapidly, the city is attempting to provide as much social and market low-income housing as possible. This can only be accomplished through a more intensive utilisation of available land.

Without doubt, neighbourhood resistance is the greatest obstacle to increasing general housing densities. Fear of political backlash has caused planners to pursue the "densification" process with caution seeking a variety of means to reach the 50,000-unit target[99]. Rezoning commercial space, for example, is generally uncontroversial, and it may prove relatively easy to persuade firms to relocate, thereby freeing up underutilised land. Another planning strategy is to create nodes of mixed zoning along the edges of neighbourhoods with good transport ties[100]. During the last 20 years, certain blocks along Arbutus and Cambie Streets have been built at higher densities, and certain areas along 10th Avenue have provided for expansion of apartment complexes. Booming housing demand has created a situation in which illegal "secondary suites" have been cropping up in single-family neighbourhoods. This is especially pronounced in attractive areas such as that adjacent to the Joyce SkyTrain station[101]. Public awareness of this situation might, in the estimation of some planners, help diminish resistance to zoning changes[102]. In many cases, site-by-site rezonings through development control may provide a key to allowing townhouse construction in some neighbourhoods.[103] At present, no comprehensive housing intensification plan exists and planners have resorted to "ad hockery" in order to limit the conflict potential of rezoning attempts. However, Vancouver's record in providing housing at higher densities (see

99   Interview with John Winsor, op.cit.
100   Ibid.
101   Estimations of the number of secondary suites in single-family neighbourhoods range from around 21,000 to 26,000. See Ann McAfee, Secondary Suites: The Issues, in Quarterly Review 14(2), April 1987, pp.16-18.
102   Interview with Dan Hiebert, Geography Department University of British Columbia, 17 September 1988.
103   Interview with John Winsor, op.cit.

Table 21) appears to justify the assumption that Vancouver will succeed in satisfying a large share of future regional housing needs.

Table 21   Higher-Density Housing Completions
City / CMA

	Townhouses		Apartments	
	City	CMA	City	CMA
1980	256	1,025	1,453	2,415
1982	819	2,027	1,302	6,222
1984	526	1,021	1,282	2,906
1986	218	1,333	2,441	1,993
1988[1]	115	939	1,181	3,019

[1] January- June 1988.
Source: Vancouver Plan Monitoring Program, 1988.

6.2.3   Consensus, Cooperation and the Success of Regional Governance

The Greater Vancouver Regional District was incorporated in June of 1967 by provincial action. Sixteen years later, the province removed the GVRD's police powers over land use, reducing it to the status of a regional service board with only planning advisory functions. Indeed, there was no lack of controversy either in the GVRD's establishment or in the GVRD's regulatory position with regard to fringe lands. Fears were voiced that an unnecessary "fourth level" of government had been created. In the mid-70s, suburban communities, such as Surrey, Delta, and Langley opposed the development controls established by the GVRD complaining of bureaucratic interference in local affairs[104]. Jealous of its authority over municipal affairs, the province summarily relieved the GVRD of its land use planning responsibilities in view of the Delta controversy.

Whether or not the GVRD deserved this fate is now beside the point. What does seem clear is that the GVRD has succeeded in overcoming municipal suspicions of its intentions and has been able to develop a certain degree of planning consensus within the region. In a 1984 report, the B.C. Minister of Municipal Affairs praised two specific aspects of the GVRD's activities[105]. First, the regional municipalities' perception of the GVRD not as an additional level of government but as a provider of regional services was important in demonstrating a lack of coercion in the GVRD's handling of development issues. Second, unanimous support for the role of the GVRD among its member municipalities facilitated purposeful cooperation within the region.

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[104] See Paul Tennant, op cit, pp.37-46.
[105] British Columbia Minister of Municipal Affairs, GVRD Review, March 1984, pp.II.2-II.3.

Accordingly, since 1983 the GVRD's Livable Region Programme has been largely incorporated into municipal plans on the basis of suasion. Compulsory compliance with GVRD guidelines in the 1970s appears to have set a general pattern of regional cooperation that has continued even after removal of police powers[106]. Surveys of local officials in Greater Vancouver have shown general agreement as to the desirability, or at least tolerability, of land use and development controls[107]. While there have been some complaints of provincial restrictiveness, particularly with regard to ALRs, land use control does not appear to be as politically salient as it was fifteen years ago[108].

There is virtually no disagreement as to the administrative role of the GVRD regarding transport, parks, water, sewage disposal and other areas of largely technical concern. Municipalities have not perceived their transferral of service delivery responsibilities GVRD as a loss to their political autonomy. Instead, the Regional District function is viewed as an "instrument of convenience", allowing the rational and economically feasible provision of various services at a level considered impossible for communities acting alone.[109] The question still remains as to whether suasion alone will continue to be adequate for regional development objectives that involve greater potential conflict. Present experience suggests that regional cooperation on certain land use issues (particularly the promotion of Town Centres and intensification of development along SkyTrain and other transport arterials) will continue. Nevertheless, without sustained provincial intervention, for example through the ALR device, it seems doubtful that uncontrolled peripheral development can be effectively avoided in potential "boom" areas, such as Delta and Surrey. High housing prices and dwindling opportunities for single-family home development closer to Vancouver will put increasing pressure on the outer suburbs to allow more new construction. Everything considered, however, it seems that Greater Vancouver has succeeded in maintaining central city vitality, promoting high-quality urban services, and concentrating new development close to future axes of regional transit. The emerging pattern is one of strategic reurbanisation, an efficient accommodation of growth, and prevention of the worst manifestations of outward sprawl.

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[106] Interview with Hugh Kellas, 21 September 1988.
[107] GVRD Development Services, Municipal Development Controls and Procedures in Greater Vancouver, January 1987, p.6
[108] Ibid.
[109] British Columbia Minister of Municipal Affairs, GVRD Review, ibid.

6.3   METROPOLITAN TORONTO: A CASE IN COMPROMISE

The Toronto Metropolitan area distinguishes itself from the other urban areas in this study in that it represents the undisputed financial, industrial, and commercial centre of its country. In terms of population, the Toronto region overtook Montréal's CMA in the mid-seventies to become Canada's largest urban centre. Furthermore, the region is still growing rapidly as outer suburban communities, such as Mississauga, Vaughn, Markham, and Ajax, develop their lands for residential and other urban uses. Having weathered the Depression and war years better than other Canadian cities, Toronto was relatively well-placed to accommodate the post-war housing boom[110]. In anticipation of rapid growth, regional planning advocates warned of the considerable financial, infrastructural, and administrative problems that individual municipal governments would face. It was argued that some form of metropolitan administration was needed to treat the Toronto area as a cohesive social and economic unit[111]. Outright annexation or amalgamation of suburban communities was the alternative favoured by the city of Toronto, realising that rapid suburban growth could result in loss of central city influence. Annexation was in fact requested by the city in 1950[112]. The Ontario Municipal Board rejected this proposal, preferring to preserve municipal governments within a metropolitan framework[113]. The metropolitan solution that was devised established a "federal", two-tier system of government in Greater Toronto in 1953. It established a new regional council, while maintaining the municipal governments of Toronto and its five surrounding suburbs. This was the first administrative reorganisation of its kind in North America, consolidating such urban services as water, sewerage, public transit, education, road construction, planning, housing, public welfare, justice, health and parks systems. Metro Toronto, as the new body was to be known, also consolidated tax assessment authority and financial responsibilities for service operation.

Metro Toronto, as established in 1953, included the five suburban municipalities of East York, Etobicoke, North York, Scarborough, and York, and seven small unincorporated townships and villages. It represented a compromise solution to what many politicians apparently believed was a technical matter. Two-tier government arguably prevented the maintenance of the city of Toronto's hegemony over its surrounding areas. Even this solution was, however, at first viewed with trepidation by suburban municipalities, who saw in it a vehicle of central city domination.

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[110] See Warren Magnusson, Toronto, in Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton (eds.), City Politics in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, pp. 105-109.

[111] Bureau of Municipal Research, Where are Toronto and its Metropolitan Area Heading?., White Paper No.305 , December 1945, Toronto.

[112] See Albert Rose, Governing Metropolitan Toronto. A Social and Political Analysis, 1953-1971, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, pp.20-21.

[113] Idem.

Table 22   Population distribution and share in Metro Toronto, 1941 - 1967 [1]

	1941	%	1951	%	1961	%	1967	%
Toronto	667,457	73,4	675,754	60,5	672,407	41,5	682,000	39,0
East York	41,821	4,6	64,616	5,8	72,409	4,5	91,000	5,2
Etobicoke	18,973	2,1	53,779	4,8	156,035	9,6	240,000	13,8
North York	22,908	2,5	85,897	7,7	269,959	16,7	342,000	19,6
Scarborough	24,303	2,6	56,292	5,0	217,286	13,4	253,000	14,5
York	81,052	8,9	101,582	9,1	129,645	8,0	139,000	7,9

[1] The data for 1967 include small towns and villages incorporated after the 1967 reorganisation into
Metro townships.
Source: Census of Canada

The priorities established in the province's White Paper were nonetheless clear: the main task was the efficient and financially feasible accommodation of future growth[114]. Recognising that individual municipalities could not achieve this on their own, the establishment of regional governance was viewed as unavoidable.

6.3.1 The First Years of Metro Toronto: Expanded Urban Services, Central City-Suburb Conflicts.

In the Depression years preceding southern Ontario's suburban growth boom, Toronto had consistently refused to accept administrative responsibility for its suburban neighbours when they, desperately short of revenue, had great difficulty in providing basic urban services[115]. The situation changed rapidly after the war as the city, its politicians, and planners, anticipated a burst of construction activity and investment spurred by federal programmes and pent-up demand for housing. Not only did they perceive a "metropolitan problem" of providing services to a rapidly expanding area, but they also saw an opportunity to maintain central city control over development. Annexation was the response Toronto chose, and in 1950 the province was asked to amalgamate the central city and its suburban municipalities into a unitary regional government[116]. This proved impossible to achieve. Toronto's "imperialistic" designs were doomed by suburban resistance to annexation and provincial unwillingness to force a unitary form of local government on the municipalities.

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[114] Ibid, pp. 16-20.
[115] See Warren Magnusson, op.cit., p 109.
[116] Idem.

Toronto's fear of a suburban ascendancy were well-founded. Beginning in the 1950's, rapid population increases in Scarborough, Etobicoke and North York began to shift the political balance in favour of suburbia. Toronto's regional share of population dropped from 73% in 1941 to little over 40% twenty years later (see Table 22). Accompanying population growth was a marked increase in suburban commercial and retail activity (Table 23) Accordingly, there was concern that future investment would be largely redirected to suburban municipalities, resulting in an erosion of the city's economic base.

Table 23: Changes in Commercial Floor Space, Metropolitan Toronto
Planning Area, 1953 - 1966

	1953	Regional Share %	1966	Regional Share %
Toronto	14,855,000	73.2	5,378,000	45.8
York	1,233,000	6.1	1,566,000	4.7
East York	577,000	2.7	1,266,000	3.7
Etobicoke	1,259,000	6.2	3,373,000	10.1
North York	1,126,000	5.5	5,775,000	17.2
Scarborough	318,000	1.6	3,615,000	10.8
Fringe	958,000	4.7	2,601,000	7.7

Source: Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Plan Review.
Existing Land Use, 1966.

If Toronto feared decline in the centre, the worries of the growth areas of Metro primarily related to financing new development and maintaining an adequate standard of service delivery. In this, they were dependent on the financial "anchor" of the central city[117]. Nevertheless, the suburban communities were suspicious of unified metropolitan governance, preferring a more fragmented arrangement that would preserve local autonomy. The creation of Metro Toronto in 1953 is seen by Kaplan as a victory of moderate proponents of regional government reform. It created a federated body with multiple administrative duties, instead of the "unicity" solution desired by Toronto, or the multitude of single-purpose districts preferred by the suburbs[118]. Despite the popular impression that the Toronto area's reorganisation involved a general consolidation of local government, a great deal of administrative fragmentation remained. Alongside Metro level agencies, the Area Municipalities (as the suburban boroughs are known)

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[117] Warren Magnusson, op.cit, p.110. Also see Government of Ontario, First Report of the Metropolitan Toronto Commission of Inquiry, March 1958, pp.6-7.

[118] Harold Kaplan, Reform, Planning, and City Politics. Montréal, Winnipeg, Toronto, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982, p.683.

retained their own local authorities responsible for various functions such as, education, health, municipal planning, libraries, etc.

In its first years of operation, Metro Toronto in fact concentrated its activities on providing physical infrastructure to accommodate new housing construction[119]. Thus, Toronto's huge tax base, now incorporated into that of Metro government, ironically served to subsidise growth in Etobicoke, Scarborough, and North York. Costly capital investments, in particular extensions of water and sewer systems into Toronto's suburbs, opened the way for large-scale housing development[120]. Realising that metropolitan development would favour suburban areas, city of Toronto officials began to lobby Metro council for support in programmes to prevent central city decline. This strategy was especially targeted at transit schemes, renewal, and the mandating of regional "fair shares" in the provision of social housing[121]. Unable to dominate the region politically, Toronto increasingly looked to aggressive rezoning and redevelopment policies as a way of limiting the negative effects of outward expansion.

6.3.1.1   The Public Housing Issue

The first years of Metro administration were accompanied by considerable central city-suburb tensions. The principal reasons for this lie in the public housing issue and in suburban unwillingness to accommodate lower-income groups[122]. Between 1957 and 1962, the boroughs of North York, Scarborough, and Etobicoke were targeted for substantial public housing construction. A total of 1,500 units were to be completed per year, but local resistance coupled with a reduction in senior government funding, stymied Metro's housing construction programme. Attempts to unify Metro's housing activities were blocked by municipal resistance as well.

Help on the public housing issue arrived from the provincial government. In 1964, provincial action dissolved the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority and entrusted the newly created Ontario Housing Corporation (OHC) with the creation and management of public housing in Metro[123]. Through a variety of means (including the purchase of existing housing for lower-income families), the OHC had created almost 50,000 public housing units by 1972[124].

1973 marked an important change in provincial policy - a Ministry of Housing had been established, but at the same time, the province attempted to decentralise housing administration and encourage greater municipal involvement in housing matters. The following year, the city of

[119] Albert Rose, op.cit, pp.29-39.
[120] Albert Rose, idem. Rose describes Metro's first chairman, Frederick Gardiner, as an enthusiastic supporter of suburban expansion and believer in the creation of a physical environment in which private enterprise could flourish and thus solve serious housing shortage problems.
[121] Warren Magnusson, op.cit. p.111.
[122] Albert Rose, op.cit., pp.75-79.
[123] Ibid, p.102.
[124] Ibid, p.105.

Toronto formed its own Department of Housing, while Metro established an Interim Housing Policy aimed at substantially increasing public housing and distributing public housing responsibilities evenly among the six boroughs[125].

At first, municipal resistance prevented the creation of a powerful Metro Housing authority and most certainly slowed efforts to increase public housing allowances. By 1978, however, enough consensus had been generated within Metro council to adopt a "fair share" programme to ensure each municipality would accept an appropriate amount of public housing. This programme has been successful: Planning data indicate that by 1985, the city of Toronto accommodated only 33% of Metro's total public housing while Scarborough and North York accounted for more than half[126].

6.3.2   Regional Visions of Development: Controlled Decentralisation

Metropolitan Toronto's first planning attempts were largely directed toward the improvement and extension of physical infrastructure. Metro government made no serious policy effort with social housing and community land planning. While a Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board was established in 1954, and a vast 240 square miles in and around the metropolitan area defined as an official planning area, regional planning remained largely advisory (it was and is the responsibility of the individual area municipalities to perform actual planning). During the first ten years of Metro existence, however, the suburban areas were concerned primarily with orderly development and the accommodation of growth, while the City of Toronto faced the task of renewing its urban fabric. The late 1960s brought a gradual change in the relative importance of regional planning, and certain long-range goals regarding central area development and suburban growth appear to have been influential in guiding municipal plans. Attempts to extend comprehensive regional planning outside the boundaries of Metro Toronto have been less successful.

In 1959, the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board (MTPB) presented its first Official Plan. Based on several urban development principles, it represented an attempt to provide a planning framework for orderly suburban growth, enhancement of the central area, and effective public transit extension[127]. Most importantly, the Official Plan emphasised that 1) the need to commute should be minimised by a concentration of housing and employment in new areas, 2) the central city should remain a conspicuous focal point of cultural and commercial activity within the

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[125] Ibid, pp.127-133.
[126] Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Metropolitan Plan Review. Housing Trends, 1976 - 1986, Toronto: the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 1987, pp.43-44..
[127] See Kenneth D. Cameron, Planning in a Metropolitan Framework: The Toronto Experience, in William T. Perks and Ira M. Robinson, Urban and Regional Planning in a Federal State. The Canadian Experience, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p. 251.

region, and 3) open space and greenbelt areas should be maintained to provide the urban populace with "rural" amenities[128]. While tacit support for these principles existed among municipal politicians, preoccupation with local area concerns and a lack of commitment to wider Metro development aims weakened the impact of this ambitious plan[129]. Never formally adopted by Metro council, the development principles laid down by the first Official Plan did, however, remain "in operation" and were resubmitted in 1966 to Metro council in a proposal for a new metropolitan plan[130]. The second plan, also failed to be adopted due to fear among Area Municipalities that local planning prerogatives would be effected. For this reason, it was never submitted to the province for final approval.

Although it was not until 1980 that Metro officially adopted an urban development plan, many of the development guidelines established by the City of Toronto's and Metro's planning boards were adhered to. Transportation planning, aside from the Spadina expressway controversy, did not present a large obstacle to cooperation. Generally, the Area Municipalities welcomed subway extensions and plan for light rail systems. For its part, the government of Ontario helped finance and maintain a commuter transit system (GO trains) connecting downtown Toronto with fringe suburbs. This is in addition to the province's support of Toronto's subway system, through which 75% of capital financing for the system is provided[131]. The coupling of capital investments in transportation with concentrated commercial, residential, and office space growth in designated subcentres also met with success. The conversion of peripheral lands also appears to have been controlled relatively well[132].

6.3.2.1   The Subcentres Policy

In the first Official Plan of 1959 the MTPB formulated general planning guidelines meant to limit commuting through the concentration of housing and job opportunities. The permissive Metro and Area Municipality planning allowed employment suburbanisation in the 1950s and 1960s to follow a generally dispersed pattern, threatening to undermine regional transit concepts. Reappraisal of Metro Plan in the 1970s led to adoption of an Office Centres policy to concentrate commercial and industrial development. Furthermore, to improve accessibility designated subcentres were to be served by regional rapid transit[133] . This concept appears to have been generally accepted by the area municipalities. Scarborough, for example, had been experiencing

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[128] Metropolitan Toronto Planning Board, The Official Plan of the Metropolitan Toronto Area, 1959, Toronto: Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 1959.

[129] See Frances Frisken, Planning and Servicing the Greater Toronto Area: The Interplay of Provincial and Municipal Interest, Paper presented for the Metropolitan Regions Research Group of the North American Federalism Project, Nov. 16-17, 1989, p.42.

[130] Kenneth D. Cameron, op.cit., p.251.

[131] Juri Pill, Toronto: Thirty Years of Transit Development, in Wayne Attoe (ed.), op.cit., p.58.

[132] Frances Frisken, (op.cit., p.43) has added, however, that provincial regulations regarding urbanisation and sewer service extensions also helped limit residential development in fringe areas.

[133] Hok Lin Leung, Mutual Learning in Development Control, Plan Canada 27(2), April 1987, p.46.

rapid population growth but little in the way of new employment opportunities. Fearful of remaining in Toronto's shadow as a dormitory suburb, Scarborough welcomed this new approach and began to promote office development in designated sites[134].

Metro Toronto, pursuing a transit-oriented policy, began to encourage high-density development in the vicinity of subway station, using zoning bonuses and other enticements.[135] At present there are six Town Centres, most of them served by subway or light rail. These are: North York "Downtown," Scarborough Town Centre, Yonge/Eglington, Yonge/St.Clair, Islington/Bloor, and Kennedy/Eglington. Additionally, the new office area of neighbouring Mississauga (Regional District of Peel) has been included statistically as a subcentre due to its relatively compact development. Mississauga City Centre is well served by buses originating from Islington subway station and thus meets several of Metro Toronto's planning criteria.

Central Toronto continues to dominate the regional office market. However, the designated centres have increased their relative office space shares appreciably. In 1971 the six subcentres plus Mississauga accounted for 9.7% of total regional office space, by 1986 their share had risen to 12.2%[136]. In terms of absolute floor space, this meant an increase from 487,000 to 1,282,000 square metres. Within the same period Metro Toronto's office space share within the Greater Toronto Region declined from 95.8% to 90.0%. The four regional districts within Greater Toronto, Durham, Halton, York, and Peel, have experienced considerable population growth. In 1981 they made up 37.5% of total population and by 1985 had raised their total share to 40.5%[137]. In terms of employment, however, the four "fringe" regions are overwhelmingly dependent on Metro Toronto. This indicates that the central area has been successful in absorbing most new employment growth and that the economic dominance of downtown Toronto and Metro will not change appreciably in the near future[138].

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[134] Ibid, p.52.Leung mentions that the rigid Town Centres concept has at times conflicted with developer's locational desires. Generally, though, compromises nbetween borough planners and office site developers have been found which have supported the basic subcentre idea.

[135] Juri Pill, op.cit.,pp.59-60.

[136] Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Office Space Characteristics. Metropolitan Region 1986, Toronto: Research Division, Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, 1987, p.25.

[137] Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Housing Trends, op.cit., p.50.

[138] Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Office Space Characteristics, op.cit., p.37.

Metropolitan Toronto Urban Structure Plan: Designated Metropolitan Centers

Figure 8   **Urban Structure of Metropolitan Toronto with Subcentres and Rapid Transit**
Source: CULLINGWORTH, 1986, p.263.

6.3.2.2   Land Use Regulation and the Toronto-Centred Region

By 1970 it was becoming clear that Metro Toronto had assumed the function of a core area for a larger urban region. While Metro had been relatively successful in controlling sprawl within its jurisdictions, it was feared that fringe areas would be much less receptive to land use regulation. The regions surrounding Metro Toronto had then, as they do now, great potential for widescale residential development. Uncontrolled peripheral expansion would not only exacerbate sprawl but greatly increase traffic congestion[139].

In order to counter this danger, the government of Ontario outlined a long-term development strategy for a major portion of urbanised north shore of Lake Ontario in 1970. The concept involved defining a Toronto Centred Region stretching from Hamilton in the West to Peterborough in the East in which certain municipalities would assume a central place role. Separating these central places would be "parkway belts" of open space in order to control sprawl[140]. The thrust of the concepts was to promote "decentralised centralisation"; relieving the core area from continuing growth pressures while at the same time, channelling growth into other centres of southern Ontario[141].

The Toronto Centred Region was an innovative concept and, at the time of its unveiling, was seen as a new direction in regional planning and a signal of a provincial commitment to comprehensive land use regulation. Unfortunately, the concept was not followed up by a legally binding plan or a serious attempt by the province to work with local governments in its implementation. Ironically, a powerful piece of legislation was enacted by the province in 1973 which might have provided the tools to set the Toronto-centred plan in motion. The Ontario Planning and Development Act enabled the province to create new regional planning areas and to develop plans for these areas. The act theoretically gave the Government of Ontario almost absolute planning authority over municipalities - requiring adherence of local zoning by-laws and plans to provincial guidelines. The undoing of this legislation, and as it turned out, of the ambitious Toronto centred concept, was the inflexible and seemingly heavy-handed nature of the 1973 Act[142]. Municipalities clearly stated their dislike of the Act, seeing in it a gross violation of local autonomy and a removal of planning responsibilities. The province, fearing a political backlash, never made use of its regulatory powers.

Without direct regulatory action by the province, the Toronto-Centred Region remained a vague concept. Researchers determined that by 1979, concepts defined by the plan were having little or no visible effect on development and that the open space areas meant to separate growth

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[139] See J. Barry Cullingworth, ibid.

[140] Government of Ontario, Design for Development: The Toronto-Centred Region, Toronto: Queen's Printer and Publisher, 1970.

[141] See Matthew B. M. Lawson, The Toronto-Centred Region Plan, Plan Canada, 24(3/4),1984, p.136.

[142] Wojciech Wronski and John C. Turnbull, The Toronto-Centred Region, Plan Canada, 24(3/4),1984 p.134.

centres were experiencing land conversion consistent with market pressures[143].

Wronski and Turnbull have noted that, despite the "demise" of the province's ambitious development strategy, there are some signs the government of Ontario might renew efforts to promote more effective regional planning[144]. The Planning Act of 1983 is less prescriptive in nature and allows a greater degree of intergovernmental coordination of planning policy. The Act specifies that provincial ministries shall be empowered to make policy statements relating to planning issues if these issues appear to be of general provincial interest[145]. Municipal councils will be able to act on these policies in a flexible manner, using their own planning discretion without rigid guidelines set by the province. However, while the political pitfalls of grappling with local autonomy may have been avoided, this approach appears to be a far cry from comprehensive regional planning.

6.3.3 Reurbanisation of the Centre

The city of Toronto could do nothing to directly influence the outward development of its suburbs. Toronto's political clout within Metro council was weakened further after the reorganisation of 1967, in which the 13 existing local governments were consolidated into five powerful boroughs. On the other hand, the city, aided by Metro council and senior government funds, did its utmost to attract new investment into the central city[146]. Toronto was, in fact, very successful in attracting new employment and was able to maintain a high tax assessment level. This in turn, helped the city keep a strong voice within Metro Council. By the end of the 1960s, however, very little unbuilt and easily developable land remained within the city. For this reason, an active policy of redevelopment and "densification" - particularly in the downtown area - was seen as the only alternative in accommodating intense demand for housing and business space[147]. The city's 1969 Offical Plan actively sought the expansion of the financial centre and encouraged higher densities in residential neighbourhoods near the core areas[148]. The plan also envisioned transportation improvements - most notably in the form of the Spadina and Scarbourough expressways - to increase downtown accessibility.

This intensification strategy had to be reexamined due to stiff and well-organised neighbourhood resistance to higher densities and general outcry against the planned Spadina

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[143] K. J. Milnes and L. G. Rees, Land Use Policy and Land Use Trends in the Toronto Commutershed, Plan Canada, 19(3) Sept/Oct. 1979, pp.237-248.

[144] Wojciech Wronski and John C. Turnbull, op.cit., p.134.

[145] Government of Ontario, The Planning Act, 1983.

[146] Warren Magnusson, op.cit, p.113.

[147] Frank Lewinberg, op. cit., pp.40-45.

[148] City of Toronto Planning Department, Official Plan for the City of Toronto Planning Area,, Part I, Toronto: City of Toronto, 1969, pp.16-18.

Expressway. This resulted in the preservation of older, inner-city neighbourhoods, and a redirection of development towards subcentres and underutilised industrial lands within the city[149]. Still, transit planning and and vigorous downtown expansion policies helped maintain the central importance of the core area through the 70s and 80s. Projects such as Eaton Centre and the Harbourfront are examples of redevelopment projects that have not only created new commercial and office space but contributed to the regional attraction of central Toronto. Simultaneously with the construction of the Harboufront project, a light rail transit line is under construction, linking Spadina Quay with the subway at Union Station. The federal government was initiator of this Harbourfront development, purchasing waterfront lands, forming a crown corporation to manage capital investments, and approving final plans for a mixed-use urban area[150].

6.3.3.1   Housing Intensification Efforts

Metropolitan Toronto has made a goal of accommodating a considerable amount of future housing demand that might otherwise be satisfied in suburban fringe areas. According to the 1980 Metropolitan Plan, Metro Toronto is to reach a total population of 2,200,000 by 2011[151]. While this signifies minimal growth in absolute terms, it is estimated that the number of households will increase sharply. Singles, childless couples, and single-parent families have been changing the structure of housing demand considerably. An estimated 209,000 additional units will be needed in Metropolitan Toronto by 2011[152]. At the present rate of construction this means a total additional requirement of 175,000 units.

Toronto has been able to intensify residential development by "recycling" old and underutilised industrial space. Linkages between office space development and space for residential contruction are also being required. Still, job increases will outpace housing possibilities if intensification is not accepted by Area Municipalities. Frisken notes, however, that intensification is a controversial issue as it can infringe upon single-family neighbourhoods[153]. Toronto's experiences in the early 1970s bear this out.

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[149] Lewinberg (op. cit.) notes that resistance to the 1969 Plan's redevelopment aims succeeded in protecting the older urban fabric from demolition but could do nothing to stop the gentrification of these neighbourhoods. Furthermore, planners and neighbourhood planning activists did not recognise that the city was in great need of high-density dwellings to meet increasing demand from singles and young couples entering the housing market.

[150] Douglas Wrenn, Urban Waterfront Development, Washington D.C.: The Urban Land Institute, 1983, p.111-112.

[151] Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Official Plan for the Urban Structure: The Metropolitan Planning Area, Toronto: Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 1980.

[152] Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, Metropolitan Plan Review. Housing Intensification, Toronto: Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, 1987, p.13.

[153] Frances Frisken, op.cit., pp.48-49.

6.3.4 Toronto: a Qualified Success

In many ways, the experience of Metro Toronto parallels that of Vancouver. Despite problems with provincial ambiguity and frequent conflicts between the suburbs and central city, Toronto's growth has been successfully managed. This is not to say that such vital issues as low-income housing or gentrification have always been handled in a decisive manner. Indeed, there are those who criticise Toronto's policy of actively maintaining its physical structure while apparently lacking the will to prevent the marginalisation of less affluent socio-economic groups. Nevertheless, considering the growth pressures on metropolitan Toronto, and the political and economic complexities of managing that growth, the maintenance of metropolitan Toronto as an efficient and livable urban area would appear to be a considerable achievement.

In the appraisal of Frances Frisken,

> "The development of Metropolitan Toronto has been characterized by the maintenance of a strong central city; higher suburban densities than area common for North American metropolitan areas; a diversity of land uses in all area municipalities; the dispersal of publicly-assisted, low-income housing throughout the suburbs; and a transportation system in which public transit (subways, light rapid transit and an extensive bus network) has played an increasingly predominant role[154]."

Metropolitan government and provincial action appear to have played an important role in generating these metropolitan patterns. While it is difficult to determine the extent to which metropolitan planning has directly contributed to this result, there can be little doubt that cooperation between different levels of government and a certain degree of regional consensus were crucial. However, the real test of maintaining Greater Toronto as a livable region will lie in future cooperation between new suburban communities and the Metro core. It also remains to be seen whether the province will assume a more restrictive attitude towards sprawl. The ambitious plans for a Toronto-Centred Region are not likely to be resuscitated. Still, it appears essential that new regional concept "with teeth" be supported by Government of Ontario if the great urban complex centred on Toronto is to remain the livable place it is.

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[154] Frances Frisken, op.cit., p.43.

7.   METROPOLITAN REGIONALISM IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY

In contrast to Canada and the United States, the begin of rapid postwar suburbanisation in West Germany was delayed by at least ten years. Directly after capitulation in 1945 the main task at hand was the reconstruction of Germany's major urban centres. Instead of developing outwards, the cities had to "fill" themselves once more and provide housing through emergency construction programmes.

Suburbanisation only began in earnest towards the late 1950s, primarily affecting such cities as Hamburg, Frankfurt and Munich. Nevertheless, population suburbanisation proceeded rapidly in major urban areas during the 1960s and early 1970s. A considerable movement of employment to the suburbs followed, resulting in the functional diversification of many suburban communities.

For their part, the cities experienced dramatic changes in their local economies. Frankfurt is an extreme example of a transformed city whose manufacturing industries have been displaced by the office sector and related service industries. Munich, while retaining a strong manufacturing industry presence within its jurisdictions, has also experienced rapid growth in service sector activity. Below we shall examine some of the impacts economic growth and suburbanisation have had on the Munich and Frankfurt regions.

Table 24   Population Change in Selected German Metropolitan Areas, 1950 -1987

		1950	1970	1987
Frankfurt	City	532,037	696,313	629,375*
	Suburbs	429,513	720,063	811,682*
	Region	961,550	1,426,376	1,442,057*
Hamburg	City	1,583,466	1,793,640	1,592,770
	Suburbs	869,665	984,244	1,170,190
	Region	2,453,131	2,771,884	2,762,960
Munich	City	830,833	1, 293,599	1,185,421
	Suburbs	573,150	780,651	1,020,542
	Region	1,403,983	2,074,250	2,205,963

* 1980

Source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung, . Bevölkerungs-
daten 1961; 1970; 1987. EMPIRICA, Regionales Strukturkonzept für den engeren Verflechtungsraum
Brandenburg-Berlin, Anhangsband, 1992, p. 22.

7.1   THE COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING LAW OF 1960

Urban policy in West Germany developed out of a situation of dire need. Emergency legislation, enacted to rebuild necessary basic urban infrastructure, accommodate millions of refugees, and address serious housing shortages, lasted until the end of the 1950s. Thus the reconstruction of Germany's largest cities dominated planning, for several years. In 1960, the various laws and emergency ordinances on land use and planning were replaced by a standard federal code. Directly translated, the Bundesbaugesetz, as the planning code is called, means "federal construction law". In reality it is a Town and Country Planning Act along the lines of legislation enacted in the U.K., intended to establish a national urban planning scheme[1].

The Bundesbaugesetz (BBauG) regulates municipal planning responsibilities and sets standards for local land use plans[2]. Furthermore it mandates compulsory compliance of municipalities with existing planning goals[3]. In addition to defining procedural aspects of local land use planning, the BBauG also contains general guidelines regarding new development. These include 1) assurance of orderly and *contiguous* growth, 2) the promotion of socially equitable land use patterns, and 3) the maintenance of a livable urban environment[4]. The urban development goals defined by the BBauG are thus in keeping with the tenor of West Germany's Basic Law. Local planning autonomy and individual property rights are restricted to a considerable degree in order to limit undesirable manifestations of urban growth or land speculation. At the same time, the BBauG respects constitutional guarantees of local autonomy by delegating planning responsibility to municipalities. Perhaps under the traumatic influence of mass destruction, the BBauG strives to insure a humane and dignified urban environment and emphasises the importance of healthy living and working conditions, the necessity of satisfying social and cultural needs of the population, and the protection of the environment and natural landscapes[5].

According to Paragraph 1 of the BBauG, land use plans must conform to general development objectives set down by the federal and state governments. While municipalities are responsible for actual planning, Paragraph 4 allows them to develop joint land use plans with neighbouring communities or in conjunction with regional administrative bodies. This section of the BBauG is, in effect, national enabling legislation for the creation of regional planning agencies. Among the more regulatory aspects of the BBauG are the allowance of temporary moratoria, the guarantee of municipal compulsory purchase rights, and the requirements of a clear planning boundary within which future construction can occur. Harmonisation of municipal land uses with those planned by neighbouring communities is also required[6]. In other words, the planning sovereignty of the one

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[1]   See Arnold Whittick (ed.), Encyclopedia of Urban Planning, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974, pp.460-462.
[2]   See Ulrich Battis, Öffentliches Baurecht und Raumordnungsrecht, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,1981, pp.29-38.
[3]   Ibid, pp.74-83.
[4]   Ibid, p.60.
[5]   Bundesbaugesetz, paragraph 1. sec.5
[6]   Bundesbaugesetz, paragraphs 2. and 14.

community limits the planning sovereignty of the other[7]. The most restrictive aspect of the BBauG is in Paragraphs 34 and 35, which define the areas within municipal boundaries where new construction is permissible. Paragraph 34 establishes that land to be converted for urban development must be adjacent to existing built-up areas. Paragraph 35 defines an outer area (Außenbereich) of rural character or open space within which construction is generally forbidden. The outer areas are intended to be preserved as open space for environmental and recreational purposes. Consequently, special permission to build here is seldom granted.

7.2   NATIONAL URBAN POLICY : THE FEDERAL PLANNING ACT OF 1965

Federal framework legislation plays an important role in West Germany's political system. Often general and even vague, it nonetheless sets a tone for more specific legislation and policies adopted by federal, state, and local governments. The Basic Law promulgated in 1949 established social equality as a fundamental political objective ("the Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state"). Article 72 of the Basic Law extended this definition to include the assurance of uniform living standards throughout the national territory. The Federal Planning Act (Bundesraumordnungsgesetz or BROG) of 1965 defined *spatial* equality as the basic goal of urban and regional planning. While general in nature and often advisory in tone, the BROG has played a vital role as a national urban development concept. It has also provided the legislative framework within which state governments have been required to formulate their own specific urban and regional development plans[8].

Paraphrasing the Basic Law, the primary goal of the BROG is to promote territorial equality in living standards. This general objective is broken down into various secondary goals such as

-       the maintenance of balanced socio-economic and cultural
        relationships as a component of spatial development,

-       the concentration of housing and employment,

-       the protection and development of healthy living conditions
        within densely populated areas,

-       the care and protection of the natural environment and
        · landscapes,

-       the protection of agriculture and forestry and the
        limitation of rural outmigration[9].

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7   Ulrich Battis, op.cit. p.34.
8   Bundesraumordnungsgesetz, paragraphs 1,2.
9   Bundesraumordnungsgesetz, paragraph 2.

Another aspect of the BROG should be mentioned. The BROG was drafted as a general concept for future development intended to maintain central city dominance within West Germany's urban hierarchy. A 1961 policy statement released by the Minister of Housing emphasised the central role of the inner-city in cultural, economic, and political life[10]. Centrality was to be maintained because the geographic concentration of services, public institutions, infrastructure, and job opportunities was considered beneficial for the country as a whole[11].

Under federal law, the States (Länder) are responsible for drawing up their own regional development plans. These are more detailed than federal legislation and are basically intended to translate broad planning concepts into more narrowly defined action programmes. The objectives of the various State Planning Acts (Landesraumordnungsgesetze or LROG) generally reiterate those of the BROG, and can be summarised as follows:[12]

- achievement of minimum living standards

- development of central places and growth axes

- maintenance of an effective transportation system

- maintenance of a viable and socially balanced urban environment

- protection of the natural environment

Furthermore, state planning acts enunciate development objectives specifically aimed at densely populated urban areas, and intended to concentrate future development so as to prevent sprawl or the loss of agricultural and environmentally sensitive lands. In general these objectives can be defined as:[13]

- the coordination of housing and employment centre growth with the development of public transit networks

- the spatial concentration of housing, to maximise public transit efficiency

- the "channelling" of growth along development axes and into central places

- the concentrated development of community centres near public transit stations.

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[10] Georg Müller, Raumordnung in Bund, Länder und Gemeinden, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965, p.3.
[11] Idem.
[12] Frido Wagener, Ziele der Raumordnung nach den Plänen der Länder, Mitteilungen aus dem Institut für Raumordnung, Vol. 71, Bonn, 1972, p.183.
[13] Ibid, pp.189-190.

Admittedly, many of the objectives defined in federal and state planning legislation are programmatic and have not been acted upon effectively. Only recently has the issue of environmental protection become a main planning concern. Transportation planning, particularly in the 70s, contributed to a considerable loss of open space and did much to disfigure traditional townscapes. Moreover with respect to the architectural quality of inner-city redevelopment, Germany produced some of Europe's most sterile urban environments[14]. Nevertheless, in some ways Germany's planning regime has been quite successful, particularly in the maintenance of central city dominance and the space-saving concentration of new urban development.

7.3 INSTRUMENTS OF PLANNING CONTROL: CENTRAL PLACES AND GROWTH AXES

Comprehensive regional planning in Germany has been achieved through the use of specific development criteria. Under these criteria, construction is regulated by growth quotas and a differentiated treatment of municipalities, based on future development potential, relative location, and the local needs of the population. Two of the most important planning instruments involve a hierarchisation of municipalities according to size and regional importance and according to relative location along designated axes of future growth.

The concept of central places, borrowed from Walther Christaller, was introduced to facilitate an optimal spatial distribution of population, employment and urban services. Central place designation, already practised in the 1950s, was standardised for the entire Federal Republic in 1968 by the Standing Conference of Ministers responsible for Urban and Regional Planning[15]. Ideally, central place planning characterises municipalities as either high-level centres (Oberzentren), intermediate-level centres (Mittelzentren), lower-level (Unterzentren), and small centres (Kleinzentren). The state governments have defined the four central place categories more according to levels of available services, population, and accessibility[16]. Bavarian planners, for example, have introduced intermediate central place categories such as "sub-level centres with partial medium-level functions" (Unterzentren mit Teilfunktionen eines Mittelzentrums). The central place hierarchy is intended to help state governments meet anticipated urban service demands based on potential growth and maximum allowable "commute times" between the various urban centres. Table 25 summarises the official guidelines for central-place designation.

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14 See Alexander Mitscherlich, Die Unwirtlichkeit unserer Städte, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1965, for a damning account of the "destruction" wrought by German urban planning in the 1960s and 70s.

15 Hans Kistenmacher, Elemente und Konzeptionen für großräumige Siedlungsstrukturen, in Heinrich Hunke (ed.), Grundriss der Raumordnung, Hannover: Curt R. Vincentz, 1982,p. 247.

16 Ibid, p.250.

Table 25	Federal and Bavarian Central Place Designations	
	Federal	Bavaria
1) High-level		
population	no minimum	
	designations	
accessibility		
2) Medium-level		
population	20,000 - 40,000	30,000 (at least 7500 in core)
accessibility	60 min. (total)	60 min. (30 km.)
3) Sub-level		
population	over 5,000	10,000 (at least 2,000 in core)
accessibility	30 min.	30 min (15 km.)
4) Small-level		
population	over 5,000	5,000 (at least 1,000 in core)
accessibility	30 min.	30 min. (10-15 km)

Source: Bundesregierung, Raumordnungsbericht 1972.

In addition, a complex catalogue of minimum services has been developed to guide capital investments and administrative decisions regarding urban infrastructure in the different centres. According to the Standing Conference of Ministers, middle-level centres should have the following amenities and services:[17]

1) Educational facilities:
   High school (Gymnasium), vocational school,
   special education facilities for the handicapped,
   adult education centre/night school,
   public library (minimum 1 book per inhabitant).

2) Health care:
   hospital for acute cases and with three specialised units,
   including surgery, internal medicine, and gynaecology
   (in areas of low population density two specialised units),
   six hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants.

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[17] Hans Kistenmacher, op.cit. pp.253-255.

3)   Sports:
        sports complex with track (400 metres) and football field and
        other facilities,
        indoor sports arena (min. 27 x 45 metres),
        indoor pool (10 x 25 metres),
        outdoor heated pool (21 x 50 metres),
        special facilities for tennis, etc.

4)   Commerce and banking:
        department store and/or specialty shops
        with a wide selection,
        wholesalers outlet,
        wide variety of customer services,
        several large banks and institutions of credit.

5)   Transportation:
        direct access to national highways,
        regional rail station.

In 1964 development axes were first introduced into German regional planning practise by the government of Northrhine-Westfalia, and shortly thereafter were adopted by the federal government and the other states[18]. There is no uniform standard for defining growth axes; some states (Bavaria, Northrhine-Westfalia) have designated important regional transit arteries as development axes while others orient their future growth axes towards existing settlement concentrations (Lower Saxony). The Bavarian State Planning Act of 1970 includes the following guidelines for development axes:[19]

1)   development is to be concentrated in central places located
        along transit and utilities networks,

2)   local amenities and services are to be improved through the
        consolidation of regional infrastructure,

3)   development nodes (central places) are to promote growth in
        rural areas without endangering agricultural lands.

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[18]   Bundesregierung, Bundesraumordnungsprogramm 1975.
[19]   Hans Kistenmacher, op. cit., p.267.

7.4 LOCAL AUTONOMY AND METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE

As has been emphasised, West German urban and regional planning has been characterised by a considerable degree of hierarchisation. Federal legislation in the form if the BROG has established a general development framework defining national social and physical planning objectives. State governments seek to implement these general goals by means of regional area plans. Through the use of central place designation, development axes, and population growth quotas, the states can effectively channel local development according to regional plan objectives. Finally, it is the duty of municipalities to plan for their own jurisdictions and determine the development of their townscapes while remaining within the guidelines of state-defined planning objectives.

Although local autonomy is guaranteed by West Germany's Basic Law, it is clearly restricted by federal and state planning legislation. The Bundesbaugesetz provides municipalities with a bundle of planning rights, delegating ultimate responsibility for land use planning to local governments. In this way, communities can determine the actual physical and functional development of the urban fabric. On the other hand, the legal responsibility for upholding the BBauG and adhering to state plans severely restrains municipal freedom to develop fringe land. Financial limitations can also often restrict the ability of municipalities to realise their full development potential.

Many German experts believe that local political autonomy is being eroded still further by a bureaucratisation of regional and metropolitan area planning[20]. A good example of this increased central control over local land use planning is the system of development quotas, which has been uses particularly at the metropolitan level as a method of dictating maximum allowable population increases within individual municipalities. Quotas have played an especially important role in Bavaria. Although they were officially done away with in 1979, they still guide important planning decisions at the metropolitan level[21]. Killat writes,

> "According to Paragraph 1 Section 2 of the BBauG, municipalities are required to produce land use plans in accordance with general urban and regional planning goals. These goals, defined by individual regional plans, limit the amount of land that communities can zone for construction purposes, particularly by means of quotas regarding population growth. Growth quotas are dealt with differently among the states: in some instances they are largely advisory guidelines, in others effective determinants of municipal development policies[22]."

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[20] See, for example, Wilfried Erbguth, Raumordnungs- und Landesplanungsrecht, Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1983, p.22.

[21] Interview with H.D. Schulz of the Regionaler Planungsverband München 19 Febmaury 1986

[22] Gerhard Killat, Kommunalisierung der Wohnungspolitik? Zur Dezentralisierung politischer Kompetenzen, Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik Vol. 62, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik (University of Cologne), 1984, p.123.

State planning legislation generally allows the designation of restricted development areas in which little or no urban development can occur[23]. The metropolitan areas of Munich and Hannover have been cited as particularly good examples where fringe agricultural lands are expressly protected[24].

7.4.1 Local Government Reorganisation: National Reforms

The federal and state governments have directly interfered in local administration by a variety of means. The most important here involve territorial reform and the imposition of regional government on urbanised areas. In response to the increasing fiscal pressures on local governments to provide urban services, a territorial restructuring of municipal jurisdictions (Gebietsreform) was executed in the 1960s and 70s. What basically occurred was a rationalisation of urban service areas through amalgamation, annexation, and the creation of larger "catchment basins" of tax revenue[25]. Before 1968, there were over 25,000 separate cities, townships, and villages, all with varying degrees of administrative responsibility. After this reform, the number of independent local governments was reduced to about 8,500. The number of counties (Kreise) and cities independent of county government (Kreisfreie Städte) was also reduced.

Similarly, municipal autonomy has not been a serious obstacle to the creation of metropolitan planning bodies. The possibility of communities combining planning efforts to improve land use coordination is guaranteed in the BBauG. The states have all passed enabling legislation which guides the creation of regional government and, in many cases, it has been imposed unilaterally on urban areas by state governments. Erbguth sees regional governance as another example of state intervention in local planning affairs; here, local responsibilities guaranteed by other legislation have been transferred to an intermediate level of government resulting in a loss of municipal land use sovereignty[26].

Meanwhile, the area of municipal finance reform has remained one of controversy. Redistributive mechanisms have been introduced in Germany in the hopes that this might liberate municipalities from the necessity of competing for industry and other "revenue enhancing" activities. At the same time, the financial burdens of local government have been increased with the devolution of unwanted responsibilities by the states. As elsewhere fiscal considerations play an important role in local land use decisions. Up to the 1960s, locally generated business taxes made up a decisive share - in fact, almost 80% - of municipal revenues. The level and quality of

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[23] See Gerhard Rutowski, Einfluß der Regionalplanung auf die gemeindliche Bauleitplanung, Dissertation (University of Münster), 1974, pp.85-88.

[24] Idem.

[25] For a short summary on local government restructuring, see Kurt Sontheimer and Hans H. Röhring (eds.), Handbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, München: Pieper, 1977, pp. 325-330.

[26] Wilfried Erbguth, op.cit. p.22.

urban services was thus highly dependent on the ability of a town to attract employment, resulting in great territorial disparities in amenities and in one-sided development policies[27].

An ambitious attempt was made with the federal Municipal Finances Reform Act of 1969 to rectify this situation. The relative share of business taxes was reduced significantly while personal income taxes increased in importance, making up about 40% of local tax revenues[28]. Additionally, transfer payments related to the number of inhabitants and territorial extension were introduced in order to insure a horizontal equalisation of services. According to Henckel and Gschwind, these reforms have not only helped reduce disparities in local amenities but promoted more balanced land use policies[29].

7.4.2   The Advent of Regional Governance in West Germany

Regional governance was instituted in several of Germany's great urban agglomeration before 1940. The Siedlungsverband Ruhr was created in 1911 and Greater Berlin in 1920. These metropolitan bodies corresponded to similar urban government reorganisations which were carried out in France and Great Britain. However, the decisive push for effective regional government in Germany took place in the early 1960s. By the early 1970s it had either been opted for by the municipalities or decreed by the states. In contrast to the situation in North America, metropolitan governance in West Germany has joined municipal administrations together in solving regional problems but clearly at the expense of local planning and decision-making autonomy. While at times quite controversial, the conflict between local autonomy and state planning authority as well as the issue of central city-suburb rivalries have not had the effect of limiting the extension of regional administrative powers in Germany. The reasons for this are manifold and too complex to deal with in detail here. Some important reasons have been mentioned below. Another important factor, and one which clearly distinguishes German from North American experience, is the continuity of national partisan politics from local up to federal levels. The "glue of party discipline", missing in U.S. local government, appears to have helped prevent the growth of exclusionist community patriotism and promoted a regionalist perception in municipal politics[30].

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27 Wolfgang Strauß, Räumliche Wirkungen der Gewerbesteuer, Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, 1983 (6/7), pp.405-418.
28 Ibid.
29 Friedrich Gschwind and Dietrich Henckel, Die Beteiligung der Gemeinde an der Einkommenssteuer aus raümlicher Sicht, Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, 1983 (6/7), p.395.
30 Interview with Prof. Robert Geipel, Department of Geography, Technical University of Munich, 01 April 1985.

Figure 9   Fragmentation of Local Governments in the Augsburg Region, 1967
Source: PAESELER AND RUPPERT, 1984, p.54.

Stand 1967

0   3   9   12 km

Figure 10   Local Government Reform after 1967: Changes in
Administrative Boundaries in the Augsburg Region
Source: PAESELER AND RUPPERT, 1984, p.55.

Stand 1980

0   3   9   12 km

At the same time, metropolitan governance has been accused of serving as a forum for central city interests by maintaining suburban communities in a politically subordinate position[31]. The Munich region arguably represents an extreme case of this alleged central-city manipulation.

7.5   URBAN RENEWAL AND REURBANISATION AS A NATIONAL URBAN POLICY GOAL

The avoidance of sprawl has remained one of the outstanding goals of German planning practise. At the same time, a variety of measures and policies have been developed to maintain the vitality of central cities. As elsewhere, suburbanisation and the socio-economic transformation of inner-city areas were dominant planning issues in Germany from the 1960s onward[32]. The selective outmigration of younger, middle-income groups was particularly alarming. The fear of sprawl due to a boom in single-family housing as well as of central city decline was accentuated by an increased inmigration of foreigners into inner city areas after 1970. These phenomena motivated the federal and state governments to pass new legislation aimed at the regeneration of inner-city areas. Proponents of urban renewal were able to draw on a great deal of political (and public) support. Two observers of urban politics, Heuer and Schäfer, commented that

> "the steady migration of the German population out of the central cities and into the peripheries has been continuing for quite some and has been generally condemned - particularly by the politicians of the affected cities. It is feared that a continuation of this trend will endanger the functional integrity of the central cities and, in the long run, lead to a duplication of "American conditions[33]."

Ironically, a combination of public policies and neglect had resulted in a drastic decline in central city attractiveness. Urban renewal programmes from the 50s to the early 70s had emphasised the elimination of older housing stock, widening of streets and the construction of new, often high-density, social housing projects. Very little was done to renovate older apartment buildings, which, in the long run, provided the most desirable living conditions in core areas. At the same time, official policy stimulated the concentration of employment within the central cities, which often resulted in a loss of environmental quality. The construction of regional transit

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[31]   See Wulf Tessin, Umrisse städtischer Umland-Politik. Die sozio-ökonomishce Ausrichtung des Umlands auf die Stadt als Voraussetzung städtischer Herrschaft über das Umland, Archiv für Kommunalwissenschaften, 1/88, pp. 43-59. Tessin's essay, which is dealt with at several stages of this study, provides an excellent insight into this seldom-studied aspect of metropolitan development.

[32]   See Volker Kreibich, Stadtflucht. Zur Kritik der Erklärungsansätze und politischen Leitbilder, in Peter Ahrens, Volker Kreibich und R. Schneider (eds.), Stadt-Umlandwanderung und Betriebsverlagerung in Verdichtungsräumen, Dortmund, 1981.

[33]   Hans Heuer and Rudolf Schäfer, Stadtflucht, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1978, p.19.

networks meant to enhance central city accessibility actually accelerated suburbanisation. The development of the Munich region after completion of the regional train system (S-Bahn) demonstrates this quite conspicuously.

Assuming that suburbanisation was largely dependent on regional housing market conditions, legislation was introduced at the federal and state levels to improve housing standards and promote a better socio-economic mix within inner city areas. 1971 saw the passage of a general urban development act (Städtebauförderungsgesetz or StBauFG) which was to define technical, financial, and legal modalities for a variety of renewal programmes. Although this legislation theoretically applied to both urbanised and rural areas, it was primarily designed to renew old inner-city housing stock. In addition, a variety of subsidiary laws and programmes aimed at the prevention of "urban flight" were drafted. These included privatisation programmes, rent supports, controls over the use of housing space, neighbourhood improvement and traffic abatement programmes, and a law regarding financial aid for the renovation of individual flats or houses (Wohnungsmodernisierungsgesetz or WModG)[34].

In the ten year period between 1971 and 1981, almost four billion marks were earmarked for urban renewal programmes defined by the StBauFG. If one includes the contributions of state governments and municipalities, the total amounts comes to nearly 7.4 billion[35].

7.5.1 "Recentralisation" Trends and Urban Policy.

Starting with the emergency legislation of the 1950s, the West German federal government has played an active role in influencing urban housing markets. Public housing programmes coupled with strict rent controls were applied to meet basic shelter needs. At the same time, ample subsidies and incentives were offered to the construction industry to stimulate economic growth[36]. In later years, guided by more conservative ideals, federal policy shifted its interventionist focus, deemphasising the role of social housing construction and relying on wealth-creating policies to address housing problems. Beginning with the Housing Construction Act of 1956, the promotion of homeownership through tax exemptions and easier credit was attempted.

It is important to note that unlike similar policies in North America, West Germany has not provided many credit incentives for prospective homebuyers. Rosen has indicated that Germany has among the lowest rates of homeownership in Europe; in 1978 54% of British, 51% of French but only 37% of German families owned their own homes[37]. Due to astronomic land prices in

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[34] For a detailed list of urban renewal programmes that were established in the 1970s and early 1980s, see Hans Heuer and Jürgen Brombacher, Steuerungsinstrumente der Stadt-Umland-Wanderung, Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Urbanistik, 1983.

[35] GEWOS, Städtebauförderung, Hamburg, 1980, p.55.

[36] See Karin Müller-Heine, Die Entwicklungsphasen der Wohnungspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Krefeld, 1984.

[37] Kenneth T. Rosen, A Comparison of European Housing Finance Systems, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, Working Paper No. 81-37, Berkeley (University of California), 1981, p. 31.

most urban areas, restrictions on mortgage credit, and, perhaps most fundamentally, planning controls limiting the amount of buildable land, this situation has remained basically unchanged. Unfortunately, the other side of the coin is that public funds for social housing have largely dried up. Privatisation of the existing urban housing stock has been chosen as an alternative strategy. This specific policy of wealth-creation has been accompanied by a relaxation of rent controls and the sale of public housing. Renewal projects aimed at beautification of inner-city areas, the maintenance of identifiable neighbourhoods, and traffic control can be seen as an attempt to rekindle private investment in central city housing markets[38]. Gentrification, a ubiquitous phenomenon in many "reinvigorated" inner-cities, has indeed begun to characterise older neighbourhoods in Munich, Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, Cologne, and several other prominent West German cities. Nevertheless, the measures seem to have helped stop central city decline. Müller-Heine writes

> "State support of investments in housing modernisation was intended to prevent a further destruction of older and usable housing stock and to prevent conversion of housing space for other purposes. In this way, a destruction of traditional urban structures in core areas was to be avoided[39]"

In 1975 new tax provisions were introduced greatly increased the financial attractiveness of modernising and purchasing older urban housing. As this alternative was much cheaper than buying a single-family or duplex home in outlying areas, a veritable speculative boom in central city housing markets followed[40]. The ensuing decrease in affordable housing through rent hikes and purchases (many of them speculative) was not compensated by public investment in social housing so that, by the early 1980s, a new crisis situation in housing had set in[41]. A parallel phenomenon which tended to exacerbate this "second" postwar housing crisis, involved a rapid increase in the number of single person households. While the population had not increased in absolute terms, the number of persons deciding to live alone and who were therefore looking for housing, grew dramatically. Droth and Dengschat have analysed the effect this attitudinal change has had on space demands in Germany's urban areas[42]. Unmarried couples, single parents, and persons preferring "communal" lifestyles are among those who make up so-called new households. Generally, they are in lower income brackets and have no interest, either out of financial or personal reasons, to live in suburban areas. The presence of new households has increased pressure on inner-city housing markets and, at the same time, helped in the reinvigoration of the central cities.

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[38] Karin Müller-Heine, op.cit. pp. 53-68.
[39] Ibid, p.50.
[40] See Volker Kreibich, Wohnversorgung und Wohnstandortverhalten, in Jürgen Friedrichs (ed.), Die Städte in den 80er Jahren, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1985, p.182.
[41] See Institut für Wohnen und Umwelt, Wohnungspolitik am Ende? Unpublished pamphlet.
[42] Wolfram Droth and Jürgen Dengschat, Räumliche Konsequenzen von neuen Haushaltstypen, in Jürgen Friedrichs (ed.), Die Städte in den 80er Jahren, op.cit., pp.147-180.

Unless radical changes in federal and state housing and planning policies take place, these developments will profoundly affect inner-city housing markets for some time. The core areas of Germany's cities will maintain their vitality and perhaps gain considerable attractiveness. Suburbanisation will not threaten central areas due to high building costs, lifestyle changes, and limited possibilities of municipal expansion. Kreibich writes

"There are numerous indications that a "recentralisation" of housing demand is taking place. As new construction decreases in intensity, land reserves lose their importance for the distribution of population. The ubiquitous decrease in outmigration to the suburbs is fundamentally related to the increasing importance of existing housing stock, particularly, of old rental housing for both rental and homebuyers markets alike...Living in urban and central settings has attained new value. After the suburbanisation trend of the 1970s has come the new move to the cities of the 1980s[43]."

7.6   METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT IN GREATER MUNICH

The Munich region embodies much of that which has characterised rapid urban growth in the past decades. Expansion in service sector industries, a concentration of large engineering and high-tech firms, particularly in electronics, and high desirability as a place to live have all made Greater Munich the dynamic and prosperous area it is today. The region also represents one of the prime examples of large-scale suburbanisation in West Germany. Due to its size, however, the central city has been able to accommodate a considerable amount of population growth experiencing net growth even at times when almost all German central cities were declining markedly. Between 1961 and 1970, Munich itself grew by 208,000 inhabitants. Several counties near the core area grew by 30 to 40% within the same period. Munich is unlike the other cities that are under discussion here in that it clearly dominates its metropolitan area. If we compare population changes within the past decades we can see that, despite considerable suburban development, the central city has retained over 50% of the total regional population.

In terms of economic growth, Greater Munich has outpaced all other metropolitan areas of West Germany[44]. Between 1961 and 1970, the number of jobs increased by over 74,000 in the city of Munich alone.[45] However, a dearth of buildable land in the central city has fuelled the process of job suburbanisation. Suburban job growth has been strongest in the county of Munich: the southeastern portion and in particular the municipality of Ottobrunn have benefited by the

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[43]   Volker Kreibich, op.cit., p,194.
[44]   H.-D. Haas and R. Fleischmann, München als Industriestandort, Geographische Rundschau, 327(12), 1985, pp. 607-615.
[45]   Günter Heinritz and Dieter Klingbeil, Zur Entwicklung der Münchener Suburbia, Mitteilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft in München, 69, 1984, pp.39-65.

expansion of defence and electronics firms such as Messerschmidt-Bölkow-Blohm. Starting in 1965, the growth of fringe areas - primarily in the counties of Munich and Fürstenfeldbrück - began to overtake that of the central city. At the same time, more rural counties, such as Landsberg and Erding, have expanded only minimally.

Table 26 Population Changes in Greater Munich, 1961 - 1983
(With Regional Shares of Cities and Counties)

	1961	% share	1983	% share
City of Munich	1,085,067	63,3	1,283,457	55,5
Suburban counties:				
Dachau	75,601	4,4	103,413	4,5
Ebersberg	55,458	3,2	97,281	4,2
Erding	72,714	4,2	87,702	3,8
Freising	81,481	4,7	118,583	5,1
Fürstenfeldbrück	82,690	4,8	174,686	7,5
Landsberg	64,276	3,7	81,032	3,5
München	123,369	7,2	257,892	11,1
Starnberg	73,700	4,3	109,210	4,7
TOTAL	1,714,356		2,313,256	

Source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung; Bevölke-
rungsdaten 1961; 1970; 1987.
EMPIRICA, Regionales Strukturkonzept für den engeren Verflechtungsraum
Brandenburg-Berlin, Anhangsband,1992, p. 22.

While service industries account for the largest employment gains, Munich and its region have maintained a strong manufacturing sector and have become an important centre for research and development in new technologies. According to Haas and Fleischmann, 30% of the region's industrial employment derived from electronics-related activities[46]. Heavy public and private investment in "high tech" areas have contributed to the region's image as *Silicon Bavaria*[47].

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[46]   H.-D. Haas and R. Fleischmann, op.cit., p.610.
[47]   Wolfram Pohl, Silicon Bavaria und Wirklichkeit, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 December, 1984.

Table 27   Indicators of Employment Change in Greater Munich, 1970 - 1987

	1970	1987
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery	11,297	3,411
Manufacturing & Construction	438,540	388,609
Trade	59,344	76,900
Services	125,740	283,941
Finance, Banking, Insurance	45,383	64,009
Public Administration	110,625	171,762

Source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung;
Arbeitsstättenzahlungen, 1970; 1987.
EMPIRICA, Regionales Strukturkonzept für den engeren Verflechtungs-
raum Brandenburg-Berlin, Anhangsband,1992, p. 24.

Alongside its economic vitality, the Munich region enjoys a considerable image as a quality urban environment. Proximity to lakes, wooded areas, and the Alps, considerable cultural amenities, and a lack of traditional heavy industries have helped make a Munich a desirable place to live. The attractiveness of the region has nevertheless brought its share of problems. Skyrocketing land prices and rents have disadvantaged lower income groups and shut many local residents out of the homebuyer's market. Inner city neighbourhoods have been gradually transformed by gentrification, commercial expansion, and the sale of rental housing. The central city has had to intensify the "recycling" of older commercial and industrial land now that very little buildable space remains. High development cost have, furthermore, severely limited Munich's ability to provide social housing. A report issued by regional planners documented land price increases of up to 700% from 1970 to 1984. Restrictive land use policies, speculative hoarding of land reserves, and attempts by several municipalities to reduce allowable housing densities have contributed to this situation[48]. One of the primary causes of this rapid increase in land prices has been the construction of a dense rapid transit network centred on Munich's downtown that has dramatically increased the accessibility of suburban areas.

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[48]   Florian Reichhold and Joachim Lorenz, Entwicklungstendenzen auf dem Bauland und Wohnungsmarkt in der Region München, Regionaler Planungsverband München, 1983.

Figure 11   Map of Greater Munich   Source: PAESELER AND RUPPERT, 1984, annex.

Other regional problems have developed as a result of deliberate planning policies. The southern part of Greater Munich has remained relatively free of unsightly industrial and infrastructural development - this is an area of lakes and forest and has been kept as a regional "greenbelt." The northern half of Munich's metropolitan areas, being of lesser environmental attractiveness, has accommodated a disproportionate share of space consuming infrastructure, high-density residential construction and "lower quality" employment, such as warehousing and distribution.

7.6.1   The Establishment of Regional Planning

The issues leading to the imposition of regional governance in Munich were in many ways similar to those in Canada. Orderly growth, an efficient accommodation of suburban expansion, issues of regional transport and the economically feasible provision of urban services were, without doubt, primary considerations. In addition, however, regional governance was seen as a vehicle by which the Bavarian state government could more effectively supervise urban development. Quite in contrast to Metro Toronto's initial function, metropolitan government in Greater Munich was not intended to promote suburban housing construction as such but to manage increasing demand for housing in a space-saving manner. As is often the case in Canada, where the provinces have kept a tight rein on metro governments, the government of Bavaria has jealously guarded its authority over municipal affairs and metropolitan administration.

Metropolitan Government and, as a result, metropolitan planning came rather late to Bavaria and the Munich region. State legislation passed in 1957 distinguished only between two levels of planning competency: that vested in the state government itself and planning at the municipal level[49]. State development plans were then, as they are today, administered on a district basis with the District of Upper Bavaria (Bezirk von Oberbayern) has maintained responsibility for the Munich region. The government of Bavaria was, at first, skeptical of attempts to establish metropolitan planning - either in Greater Munich or elsewhere in the state. Invoking state authority over municipal affairs and land use issues, Bavaria refused to recognise any compulsory element in locally developed regional plans[50].

As in North America, and as was generally the case in Germany, the first attempts at some form of metropolitan planning in Greater Munich were the result of local voluntary initiatives. 1950 saw the establishment of the "Planning Association of the Greater Economic Area of Munich" (Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum München). This informal body worked primarily towards promoting planning cooperation among the various municipalities in the

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[49]   See Olaf Boustedt, Allgemeine systematische synoptische Übersicht über die Planungsräume, in Olaf Boustedt (ed.), Methoden und Praxis der Regionalplanung in großstädtischen Verdichtungsräumen, Hannover: Gebrüder Jänecke, 1969, pp.79-101.

[50]   Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum München, Regionalentwicklungsplan, 1968, Munich., p.9.

Munich region[51]. Its membership was made up of municipal representatives, academics, and planning experts advocating the idea of a regional planning body. Lacking any decision-making authority, the Planungsverband attempted to recruit the assistance of the Bavarian Ministry of the Economy and Transport in working out an official regional plan for Greater Munich. The state government, however, showed little interest in supporting such a locally developed plan and the Planungsverband was more or less forced to work entirely on its own[52].

In November of 1968, a regional plan was adopted by the members of the Planungsverband. Despite its advisory nature - the Bavarian government was not about to recognise it as an official plan - the Planungsverband hoped regional municipalities would voluntarily adhere to its development guidelines. Indeed, cooperation with municipal governments, many of them members of the Planungsverband, as well as with various technical departments of the state government and environmental groups did succeed in giving the Regional Development Plan (Regionalentwicklungsplan) a certain compulsory character[53]. Official recognition of metropolitan planning finally came in 1970, with the passing of Bavaria's second State Planning Act. This Act contained enabling legislation for the creation of an intermediate level of planning authority, thus allowing regional bodies to regulate municipal land use within metropolitan areas.

In 1973, a Regional Planning Association (Regionaler Planungsverband München) was established for Greater Munich and has existed since then alongside the "unofficial" Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum. It is the responsibility of the Regionaler Planungsverband (PV) to supervise local land use planning - in most cases developing the actual municipal plans. The 1970 Planning Act also devolved responsibility for regional planning from the District authorities to the PV Munich. Besides general land use matters, the PV is responsible for technical planning in areas such as, waste treatment, energy, roads, parks and recreational areas, and water quality. Thus, regional governance *per se* in metropolitan Munich is less concerned with the actual delivery of urban services as it is with the analysis of future service demand and the physical or spatial aspects of land use. This includes regional cooperation in the location of infrastructure projects, in the determination of future areas of residential and industrial growth, and in the area of environmental protection. In accordance with its metropolitan planning role, the PV prognosticates future demand for housing, buildable space, urban services, water, energy and a variety of other amenities. It then consults with various municipal, state, and federal agencies as well as private companies in developing long-term plans to meet these demands.

As is the case in North America, vital urban service functions in Germany are often dealt with by locally based special districts. However, state and federal agencies play a comparatively larger role in urban service delivery. The federal railways (Deutsche Bundesbahn), for example,

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[51]   See Rainer Schoener and Goerg Elling, Der Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum München und seine Tätigkeit, in Olaf Boustedt (ed.), Methoden und Praxis der Regionalplanung in großstädtischen Verdichtungsräumen, Hannover: Gebrüder Jänecke, 1969, pp.67-78.

[52]   Idem.

[53]   Idem.

were responsible for the creation of Munich's regional rapid transit or S-Bahn network. Together with municipal transport agencies, the federal railways operate a regionally integrated transport authority (Münchener Verkehrsverbund). Law enforcement and schools are two important areas within the domain of state agencies.

7.6.1.1 Development Concepts and the Regional Development Plan

The regional plans that have been elaborated for Greater Munich have necessarily reflected general planning goals delineated by the BROG and the various planning laws and programmes adopted by the Bavarian government. As in other metropolitan areas of West Germany, a balanced spatial distribution of jobs, infrastructure, and basic amenities, as well as environmental protection and the preservation of open space through the coordination of new development with existing urban infrastructures are basic long-term objectives of planning in Greater Munich. Of particular importance have been attempts to control suburban sprawl and prevent central city decline. These last two goals are areas where regional planning in metropolitan Munich appear to have been most successful.

In general, regional planning in Greater Munich has been characterised by its restrictiveness. This has manifested itself most clearly in a strict control of housing construction in suburban areas, channelling of development in certain designated areas. The original intention of the first regional plan was, ironically, to avoid an overconcentration of urban activities in the central city. A fair distribution of urban amenities within the region, a deconcentration of jobs, and improved access to recreational areas was envisioned. In suggesting that jobs and amenities should be more evenly shared among regional municipalities, the 1968 plan adhered to existing development guidelines by which new settlement growth would take place along rapid transit axes[54]. In accordance with the recommendations of the Forestry Department and environmental groups, the southern section of the region was to be kept largely as open space. The regional plan thus designated the south as a recreational and environmentally sensitive area and emphasised development in the northern suburbs[55]. Meanwhile, the rural fringe of the region was to remain free of large-scale urban development, allowing only so much new construction as was necessary to meet the needs of the local population.

The first official regional plan was adopted by the PV in 1985 according to guidelines set out by the Bavarian State Development Programme of 1976[56]. While it has adopted a more cautious approach to economic growth and suburban development, the basic objectives set out in the Regional Development Plan of 1968 have not changed. This has ensured a considerable degree of regional planning continuity during the last two decades.

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[54] Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum München, Regionalentwicklungsplan, op.cit. p.32.
[55] Idem.
[56] Regionaler Planungsverband München, Regionalplan, München, 1984.

7.6.1.2   Growth Quotas and Regional Development

Regional development as foreseen by the 1968 plan, was to be facilitated through the promotion of central places - growth poles which would act as a counterweight to the overwhelming influence of Munich. Central places had been previously designated by the District Government of Upper Bavaria in its regional development programme. These were more narrowly defined by the Planungsverband and categorised according to size, function, environmental qualities, and potential for future growth. Municipalities were identified either as "A", "B", or "C" settlements and growth quotas established in order to control the extent of population increases. "A" municipalities were those towns deemed most suitable to accommodate population and employment growth and to serve as central places for adjacent communities. Generally, "A" municipalities were not located in environmentally sensitive areas, were relatively well provided with basic infrastructure, and with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Garching), were all located on rapid transit lines. "B" municipalities were defined as those communities which would primarily serve as areas of modest housing construction growth. While they were to provide services on a more limited and local basis, they were also to obtain a certain central place function for smaller communities nearby[57]. Finally, "C" municipalities were those which were either exclusively or predominantly rural in nature and where only a minimum of new housing construction was to be allowed.

Many of those municipalities which were given the "A" designation have experienced truly dramatic growth. Growth quotas established for the period 1968 - 1990 envisioned, in many cases, a five and sixfold increase in population (see Table 27). However, local criticism and a reevaluation of regional planning goals in the early 1980s led to an easing of the quota guidelines.

Table 28   Regional Growth Quotas for "A" Municipalities (Munich)

	1968	1990	Planned increase
Eching	3,078	12,000	390%
Garching	6,605	35,000	530%
Haar	13,281	35,000	263%
Kirchheim	1,712	13,000	760%
Poing	3,368	17,000	505%
Puchheim	3,907	22,000	563%
Unterschleißheim	6,027	25,000	415%
Zorneding	3,442	18,000	523%

Source: Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum München, Regionalentwicklungsplan 1968.

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[57]   Ibid, p.35.

Despite its advisory character, the Regional Development Plan of 1968 was very influential in determining how population, employment growth, and new housing construction was to be spatially channelled within metropolitan Munich. This municipal development hierarchy was, in fact, adhered to by the PV after 1973 and continues to influence long-term metropolitan planning in Greater Munich[58]. Growth municipalities, to the extent that they will expand in the near future, form an "urbanising" ring around the central city, located in what is designated as the "immediate zone of urban concentration" (engerer Verdichtungsraum). This applies primarily to the county of Munich which surrounds a large portion of the central city. The "B" communities are located either within or on the periphery of this ring and represent substantial future growth potential should the need for new construction arise. The rural communities lie within a "greenbelt ring" of sorts in which urbanisation is to be avoided. Similar to the land reserve policies adopted by Canadian provinces, the "C" designation is a planning instrument by which agriculture and more traditional ways of life are to be protected from suburban encroachment[59].

Table 29   Growth Communities in the County of Munich, 1950 - 1983

	1950	1960	1970	1983
Garching	2,669	3,518	7,469	11,741
Haar	8,779	10,204	11,074	19,289
Kirchheim	1,176	1,123	2,005	9,708
Ottobrunn	4,628	8,770	13,413	20,129
Taufkirchen	1,786	1,601	1,604	15,002
Unterhaching	4,678	5,843	13,995	17,637
Unterschleißheim	3,062	5,285	7,019	1,789
County	96,475	123,369	168,337	257,892

Source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung, Gemeindedaten 1984.

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[58]   Interview with Mr. H.D.Schulz of the Regionaler Planungsverband München, 19 February, 1986.
[59]   Regionaler Planungsverband München, Regionalplan, op.cit., p.36. The goal of protecting agriculture is given further backing by federal and state legislation. Even without regional planning in its present form it would prove difficult to promote housing development in Munich's greenbelt.

7.6.2 Central City Domination and Metropolitan Planning

Development policies in the city of Munich itself have had a profound effect on the region. Metropolitan governance and planning appear as well to have strengthened the hand of the central city with regard to regional policies. The long-term planning goals defined in state and regional urban development plans indicate that great importance has been attached to the maintenance of Munich's dominant economic, cultural, and infrastructural role. This has meant, among other things, actively promoting Munich's economic vitality and assuring future growth potential. Munich itself has taken a clear initiative in this direction. The 1963 City Development Plan foresaw a strengthening of Munich's already absolute central importance and the development of the city into a "world-class metropolis"[60]. This concept appealed as well to the Bavarian state government for a variety of reasons. Not only would Munich form a vigorous growth-pole in a largely nonindustrial region but add to the prestige of the state within West Germany and Europe.

The Urban Land Use Plan of 1965 - adopted during a period of continuous population growth - took the first concrete step to enhance the central city's economic attractiveness. Large areas of the inner-city were basically re-zoned to accommodate expansion of the financial and commercial district[61]. Simultaneously, a system of sub-centres within Munich was to be promoted to provide for new housing construction. This resulted in the realisation of immense planned residential areas in Munich's outskirts, such as Neu-Perlach, Fürstenried-Ost, and Hasenbergl. Starting in the late 1960s, the concept of residential sub-centres began to influence development in adjacent municipalities of the region. Due to the rapid growth enjoyed at the time, community governments agreed to allow new housing projects within their jurisdictions - a decision which allowed Munich to free up land for economic development[62]. As mentioned before, the central place development policy established by state and regional planners and the construction of a regional heavy-rail transit network allowed for an effective suburbanisation of much new residential development while enhancing the industrial and commercial potential of the central city.

While this strategy of easing housing pressure on the city worked, it resulted in a variety of regional problems. By the early 1970s it was clear that intensified suburban residential development and an overemphasis of the inner-city's economic function were irreversibly transforming the regional character. Traditional settlement patterns and townscapes were overwhelmed by gargantuan housing projects, traffic, and an influx of newcomers from all parts of Germany. In the core area of Munich, aggressive redevelopment transformed old neighbourhoods, pushing their inhabitants out of the inner city. Writing in 1974, Harald

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[60] Stadtplanungsreferat München, Stadtentwicklungsplan 1982. Maßnahmen und Ziele, Munich, 1982, p.1.
[61] Stadtplanungsreferat München, Flächennutzungsplan 1965, Munich, 1965.
[62] See Karl-Heinz Witzmann, Siedlungspolitik und Regionalentwicklung dargestellt am Beispiel München, in Jürgen Friedrichs (ed.), Wohnungspolitik und regionale Siedlungsentwicklung, Hannover: Curt Vincenz, 1982, p.245.

Schrotenroehr criticised what he saw as an unacceptable functional polarisation within the region[63]. In his opinion, the suburban periphery was developing into an "increasingly subordinate backwater with drab communities, nonexistent or inadequate employment opportunities, and ruined town and landscapes"[64]. Munich, on the other hand, was becoming more and more a "top-heavy metropolis with employment potential for the entire region and a *chic*, little international city lacking however, a feeling of home - of a place where one would like to raise children"[65]. Single-mindedness on the part of the city and regional planners was seen to have produced an undesirable monocentricity to the detriment of much of the region[66].

The conflicts arising out of this situation forced Munich's planners to reevaluate their objectives. Realising that an overemphasis of Munich's economic function had been largely to blame for these conflicts, a new planning strategy based on "polynucleated and balanced development" was suggested[67]. This new strategy was adopted in the 1975 Urban Development Plan and promised a departure from the monocentrism of the earlier approach. In accordance with the new city plan - in which "growth control" was mentioned for the first time - suburban residential development was viewed more critically by the PV. Large housing projects were only to be carried out in exceptional cases while municipalities acquired more freedom to determine housing types and densities[68]. Munich appears to have reacted to this change in direction by attempting to restrict residential zoning within he region. Heuer and Schäfer have indicated that Munich - arguing that sufficient regional residential growth had been allowed by existing growth quotas - apparently used its political clout within the PV to restrict the conversion of fringe land for construction[69]. At the same time, municipalities have themselves become more restrictive in their zoning policies, preferring only modest growth.

7.6.2.1   North-South Conflicts

Suburbanisation patterns in Greater Munich have been influenced considerably by the interests of the central city. This is evidenced not only by Munich's persistent economic domination of the region but by the selective nature of suburban development. One of the primary long-term regional planning goals has been, and remains, to preserve open space and natural areas in the southern section. The 1968 Regional Plan consolidated technical plans produced by the Department of Forestry and other state agencies that foresaw establishing land preserves (landschaftliche Vorbehaltsgebiete) in the Munich region. For this reason, the decision was made

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[63] Harald H. Schrotenroehr, Blühende Kleinstädte in Sicht?, in Karl Ganser (ed.), Die Region München im Bayerischen Landesentwicklungsprogramm, Munich: Münchner Forum, 1974, pp.33-39.

[64] Ibid, p.34.

[65] Idem.

[66] Richard Michael, Überlastete Kernstadt, zersplittertes Umland, Munich: Münchener Forum, 1982.

[67] Interview with Mr. H.Heil, former head of planning for the city of Munich, on 28 April, 1986.

[68] Idem.

[69] Understandably, this is denied by Munich's planning department.

to concentrate suburban industrial and residential development in the north, leaving the south as a recreational and agricultural zone. No forest preserve area was designated in the north of the region until 1985[70].

This policy has resulted in a functional polarisation within the metropolitan region. Communities in the western part of the region are by and large dormitory suburbs with little industrial or commercial activity[71]. This is also the case in the south although certain municipalities, such as Ottobrunn, have attracted considerable employment. Planning restrictions have, however, limited the ability of Ottobrunn to expand as this would contradict regional "greenbelt" policies. In contrast, the northern portion of the region has accommodated most of the region's suburban industrial growth and is earmarked for future regional infrastructure and industrial development. The community of Garching, for example, has zoned 48% of its land for industrial and commercial purposes. The neighbouring towns of Eching and Kirchheim, both which have experienced rapid growth in the last 10 years, area also generously zoned for industrial development. The north, however, has suffered a perceptible loss of environmental quality and is poor in recreational open space. Already in the early 1970s, experts spoke of a "socio-economic environmental quality differential" between north and south[72]. Because of its flat topography and of a prevalence of gravely soils and moors, the northern part of the region is particularly suited to accommodate water treatment plants and other large infrastructural facilities[73].

Alongside existing rubbish dumps, power stations, and sewerage plants, a series of other infrastructural projects are planned for the northern metropolitan area. Understandably, communities in the north feel discriminated against and have resisted the attempts of regional planners and the central city to export cumbersome and undesirable land uses to their vicinity[74]. In response to the north's protestations, the PV adopted a "positive action policy" (Positivplan) in 1985 designed to improve the quality of life there and compensate for negative effects of large construction projects, such as the new Munich airport. However, serious attempts to ameliorate the environmental situation in northern communities clash with the immediate urban renewal goals of the city of Munich. The city has been seeking to recycle land by transferring space-intensive infrastructure into the suburban fringe. As the southern half of the region is more or less off limits, it is the "destiny" of the north to receive these facilities.

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[70]   Rudi Kanamüller, Bannwälder im Münchner Norden ausgewiesen, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 01 May, 1985.

[71]   Peter Lintner, Flächennutzung und Flächennutzungswandel in Bayern, Münchener Studien zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeographie, 29, Regensburg: Michael Lassleben Verlag, 1985, pp.111-112.

[72]   Robert Geipel, Probleme der Universitätsstadt München, Mitteilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft in München, 57, 1972.

[73]   Robert Geipel and Jürgen Pohl, Umweltqualität im Münchener Norden, Munchener Geographische Hefte, 49, 1983, p.17.

[74]   Rudi Kanamüller, Bürger der Nordgemeinden gehen auf die Straße, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 February, 1986.

7.6.2.2 Urban Renewal Strategies in Central Munich

The 1982 City Development Plan for Munich signified a reorientation of planning priorities. Polycentric growth was espoused in order to relieve the inner city from increasing development pressures and to provide Munich's subareas with, among other things, enhanced urban amenities and increased local employment. Another priority adopted by the 1982 plan was to emphasise social and "quality of life" issues in the future development if the city[75]. At the same time that these goals were championed by city planners, the necessity to maintain Munich's role as economic, cultural, educational, and commercial focal point of the metropolitan area (as well as of southern Bavaria) through new spatial and social policies was emphasised. This indicates that despite certain changes in urban growth policies, the city's continued ability to compete with suburban areas for population and industry has remained a goal of overriding importance. Munich's urban renewal policies of the last ten years give ample testimony of this[76]. These have concentrated on housing intensification and the assembling new land for commercial and industrial purposes[77].

Munich's "two-pronged" renewal strategy has aimed at "reclaiming" and recycling inner city land for new and more intensive use. This is all the more important as the last remaining buildable lots within the city will disappear in the early 1990s[78]. The recycling policy has entailed relocating large and undesirable urban utilities out of the city and into the region. Arguing that Munich cannot be expected to bear all the costs of urbanisation within its boundaries - particularly in the light of its overwhelming significance for the region - city planners have advocated a policy of infrastructural development in the suburbs, thereby creating space for new educational, cultural, and administrative facilities and enhancing the city's ability to accommodate more housing and jobs[79]. Some of the major infrastructural projects included in this policy - some of them still in the planning stage - have been the new international airport near Erding, a railroad marshalling yard in Allach, a coal-burning generator in Unterföhring, and a regional water treatment plant in Garching. The new regional and international airport (Munich II) is an interesting case in point. Built despite much resistance from local municipalities, citizen's groups, and environmental lobbies, it will allow the city to free up an extensive area of land after the demolition of the old airport in Riem.

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[75] Stadtplanungsreferat München, Stadtentwicklungsplan,op.cit., p.1
[76] Attitudes towards Munich's future growth potential do, of course, differ strikingly. Most controversial is the issue of inner-city gentrification, of which increasing employment growth and inmigration of affluent *yuppies* is seen to be the cause. However, among the political élite, only a small group of environmentalists appear to favour a drastic curtailing of land recyling and "densification" measures. Professor Robert Geipel, Geographer at the Technical University, has noted with some irony that Bavaria, despite its federalist traditions, has chosen to concentrate most everything in the capital, Munich. (quoted from Otto Fischer, Heißt es in Zukunft "Reich rein - Arm raus"?, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 October, 1988.)
[77] Stadtplanungsreferat München, Stadtentwicklungsplan, op.cit., p.11-16.
[78] See, for example, Otto Fischer, Dem Sozialwohnungsbau wird der Boden entzogen, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23 June, 1988.
[79] Stadtplanungsreferat München, Flächennützungsplan, op.cit., p.16.

The city of Munich is under great pressure to allow industrial development on the last remaining areas of open space within its jurisdictions. Demand for a central city location has remained high despite excessive land costs. Taking stock of the situation in 1985, the city's economic development department revealed that 480 firms with a total space requirement of 1,350,000 square meters were on waiting lists for central city locations[80]. The social-democratic city government spoke of activating over 650 hectares - primarily in the areas of Moosach/Allach and Obersendling[81]. Although the city appears to have adopted a "go-slow" attitude to granting new construction permits, particularly in view of more cautious regional development approaches, a so-called "Business Space Programme" (Gewerbeflächenprogramm) was initiated to help certain firms locate in central Munich. Much acrimonious debate ensued over Munich's industrial zoning policies. Conservatives complained of over-restrictive land use policies and warned that a suburbanisation of business tax revenues through firm relocations would severely hurt the city. A compromise programme was adopted in January 1988 in which a total of 220 hectares will be provided for industrial uses until 1992[82]. High hopes have been put on the future exploitation of the present airport grounds in Riem. There, residential, industrial, and recreational uses will share equally in its redevelopment[83].

In 1979 the city of Munich established its "Housing Creation Programme" (Wohnraumbeschaffungsprogramm). This programme is an attempt not only to meet increasing demands for different types of housing but to improve housing quality and neighbourhood attractiveness. One of the principal objectives of the Housing Creation Programme is to prevent families from leaving the city for the suburbs. In order to achieve this, the city has resorted to zoning unused lots for residential development and offered financial help to potential homebuyers. By the beginning of the 1990s about 45,000 new housing units will have been built as part of this renewal effort[84]. In attempting to ameliorate inequalities that have arisen out of speculation and gentrification, the city has also committed itself to the construction of new public housing and the provision of subsidies to large and low-income families. Some of the measure that have been adopted here include: subsidised lot prices, cheap loans for homebuyers, rent supports, and priority lists for those in most need of low-income housing[85].

The spatial goals of Munich's housing programme concern both the space-saving construction of new units and the maintenance and modernisation of older housing stock. However, with the increasing scarcity of buildable land, Munich has clearly shifted emphasis on the latter strategy. "Preservational urban renewal", as it is called by the city planners, involves all aspects of housing

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[80]   Marianne E. Haas, Stadtkämmerer alarmiert, Münchner Stadtanzeiger, 26 March, 1985.
[81]   Otto Fischer, Der Wohnungsbau bleibt ein Schwerpunkt, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 and 12 May, 1985.
[82]   Otto Fischer, Stadtrat beschließt Gewerbeflächenprogramm, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 January, 1988.
[83]   Of course, the Chamber of Commerce emphasises the industrial and commercial recycling of Riem. See Walter Fürstweger, Gewerbe braucht Raum in Riem, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 May, 1986.
[84]   Karl-Heinz Witzmann, op.cit., p.255.
[85]   Landeshauptstadt München, Zukünftiges Wohnprogramm. Beschluß der Vollversammlung des Stadtrats vom 30.10.1985, unpublished report.

and neighbourhood improvement necessary to prevent the physical and socio-economic decline of older inner-city areas[86]. Through a more intensive use of existing infrastructure, traffic abatement measures, and the reactivation of older - and often vacant - apartment houses, the city hopes to satisfy a considerable portion of regional housing demand within its own jurisdictions[87].

It is clear that Munich will be hard put to realise all of its housing unit targets. While the Housing Creation Programme foresaw the yearly construction of 1,500 off-market units, the competition for space between residential and industrial uses, financial difficulties, and political resistance within city government will most likely reduce this figure to less than 900 in the 1990s[88]. However, this does not overshadow the fact that, during the 1980s, Munich accommodated a substantial portion of new regional housing. After several years in which housing starts declined markedly in the central city, Munich, thanks in part to the Housing Creation Programme, has steadily increased its regional share of new housing since 1980. At the same time, a more restrictive attitude towards suburban growth at the municipal and regional planning levels, has decreased the importance of fringe housing markets[89]. As a result, central

Table 30   Total Housing Construction in Metropolitan Munich, 1971 - 1983

	Total	City	Suburbs
1971	26,966	13,219	13,747
1972	40,540	22,083	18,457
1973	37,337	16,803	20,534
1974	30,442	14,313	16,129
1975	16,006	7,719	8,287
1976	13,394	5,187	8,207
1977	12,700	5,410	7,290
1978	11,053	4,379	6,674
1979	11,929	3,970	7,959
1980	14,391	6,757	7,634
1981	15,399	6,744	8,655
1982	14,646	7,673	6,973
1983	15,946	8,213	7,397

Source: Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung, Wohnungssituationsberichte, 1977 - 1979; 1980 - 1983.

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[86] Ibid, pp.54-57.
[87] Ibid, p.56.
[88] Otto Fischer, Sozialwohnungen werden immer weniger, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20 Januar, 1988.
[89] Otto Goedecke, Baulandausweisungen und Wohnungsnachfrage im Raum München, Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, Vols.5 and 6, 1981, pp.352-353, and N. N., Rückgang der Bautätigkeit um 20 Prozent, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 08 March, 1985.

city and suburban housing starts have reached parity. In addition, the central city's share of new detached housing increased dramatically during the late 1970s and early 1980s, thereby improving Munich's overall market attractiveness in the region.

While Munich has regained its original importance as provider of housing, it is difficult to say what the long-term benefits of intensified residential development will be. Financial restraints limit the amount of public housing that can be built while generous subsidies are necessary for homeownership programmes. At the same time, much of the housing demand that is "recentralising" comes from lower-income singles, single parent families, and other persons preferring to live in urban surroundings. Munich's concentration on homeownership and the needs of "traditional" families has meant a neglect of the rental housing sector.

7.6.3 "Organic Growth", an Alternative?

The second regional plan for Greater Munich was adopted by the PV in 1984 and became effective two years later. Unlike the first regional plan, it was a legally binding document and one which offered a much more critical analysis of the region's extraordinary economic development. In an attempt to correct the mistakes of the past and give suburban communities a greater opportunity to develop a sense of functional independence, the regional plan has espoused the so-called concept of "organic growth". This concept signifies a more cautious use of growth quotas, a greater degree of citizen participation, and an end to large suburban housing projects. In addition, a further spatial separation of jobs, urban amenities, and housing in the suburbs is to be avoided[90].

As mentioned above, the second regional plan emphasises Munich's importance as *the* central place and economic locomotive of the metropolitan area and of Bavaria. As such, maintaining the centrality of Munich remains a primary, if not the primary, regional planning goal. At the same time, however, the plan attempts to dynamise the built-up suburban areas, in particular those municipalities that possess the potential for becoming central places in their own right. This means a much more careful policy with regards to industrial zoning and housing, in the hope that problems, such as commuting, fiscal inequality, and high development costs, can be avoided in the future. As the term "organic growth" might indicate, regional planners are attempting to guide future development in a balanced and ecologically sensitive manner - much in the spirit of Greater Vancouver's Livable Region strategy. For this reason, open space and green buffer zones (Trenngrün) play an important role in limiting suburban expansion and in improving local environmental quality[91]. This restrictive element was demonstrated convincingly by the refusal of regional planners to allow the Löwenbräu concern to relocate to Neubiberg. Löwenbräu's planned

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[90]   Regionaler Planungsverband München, Regionalplan, op.cit., p.92, 147.
[91]   Ibid, p.115.

move would have severed a regional green buffer zone.

Despite its espousing of an "organic" urban development, the second regional plan is not as innovative as it might seem. Indeed, much of its content has been carried over from existing state and regional development plans. This is evident in the general thrust of the 1984 regional plan: sprawl is to be contained, open space to be protected, and new development is to be coordinated with the existing rapid transit infrastructure. Indeed, Greater Munich and, in particular the rural fringe, are subject to considerable long-term development pressure. Housing demand has remained very high and can be expected to increase in the future. The attempts of the central city to accommodate this demand are expected to reach their limit by 1993. After this, pressure will mount on suburban municipalities and the PV to allow a greater amount of peripheral land conversion[92]. Even with the exploitation of recycled land, Munich's ability to supply commercial and industrial space will also diminish considerably. In order to prevent a potential outward spread of suburban residential and industrial zones, regional planners will depend on a variety of measures ranging from putting peripheral land in agricultural or forest preserves to encouraging a more intense utilisation of built-up suburban areas.

The forest preserve instrument has been instrumental in shaping the development of Munich's metropolitan area. It has shifted much residential and industrial growth to northern communities, leaving the south generally a recreation zone with "exclusive" residential communities. By 1989, 44 forest preserves had been established. In the county of Munich alone, such preserves encompass an area of about 275 square kilometres - over 40% of total county land. Future preserves are planned for the county near the northern communities of Garching and Oberschleißheim[93].

7.6.3.1 Land Banking and "Organic" Community Development

Closely associated with the concept of "organic" urban growth is a local needs criteria for housing policies. Realising that rapid economic growth has created an urban land market dominated by "outside" demand, regional planners together with Munich and suburban municipalities, have devised a land banking programme for long-term residents[94]. Among the growth problems facing suburban municipalities has been that of "population transformation" as more and more "native" residents find themselves unable to purchase homes locally. This programme is a means by which land can be offered at off-market conditions to local residents. By 1983 almost a third of all regional municipalities had adopted a land-banking programme for local housing needs[95].

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[92] Interviews with Mr. Deffner of the Bavarian Home and Property Owners Association (Bayerischer Wohnungs- und Grundeigentümerverband), 12 June, 1986 and 10 November, 1988.
[93] Thomas Soyer, Schutz vor unerwünschten "Fruchtfolgen," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 April, 1989.
[94] Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum München, Info No.13, Munich, 1980.
[95] Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum Müchen, Info No.23, Munich, 1983.

Not surprisingly, after the unfortunate experiences of the 1960s and 70s with high-density housing projects, many suburban communities have adopted a decidedly "slow-growth" approach to further development. Puchheim, Taufkirchen, Haar (site of the largest housing project), Unterhachingstal, and other municipalities with considerable growth potential have, with the support of regional planners, basically cut themselves off from outside development pressure[96]. Of course, not all communities have adopted "slow growth" policies. Several towns in the north, such as Unterschleißheim, Kirchheim, and Heimstetten, are very much interested in industrial expansion. These are, nevertheless, communities that have been designated as suburban growth poles[97].

7.6.4 Munich:Municipal Support of Regional Planning

Munich's experience with metropolitan planning has been characterised by a general consensus as to the necessity of regional land use planning cooperation. Even before the establishment of an official regional authority, municipal acceptance of the advisory Planning Association facilitated the realisation of various urban development objectives. This was most clearly evidenced by the successful concentration of new urban growth in designated suburban "central places"[98]. In other words, a pattern of regional cooperation had already been established by the time the Planungsverband München was created in 1973.

Among the principal barriers to metropolitan planning and governance has been municipal fears of a loss of political sovereignty. In the cases of Toronto's and Vancouver's suburban communities, local government reorganisation was initially seen as a method by which the central city could achieve political domination over the region. While the often diverging interests of Munich and its region have at times led to acrimonious conflict, there appears to be agreement that, in the long run, regional planning has strengthened the hand of the suburbs, allowing them to fend off developers and guide development more in keeping with local desires[99]. The very experience of working together with the central city and other communities in the region has also increased the expertise and *savvy* of local governments in dealing with land use issues. Ironically, the increasing planning sophistication of suburban communities - while basically beneficial to the regional land use decision-making process - has made the work of the PV more complicated. Many suburbs, for example, are hard to convince that they should allow greater residential and

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[96]   Much to the displeasure of the construction and real estate industry as Mr. Deffner of the Bavarian Home and Property Owners Association pointed out.

[97]   In the case of Kirchheim-Heimstetten, state authorities went so far as to override regional planning restrictions, allowing the community to plan for a future population of 25,000.

[98]   See Karl-Heinz Witzmann, op.cit., p.249.

[99]   Interview with Mr. Lamey of the PV Munich, 10 June, 1986.

industrial development or that building densities should be increased[100]. In summary, Greater Munich represents an example where regional planners have, by and large, been able to decisively influence spatial development. This is partially due to the existence of a dominant primate city in whose interest many of the regional planning goals of the last two decades have been formulated. The role of the Bavarian state government has also been crucial. Using the land use regulating powers vested in it by federal framework legislation, Bavaria has supported a settlement pattern in metropolitan Munich which limits sprawl and emphasises the functional importance of the central city. Finally, a lack of municipal resistance to regional development objectives has allowed a smooth imposition of metropolitan land use regulations.

7.7   OBSERVATIONS ON THE FRANKFURT REGION: AN EXAMPLE OF COMPROMISE

Unlike Munich, Frankfurt is situated in a polynucleated urban area. Frankfurt's neighbours, among them Offenbach, Wiesbaden, and Mainz are large cities with their own economic hinterlands. For this reason, despite its economic strength, the city has not been able to dominate its urban region to the same extent as Munich. However, Frankfurt offers a good example of a dynamic central city whose continued office sector growth is fuelling population and employment suburbanisation. It is also a good example of how the combined efforts of state and regional planning have succeeded in concentrating development, limiting sprawl, and in the efficient provision of urban services. Despite central city-suburban antagonisms, a regional arrangement has been found which, up to now, has managed growth quite well.

7.7.1   Suburbanisation in the Frankfurt Region

Suburbanisation has been extensive in the Frankfurt region. In this respect it has not differed from other areas in Europe or North America. As in the case of Munich and other German cities, the suburbanisation process has not led to a functional decline of the core area. On the contrary, Frankfurt is booming and the closer-in suburban areas are profiting from overspill effects.

Since the mid-1970s the process of population suburbanisation has changed considerably. Total population for the UVF region decreased by some 25,000 between 1976 and 1986 - the result of dramatic losses in the central city and slower growth in the suburbs. At the same time, however, an increasing number of households and jobs has exerted continuous growth pressure on suburban communities[101].

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[100] Florian Reichhold and H.D. Schulz (Regionaler Planungsverband München), Bestimmungsgrundlage für die kommunale Baulanderschließung, Munich, 1980, p.28.
[101] Data from Umlandverband Frankfurt/Main, Flächennutzungsplan: Erläuterungsbericht, 1988.

Table 31   Population Change in the Frankfurt Region, 1939 - 1980

	1939	1950	1961	1970	1980
Frankfurt/Main	553,464	532,037	708,082	696,313	629,375
Offenbach	70,429	89,019	117,031	118,841	110,993
Hochtaunus County	73,445	109,071	141,587	175,565	205,038
Main-Taunus County	71.235	100,234	116,100	168,891	201,401
Offenbach County	101,368	131,189	186,589	266,766	295,250
Region	886,564	961,550	1,269,389	1,426,376	1,442,057

Source, Umlandverband Frankfurt, 1988.

7.7.2   The Nature of Metropolitan Problems

One important spatial aspect of Frankfurt's service-sector expansion is the phenomenon of "overspill" into suburban communities. The overconcentration of corporate and other office-based service activities in the core area has been pushing out population and manufacturing employment into the region. The economy of Frankfurt's downtown is growing faster than its physical extension might indicate. Indeed, the city has become the focus of economic activity not only for the region but the entire state of Hessen[102]. One of the principal goals of the 1961 Master Plan was to promote expansion of the office sector in the core area, leaving very little space for residential use. In fact a considerable degree of structural and spatial change in the city was planned for: included in the 1961 plan was a "finger" concept of development in which transit axes would serve as nodal points for office growth[103]. Investment in the downtown area boomed and, with the support of Frankfurt's pro-growth government, the financial district expanded westward into traditional residential areas. This unabashed promotion of the city as a national and international corporate centre provoked violent community protest in the 1970s as housing and other redevelopment problems intensified.

In nearby municipalities housing demand skyrocketed. Frankfurt was too small to appreciably increase its housing stock, with the result that established cities like Bad Homburg, Langen and Eschborn developed into dormitory suburbs. This phenomenon presented a double-edged problem: Frankfurt viewed suburbanisation as a challenge to its economic predominance and political importance in Hessen, while the suburbs lamented their loss of individuality and subservience to the central city[104]. As employment growth - and particularly service-sector

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[102] Klaus Wolf, Agglomerationsraum Rhein-Main, Geographische Rundschau, 33(10), 1981, pp.400-406.
[103] Glenn Yago, The Decline of Transit, Urban Transportation in German and U.S. Cities, 1900 - 1970, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.119.
[104] Interview with Nikola Dischkoff of the Umlandverband Frankfurt/Main, 29 March 1990.

growth - began to pick up in the suburbs in the 1970s, problems of a different nature have appeared. The suburbanisation of service-related employment continues to develop along selective lines, generally concentrating in municipalities in the direct vicinity of the central city or in smaller regional centres. This tendency exacerbates functional disparities among the suburbs and is resulting in a marginalisation of older manufacturing industries. At the same time, the traditional industrial worker-oriented housing market of many of these communities is being transformed by demand generated by office-related and other service jobs[105]. Indeed, there are many who see smaller cities adjacent to Frankfurt in danger of being overwhelmed by rapid employment growth and "overurbanisation" tendencies caused by overspill[106].

Table 32   Employment Growth in the Frankfurt Region, 1950 - 1985

	1950	1961	1970	1977/78	1985
Frankfurt/M.	255,505	486,495	545,245	505,785	511,820
Offenbach	38,058	67,261	65,970	58,558	58,490
Hochtaunus County	28,714	47,300	55,870	61,370	69,810
Main-Taunus County	18,663	29,932	43,343	58,914	67,200
Offenbach County	36,208	68,891	92,576	101,998	110,290
Region	377,148	699,881	803,004	786,625	817,610

Source: Umlandverband Frankfurt, 1988.

Table 33   Sectoral Change in Regional Employment in Greater Frankfurt, 1976 - 1986

	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986
Agriculture & Forestry	2,201	2,517	2,612	2,785	2,927	2,942
Manufacturing	292,807	287,152	290,084	268,267	257,178	264,727
Services	395,442	404,504	433,193	423,982	428,710	453,675
UVF Total	690,450	694,173	725,889	695,014	688,815	721,344

Source: Umlandverband Frankfurt, 1988.

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[105] Klaus Wolf, Suburbanisierung des Rhein-Main Gebiets - Erste Ergebnisse und weiterführende Hypothesen des Forschungsvorhabens, in F. Schymik (ed.), Der Verdichtungsraum in Regionalforschung und zukünftiger Raumordnung, Besipiel Rhein-Main Gebiet, Rhein-Mainische Forschungen, Vol.98, Frankfurt, 1983, pp.103-104.

[106] Klaus Wolf, Agglomerationsraum Rhein-Main, op.cit.

7.7.3 Regional Governance Established: City-Suburb Compromise

Consensus as to the need of Hesse State's supervision and support - particularly in transport and utilities planning - was rapidly achieved after 1945. The considerable tasks presented by reconstruction and the desire to reestablish Frankfurt's economic role were doubtless major factors in building this consensus[107]. As Frankfurt's *Wiederaufbau* proceeded, the city expanded considerably, annexing adjacent land under provisions established by state emergency legislation[108]. However, concepts of metropolitan governance only developed after Frankfurt had overcome the damage of war and was well on its way to recovering its economic importance. Suburbanisation and the realisation that Frankfurt was limited in its physical expansion by the sovereign municipalities surrounding it, forced city planners to reevaluate the relationship between the central city and its region[109]. Accordingly, the first initiatives to establish regional planning bodies were undertaken by Frankfurt. The first such attempt resulted in the creation of a purely voluntary association in 1962. In 1965 the State Planning Act of Hesse provided the legal framework for the creation of regional planning districts. These were defined as voluntary associations of counties and incorporated cities, which after their establishment would assume legal responsibility for regional master plans. Municipal zoning and land use plans remained the responsibility of local governments[110]. The establishment of a regional planning authority, the Regionale Planungsgemeinschaft Untermain (RPU), followed in the same year. Ironically, the existence of the RPU did not represent an immediate advantage for Frankfurt. Only after Frankfurt agreed to accept underrepresentation within the planning body did the other local governments agree to its creation[111].

The RPU's regional development concept was adopted by the state government in 1972 and thus became the official Regional Master Plan (Regionaler Raumordnungsplan) for Greater Frankfurt. This plan contained guidelines in which new development was to be concentrated in existing centres and along principal rapid transit axes. A system of radial transit lines centred on Frankfurt's train station was built and consequently, urban development intensified along various

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[107] Kurt Blaum, Wiederaufbau zerstörter Städte: Grund und Vorfragen dargestellt an den Problemen der Stadt Frankfurt/Main, Frankfurt: Cobet, 1946, p.26.

[108] Herbert Böhm, Städtebauliche Grundlegung für ein neues Frankfurt, in Max Kurz (ed.), Frankfurt baut auf, Frankfurt/Main: Kurz, 1953, p.3.

[109] Lorenz Rautenstrauch, Region Rhein-Main: Frankfurt und sein Umland. Planung, Politik, Perspektiven im Bereich des Umlandverbandes Frankfurt, Umlandverband Frankfurt, June 1988, p.17.

[110] Alexander v. Hesler, Die Regionale Planungsgemeinschaft Untermain, in Olaf Boustedt (ed.), Methoden und Praxis der Regionalplanung in großstädtischen Verdichtungsräumen, Forschungsbericht No.8 des Ausschusses "Raum und Bevölkerung" der Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung, Hannover: Gebrüder Jänecke, 1969, pp.33-41.

[111] Lorenz Rautenstrauch, op.cit.

points of the system. Additionally, bands of open space were created to hem in urban development and improve microclimactic conditions[112].

Unhappy with the existing arrangement, Frankfurt set out during the late 1960s to develop an alternative regional planning approach. This culminated in the so-called Regional City (Regionalstadt) concept. The Regional City idea visualised a federated metropolis along the lines of Berlin and Hamburg. This meant the creation of two or three-tier system with metropolitan and local bodies sharing responsibilities over a wide range of functions. Crucial functions such as finances and planning were to be transferred to a metropolitan "senate"[113]. This concept was not greeted warmly by suburban communities, who saw in the plan an indirect form of annexation. Indeed, the RPU's Master Plan did not contain any conceptual reference to the Regional City scheme.

In 1970 the government of Hesse amended its Planning Act, outlining new jurisdictions for regional districts throughout the state. Five years later Hesse passed legislation creating a multi-purpose metropolitan district in the Frankfurt area, the Umlandverband Frankfurt (UVF). This agency was made responsible for most general service functions, such as water supply, waste disposal, and recreational facilities as well as master development plans. Actual zoning remained a municipal responsibility. At the same time, the UVF's territorial jurisdictions were expanded. At present, the UVF planning area includes Offenbach, Kelsterbach, Hochtaunus County, Maintal County, Main-Taunus County, Offenbach County, and Bad Vilbel. As in the case of the RPU, Frankfurt did not receive proportional representation within the agency. In 1977, the RPU was amalgamated into the UVF.

Regional development plans adopted by Hesse have supported a central place hierarchy around Frankfurt and designated development axes along principal rapid transit lines. (The state plans for South Hessen cover a much larger territory than that administered by the UVF.)

7.7.3.1   Regional Conflicts in Metropolitan Development

Frankfurt was willing to compromise with its regional neighbours to establish regional governance but appears never to have been truly satisfied with either the RPU or the UVF. An indication of this is the city's frequent reiteration of the "Regional City" concept as a solution to metropolitan problems[114]. The intention behind such repeated suggestions is to allow Frankfurt a greater flexibility in development planning by relocating certain functions in suburban communities. Space for housing, space-intensive industrial uses and infrastructure is available in the region. Their "exportation" out of the city would free up new areas for commercial and office

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[112] Ibid, p.21.
[113] Ibid, p.18.
[114] Wolfgang Schubert, Planungsdezernent Wentz: "Der Ballungsraum Frankfurt muß seine Identität neu gestalten," Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 January 1990.

Figure 12   **Map of Greater Metropolitan Frankfurt with Subregions and Administrative Boundaries of the Umland Verband Frankfurt**
Source: UMLANDVERBAND FRANKFURT, 1988.

expansion while an intensified construction of medium- to high-density housing in the suburbs would take pressure off the core area housing market.

These suggestions have never worn well with neighbouring communities. Comments made in January 1990 by the Frankfurt Planning Commissioner, in which the "Regional City" was promoted, provoked a quick response[115]. As a result the Mayor intervened, retracting the statements made by the Planning Commissioner, in order to reassure the regional municipalities[116].

In grudging acceptance of regional political realities, Frankfurt has intensified development within its own jurisdictions. Office space growth has been concentrating in the western section of the city, leaving the eastern areas saddled with underutilised industrial land. One of the most ambitious projects the city will undertake is the redevelopment of areas around the eastern dockyards (Osthafen). This project will involve the construction of high-density residential units and the creation of an "office city" on adjacent grounds divided between Frankfurt and Offenbach. After twenty years of debate, both cities have agreed to the redevelopment plans. Approximately 21,000 new jobs will be generated by the office complex[117].

Frankfurt has tended to view the greater region as its functional hinterland - as an area which might, for example, accommodate a new railroad freight terminal or a regional waste disposal facility[118]. In this and other respects the city has attempted to use its economic and political influence in manipulating regional developments[119]. Furthermore Frankfurt has remained aggressive in its economic development policies attracting "quality" development. In one well-known case, Frankfurt enticed a prominent Offenbacher firm to relocate within its city limits, even though Offenbach was and is in dire need of new employment[120]. This apparently selfish behaviour of the central city has generated the image of an arrogant central city that is largely disinterested in regional affairs.

These conflicts notwithstanding, regional cooperation has not been questioned, nor is there a lack of a consensus as to the importance of maintaining Frankfurt as a major economic and cultural centre[121]. One of the most important reasons for the acceptance of regional planning has been the relative success of the UVF in distributing the benefits and disadvantages of urban development in a manner that has not discriminated against individual communities[122]. Rautenstrauch warns, however, that Frankfurt's ambitions to become a "world class" metropolis -

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[115] N.N., Planspiele von Stadtrat Wentz; "Das ist doch Eingemeindung,"Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 January 1990.
[116] N.N., OB pfeift seinen Planungsdezernent beim Thema Rhein-Main-Gebiet zurück, Frankfurter Rundschau, 17 January 1990.
[117] N.A. Einigung über den Kaiserlei, Frankfurter Rundschau, 25 January 1990.
[118] Lorenz Rautenstrauch, op.cit., p.36.
[119] Interview with Winfried Seip, member of the Offenbach City Council, 29 March 1990.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Interview with Nikola Dischkoff, op.cit.
[122] Lorenz Rautenstrauch, op.cit., p.47

occupying a prominent position in Europe alongside Paris and London - could endanger regional government[123] . Such an attempt would necessitate increasing the capacities of infrastructural facilities within the region, and forcing undesired urban uses on suburban municipalities. According to Rautenstrauch, this would intensify interlocal tensions, limit the ability of municipalities to compromise on regional issues and, as a result, jeopardise regional planning.

Nevertheless, the general scenario appears positive. Regional planning has functioned well although not all central city-suburb conflicts have been resolved. The suburban municipalities of Greater Frankfurt cannot escape the economic influence of the central city. Through regional government, however, they appear to have limited many of Frankfurt's grand regional designs.

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[123] Ibid, p.69.

8.   C O N C L U S I O N

This study has attempted to show that various degrees of planning centralisation and government involvement in metropolitan development issues have been an important factor in producing different urban patterns in the United States, Canada, and West Germany. Strong evidence has accumulated that the three countries have gone largely separate ways in managing metropolitan growth. The reasons for this are complex and involve a combination of political, ideological, economic, and sociological factors. We have directed our attention to only a few of these aspects, defining a problem-solving mechanism with which these federal states have attempted to address metropolitan change.

Although essential, the planning process is only one element in the metropolitan problem-solving equation. Senior government activity in land and housing markets, subsidies of capital projects, tax revenue equalisation schemes and the degree of regional cooperation in achieving long-term development goals also play an important role. Furthermore, metropolitan governance appears to demonstrate a potential ability to influence urban development in at least two important ways. The first of these involves the administration and/or coordination of senior government programmes and planning policies in a manner consistent with local needs. This entails not only housing and redevelopment but a wide variety of urban services that are either partly or wholly funded by state and federal governments. The second aspect of metropolitan governance refers to its capacity for the mobilisation of regional energies, financial resources, and popular opinion to institutionalise regional problem-solving. Evidence indicates that regional *forums* can contribute a great deal to mediating central city-suburb conflicts and promote more effective interlocal .

Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that metropolitan governance is only a <u>potential</u> mechanism for regional problem-solving. Its capacity to influence urban growth is often only as strong as regional consensus to accept certain development goals and as the authority vested in it by senior governments. Volunteerist regionalism - while best suited to political situations where local autonomy is held to be paramount - is often limited to suasion and negotiation in its problem-solving activities. On the other hand, metropolitan entities that truly represent an intermediate (or fourth) tier of government can, if necessary, force municipalities into abiding by comprehensive regional development guidelines.

Metropolitan problem-solving must address the issue of local political autonomy and individual property rights. In federal systems, where municipal administrative sovereignty is either constitutionally or tacitly guaranteed, the problem of centralising the urban planning function would appear particularly difficult. Absolute municipal sovereignty is, of course, a fiction. Local governments, especially in the latter half of the twentieth century, have been dependent on senior government moneys and tax equalisation schemes in order to finance urban services. In addition, federal and state legislation has established an array of administrative guidelines and regulations within which municipalities must operate. Indeed, all three countries

represented in this study have maintained a strong regulatory presence in such areas as, environmental protection, water quality, national defence, and in the planning of large capital projects (e.g. national transport networks).

Still, planning continues to be considered largely a local matter and, indeed, local planning autonomy is respected and guaranteed in North America and West Germany. Some of the reasons for this are quite clear: Planning is an urban administrative function where local needs, interests, and development concerns are perhaps most clearly articulated. To surrender planning powers to another level of government can mean, therefore, a loss of control over community "destiny." One of the main problems of federalism is balancing local needs - and their democratic articulation via planning and a voice in politics-at-large - and the needs of society as a whole.

North American traditions of local autonomy and metropolitan fragmentation have contrasted sharply with West German experience. In no other area of urban administration is this as evident as in the land-use planning process. While major planning responsibilities have been delegated to municipal governments in Canada, the United States, and West Germany, the degree of actual decision-making freedom in land use issues is unequivocally greater in North America. However, the question has also been raised as to how Canadian and U.S.-American traditions of metropolitan problem-solving have differed from one another and, more importantly, to what degree these different traditions have influenced metropolitan development in the two countries.

The three countries we have considered in this study arguably represent three different variations of the metropolitan governance theme. Furthermore, it can be argued that these countries have developed different urban problem-solving approaches which, despite many similarities in economic and spatial trends, have produced characteristic, if not unique, patterns of urban growth.

8.1   PROBLEM-SOLVING MECHANISMS: A SUMMARY

The United States, characterised by traditions of local autonomy, a unique dispersion of power at state and federal levels, and by deep-seated mistrust of government intervention in urban land-use issues, has clearly chosen the volunteerist path. While senior governments, and particularly the federal government, have been far from inactive at the metropolitan level, their efforts have concentrated on capital projects, the subsidy of homeownership and, starting in the 1960s, environmental protection. A process of regional governance involving such aspects as, revenue distribution, comprehensive transit planning, and a semblance of long-term land-use planning has not been found. A handful of exceptions - largely related to the creation of single "urban counties" - exist but do not appear to have appreciably influenced the vast majority of metropolitan areas in the United States. Without "prodding" by the state governments regionalism will continue to depend on locally based initiative, the activities of single-interest

groups, the operation of limited-function special districts and negotiation among private and public actors in the land use arena.

Canada has also had to grapple with local autonomy and local government mistrust of regional planning. Metropolitan governance was by no means met with popular acclaim; suburban communities feared domination by central cities and a loss of neighbourhood identity. Most municipalities were satisfied with the performance of special districts and unwilling to surrender decision-making authority to a "fourth-tier" of government. However, a realisation both at the local and provincial that the complexities of urban management could not be addressed without multiple-function metropolitan administration led to the imposition of regional governance. While the province appear to have viewed regional governance primarily as a logical vehicle for the efficient and economically rational delivery of urban services, social and environmental issues have not been ignored. Compromises between developers, local governments, "Metro" governments, and other actors have been engineered by a combination of regional, provincial, and, in some cases, federal activities. The cases of the Toronto region and Greater Vancouver amply describe the situation of *flux* inherent in provincial regional planning policy. Ontario and British Columbia have oscillated between active support and promotion of regional planning initiatives and ambivalence or outright antagonism towards regional government. This can be explained by provincial sensitivity to local opinion, and a concern with local autonomy that has tempered regional planning intervention. Concurrently, however, the action of the provinces in such areas as, urban transit, housing, and redevelopment appear to have helped maintain vigorous central cities. While falling far short of establishing distinctly Canadian, or for that matter, provincial urban policies, the interplay of these different levels of government has produced a metropolitan problem-solving mechanism that has maintained well-functioning and livable urban regions.

In the case of West Germany, local autonomy and North American-style privatism have not presented an appreciable barrier to metropolitan governance, nor to state and federal intervention in urban affairs. This is not to say that Germany's system of rigid planning centralisation has not been criticised or that local patriotism is non-existent. Indeed, the days in which large cities could annex their suburban neighbours with the blessing of state governments are gone forever. Nevertheless, the enabling and/or outright imposition of regional government by the states appears to have strengthened the hand of central cities. In several cases, such as that of Munich, the central city has clearly used regional government - and the support of the state government - to manipulate urban development in its own interests. In general, however, there appears to exist a general consensus that regional governance benefits both central city and suburbs and that regional well-being cannot be defined solely in terms of the fortunes of individual communities.

8.2   SOME SPATIAL GENERALISATIONS

Some of the most important spatial consequences metropolitan problem-solving appears to have had for urban development in Canada, the United States, and West Germany are summarised below. These observations relate almost exclusively to recent developments in an attempt to characterise *variations* in urban growth patterns.

Canada

Suburbanisation of employment and population has been continuous. This has resulted in the rapid and far-flung expansion of metropolitan areas particularly in Greater Toronto. At the same time, Canadian central cities have been able to maintain a dominant economic role and protect the social and environmental vitality of their neighbourhoods through strategic renewal, housing and office space intensification, relatively effective public housing programmes, regional transit systems centred on the core areas, and cooperation with suburban neighbours in sharing burdens of development.

Germany

The suburbanisation of population has been compensated for by aggressive planning polices aimed at economic renewal and housing intensification. Transport planning coupled with state and regional zoning guidelines have tended to concentrate new development along public transit axes resulting in a relatively limited degree of outward sprawl. A considerable degree of central city hegemony has been secured through senior government intervention and oftentimes through the establishment of regional government. The degree of functional decentralisation of urban area has been limited, with the result that suburbs have often remained largely dormitory communities in the shadow of the central city.

United States

> Growth has manifested itself in a "permanent" outward
> expansion of new peripheral growth centres and new
> belts of dormitory suburbs. Functional decentralisation
> has proceeded apace leading to great fiscal disparities
> within metropolitan areas. The lack of regional land use
> controls, revenue sharing, and a variety of regional
> policies aimed at concentrating new growth has permitted
> peripheral areas to expand and flourish at the expense of
> older core areas.

8.3   CLOSING THOUGHTS ON URBAN CENTRALITY

One of the prime motives of this international study in metropolitan management has been to contribute arguments for an "agency"-based approach to comparative urban analysis. For the purposes of this comparison, agency has been defined as the willful manipulation of urban economies and urban space in order to achieve specific development goals. Furthermore, it has been argued that cultural attitudes and political traditions have influenced not only the definition of these goals but the manner in which they have been realised. Metropolitan problem-solving and growth management were the parameters of agency used here. At the same time, the relative success in maintaining the functional importance of central cities was used to gauge the performance of urban problem-solving in Canada, the United States, and West Germany.

A "defence" of the central city is only part of the issue. Urban centrality - insofar as it involves a concentration of public services and amenities and a rational coordination of urban growth with capital investments in infrastructure - is also a matter affecting suburban areas. Moreover it involves the realisation that a metropolitan approach is essential in solving many planning problems facing individual jurisdictions, and that a robust central city and an efficient region are an asset to all communities.

In the case of Germany senior governments have facilitated annexation, local government restructuring, and the establishment of metropolitan agencies with regional planning powers. Tax reform has achieved a relatively successful redistribution of revenues, demising the need for "fiscal" zoning. In addition, the federal and state governments have actively supported rapid transit, public housing programmes, and capital investment projects aimed at improving urban infrastructure. The level of senior government intervention has been remarkable. Comprehensive amalgamations of local governments, for example, were imposed by the states in the late 1960s and late 1970s, because voluntary reorganisations proved unworkable. A similar measure would be unthinkable in North America.

On the regional level, West Germany's central cities have joined - together with their suburban neighbours - service-delivery and planning agencies. In Munich's case this has resulted

in a situation where the central city has strengthened its political power base within the region and can influence urban development to its advantage. However, while the suburbs have remained clearly subservient to the centre, most communities have profited from the imposition of regional planning. Frankfurt, surrounded by independent cities, has not been able to manipulate regional politics to the same degree. Nevertheless, regional governance has enhanced the locational advantages of Frankfurt, helping to maintain an efficient region and tying suburban communities into a larger, expanding service-sector economy.

In Canada's case the federal government and the provinces have not always operated in a consistent and coordinated manner vis-à-vis urban policy. Moreover, the provinces have not always used their police powers to the fullest in establishing regional land use planning. The reorganisation of local government has often been a compromise between amalgamation and voluntary forms of interlocal cooperation. Certainly nothing as forceful as West Germany's jurisdictional realignments was ever attempted. At the same time, the provinces have demonstrated an important consistency in specific areas of urban and land use policy of which the protection of open space through agricultural reserves, a commitment to public transportation, and an active participation in core area redevelopment are important examples. The provinces have also "prodded" cities into accepting metropolitan governance, so that a pattern of interlocal cooperation has been established. As the experience of Vancouver demonstrates, this cooperation has survived even though political changes at the provincial level have occasionally resulted in a weakening of regional agency authority.

In the cases of Vancouver and Toronto, central city-suburb conflicts have greatly diminished due to the realisation that regional well-being is beneficial to all municipalities. This realisation was long in developing but it has reinforced metropolitan regionalism, establishing it as an important component of Canadian urban planning practise.

Finally, the United States can be said to represent an extreme case of metropolitan management. Most of America's great cities have their lobbies, their business elite, and political representatives who work to further central city interests. Indeed, as has been noted, "boosterism" and local entrepreneurship were essential in assuring the prosperity of many cities before World War II. What U.S.-American cities have lacked, however, is the active support of senior governments in developing problem-solving strategies.

While often considerable in dollar terms, federal involvement in central cities has been seldom decisive or coordinated and has generally lacked continuity. Instead, a plethora of reactive policies have coexisted, many of them with contradictory goals. Depending on the political climate in Washington D.C., these policies have been either emasculated or discontinued, some only a few years after their adoption. The states have rarely assumed an important policy role with regard to their major urban areas. Lack of funds, fear of tampering with local autonomy, and an ideological dislike of interference in municipal affairs have been among the primary reasons. At the metropolitan level, central cities and suburbs have found themselves using 19th century political mechanisms to deal with 20th century problems. Municipal sovereignty, an

absence of revenue redistribution, and a lack of regional controls on zoning have intensified competition among metropolitan communities. Left largely to their own devices, the central cities have been forced to undertake expansive and often one-sided redevelopment of their downtowns. In certain areas, such as "slum-clearance" federal funds were available for a time. In other crucial areas, particularly public transit and housing, federal moneys were often insufficient. Depending on their affluence, location, or level of amenities, suburban communities have been able to market themselves successfully, attracting residents and employment through generous zoning policies.

As long as regional controls on land use remain absent and local opinion has not forced a limitation on municipal growth, many suburban communities with market potential will try to realise their development ambitions to the fullest. In the fast growing West - an particularly in California's urban centres - housing demand has remained high. Peripheral areas of the metropolitan regions have profited from this demand and continue to grow outward. Their expansion has, in turn, fuelled development ambitions in other - often more distant or exurban - communities. In this way, a process of continuous peripheral expansion has characterised recent metropolitan development not only in California but in Seattle, Washington D.C., New Jersey, Phoenix and many other urban regions of the United States.

It would, of course, be unwise to view recent metropolitan development in the U.S., Canada, and West Germany solely on the basis of growth management and centrality issues. Economic transformation, coupled with technological change has not had uniform impacts on all urban areas. Indeed, regional economies vary greatly. While manufacturing remains important in Greater Munich, Los Angeles, and Toronto, it much less so in the Vancouver and San Francisco areas. Such differences in the sectoral makeup of metropolitan economies, as well as varying demographic trends, might also help explain why different responses to growth have developed in different urban regions - a possibility which undoubtedly complicates international comparisons.

The U.S.-American metropolis - represented here by the expansive urban regions of California - appears to represent a uniquely extreme case of urban decentralisation. In the game of urban growth and economic expansion, those areas within the U.S.-American metropolis able to market themselves successfully have prospered. Less fortunate core areas have been faced with decline, disinvestment, abandonment, and, ironically, increasing public service burdens. This hole in the metropolitan doughnut has no counterparts elsewhere. This is demonstrated by the vitality of Canadian central cities and the perseverance of urban centrality in West Germany. Furthermore the process of continuous outward is seldom as pronounced as in metropolitan regions of the United States.

These and other considerations indicate that caution is urged in generalising comparative metropolitan development. The pitfalls involved in a selected study of only a few urban areas are considerable - particularly if these areas are considered representative of certain national developments. By the same token there is ample evidence that enough consistency can be

discovered in growth management and metropolitan problem-solving to justify the degree of generalisation employed in this study. Furthermore there is another important justification for the methodology used here. One of the principal objectives of this comparative analysis has been to argue a case for qualitative, agency-based approaches to urban studies. Using such methods, it has been hoped to demonstrate that important variations in international (or, for that matter, national) urban trends can be observed and, at least partially explained.

At a time when "convergence" and the apparent internationalisation of economic and spatial trends have tended to dominate urban studies, it would seem challenging to take a somewhat different stance. Indeed, despite the global nature of various economic, technological, and spatial phenomena, evidence indicates that certain patterns of spatial *divergence* are intensifying.

In conclusion, there seems little merit in elevating the U.S. metropolitan area to a model representing an ultimate stage in international urban development. We might, however, envision future patterns of spatial convergence under a scenario in which U.S.-American cities actively regulate their growth utilising public transit, revenue distribution, and a variety of regional measures. Indeed, the contradictions of growth management in the United States might provoke a revolutionary policy response. U.S.-American metropolitan areas might then develop more along Canadian and European lines.

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P H O T O G R A P H S

(all photographs taken by the author)

Photo 1:   An exemplary "post-modern" business park located near
            Dallas Airport, Texas. Oct. 1990

Photo 2:   Downtown San Francisco. Intensive development of the
            financial district in   the   form of expanding office
            space capacities, hotels and "upscale" housing
            encroaches upon traditional neighbourhoods. July,1987

Photo 3:   Suburban "downtown" development in Concord,
            California (San Francisco Bay Area). The 1980s saw
            an office-construction boom in the suburban periphery.
            July 1987

Photo 4:   Mid- to high-density commercial/residential development in the
            suburban city of Pleasanton, California (San Francisco Bay
            Area). Aug. 1985

Photo 5: The immense "Bishop Ranch" business park located in the western suburbs of the San Francisco Bay Area. West of the freeway lies San Ramon, an affluent residential community. Behind Bishop Ranch, a new master-planned community, Canyon Lakes, can be seen. Low overall housing densities and large commercial and office complexes near regional highways are typical of recent suburban growth in metropolitan areas of the United States. July 1987

Photo 6:   Redevelopment in downtown San Diego. In the foreground a large retailing complex, Horton Plaza, can be seen. Beyond that a new international hotel and bank building - all typical elements of inner-city revitalisation in the United States. July 1988

Photo 7:   Rapid urban development on the metropolitan periphery of San Diego, California. The photograph shows Rancho California, a new community located 80 kilometres (!) north of downtown on Interstate Freeway 15 that is rapidly becoming an important residential, industrial and commercial centre. July 1988

Photo 8:   False Creek, South Shore. An example of recently built high - density housing in the core area of Vancouver, B.C. Aug. 1988

Photo 9:   View northwards of False Creek, including Granville Island and downtown residential towers. Aug. 1988

Photo 10:   Development in Burnaby's Metrotown, a designated Town
              Centre within Greater Vancouver. Construction is most
              pronounced around the regional SkyTrain station which
              serves as a focal point for "densification". Aug. 1988

Photo 11:   Burnaby's Metrotown station serves as a regional transport
              node served by numerous bus feeder lines. Aug. 1988

Photo 12:   Toronto's Harbourfront redevelopment project: Harbour
             and York Quays. Harbourfront is an example of federal
             government initiative to "recycle" underutilised and/or
             abandoned industrial land.   The complex, which
             encompasses nearly 100 acres, includes hotels, shops,
             parks, housing and offices. Aug. 1988

Photo 13:   Mississauga, a focal point for concentrated commercial and
             office-related growth within the Toronto-Centred Region.
             Aug.1988

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ANNEX

REGIONAL FOCAL POINTS AND AREAS

CENTERS

multipurpose   single purpose

● level 1   ◖ level 1 ⎤ commercial or office
● level 2   ◗ level 2 ⎦
● level 3   ■ institutional, cultural, recreational

CORE AND LINEAR ACTIVITY AREAS

▨ core   〜 linear

MAJOR TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS AND FACILITIES

— major transportation corridors (EXISTING & PROPOSED)   ▲ terminal facilities

MAJOR URBAN AND NON-URBAN AREAS

ⓤⓐ urban areas   ⓞⓡ non-urban areas (INCLUDES OPEN & RURAL)

OTHER FORM FEATURES

///// natural edges   ∩ entryways

urban form policy
(Adopted November 25, 1980 by the Board of Supervisors)

NATIONAL FOREST

ANTELOPE VALLEY

Antelope Valley Comm. College — Lancaster

Palmdale — Palmdale Airport

SAN GABRIEL MOUNTAINS

NATIONAL FOREST

Magic Mountain — Valencia
College Of The Canyons

San Fernando
San Fernando Mission
V A Hosp.
Cal. State Northridge
Northridge Fashion Center
Busch Gardens
Panorama City
Van Nuys
Warner Ranch
Pierce College
Encino
L. A. Valley College
Valley Plaza
Burbank
No. Hollywood
Universal City
Sherman Oaks Fashion Center
Sherman Oaks
Fallbrook Square
The Oaks

VERDUGO MOUNTAINS

Burbank/Glendale/Pasadena Airport
Glendale Comm. College
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Rose Bowl
Pasadena
Hastings Ranch
Santa Anita
Azusa
Montclair Plaza
Glendora/San Dimas
County Fairgrounds
Claremont Colleges
Cal State Poly Pomona
Pomona

Eagle Rock Plaza
Glendale
Huntington Library
Alhambra
San Gabriel Mission
El Monte
El Monte Bus Terminal
West Covina Fashion Plaza
Eastland

Beverly & San Vicente
Sunset Strip
Sunset-Vermont Medical
Dodger Stadium
Hollywood Blvd.
L.A. Civic Center
Wilshire
Miracle Mile
Century City
Korean Cultural
County USC Medical
Cal State L.A.
Atlantic-Brooklyn
Montebello
Mt. San Antonio Comm. College
Puente Hills
Diamond Bar

Westwood-UCLA
Brentwood
Pepperdine Univ
Santa Monica
Santa Monica Comm. College
Santa Monica Airport
Marina Del Rey
Crenshaw
Westlake
Union Station
Chinatown
Little Tokyo
Downtown L.A.
East L. A.
Rio Hondo Comm. College
Whittier
Whittwood

West L.A. College
Fox Hills
Loyola Univ
Westchester
Inglewood
Hollywood Park
USC-Exposition Park
Bus Terminals
L.A. Trade Tech
Huntington Park
Watts
Stonewood
Rancho Los Amigos Hosp.
La Habra Fashion Square
Brea

L. A. International Airport
El Segundo
T.R.W.
South Bay
King Harbor
L.A. Southeast College
Hawthorne Plaza
King Hosp.
Compton
Compton Comm. College
Cal State Dominguez Hill
Carson Mall
Cerritos Comm. College
Los Cerritos
Lakewood
El Camino College
Long Beach Airport
Long Beach City College
Long Beach
Buena Park
Huntington Center

Del. Amo
County UCLA Medical
Peninsula Center
L. A. Harbor College
L.A. Harbor
San Pedro
Marineland
Long Beach Harbor
Long Beach Marina
Cal State Long Beach
Westminster Center

SANTA MONICA MOUNTAINS

SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND

SANTA CATALINA ISLAND

note: these islands are not in their true locations.

PUENTE HILLS

county of los angeles
GENERAL PLAN
NOVEMBER 1980

0   3000   MILES
METERS

Supplementary map: Los Angeles County Planning Area   Source: Department of Regional Planning, Los Angeles, 1980.