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**The General Theory of Public  
(Spatial) Planning**

*The Social Technique for Creating the Future*

**by  
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**Series editor**

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## Introduction

This short discussion paper is a cross section or a thematic summary of a considerably longer work. The limited scope of the Discussion Papers series does not allow lengthy, detailed explanations or extensive references, only the presentation of mainly summarizing statements. In spite of the ensuing vulnerability, I did not refrain from the publication of my ideas in this form, hoping that they will become accessible to a wider readership in this way and the positive or negative feedback received will help me improve or further elaborate my theory.

Hungary abandoned the practice of the former ‘socialist’ type planning in the early 1990s and even wound up the institutions related to it, but the development of a new planning system seems to take a longer time than expected. I believe that in a situation like this the best thing we can do to assist practice is to offer a sound theoretical foundation. A general theory can not only lead to a better understanding of the gist and possible forms of planning but can also serve as a basis for *a continuously developing methodology of learning and rationalization*. My purpose is to foster changes in attitudes to planning and to develop a new philosophy of planning with emphasis on teleology. I also intend to raise awareness concerning the limitations we have to face in the exploration of a given situation, and replace fallacies about the unknown reality with *desirable and accepted visions*. My approach suggests that proper methodical thinking and action will make it possible for us to control our own life on condition that we fully realize our limitations, and do not pretend to be unquestionably objective in cases when the majority of our statements cannot be verified.

*Jujol*, one of *Gaudi’s* colleagues, who contributed to the final shape of the unique buildings created by the great Spanish architect, had a very special technique: he not only used the traditional materials in unusual ways but made use of objects that others would throw away and by doing so he gave a new interpretation of the components used and created works of great originality. With considerably less determination and hope I have also revived and re-interpreted ideas and have taken over – or vulgarised for the sake of practical work – time-honoured arguments in order to use them as components of ‘some kind of planning theory’.

The paper does not contain the traditional presentation or description of theories developed by other experts, and the reason is not only the limited scope. I believe that understanding what we read means interpreting it at the same time therefore I have incorporated the views of others in my theory of planning after filtering them through my own viewpoints and intentions. References to empirical works or case studies are also missing in spite of the 25 years’ experience I have accumulated as

a planner. I also deliberately rejected the approach of empirical sociology, i.e. the description of events occurring in a given context.

The approach I use is basically post-positive; in general I prefer the normative approach, but in the case of some specific elements of planning I am prepared to accept the conventional efforts for verification.

# 1 What is the general theory of public planning concerned with?

The general theory of planning is one of the practice-oriented social sciences, concerned with the possibility, ways and processes we have to actively shape our future instead of passively enduring what life may bring or being satisfied with simple, ad hoc actions. It also provides guidance about the possible interpretations of events in the past and present or the tools allowing the management of future events.

The *substantive* theory (theory of planning) seeks to explain the essence of teleological action and to give a better understanding of planning itself. It also helps planners to identify the interpretation (belief/paradigm/theory) that is most easily compatible with their views, most suitable for the object of planning and is – at the same time – capable of increasing awareness and strengthening planners' commitment. The *procedural* theory (theory in planning), focusing more on the practice of planning, describes the various phases and techniques used in designing the future, clarifies the role of planners and other actors involved, and recommends various tools for the solution of the problems/tasks. *Institution-oriented* approaches are closely related to the latter, putting the norms influencing the planning process, the legal regulation of the process and the development of the institutional framework of planning in the focus of interest. Legal institutionalisation alone can guarantee that the accepted norms are observed and consensus is maintained. There are several arguments for the distinction of the above three approaches but I believe, that such a disjunction actually conceals the main point, namely that *these different approaches represent the essential facets and specific manifestations of the same notion, that is the process of designing the future (planning)*.

The *general theory of planning* which integrates the various possible approaches ('meta-planning') is concerned with the fundamental issues of planning, its conceptual system, their explanation and the general methodological questions (axiomatic framework). It formulates comprehensive statements at the highest level of abstraction. With a more practice oriented approach it can be defined as the general theoretical framework, model and methodology of planning. In the latter sense it can be interpreted as meta-planning in constant transformation, capable of integrating the ever occurring changes. It formulates general assumptions ('meta-criteria') that become more concrete in the course of practical application after further input (scientific findings, choice of values) and allow *personal interpretations* as well. It represents a level of generalization where the anomalies arising in the course of application cannot make it refutable; on the contrary, they serve as precedents strengthening the theory with their quasi-empirical content.

It is more and more widely accepted that there is no single theory or method that has proved better than the others in a historical perspective. We could only have a chance to create some kind of a comprehensive general theory if it were possible to grasp the *formation* of the meta-theory and methodology of planning *as a process*, the totality of the various theories as well as to provide it with the ability of *adaptation and self-development*. This presupposes the *concomitance or the plural stock* of the various theories and the existence of *permeability, interaction and points of contact* among them.

It would be hard to avoid incorporating the various theories and methodologies into my work, or defining their relationship to the general theory. The classification that I am going to describe later on makes a distinction between *substantial theories* (theories of planning) and *procedural theories* (theories in planning). (This distinction and the terms used are taken from Faludi's work (1973), although I need to point out that there are differences in our understanding of what they mean.) There is no general agreement in literature about their interpretation or their relationship and the existence of the various 'schools' makes the situation even more confusing. It is, however, more important to emphasize the common features of the two sub-systems rather than the differences between them. The practical application of substantial theories presupposes the clarification of the various roles and the process itself, while the methodological approaches focusing on the process should also clarify the theoretical foundation.

Theories of planning tend to be influenced by philosophy, while theories in planning are more exposed to the impact of sociology. The *basic cases of* (substantial) *planning theories* seek to answer the *general, fundamental questions* of planning, like 'Should we, or can we make plans in the given situation?' or 'What kind of rationality can replace the missing methodology of transcending?' The answers provided by social philosophy serve as a guideline for planners in solving their own dilemmas. The various approaches in planning theory draw on different philosophies or paradigms, their formation being primarily influenced by the development of social philosophy, and determined by the 'Zeitgeist', i.e. the social context in the broad sense of the term. These issues should be the concern of planning philosophy in the first place. Every theory of planning is embedded in a normative, historical and social context at the same time. The planner cannot consider himself well prepared for all kinds of planning situation without being familiar with several theories, including the recommendations for their application or their potential 'side effects'.

After choosing the planning philosophy (planning theory) he is to apply, the committed planner also has to decide how to do the planning, how to build up the system and implement the process. In doing so he can rely on the (procedural) *theories in planning* that contribute to the clarification of the system of planning, the specific conditions in which planning takes place as well as the procedure.



They differ only in 'style' i.e. the methods recommended – providing a kind of theory of planning methodology. Its application in practical work will help planners to understand the environment in which they operate. Theories in planning are always directly influenced by the prevailing power relations and the current political contents and this defines *the role of public planning within the governance, the way it is used as a tool. The system of planning will be developed and regulated accordingly.*

Planners can be given various assignments or they can undertake various roles after assessing and analysing the actual situation. Depending on the type of chosen or given (highly regulated) planning role, I make a fundamental distinction between allocative, innovative and radical planning, each representing, at the same time, a choice of planning theory and methodology.

Consequently, a general theory comprising all these approaches can assist not only in making conscious choices concerning the philosophy of planning (i.e. understanding the essence of planning) but in the adequate application of the various planning theories, i.e. the planning and implementation of the specific planning activities as well. This is a coherent system that can update the theses and paradigm of the planning theory in accordance with the *Zeitgeist* as perceived by the planner defining, at the same time, the main rules that govern planning. It can also give answers to the main dilemmas that arise about planning and the procedure to follow. It discusses the relevant theories and schools of planning as tools or procedures that can be chosen in various situations or in the pursuit of specific goals. It follows from the above considerations that instead of picking out or creating a (meta)-narrative for a specific application trying to prove its universal truth and general applicability it provides a general framework for a *set of compatible narratives with multiple components* comprising a great variety of values and assumptions. Its theses formulated at a higher level of generalization (abstraction) tend to synthesize/integrate the various approaches without banning any of them or refusing to enlarge its set of tools. It is precisely this feature of the theory that makes it possible for planners to find in it the answers or tools required in rather different situations or *for different purposes*. A good workshop is characterized by the availability of different kinds of expertise and a wide range of tools allowing the efficient solution of the problems that may arise or the implementation of the given tasks.

In my theory spatial planning is not treated as an independent theory of planning, but as an activity overlapping public planning considering that the definition of the content of spatial plans, the related decision-making, legitimation, etc. are linked to territorially separate communities. This is quite obvious in the case of spatial plans of development type, but in the case of physical planning the emphasis is not on the separation/demarcation of the activity, but on the integration of physical planning into the community planning process at various levels (see last chapter).

## 2 Changing paradigms in planning

Besides advocating the need to retain the pluralist, sometimes contradictory views, I am also convinced that the planning practice formerly referred to as positivist, is undergoing a transformation and we can witness the emergence of a post-empiric, post-positivist paradigm, which is modernist in a ‘post-modernist’ way.

The changes we can perceive at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries may make it self-evident for us to make the basic distinction between modern and post-modern views.

In my opinion planning is the product of the modern age, and there is no such thing as post-modern planning (see section 5.5). The reason why I prefer to describe the recent trends as normative or concept-driven planning, instead of using the term post-positivist is that besides transcending classical positivism and empirio-criticism, the emerging paradigms integrate some new types of (neo)-positivist ambitions (components) as well.

Table 1

POSITIVIST	NORMATIVE
APPROACH	
absolutist	relativist
objective	subjective
objective-subjective	true-false
empiric	rationalist
causality	teleology
structuralism	existentialism
moral universalism	cultural differentiation
meta-narrative	multitude of ‘small narratives’
induction	deduction
analysis	synthesis
descriptive	normative
experience	self-reflection, vision of the future
‘because’	‘in order that’
constant environment	constituted ‘lifeworld’
measurable quantity	quality, value
persuasion, assertion	criticism, argumentation
technical, instrumental rationality	practical, communicative rationality
work, performance	discourse, understanding
justification	validity, legitimation
homo oeconomicus	experience subjective

*Source:* Author’s.

The list is far from complete; it is only meant to illustrate the point without any importance attributed to the order of the items. There is a partial overlap between the concepts listed in the two columns. It does not follow from the pragmatic approach used here that the concept pairs entered in the same line of the table are in antinomy: there is an *axis between the two columns along which items can be chosen freely*. If someone prefers to build his conceptual framework from items of the first column, he can be expected to identify the tasks deemed necessary under the determining and restricting conditions of the socio-economic environment, closely linked to the empirical world. The planner, who puts his faith in the validity of the second column, will tend to emphasize synthesis, the formulation of a concept and – fully aware of the possibility of mistakes – attributes more importance to monitoring and the learning process.

My view is that the main distinction should be made between concept-driven (normative) planning based on teleology and the empiric-analytic theory of planning based on positivism (*Table 1*). Since the new paradigm is still in the stage of formation, all we can observe in the practice of planning is only the strengthening of the items in the second column, and increasing preference for their application. Further concretising these trends to the planning activity I have identified the differences shown in *Table 2*.

Table 2

*Some characteristics of empirical-analytic  
and concept- driven planning*

	EMPIRICAL-ANALYTIC	CONCEPT-DRIVEN
<i>Philosophical foundation</i>	positivism, materialism, determinism, evolutionism	Post-positivism, spatial-cultural relativism, criticism, communicative ethics
<i>Ideology</i>	Totalitarian, instrumental	The concomitance and conceptualisation of theories
<i>Knowledge</i>	Dualism of the descriptive and the normative	Critical, practical
<i>Motivation, the basis of planning</i>	'what there is'; familiarity with reality perceived as objective and the preliminary events 'because...'	'what there should be', truth valid then and there, norms and intentions 'in order that...'
<i>Methods</i>	analysis, induction, scientific rationalism, scientism	synthesis, deduction, argumentation (dialectics), historically determined „communicative mind”, understanding

Table 2 (continued)

	EMPIRICAL-ANALYTIC	CONCEPT-DRIVEN
<i>Tools</i>	Scientifically proven (accepted by the power) models, patterns, measures	Search for consensus, procedures valid in the given context, patterns of interpretation, culturally internalised assumptions
<i>Criteria of evaluation</i>	'objectivity', measurable results, scientific quality	Validity, legitimation, 'aesthetic experience'
<i>The function of the plan or planning</i>	administrative, a tool of power, it allocates, prescribes, prohibits, restricts, divides	A tool for the realization of free will, it creates opportunities
<i>Goals/political context</i>	sectorial, 'product oriented'	Territorial, problem-oriented
<i>Space</i>	The receptive physical structure, 'projector screen' - the area of practical work	Interrelationships of contents
<i>Citizen</i>	The object of planning and executive	Active participant in the development, implementation and monitoring of the plan
<i>Planner</i>	Rationally thinking expert, aiming at 'objectivity'	moderator, catalyst, receptor, subjective, intuitive expert, working with semantic contents
<i>Preferred solutions, technology</i>	The most efficient (standardized, uniform)	Locally suitable (individual, flexible)
<i>Planning</i>	Drawing up of the document	Interactive and interpretative learning process, argumentative procedure, 'discourse about the truth'
<i>Decision-making</i>	In a hierarchic structure those who have power, the role of the central/national level is outstanding	Decentralized groups of socialized individuals, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity
<i>Target organization</i>	The public sector, large (economic) organizations	Small organizations, the civil society, individuals

Source: Author's.

All things considered I advocate the normative approach to planning and contend that the concept developed in the course of debates or discourses is crucial for the process of planning, without excluding the possibility that functional-allocative planning is also conceivable if several strict conditions are met simultaneously. The

process of planning as a whole is a normative activity even if *the positivist approach can be applied only to a specific stage of it, i.e. the drawing up of the planning document*. However, it is true even in this case that the choice of a tool involves a choice of value as well, therefore planners' loyalty and commitment entails observation of specific norms.

### **3 Description and maxims of the general concept of planning**

Like many other concepts, planning is not easily discussed in generality, independently of space and time, or the historical-political context, because neither its object, nor is methodology (form) are constant, and the various (political) cultures also have quite different ideas of what planning is. Public planning is a *constantly changing evolutionary process of social technique*. To make the situation even more complicated, planning as a tool is used by the basic units of the economy and the society in the same way as by governments and their various supra-national communities. In spite of all these difficulties I attempt to define the essence of planning, which can be grabbed in most of the cases, as well as to formulate the currently prevailing maxims because they are the main factors in defining the subject matter of planning theory, and setting the boundaries of its theses and concepts.

The main question that empirical-analytical sciences seek to answer is '*How can we know what there is?*' and how is it possible to reproduce what has existed so far even if in a different form or only in the bud. The majority of positivists or Marxists consider 'future as a past' that will take place after the present. In their view this future has already existed in some form in the past and is with us in the present as well. In contrast with this the theory of planning seeks to answer the question 'how we can find out how to' define the future 'we wish to shape' and what should we do, in what way and using what tools in order to realize the 'dreams about a bright future' or how it is possible to bring about something that has never existed before. Methodologies based strictly on formal logics or deterministic relations do not allow planners to constitute target-causes or to plan. Planning focuses on setting goals, developing concepts on the basis of transcendental logics, and in this way makes the solution of the problems of practical life an orderly activity.

In this chapter I attempt to define the essence of planning, i.e. describe its basic assumptions, and those *elements of its paradigm that can count on general validity*.

These together constitute the basis for a possible theory (meta-planning). The theory of formal and procedural issues will be discussed later.

In the search for the essential elements of planning I make two restrictions:

- My analysis is concerned exclusively with planning in the public sector, related to public policy therefore the features of business planning are not included;
- Planning, as it is understood in our days, is linked to modern age, and this is the object of my study. Modern consciousness integrated historical and utopian thinking; modern man believes in progress, the possibility of setting and achieving positive goals, consequently in the possibility and sense of planning as well.

In a philosophical sense the past and the present cannot serve as a basis for determining what should be done, because there is no methodological link between the past and the future. The only way to bridge this gap is to *accept certain preliminary assumptions and build a methodology on them*. The assumptions and the various principles can create a symbolic meta-system in which our decisions about the future can be made and which can serve as a framework for reorganizing the known and unknown (not explicit) factors.

Assumptions (dogmas, axioms):

- I assume the existence of the *unknown*, constantly changing reality, the need to get to know it and the endless changes in cognition.
- Man is a being condemned to constantly concretising his views, (*Wittgenstein*) making choices and taking actions.
- Teleological action is characteristic of man only and *planning is its operationalization, its explicit form*.
- In order to interpret planning as a teleological activity we have to recognize the ability of actors to have opinions, make decisions and implement them.
- Our choices and decisions are influenced by 'external resistance': the praxis of others and the availability of the resources (shortage).
- I accept *rationalization* as a teleological principle, built on the possibility of transcendence.
- I accept the *efficiency principle* without restricting its application to economic achievement alone. I allow the broadest possible interpretation of positive changes.
- I accept that the public sector can interfere with the private sector if necessary, after careful deliberation of each individual case.
- I accept the need for a pragmatic approach in daily practice; decisions can be inevitable even without certainty or the knowledge of the optimal solution (not deciding is also a kind of decision).

At the abstraction level (in the broad sense) of the general theory (meta-planning) purposeful foresight, action based on it, the assessment of results and the drawing of conclusions, as well as their different variations can all be considered as planning, because planning in practice is also heterogeneous, united by the similarity of intentions and methods. Every planning activity defines tasks or series of actions in order to avoid problems that may arise in the future, to achieve better results, or simply to control certain situations. The main point is the *contingent* or the *accidental* and overall *determinism* (e.g. historicism, historical materialism, or geographic determinism) *are opposed to consciously planned (wanted) actions*. The thesis ‘they do not know it just do it’ is replaced by the principle ‘we know more and more about it and do it’.

Planning is used here in the broad sense of the term, while *making plans* is only an element of the process. Since there is no objective basis for foresight, plans can be considered to be nothing more than falsified hypotheses. This is the reason why I think it is necessary to create the unity of plan making, implementation and feedback. A planning cycle is a process comparable to a scientific experiment, during which our knowledge is enlarged, awareness increases and the new planning cycles become better founded.

Plans are meant to be implemented. Without the element of implementation a plan is just a ‘written work’, a political document, which is realized by the activities of others when the tools required for it become available (e.g. political coercion or incentives). In the course of methodical planning rational knowledge becomes more practical, i.e. the knowledge embodied in the planning documents and statements changes into practical knowledge manifesting itself in the activities. Planning helps us to systematize and formalize the knowledge we already have, transforming implied knowledge into explicit one. Implementation of the plans contributes to the objectification of the knowledge obviously incorporated in them, making it appreciable even for the laymen.

The genius of Christopher Columbus consisted in *accepting the new findings of science*, namely he believed that the earth had the shape of a globe and set out to find India over the Atlantic Ocean. *The strength, power and also the main hazard of planning originates in the process during which thinking is turned into praxis, and will is concretised*. The lack of extensive objectivity, and the unpredictability of all the future consequences are typical features of planning and all teleological actions. Not being able to fully grasp reality, a plan (an assessment of the situation, vision) will at best make an adaptation of it, just like the forthcoming reality will also ‘adapt’ the content of the plan.

The making of plans and the activities it triggers change our physical and social environment in a way that cannot be annulled. *This change is irreversible!* What is more, we may have different interpretations of reality depending on our world outlook, and imagine our future or create new realities according to it. The situa-

tion is made worse by the fact that nature (reality) – and often a certain part of the stakeholders – are not able to say no. Even if a cry for help is transmitted by go-betweens, the will of people on power can easily suppress it. *In the course of teleological action man can influence the processes and – with planning becoming more and more widespread – both man and his environment are becoming to a larger extent the product of his own purposes.*

Planning relies on anticipation and prediction which is closer to reality than the visions created by researchers of the future or futurologists inasmuch that in the stage of implementation active steps are taken to induce the occurrence of a specific condition and if the assessment of the circumstances and opportunities was made properly, the attempt will probably be successful. Futurology focuses on our ability to develop a vision of the future, and the probability of this vision coming true. Planning, on the other hand, is concerned with the present validity and future acceptance of the planned and actually occurring changes. It is not enough to take action in order to promote the realization of the plan; it must be made clear that – similarly to the findings of futurology – a plan is not a reflection of a future reality either and has the inherent probability of mistakes. The foundations of planning or insight are not found in the future but, to a great extent, in the present.

A plan is the picture of a future action in our mind, and planning is the process itself that creates this picture. *The creation of the picture and determination that appears in the human mind is a decisive moment of planning.* In order to arrive at the best possible definition of the vision (What do we want to achieve? Where do we want to get?) and the strategy (What should we do to achieve this? How can we get there?) we need to make the cognitive processes of the present or ‘internal determinations’ more explicit, conscious and formalized.

*Purposeful* freedom and responsibility (moral commitment) are key elements of planning, which means that the actions we take to help the future come true are of our free will and we have to draw the conclusions from the changes induced (learning). Freedom means autonomy, creativity, abilities that can be used to achieve our ends and is limited only by external resistance – as Sartre put it – consequently it also includes voluntary commitments, agreements and all kinds of external impacts that could only be rejected at the cost of serious consequences and do not prevent the achievement of our goals. The reason why we create a vision of the future is because ‘we exist in the world’ (Heidegger, 1989), we do so freely but influenced by the present and we are also capable of recreating our environment in accordance with it. Since man is also capable of self-criticism, planning allows us to learn from our genesis, interpret facts on the basis of our experiences and even approach the *Zeitgeist* with a critical mind. In a deterministic way we can choose either to adopt passive conformity or – recognizing the new opportunities – we may make effort to transcend the already known conditions. Regardless of our past, we may accept what has become of us and can strive to become whatever can.



This, however, does not mean to say that we have to do something simply because there is an opportunity for it. Neither the past nor the goals projected into the future can relieve planners of the responsibility they have to bear for their decisions. If we are free to choose what actions to take, we have to assume responsibility for them or for not taking them.

In the course of making and implementing plans everybody should be aware that others have plans and ambitions as well. An individual's freedom is limited by the recognized freedom of others. If we accept the plans that others make and try to implement, they become an objective condition for us. Others proceed in a similar way: they objectivize our situation and by accepting or rejecting it, set the limits of our freedom in planning. Either they accept our goals and ambitions and then they count on their implementation, or they will make efforts to change them.

The possible range of planning (content, geographical area, stakeholders) depends on the consensus about the values (identical interests) and the conflicts of interests. Since a plan is to be put to practice, planning and legitimating the plans is only possible within the boundaries set by the conflicts of values. A conflict in the fundamental interests of the parties concerned may lead to clashes, open conflicts or 'simply' failure of the implementation. There is no communication between the different value packages or paradigms, therefore it is not possible to attempt building a consensus or involve planners with different orientations in joint planning.

The maxims or meta-criteria that I consider valid for planning in the public sector at present are the following:

- Public planning is basically a social technique which has a theory of its own and the operational practice ( modern theory and teleological social action);
- It is not enough to foresee the future or want it to happen – the future should be created! Planning includes the elaboration of the plans, their implementation as well as a feedback process, thus contributing to the recreation of life world;
- Planning is a self-developing system based on the learning process, i.e. the planner is capable of correcting his own mistakes;
- Most of the *a posteriori* experiences are gained via 'experimentation', by creating plausible hypotheses and implementing the plans including them; Experimental rationalism dynamizes *a priori* knowledge and the new *a posteriori* knowledge will serve as a basis for further progress;
- It is an inter-subjective process of rationalization: the normative dialogue conducted with reality and inter-subjective communication both increase awareness;
- It is a transcendental pattern, the method of transcending experiences;
- Conception building (transcending, creating a paradigm, particularizing values) is a key element in it;

- Control is limited, it is possible mainly when the actions have already been taken;
- It creates a link among liberty, probability and responsibility;
- Relying on the knowledge available today it is actively future-oriented (it is concerned with the future management or control of some system or process);
- It gives rationalization and teleological action a systemic, well managed character;
- It is pragmatist, externalising actual knowledge and purposefully transforming it into actions (practical policy);
- It generates irreversible changes in its environment;
- It is a power game with many actors and several levels, a tool or medium of exercising power
- It follows an explicit, well-articulated, well-structured and formalized procedure;
- It is a special form of communication: the documents of the process and the plans are the objectified versions of linguistic communication;

*The general conditions (the meta-prescriptions valid today) of 'reliable operation' (i.e. the effectiveness of the maxims):*

- guarantee of ethical operation;
- shift towards communicative action (*Habermas*), promotion of convergence: efforts should be made to solve the problems by way of discourses, and eliminate the negative impacts of strategic actions;
- separation of areas with consensus about the values, efforts to create identity of interests concerning the object of planning;
- transparency;
- guaranteed access to information;
- competence (availability of expectable knowledge and necessary tools);
- control over the process;
- every potential stakeholder should be guaranteed (by the regulation) the right to participate (in a clearly defined way) in the planning process, to give an opinion and monitor the implementation;
- planners and decision-makers should make efforts (within reasonable time and cost limits) to discuss with all potential stakeholders, to achieve mutual understanding;
- efforts should be made to create 'ideal speech situations' in all the real communicative communities;
- a plan should be plausible and feasible.

In conclusion let me summarize briefly the main points: planning is a cyclical learning and rationalizing process meant to shape the future and built on 'experimenting', a well-structure instrumental mode of success-oriented social action and also a tool of governance (management). A planner is a communicative individual existentially dependent on the historical present, and endowed with various argumentative and strategic competences. A plan is a picture of intended actions, fixed (projected) at a given moment, a medium of communication, the objectification of social action interwoven with norms. Its acceptance means commitment. Objectification (documentation) is required not so much for the sake of implementation, but rather for transparency, the possibility to make comments (falsification) to follow the principle of partnership and to guarantee accountability. In order that the plan should meet the above requirements its use is regulated by the social norms and the rules built upon them. The planning document is a communication tool, which contains information, transfers messages and sets standards. Plans can be regarded as hypotheses which cannot be fully founded or verified, and which need revision from time to time.

Planning, implementation and monitoring require a linguistic framework. The process of cognisance is realized through discourses, which means, most of the time, the correct (common) interpretations of the concepts. The description of the current situation abstracts the particular, subjects it to the intentions and the existing code system. The plan can be regarded as the unity of signs, codes, metaphors, norms and human relations arranged in a logical order. Implementation requires a new interpretation especially if the planner and the implementer are not identical, or if the plan is made for the long term. Reinterpretation during implementation is motivated by tactical and strategic goals within the given framework. The type and character of the planning, implementation and monitoring systems depend on the adopted rules and also on the allowed 'intellect input' and 'value input' (*Nietzsche*).

## 4 The canon of teleological action/planning: ‘we know it and do it ever better’

### 4.1 The cyclical learning and rationalizing process

Drawing on the works by *Weber, Foucault, Habermas* and others we can establish that human actions of various types and of diverse rationality take turn from time to time in becoming dominant, holding power and thereby changing the *teleological orientation* of a specific culture, society or community. As time passes and discourses become more extended and open, the knowledge and experience accumulated by people results in a *rationalizing process of progressive tendency*. Increasing publicity and partnership in daily practice together create a trend of rationalization.

*Kuhn* (1984) described the historical character of scientific rationalism pointing out that the modes of scientific cognition are not invariable and absolute, but changing and dependent on time (and also place, I believe). Paraphrasing the empirical thinking of logical positivists we can formulate the requirement that planning should always rely on the knowledge available at its time and meet the methodological ideal of the age. We have reason to assume that *the amount of knowledge increases and its quality improves during the subsequent planning cycles* (cumulative model of development), consequently the whole teleological action (making plans and implementing them) is a progressive (developing) process, even if this progress is not linear, and by integrating the results of the learning process in it later stages it becomes increasingly ‘superior’. The same knowledge and methods were not available in the earlier stages, it is therefore understandable (but not necessary) that in the light of more recent knowledge former results or decisions do not appear to be good and what was earlier accepted as true, may later turn out to have been false.

I use the method of hypothetic deduction in an attempt to reconcile the framework of the above described positivist model with the views emphasizing the uncertainty of cognition, and the Popper’s ideas on scientific research (*Popper* 1976, 1997). Popper holds that the development of science should not be interpreted as the simple accumulation of true knowledge but as an ever stronger convergence towards the truth (evolutionary convergence model) The intentions formulated at the beginning of the planning process are to be considered as hypotheses that should be subject to professional reviews and normative criticisms (falsification) following ex ante evaluation and social debate. The corroboration of the vision, the goals and priorities by the experts (i.e. checking compliance with the scientific paradigms and methods) is acceptable only in relation to the community concerned,

in the given time and pace. This can be guaranteed by the jointly accepted norms, and the consensus achieved after the debate concerning the values.

The consistent application of the formal planning operations is essentially a process of rationalization, capable of *self-correction* on the basis of the experiences and guiding principles. In this way community planning becomes the *formal tool of social rationalization*, which is institutionalised in the more highly developed societies in the form of ‘methodical conduct’ (*Weber*). Planners become more and more ‘conscious’, capable of analysing events with better efficiency, identifying the relevant parts of the ongoing communication or use of language, assessing the future consequences of their own acts and the after effects on their own life and they can foresee more and more steps of future developments.


The process/result of planning is not suitable for the formulation of general laws, but the use of adequate tools in the adequate procedure may foreshadow progress. For technical reasons or easier manageability it seems helpful to treat the increasingly complex process of social planning as a sequential system, and break down the individual cycles as well. Sequentiality means that the system develops through series of learning and feedback processes changing the technology of planning and the content of the plans as well. Instead of forming circles, the cycles progress in the form of a spiral, with occasional interruptions. The subsequent learning cycles cause irreversible changes both in reality and in the cognitive sphere.

The planning process built on the learning cycles means the realization of the principle ‘we know it and do it ever better’ which expresses the increasing consciousness of planning. The rationalization spiral of the planning cycles is shown in *Figure 1*. The initial conditions at point  $tx$  are never identical with the knowledge available at  $tx-1$  and the other conditions. The *subsequent initial hypotheses have greater and greater empirical (truth) content*. Progress is achieved through learning, or ‘understanding perception’ (*Heidegger*) making it possible for the new programmes to have additional content, or show improvement over the ones they replace.

In the case of a radical change in the environment (e.g. economic depression or September, 11, 2001) the emergence of new norms (e.g. change of regime or general elections when new values are voted for) or a crisis (e.g. bankruptcy or natural disaster) it is not possible to build directly on former experiences and continue the former trends; the rationalization spiral may be interrupted and it becomes necessary to start a new cycle by way of radical planning (to be discussed later). In such situations emphasis is not on continuity but on wanting something new. There may be partly or totally different, alternative courses as well that can either fade away in time or prove to be better and become dominant.

Figure 1

*Rationalization spiral of planning cycles*



Source: Author's.

There is a great variety in the time horizon of the planning cycles and it is very difficult to define it in general terms. It is more and more frequently emphasized by environmentalists, futurologists and physical planners that plans should be made for longer periods of time and the future should be considered as important as the present. I do understand this demand or intention, but with regard to the difficulties of foresight, the problems involved in the assessment of the validity of visions and the justification arising from the results of the actions I feel more inclined *to achieve the original goal with cyclical (preferably medium-term) planning that is*

*better adjusted to the object of planning.* In this way it becomes possible to reduce the risk inherent in the choice of values, the identification of goals and the ensuing action, and we can be more certain about meeting requirements like sustainable society or social justice (fairness). Continuous or cyclical planning does a better service to our vision of the future than a one-time long-term plan.

As far as values are concerned: their changes can be perceived in the present only and their survival can be assumed with more probability in the medium term than in the long run. The same is true for our judgement on these values. The short- and medium-term planning cycles created by the need for frequent feedback (praxis-rationality), long-term thinking and responsibility taken for the future are all present in the planning process urging us to give priority to values of general validity in the formulation of medium-term tasks, i.e. values which can be expected to survive in the long run.

Planning is also continuous experimentation, an activity where theory and practice are collated with each other. Not being satisfied with the experiences already gained, we set out to acquire new knowledge by putting our hypotheses into practice. In the course of cyclical planning *some of our a priori hypotheses turn into a posteriori knowledge.*


*Figure 2* shows the dual cycles of learning and monitoring present in planning. Teleological thinking and (re)conceptualization are affected by the historical setting, the territorially-culturally determined situation of action, some factors of which can be highlighted and presented in an explicit way. The action situation is actually a part of the environment (lifeworld) picked out by the actors of planning and constituted by the elements considered relevant to it in the light of the opportunities linked to the object (subject matter) of planning. It is the object of planning that delimits the scope of relevance that the exploration of the situation and evaluation is focused on. The arrow indicating orientation expresses the unity of teleological thinking and action, aimed at deliberately inducing changes in its environment.

The figure shows that the external environment, especially the action situation in its complexity is not only part of the input – or we might say the ‘raw material’ in the Marxian sense – of the planning process, but its output as well. Teleological action transforms the physical and social environment, it has an impact on the norms and even ‘increases’ our experiences and knowledge.

*Figure 2* presents two learning/feedback cycles of praxis-rationality. In the inner (lower) cycle we aim at empirical self-justification, while in the upper (inter) cycle we seek to achieve normative acceptance. The learning cycle taking place in the upper, inter-subjective area and the normative control (acceptance) together produce the current interpretation of truth. The judgement made in the outer cycle is rooted in the moral knowledge of all those concerned. Social rationalization can only be ensured by the external learning cycle.

Figure 2

*The learning and control circles of planning*



Source: Author's.

The external (or upper as shown in *Figure 2*) learning cycle controls not only the process of plan-making and implementation, but the inner learning cycle as well, i.e. the whole process. This upper cycle cannot come about and operate without the continuous documentation of planning and the consistent compliance with the principle of transparency.

The implementation of the plan means that the intentions get objectified and after feedback assessment is made of compliance with the goals and norms in the course of implementation on the one hand, and, on the other, decision-makers and planners evaluate the process in a world created partly according to their own intentions and they also draw the necessary conclusions. The new action situation created by the active implementation of the deliberate actions and their objectification becomes the starting point of a new cycle. This learning process may change not only the evaluation of the reshaped external world but the subjective actor involved in the process as well, together with his abilities and values, which means



that he will become capable of communicating in a new way, using different tools, and develop both himself and the process of planning. During this process the planner undoubtedly uses a particular part of the environment as a kind of 'raw material' in order to create a new 'product', thereby transforming a part of (both the physical and spiritual) world.

## 4.2 The knowledge creating process

New knowledge can be acquired through purpose- and problem-oriented actions. Experimentation is meaningless if the opportunities offered by rationalization and reasoning are not made full use of. Planning is quite similar to scientific research, the process during which new knowledge is acquired. It builds not only on existing knowledge, but draws on the unknown as well. In the course of the above-described planning process we can acquire ever increasing and more profound knowledge. Thanks to intuition and personal knowledge it is not only explicit knowledge, but implicit knowledge, another component of personal knowledge that also gets integrated into the decisions or plans during the process of systemization and conceptualisations and contributes to the creation of something new.

Drawing on the works by *Polányi*, *Nonaka* and *Takeuchi* (1995) and *Nonaka* and *Konno* (1998) developed the model of the learning cycle during which new knowledge is created. It is this widely known SECI model that I modified and complemented with the steps of the planning process (*Figure 3*).

New knowledge is created as a result of an inter-subjective, inter-active process involving the various types of knowledge, called knowledge conversion. Nonaka and his various partners (1995, 1998, 2000) distinguish four ways of 'knowledge conversion', which take place in different spaces of interaction:

1) In the course of *socialization* (joint praxis) *people continuously exchange their 'implicit knowledge'*. In the small scale physical space we can understand one another in the course of face-to-face relations, exchange information, and influence one-another's values, i.e. the direct and indirect experiences increase the knowledge acquired by individuals. This knowledge remains implicit most of the time, because the process during which individuals learn from one-another within the community does not require any recorded (written or audio-visual) forms or – in some cases not even verbal communication. In order to learn from one another it may be enough for us to see, experience and understand various situations. Mutual understanding is enhanced by the common culture, territorial identity, openness, empathy and –last, but not least- common genesis. By building and strengthening communication networks and new communities, by strengthening the pre-requisites of ideal communicative situations as described by Habermas we can improve


the chances and depth of co-operation and the efficiency of information transfer and mutual understanding.

In the course of planning this implicit knowledge manifests itself in the evaluations, norms and will of the stakeholders on the one hand, and in the synthesizing or intuitive skills of planners and decision-makers, on the other. The total of knowledge that is available in a specific area or settlement without being tangible or explicit is often referred to as innovative environment.

2) During *externalization* a part of the implicit knowledge is turned into *explicit in the process of articulation*. It appears in the form of transferable analogies, patterns, models, metaphors, statements, etc. that can be understood by others as well. The transfer of knowledge to others often requires a written or other transferable form. *Externalization* primarily uses tools like dialogues or reflections taking place in the *interactive space*. During the dialogues personal knowledge and abilities (in the case of norms and values: the commonly shared part) are transformed into common evaluations, statements, goals, concepts and strategies. In contrast with the previous, original or natural process and space this one requires a more conscious structure. The media, community forums, professional events, the internet, public meetings of various authorities, etc. can all become the scene of externalisation. *Explicit knowledge can be transferred and acquired by everybody, because is it assessable to all at least in principle.*

Methodology is the critical point, i.e. the question already discussed in the previous section: 'Which parts of the values reproduced by the various communities and of the implicit knowledge including norms as well can be made explicit and in what way?' or 'Which opinion should be accepted as valid?'. In my opinion this methodology (or technology) is also the methodology of planning, which helps us make the apprehensible forms of knowledge explicit. The key issue concerning this process is the way in which power is used.

Figure 3



Source: Own design on the basis of Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, p. 71 and Nonaka and Konno 1998, pp. 43 and 46.

3) *Combination* is used to associate, integrate, structure and categorize the various components of knowledge and thereby create new knowledge. Nonaka et al. as well as those who apply the SECI model hold that this way of systemizing combines the explicit components of knowledge. In my opinion this can be true only in the case of analytic-empirical (mostly positivist) planning, which does not work as I have already pointed out. Explicit knowledge is generally synthesized by certain people from their own complex knowledge, therefore this stage also includes the *addition of extra implicit knowledge to the already existing knowledge*. All this takes place in an internal space of monologue. The knowledge created in this way can be presented in an explicit form, it can be taught, transferred and implemented.

When a concept, strategy or operative plan is drawn up, the relevant knowledge and values are synthesized in a new way. I refer to this synthesizing stage of planning as tendentious rationalization (contamination) (see later chapters). Who will have the opportunity to perform this operation and whose opinion/knowledge/plan will be accepted and put to practice greatly depends on the outcome of the processes taking place in the power space.

4) *Internalisation* means that while the new knowledge (the documents, the information heard) is put to practice (praxis-rationality) individuals incorporate the experiences gained during implementation into their own implicit knowledge thereby individualizing them. This process takes place in the space affected by practice.

The experiences gained in the course of implementation enlarge the individual (both implicit and explicit) knowledge of all those concerned through the learning cycles of planning.

Consequently, the process of making plans, or at least several steps of the process are similar to the dynamic transcending model of creating new knowledge. In the course of planning we can make use of the implicit elements of social knowledge and make explicit the essential elements of teleological thinking and action. The action strategies, or plans represent a new, synthesized knowledge which – when implemented – can provide new knowledge to the planners, decision makers (internal learning circle) and those concerned (internal learning circle) alike. Every planning cycle creates new knowledge and the knowledge spiral created by this process is overlapped in several respects by the rationalization spiral of the planning cycles.

### 4.3 The evaluation of the plans, criteria of validity

Assessing whether the statements formulated about the future are true and proving them is the critical point of success-oriented planning, as a methodology of rationalization, creating new knowledge. The statements made in the plan are true if they can be proved in practice, i.e. the truth of the statements basically depends on the success of the ensuing actions. A plan is 'good' if it conveys the same meaning for everybody and works, i.e. it can be put to practice and proves to bring results (total of impacts). The success of the actions depends on the instrumental value of the programmes envisaged and their evaluation in the resulting new situation. Instrumental control (the achievement of the goals) is performed in the inner circle (the lower one in *Figure 2*), while moral and ethical judgement takes place in the external (upper) circle, i.e. the social context. The ultimate criterion is whether the performance of the actions defined in the plan can be accepted in the future or not.

In the case of cyclical, concept-driven/normative planning the main function of evaluation is to provide *a better ground for new decisions* and not to give subsequent justification or apology. The validity of our experiences gained (a posteriori) by experimentation during the implementation of the plans is temporary and limited, therefore the new proposals should again be treated as hypotheses and subjected to new criticism. Objectivity should mean the objectivity of this method of continuous criticism, being quite different from objectivity achieved by experimentation in the field of natural sciences.

The impacts generated by implementation and their acceptance can either strengthen or refute all the assumptions that governed the planning process. It is, however, not enough to have an evaluation *subsequently*, after the operations; we also need a *preliminary* examination of the correctness of the intentions as well as an *interim* control of the process of implementation, i.e. the choice of values and tools.

The method using the results of the operation for critical justification is a deductive one: hypothesis, based on a posteriori and a priori knowledge → action → a posteriori experience → acceptance or revision in the new situation. The results of teleological action (the impacts of implementation, either measured or non-measurable but perceived during norm control) may not be able to prove the correctness of the initial hypothesis once and for all, they can, however, confirm them a posteriori to various extent and this is of great importance for future progress. In the course of the planning cycles we learn to set better justified goals and operative programmes.

a) *Ex ante evaluation*

Before putting our will into practice we need to make sure that our intentions are correct, and their planned implementation will most probably lead to the realization of our objectives and the creation of more desirable conditions. The difficulty is that the choice we have to make is not between objective knowledge and lack of knowledge, but among hypotheses (beliefs), attempting to pick the one that is the most strongly justified and plausible. We can implement only those objectives or promote the realization of those values which are expected to produce results that all stakeholders are more inclined to accept than of any other alternative. An agreement should be reached today about the expected consequences and their chances for acceptance in the future. The expected consequences are a priori projected into the future. *In principle* plans (objectives, priorities, programmes) we formulate can only be valid (true) and therefore feasible if – in a given situation – all the others concerned would have identified the same ideas and the expected impacts of implementation are supposed to be accepted by all stakeholders. In the given operative situation and during the extended discourse about them, they have the same meaning for everybody and judging them from their own viewpoints everybody finds them acceptable. The evaluation/judgment made by the planner in the present coincides with the evaluations/judgments made by others in the present or future. It is hard to imagine that this strict requirement can be met in *practice*, therefore the following procedure is chosen: We outline the vision together with the system of objectives and preferences pertaining to it. At first it is treated as a hypothesis, a cluster of basic beliefs, discussed extensively with all the stakeholders involved. If the arguments brought up make it necessary, modifications are made continuously. The version that cannot be shaken either by the scientists, the professionals or the stakeholders or which cannot be replaced by a better one will be accepted as the best possible version at the time. However, *we cannot say that there exists no better version*. That is the most that *ex ante* evaluation can undertake. The mode of planning is also of great importance: the method we choose should be able to guarantee the required coincidence between our potential programmes and ‘facts’ or norms of the future.

As a starting point we can accept the pragmatist, conventionalist assumption that a set of objectives or a proposed operative plan can be used as an initial statement for planning without being proved to be true or fair. False statements or invalid conclusions will be ruled out anyway later on during the ensuing communication process, the debates by professional bodies and social organizations, so that in the end we will be capable of formulating the objectives accepted then and there. Falsification can be applied in the *ex ante* evaluation during the planning process, but the final conclusions can be drawn only subsequently, during the *ex post* evaluation following practical implementation.

Polányi (1994) also pointed out that we may not have to reject the theoretical forecasts or scientific statements simply because *initially* observations seem to contradict them; the discrepancies can be just temporary anomalies. The methodology proposed by Lakatos (1997) may be even better suited for the theory underlying practical planning than falsification in the strict meaning of the term, because his ‘research project’ – or plan proposal in our case – is closer to real life. There is no reason to reject our strategy after discovering the first anomalies as long as the programme keeps its momentum, positive heuristics and relies on the competition among the programmes running side-by-side. Planning can be interpreted as a scientific programme, or an experiment in which the plan is always corroborated to the expectable extent and – as a hypothesis – is widely accepted by the stakeholders. In practice we should focus our efforts on the implementation of the statement which cannot be falsified with all certainty and our confidence in it is justified by more facts and experiences than in the others, or which have obtained the support of more people than the other proposals. The only hypothesis or programme we should allow to start the implementation stage is the one which has good chances for acceptance or can be expected to get full justification in the course of ex post evaluation. During the interim evaluation our confidence in it may increase or decrease and this may, in turn, strengthen or modify the operative programme. Within the (never ending) planning process a programme/strategy should only be replaced by a better one, which promises more additional returns gained in an empirical way (praxis- rationale). A better programme can realize more principles or objectives that everybody can agree on.

*b) Ex post evaluation*

*Establishing or empirically refuting the correctness and future validity of decisions related to plans is only possible after their implementation and to a limited extent. It should also be accepted that this evaluation is valid only in the given context.* On the one hand, the feedback on our *a posteriori* experiences depends on the technical knowledge available at the time, and, on the other hand, it is transferred to us by the society. After the implementation we may find that what we supposed to be true was actually false and the expected impact was nothing but illusion. Revision will be performed in the light of this new knowledge. Ex post evaluation following operation consists of two components as illustrated by the learning cycles in *Figure 2*:

- *Internal control*: The decision-maker himself attempts to evaluate the procedure he followed. He checks whether the results achieved in the course of implementation are in good agreement with his intentions. This inner circle controls the explicit, operational part of instrumental rationale or ‘scientific objectivity’. On the basis of the impacts induced the choice of tools can either

be justified or refuted in an empirical way. *Here justification is identical with success*, which – in the case of community planning – is not necessarily the same as economic rationality based on the traditional efficiency principle. Plausibility of the plan, good preparation of implementation is proved by the fact that our intentions have been realized and the expected/promised impacts have come about. In this case we have a positive feedback from the internal control (learning) circle: the operations were planned properly, our initial hypotheses were correct, implementation was carried out in compliance with them and the results are in good agreement with our intentions. Assumed truth has been transferred into reality as it is proved by its implementation according to instrumental rationale. We had faith in the success of the tools and measures chosen and we did not fail.

- *Social (norm) control*: the effectiveness of an operation performed by a success-oriented interest group does not automatically entail the acceptance of their actions or the justification of the plan hypothesis. The stakeholders (or their groups) and other interest groups within the society will also evaluate the induced changes, comparing them with their norms and the objectives of others and providing feedback to the decision-makers (and planners) at the right forums. This is represented by the upper circle in *Figure 2* as a normative control, with some respects of equitableness as well, contributing to moral ‘development’.

The interaction of the separate systems of value and interest spheres leads to the rationalization of the common fields of operation. *The validity of ex post evaluation has no retrospective effect, its importance lies in its contribution to the better foundation of the new decisions.* After correlating the feedbacks coming from the two circles (argumentation) we can decide whether the guiding principles of planning should be strengthened or corrected. In this way the result of ex post evaluation serves as a basis for the next, higher level cycle. Acceptance in a specific space and time takes place in an inter-subjective sphere determined in a more complex way, both territorially and culturally. This post factum evaluation is concerned with the result, the *new operative situation*, establishing the validity of the impacts attributed to planning and observed in a given place at a given time. The longer the planning cycle and the more significant the changes generated, the *weaker the retrospective qualification of the decisions made on the basis of former information.* This is the inherent contradiction of ex post evaluation.

#### *c) Interim evaluation*

In addition to the preliminary and subsequent evaluations, several smaller, interim, ex post-type circles of control and feedback should also be operated within the planning process. These interim evaluations are not focused on the basic prin-



ciples, or the determining objectives, but on their particularization and the choice of tools. Depending on their findings, smaller modifications can be made on the implementation process. The exchange of tools, entrepreneurs, etc. can be governed by the principle of asset efficiency, with the objectives set considered to be constant.

Efforts should be made during all three types of evaluation to use material (quantitative) terms. In the right stage of planning (e.g. formulation of operative programmes or action plans) the objectives should be expressed wherever possible in a naturalistic, quantified way. In the course of *ex ante* evaluation estimates should be made of the impacts expected and the same indicators are to be used in the course of the continuous interim and *ex post* evaluation as well. Our hypotheses about the objectives can gain experimental justification and thereby confirm the correctness of our intention if the expected impacts are realized and welcomed by the stakeholders.

A lot of future problems can be avoided by socializing planning and rationalization, by making the objectives, priorities and operative strategies public, and having them discussed extensively. This approach can also decrease the probability of a conflict between the two control circles. Democratic decision-making, or rather, having the plan accepted by all the stakeholders will reduce personal responsibility (of planners and decision-makers) and make these corroborated objectives and intentions quasi objective for implementation. This could be a problem later on if planning were not made cyclical and the learning cycle did not lead us to newer decisions or the former decisions could not fall victim of new falsification.

#### **4.4 Factors influencing formulation of the will**

Representatives of the analytic-empirical planning schools based on the positivist philosophy emphasize the importance of exploring the current situation as well as possible. They look for an unshakable rock-bed and draw their conclusions about the desirable future condition and the necessary operations from their technical-rational reasoning, sometimes even making pretence of being objective but concealing the value premises and evaluation processes. The outcome of their activity is the mere reproduction of things or processes supposed to be right. External conditions cannot be considered as the direct causes of the work we have to do; their impact is realized through the human mind. The noumenon is neutral; it does not hold and is not structured according to *causa finales*. Values are not realistic and cannot be deduced from specific facts – it is more important to find out what kind of truth we aspire for, what kind of future we would like to live in, i.e. what kind of reference the actors (planners, stakeholders) have of the world. As far as planning is concerned *the key elements are the vision created in the human mind in an inter-*

*subjective way and in accordance with the Zeitgeist as well as the decision to take action.*

Looking for points of reference in the course of planning we should interpret adequate reality as a condition that will come about in the future, simultaneously with the specific actions or operations. The longer the period we attempt to pre-contrive for, the more uncertain the outcome will be, because the number of unknown elements increases. The starting point, the basic information we need *can only be found in the present*; we can assume that some of it will remain constant, another part can be forecast, and certain determining trends will continue. We must bear in mind, however, that whatever the starting point or point of reference we may choose, we always have the possibility to criticise their genesis or even the Zeitgeist, to prescind from them depending on our expectations, our desire for justice, our will and creativity influenced by various commitments and our intuition, or even to create new visions. Our free choice and determination is also influenced by our assessment of the opportunities open to us, the resistance of the 'environment' in which the praxis of others plays a key role.

The fundamental truth: 'what there is does not entail what there should be' should be complemented by another recognition, namely that *a given condition or operative situation is preceded by a previous one* and even if there is no deterministic relationship between two, the system does not forget, it is incapable of starting from zero. *Every operative situation has a retrospective meaning and one that points forward.* As we have to reject geographical or historical determinism, we should not accept pure indeterminism either, because constraints do exist and we cannot escape their impacts; genealogy is also active and the genetic codes of the past and present will have an impact on the future as well. There is no such thing as general determinism but there are *mosaic chains that behave in a deterministic way and we should always be prepared for obstacles representing various degrees of difficulty for those who intend to overcome them.* *There are also conflict-free local conditions, trends, phenomena and values which can maintain their equilibrium in the long run, and which we can use by either strengthening or disavowing them.* Our natural environment offers not only a repository of opportunities, but also a set of constraints, a kind of resistance; our built environment can be looked upon as former knowledge objectified allowing us to learn from the results of previous operations. Historical determinism does not help us to decide what we should do but history has relevance for the present. *Past experiences are selected according to the needs of the present operative situation.* The emphasis is on the decision we make. The analysis of the present situation (genealogical, genetic map, Zeitgeist), the description of the present situation and its historical roots can provide valuable information for the definition of normative regulations and the necessary or desirable actions. We should not forget, however, that new things can arise not only from past experiences.

For the sake of illustration (and not justification) I attempted to formalize the definition of a common vision and operative programmes in a specific place and at a given time as a quasi-function, hoping to *make explicit* a part of the relationship and demonstrate that one of the components is not simply one of the many on the list but plays a key role in the *integrated interpretation* of all the others. The components thus separated and made explicit (reality, scientific findings, the norms of the stakeholders and anything else that has not been named individually) are not independent from one another either. The dialogue they have with one another and their interrelationship are of particular importance.

$$\mathbf{P} = \mathbf{f}_i(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{S}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{N}_j(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{S}, t), \mathbf{E})$$

where

- P** – is the result of transcending (vision, **plan**, strategy, programme);
- R** – is reality perceived (explored), ideas related to the facts (phenomenological basis, practical knowledge);
- S** – represents the structural, pragmatist framework, the constraints imposed by power, opportunities for safeguarding interests (artificial machinery, social world);
- s** – is updated science, scientific and technical explanation (theory) and the tools available (the explicit part of our knowledge about the object of planning, accepted by the scientific community);
- N<sub>j</sub>** – normative evaluations made by community **j**, their foundation, and criticism of the previous components (specific norms, regional-cultural values and evaluations, autonomous pieces of justice, local, ‘subject’, ‘minority knowledge’);
- E** – other impact factors that cannot be made explicit;
- f<sub>i</sub>** – the ‘type’ of function, the tendentious rationalization of planner/decision-maker **i**, the character of evaluation ( the philosophical, normative commitment of the planners, their ‘faith’, implicit knowledge, intuition, etc.).

The total of the first three components (P, S and s) contains the factors that can be made explicit within an operative situation i.e. all the external phenomena, structures and events to which the stakeholders are in some way related to, reveal their values and pronounce them true or false according to their norms (N<sub>j</sub>). On the basis of all the above components the subjective planner (f<sub>i</sub>) creates his own image, determines his relation to the subjectivity of others and contributes to the planning process with his personal knowledge. Planners (the experts who make the plans and the politicians who make decisions) are in a position to accept or reject the norms mediated by the stakeholders and the valid assumptions or findings of scientists, but they are not supposed to ignore them. In order to avoid internal subjec-

tivity and to make a judgment of the conviction (i.e. to maintain it or reject it) it is indispensable to make explicit their relationship to the operative situation and the external factors as well as to have inter-subjective communication.

The *main driving force* of the system presented by this schematic formula is *continuous dialogue and multilateral communication, during which it is possible to establish the relationships among the factors and the actors' opinions can also be reconciled*. In addition to their reflexive monologues the scientists, the stakeholders and the planners also engage in a continuous dialogue with their environment which results in the formulation of the picture they have of reality (R). Dialogue with the natural environment is a 'one-sided and silent act'. There is a continuous interaction between the actors, the repositories of the intentions and the structures (communities) they constitute. The 'formula' is about taking stock of the results of inter-subjective scientific rationalism (s). The norms of the stakeholder communities develop in the course of inter-subjective processes and mutual understanding (consensus) is the result of communication. The choices made by planners are deeply influenced by communication aimed at mutual understanding, even though the internal monologues also have an important role.

## 5 Basic cases in theories of planning

The theories listed below do not divide the domain of planning completely and without overlaps. There is no clear demarcation line to separate them and they cannot be added up to produce an integrated meta-planning. The various approaches may result different groupings and we can also see (apparently) new theories emerge day by day. A part of the literature concerned with planning theory attempts to clearly distinguish the various approaches (e.g. *Limdblom* 1959, *Faludi* 1973, *Friedmann* 1987) highlighting their particularities, while other authors describe and analyse practically the same fundamental cases from the viewpoint of a specific application. The conflicting theories all reserve themselves the right to be critical. Most of the new theories have been developed with a view of replacing the former ones and not of complementing them. I am not going to give a list of the well-known schools here; my ambition is to identify the paradigmatic differences inherent in the *basic interpretation of planning* and analyse the points that the various approaches emphasize.

In a given situation the choice among the theories means, at the same time, the choice of a paradigm, but utility considerations are also important. If we are to have a real influence on the processes in spite of the consequences involved we should not choose functional planning. If our priorities are controllability and practicability and we intend to exclude the possibility of a mistake, we should vote for

the incrementalist approach. If we have no clear ideas of what could or should be done and we prefer long-term solutions, rational-comprehensive planning is the best for us. Strategic planning is recommended if we want to achieve something absolutely new and rather quickly and we have an idea of what should be done. In practice, however, the artful application of their various combinations can also be observed.

## 5.1 (Pseudo-) positivist functional planning

Planning seeks to answer two basic questions: ‘What should be done?’ and ‘How should it be done?’ The second question follows from the first and the normative answer given to the first will have influence the range of the special rational answers that can be given to the second. Several authors (*Weber, Mannheim and Faludi*, etc.) argue that planners should not be influenced by any ideology just follow the objective principles of the profession. In the 1940s and 1950s representatives of the ‘Chicago school’ believed that politicians should rely on objective, expert planning. Several outstanding planning agencies (e.g. Royal Town Planning Institute) still follow the (written) ethical principle of (political) neutrality. How can this be achieved if we accept that planning is a normative activity?

The core of the functional concept of planning is rooted in the distinction made by Weber between formal and value rationality as well as in the idea of ‘functional’ rationality developed by Mannheim. Weber’s concept of formal rationality is close to what is called ‘instrumental rationality’ in our days. Weber holds that value rationality is concerned with human purposes in the context of social actions but in other works, where he writes about economic decision-making, he puts more emphasis on technical tools, and materializable factors, which are closer to the notion of instrumental rationality. Weber defined both types of rationality as a logical relationship between the means and the ends/results, distinguishing them from value rationality, which has its roots in ethics.

Consequently, formulating and setting the goals do not belong to planning – except for some incrementalist cases – but to politics. It is this approach that lead *Friedmann* (1966/67), followed by *Faludi* (1973) to introduce the notion of *functional planning*. It is a mode of planning in which ‘*the planner assumes the goals (choices of values) to be given in the situation and is rational with respect to the means only.*’ In this case planner is receives the goals from the client, a decision-maker, or – less frequently he postulates them. Even in this latter case, however, they assume the autonomy of defining the ends and the means, their inseparableness, i.e. functional rationality. The mission of planning is to define the possible ways and means leading to the achievement of the goals presumed to be constant – therefore its leeway is rather limited. Planners are not allowed to make rational

choices concerning value orientations or interests, because these are considered to be granted.

This approach often goes together with a naïve empiricism, which requires not only the exploration and description of the facts without regard to the values, but also assumes that these facts get systematized by themselves (according to their own laws). As a result of this approach and practice arbitrary choices of value are concealed, responsibility declined and various manipulations become possible. Taking this positive approach too seriously we may find that the answers are not given to the questions we asked.

The weak point in the apology of functional planning is that values can be linked not only to the ends/goals, but – in many cases – the choice of means can also involve values. A functionalist planner with a positivist attitude would not have the chance to choose among competing planning theories, modes or styles, because these choices involve values and are therefore considered to be ‘political actions’. He would not even be allowed to choose the most suitable means among those available, because different means produce different results, consequently they affect the various interest groups in different ways.

Functional plan making and purposive actions usually have a rational justification, and can be judged in a more exact way than the other planning processes. The choice of means at a given time can be justified with rational arguments and even the incidental failure of the means chosen can be explained after the intervention, when the facts have come to be known.

*In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the following:*

- Positive and normative approaches can and should be distinguished, because this is the only way to ensure moral neutrality of planners and the ‘scientific’ character of the activity (artificial maintenance of the illusion of positivism);
- The definition of the desirable goals and means should be strictly separated, which means the separate handling of value and formal(functional) rationality;
- The actors in the planning process (planners, political decision-makers, executives, etc) work according to clearly defined and separated responsibilities and competences;
- Planning has a neutral technical form built on technical, instrumental rationality;
- The task of planners is defined on the basis of positive sciences and rationality with respect to the means (professional rationality), i.e. the end defines and justifies the means that are applied;
- Planning is an accepted software, making the plan means running the software using the hardware, its institution.

## 5.2 Rational comprehensive planning

In the 1960s rational comprehensive planning was the most frequently applied method, which greatly contributed to the general acceptance of planning and is still highly recommended in our days. Its advocates claim that by applying some principle of rationality in a uniform way we can mobilize currently available knowledge for the solution of the social problems and thereby get closer to the attainment of a great, general end.

The *adjective comprehensive* refers to the *complex handling of the system and a multi-disciplinary approach*. It actually means a multilateral approach, because manageability sets a limitation to the depth of problem solving. This mode of planning makes use of the available knowledge, is inventive in the search for new solutions, and handles the factors of uncertainty. It is also sensitive to the various value judgments or political approaches, but – as *it is usually made by an institution in order to realize specific decisions* it does not necessarily make efforts to establish a wide range of partnerships. Agencies view the action space from a given viewpoint and may, therefore, miss some parts of it consequently planners themselves mean a constraint for the range of factors explored in the course of the analysis. The future success of this approach, the effort to achieve a comprehensive overview of the situation greatly depends on the extent to which factors in the blind spot can be taken into account.

The adjective *rational* refers in this case to the ‘objective and scientific’ nature of planning, which means that its propositions can be borne out by logical arguments and experiences. Logically this implies that this mode of planning should reject every hypothesis that cannot be underpinned by arguments and/or facts. I believe that every vision of the future and goal related to the future is a non-verifiable hypothesis in the traditional sense of the term therefore a compromise is necessary.

Representatives of rational-comprehensive planning often tend to ignore the duality of facts and decisions and have a penchant for presenting the ends/goals as if they were the findings of comprehensive analyses. A rational action, like rational planning necessarily has a purpose, and makes rational efforts to achieve it choosing its means and taking action accordingly. They do not make a distinction between technical rationality concerned with the means and substantial rationality concerned with the ultimate ends. In this way they optimize the ‘ends and means’ or ‘form and content’ simultaneously. They assume that normative questions can be given rational answers based on the scientific cognition of the past and present. Highly qualified planners are in possession of the scientific knowledge and methodological skills that enable them to set better ends and choose the best feasible alternatives. Scientifically founded expertise can override ‘other opinions’. For

lack of adequate information, elected politicians focus on public interest – and thus the rules of representative democracy are made suitable for decision-making.

In the practice of rational-comprehensive planning formal rationality often overrides substantial rationality and the ‘technical’ aspects presented in a scientific light conceal the moral issues related to values. The definition of the paradigm to be used then and there and the identification of the goals are also performed according to the purposive (but far from value-free) preferences of the planning bureaucracy. The application of scientific analogies, methods and models tends to oversimplify the image of reality and limits the range of alternatives. The attempt to bridge the gap between theory and practice usually fails. *Bryson* (1983) argues that all comprehensive planning can produce in practice is the fragile functional plan of several ‘sectors’ all treated separately.

Rational-comprehensive planning is an integrated process in which *every relevant factor is analysed* in principle and the knowledge gained in this way is used as a basis for creating – mainly by using extrapolations, unfortunately – a vision of the future to be implemented in the long-run. Then the alternative ways and means are defined and final decision on the tasks is made on the basis of their expected impacts. Because of the long time horizon performance is usually not compared with the initial ideas.

Comprehensive planning – if correctly interpreted – has the following characteristics by *Dror* (1971):

- It is concerned with systemic problems that *cannot be operated in a self-regulatory way*;
- It can be comprehensive only within the limits of manageability;
- It should be cost- and time-efficient;
- It takes into account the states of equilibrium and disequilibrium, as various stages of development;
- It optimizes the desirable impacts on future reality;
- It is continuous and iterative, using breakdown into parts only as a tool.

Rational-comprehensive (long-term) planning can be nothing more than an ideal, an aspiration because it cannot be fully realized. The newer and newer experiments, chaos theory, evolution models, verbal models, the holistic handling of the phenomena can only make it less strict or less scientific in character without fundamentally changing the essence of the theory.

*In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the following:*

- It is *generally applicable* in all cases where self-regulation does not work. (This was the prevailing mode of planning for decades.);



- It is based on the rationality/model of ends and means. After clarifying the values, it defines the ends structure then, in a separate process but according to the pre-assumptions it analysis the possible alternative decisions and chooses the means;
- It optimises the *intended* impacts on the *future reality* weighing the both the ends and the means;
- It attempts to describe and analyse reality as a whole in its *complexity* and continually updates positive realism for this purpose. Within the limits of manageability it strives to be *exhaustive*. It is multidisciplinary and covers every relevant factor within the constraints of budget and time;
- It is *future oriented in an extrapolative way*: the comprehensive analyses reveal the development trends and allow the formulation of fragments of the future. It uses the methodology of (scientific) future research;
- Its main feature is *long-term* thinking;
- The planning process leads to the formulation of a plan.

### 5.3 Pragmatist incrementalism

Pragmatism and incrementalism have a lot in common. Both tend to avoid radical changes, follow liberal-democratic ideas, and – besides the traditional technical instrumental rationality they take into account power related issues as well. Every kind of planning is pragmatist to some extent, but in this special case it is particularly justified to emphasize it in the name as well, because this theory of planning focuses decidedly on solving practical problems.

Politics is constrained to produce results, therefore the daily routine of modern community planning follows patterns, models and precedents, striving to produce ‘tangible benefits’ and consequently prefers the incrementalist methods to the above described and criticized rational comprehensive planning that many find more desirable. The justification of the incrementalist approach is not questioned by the fact that social and welfare goals have recently been given more attention, which raises mainly questions of methodology and quantification.

The gist of the ‘spirit of capitalism’ as defined by *Max Weber* (1982) is that in the ‘modern plants’ continuous rationalization has become the professional means of generating legal profit and improving profitability and this attitude has *become the accepted normative way of life*. The administrative and legal systems are imbued with the modern rationality of the west and its predictability to such an extent that this attitude or approach is now required not only in the economy, education, sciences, etc. but in planning as well. Since making money is not a ‘professional end in itself’ for the modern capitalist, similarly, *result-orientation and its ac-*

*accountability* are expected to govern all social actions. In Weber's spirit of capitalism persons and official bodies with the authority to pursue planning are rightfully expected to strive for effectiveness, be success-oriented in the sense defined by Habermas and produce benefits that show in the balance sheet.

Descartes (1991) considered systematic doubt and linguistic clarity to be important features of modern thinking. By the second and third rules of his 'method' every problem should be broken down to as many parts as possible or as required in the interest of finding the best solution and thinking should begin with the simplest objects that are most easily understood.

In his most famous work, 'The open society and its enemies' (2001) *Popper* advocates the method of small steps in social leadership as the only way to scientifically manage social problems. He believes that 'part-oriented planning' is the only method that can aspire for success. This method is not focused on defining the 'ultimate good' and fighting for it, but on solving the current problems of the society. This method of small steps is easy to apply anywhere and any time, and is obviously capable of improving the situation in which people live. The 'small scale' social reforms (experiments) that follow the principle of progressivity can usually be implemented without difficulty. This method allows us to get to know and continuously modify our 'experiment'; to learn without having to face the consequences of serious mistakes. With this method politicians have a chance to correct their mistakes without having to apologize for the errors by referring to the unfathomable character of the future. *Popper* also warns that if we do not want our decisions to be a 'leap in the dark' we should have an empirical picture of the expected consequences.

It is practically impossible to perform the preliminary evaluation of rational-comprehensive plans that cover the processes and phenomena in their complexity. The hypotheses can be justified or falsified only after implementation of the plans.

The risk of errors can be reduced by breaking down our forecasts into steps or measures that can be expressed in exactly measurable quantities. We can also choose to apply principles or criteria which allow us to measure improvement (e.g. Pareto optimum, equity of distribution, compensation principle and test, etc.).

It is impossible to take into account the totality of socio-economic processes in a complex way, it is therefore more practicable to break down the processes into *parts that are easier to grasp and handle*. The rationalization of the individual parts can be conceived of as components of development as a whole. Attention should be focused on parts that are of key importance with respect to the given problem and promise the most success. If we are expected to produce results with them and the programmes planned are taken positively by the stakeholders in the light of their expected outcome the system as a whole is also supposed to change in a positive way. The change is essentially the total of the perceivable (and measurable) effects and our actions will be judged on the basis of their effectiveness and

(practical) usefulness. *The test of deliberate actions – as well as plans – is implementation itself* and if there is a mistake in our judgement of their impact on reality we still have the opportunity to correct it in the next step (rationalization, learning process). The goals should also be screened before being set – e.g. with Popper's falsification method – using criteria in the selection of the acceptable or possible ones which can be experimentally measured or justified in the course of implementation.

The debate on incrementalist planning dates back to the study published by Lindblom in 1959. The author's starting point is that anyone who is responsible for the development of a policy may come across several other goals and values while pursuing his goal and cannot avoid weighing them with regard to a political choice he may have to make. This is particularly difficult in the case of community policies, because a large number of various factors should be handled at the same time. Lindblom describes two possible approaches: the traditional rational-comprehensive planning (Root method) and the one based on 'successive limited comparisons' (Branch method) The latter, also called the disjointed-incrementalist approach, *limits its scope to fostering changes in the present status quo that are practicable and produce measurable and accepted results.*

The basic proposition of the approach known in literature as 'muddling through' is that we should *minimize the risks involved in the changes we induce* and should only move away from our present knowledge and practice to an extent that can be justified *on the basis of past experiences.* The difficulty is that whenever the current processes ensuing from former policies prove to be undesirable, the method does not allow the radical new changes that become necessary. Even the small steps have an orientation! They also follow some kind of principle – either explicitly or implicitly – and are aligned according to a theory. In a given context we have to decide whether we wish to proceed by small steps but with great certainty – innovative incremental planning is a good method for that – or by taking a leap in the dark induce fundamental changes (radical planning) which might turn out to be positive, but we run the risk of making a big mistake! Incrementalism also implies that a programme promising measurable benefits should be carried out only if it does not involve damage to the environment; the method actually prefers solutions which contribute to the improvement of the environment besides pursuing a particular interest. With the small steps, however, we have to face the danger that it may not be possible to prove either the long-term damaging effects, or those that slowly improve the environment. A typical example could be the programming system of the European Union, where the identification of the strategic objectives is followed by incremental planning, giving priority to the environmental issues and supporting an action only if it does not involve any deterioration of the environment.

In order to avoid the extreme simplification of the small steps method, *Behn* (1994) proposes a new kind of leadership 'by fumbling about in the dark'. 'Groping about in the dark' the leader tests several ways, methods or approaches he can apply to *achieve his goal*. He abandons those that prove to lead to failure, makes corrections, learns and adjusts himself. *Behn* emphasizes the process itself, the experimentation which can help to avoid incrementalist comparisons, but he also points out that even those who 'grope about' should evaluate the steps they take, which is not significantly different from *Lindblom's* incrementalist comparisons. This just is one of methods advocating small steps.

In my opinion the main problem with the use the pragmatist incrementalist planning theory lies in the difficulty of its further development which should involve complementing the economic goals and indices with social ends. Planners could be assisted in this work by the recent findings of communicative ethics. With communicative rationality combined in it *Sager* (1993) developed *dialogic incrementalism*.

*In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the following:*

- It is based on pragmatic (limited, strategic) rationality;
- Planning, as an applied science and as a methodology is capable of bridging the gap between 'there is and there should be';
- This planning theory has an applicability limited to cases when the individual steps are easily evaluated. Comprehensive values cannot be evaluated only the marginal incremental differences. Progress from the present situation should be made by safe (small) steps in order to avoid mistakes (small step – result – correction model);
- The normative and positive approaches can be reconciled in the course of marginal evaluation and empirical analysis. Values cannot and should not be abandoned because they constitute the natural structure of thinking and the results of a normative action can be demonstrated in another form as well, which is of equal value and reduced to empirical facts. This theory tries to link values and political goals to empirical experiences and usually reduces them to efficiency criteria;
- It is possible to make an advance without knowing exactly the ultimate ends. It is the tangible goals and *the strategies needed for attaining them* that we should compare, and reach an agreement about the strategy chosen;
- Be operational! Practical politics has priority over social theory. Operability is of a technical character and is not suitable for making an opinion on equity or justice;
- Rightness of our actions should be judged on the basis of the consequences they probably entail (utilitarian ethics). The alternatives considered can dif-

fer from one another only in some measurable benefit (increment, proceeds, etc.);

- The planning process is a series of small steps. It breaks down the process of analysis and concept development into manageable 'elementary parts' that are easy to comprehend and reduces them to comparable alternatives;
- It take into account only the most important and not all the conditions and potential consequences (indicators);
- The transparent structure and tangible goals facilitate consensus building on the basis of democratic participation;
- The time horizon can be adjusted to the fragmented parts.

#### **5.4 Strategic planning (management) in the public sector**

It is difficult to decide whether strategic planning in the public sector belongs to the fundamental cases of planning theories or is to be considered simply as a variety of style, method or approach. Today I am inclined to consider it an independent theory of planning, because its advocates markedly distinguish it from the other theories and practices both in content and procedure. This is also the theory that most characteristically embodies procedural prescriptive theory for me. The discussion of strategic planning/management at the community level is particularly justified by the fact that the operation of the structural funds of the European Union builds on a mixture of strategic and incrementalist modes of planning. Strategic planning was transferred to the public sector and spatial planning from the business sector; the experiences gained there were adapted to the community level.

The evolution of strategic thinking after World War II has gradually led from long-term planning through strategic planning to strategic management. With respect to my concept of planning *the most important step was the shift from strategic planning to management*, the latter regarding planning as an integral part of a complex process including implementation and feedback as well. Planning in the broad sense of the term fits into strategic management much better than the former views which identified planning with the elaboration of the plans (project writing) in a narrower sense. In the present case the development-management process is accompanied by the adequate stages of planning and the control cycles become fully integrated. Planning is not a separate module within the control system (flow-chart, modular structure) playing a role only in a given stage its operation, but remains active throughout the whole process. Several management and planning functions or tasks get intertwined to such an extent that it is not necessary to distinguish them in practice.

Until the 1970s rational-comprehensive planning and physical planning prevailed in the planning activities of the local governments and other bodies. The strategic approach first appeared in community/spatial planning in the 1980s. Strategic planning was first introduced in some states (e.g. California, Ohio, Wisconsin) and large cities (e.g. San Francisco, Philadelphia, New York, etc.) of the USA. The National Urban Policy Report published in 1982 speaks about strategic approach, internal strengths and weaknesses, external threats and opportunities. This is a good illustration of the fact that strategic planning was practised not only in the economy, but was also used to integrate the sectorial approaches at municipal or state level. In 1984 the US Department of Housing and Urban Development supported the publication of a strategic planning manual, which encourages the coordination of the various areas of development (*Sorkin, Ferris and Hudak 1984*).

Strategic planning practised at community level has a component which has preserved its special character to this very day: the SWOT analysis, developed from the Harvard model. By the 1990s it spread over to Europe, and the EU even prescribes this mode of planning. In Hungary it became widely used after the turning of the millennium mainly in consequence of the accession talks. In our days strategic planning as applied in the community sphere includes the following steps or modules:

- 1) continuous data collections, observation (sometimes only looking for calls for project proposals);
- 2) recognition of problems, key components (opportunities to apply for grants, submit project proposals);
- 3) definition of comprehensive goals and the mission;
- 4) SWOT analysis (in practice the table is usually not analysed);
- 5) elaboration of the specific goals and the strategies required for attaining them;
- 6) development of an action plan or operative programmes;
- 7) monitoring and feedback (control).

Strategic management is closer to my interpretation of comprehensive planning than strategic planning. Strategic management is a complex process which includes the definition of the missions or goals, the formulation of the potential strategic alternatives we might use to attain them, the elaboration of the strategy details, planning the steps of the implementation, the management of the implementation and the evaluation of the results achieved, taking into account the changes induced in the environment as a kind of feedback. Intuition and creative imagination play an important role in the thinking of strategic planners because of their desire to create something new and original. It follows from this that the kind of verification used in the previous planning theories is not possible here. The evaluation of the (probable, feasible and irrefutable) programmes proposed is not possible until after

practical implementation, in a plausible way, on the basis of the experiences gained; therefore it is particularly important to follow a more formal procedure and choose a shorter time horizon.

Several authors emphasize the importance of long-term thinking in the case of strategic planning as well, but in my view here we have one of the main differences as compared with comprehensive (long-term) rational planning. Because of its action and success orientation *the optimal time horizon for strategic planning is a foreseeable medium-term, i.e. 4–7 years* in our accelerated world.

This view is underpinned by the requirement that a strategist (management, elected body, etc.) should produce some result as early as in the medium term. It is not possible any longer to get short and medium-term programmes (and their incidental failure) accepted by setting vague and remote goals. It is useful to draw the conclusions from the medium-term actions and – with due regard to the changing environment or failure – develop new strategies, i.e. to close the circles representing learning and controlling as well. In the case of failure the chief strategist (it could be a group of decision-makers, or an elected committee, or a body, too) should be dismissed even though it is not so easily done in community planning as in business firms. In the case of success, however, he should be strengthened in his position. My experiences in the field of practical planning have convinced me that action-oriented strategies should be updated after each cycle, and modifications made quite frequently. This is not in contradiction with the point that the main strategic goals we formulate are usually of a more general character and take a relatively long time to change consequently they have a long-term validity. In the optimal case they remain like that but – following Popper's logics of scientific research – we *constantly subject them to critical analysis* and replace them whenever a better alternative is found. In reality the main difference between long-term and medium-term objectives is that the former have a more general character and a long-term validity. In consequence, the medium-term programmes are elaborated in such a way that they should be in line with the generally accepted system of norms. When we come to define the course of action for our more specific goals (operative strategy) using our compass (strategic planning) we always keep the long term goals in view as true north.

Similarly, I cannot accept the need to confront it with short-term planning, since in a given stage of the planning process we should formulate the short-term operative plans as well together with the specific actions to be taken, it is therefore not the differences that I wish to emphasize but the connection between the two, i.e. when and how will the strategic programmes be turned into short-term operative plans and how can their implementation contribute to the attainment of the strategic goals or the realization of the vision.

Strategic thinking in planning is equally important for the public administration, the local governments, the agencies of regional development and the non-profit as

well as the private sectors. In the case of profit-oriented business ventures strategic planning is relatively simple as opposed to the public sector, where one decision-maker is responsible for each field of action but his decisions are made on behalf of others and with regard to their interests; therefore communication among the institutions and interest groups as well as collective thinking play an important role. Managing strategic planning in such a 'divided' power context is a very complex task in itself. On the other hand, the strategic approach is most suitable for the discharge of the tasks in politicized community planning because it takes into account both the external and internal conditions and is more strongly operation-oriented than long-term allocative planning (e.g. physical planning).

In good agreement with the spirit of my present work (meta-planning) I do not treat *Mintzberg's* (1990) schools as autonomous theories, but as specific aspects which contribute to the understanding of the whole with the special approaches they use. As these schools have pointed out, strategy development can be simultaneously interpreted as a process of cognition regulated in great details, an analytical process, the creation of a vision and a conception, a learning process, a bargaining process, etc. and not just one of these. In the case of specific applications and their various stages, however, priority may be given to that one or another 'method'.

*In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the following:*

- It builds on the strategic rationality of the actors, which – in the local context and the given situation – attempts to pay equal attention to the reactions and opinions of other actors as well as the social expectations too;
- The key issue in defining strategic action in the public sector is the establishment or maintenance of a multilateral equilibrium on the basis of mutually accepted assumption and norms;
- It can be applied extensively;
- It is *success and operation oriented*;
- Strategy development is a controlled and – in most cases – formalized planning process taking place within institutional frameworks. It focuses on the identification of the (optimal) way leading to the desired conditions and the elaboration of the operative strategy.
- The process of strategy development should be simple and transparent.
- It is characterized by intuitive originality, a focus on changes, a search for frequently unique solutions, the intention to implement 'strategic leaps'.
- Strategy is the result of a creative, innovative process and it should be clearly articulated and feasible.



- In community planning it is difficult to make decision-makers accountable; responsibility is typically shared or declined. As a resultant of various informal impacts (lobbying, compromises, etc) decision is made on the goals and priorities by the strategist who also chooses among the means. It is difficult to decide whose strategy it is.
- In my opinion – and in contrast with others – the *typical time horizon of the planning cycles is the medium term*, i.e. 3–7 years.

## 5.5 Communicative-collaborative planning

In the late 20<sup>th</sup> century many authors reacted to the new challenges that planners had to face by strengthening democratisation and giving more importance to linguistic communication and understanding. Planning theory has heavily drawn on hermeneutics and other philosophical works on communicative action, nonetheless its must be admitted that these new approaches cannot – as if by magic – solve all the dilemmas arising in the course of planning, and several of their contentions preclude any relevance to planning.

Research projects in social sciences have revealed that *whenever the individual operative plans are formulated in a given life world with consensus as a result of properly conducted communication their validity will be conform to the norms developed and accepted there*. The application of the discourse principle to planning promised a chance to decide practical issues rationally and without prejudices.

*Apel* argues that a real communicative community where he can take models of interpretation and where his own concepts and propositions can be compared with the concepts of fellow creatures while trying to understand himself is a necessary presumption for the cognitive-active individual. The action aimed at mutual understanding can take the form of argumentation, a discourse between the partners conducted in the course of common planning and debate of the plan in the context of topic discussed here.

We should do our best to create ‘ideal communicative situations’ in an ‘ideal communicative community’ but in practical planning we should be satisfied with the possibility of a ‘realistic communication’. *Apel* proposed that actors should ‘not be expected to do more than their best’ in order to create ideal conditions for the practical debates and conduct them properly. This can be enhanced by a preliminary rational agreement resulting in the codification of the general rules of planning – as general interests on which the agreement has been reached – in the form of norms (laws or orders). Drawing on *Apel* and *Habermas* (*Habermas*, 2001) the following principled criteria can be identified that planners should *bear in mind* in the course planning:

- All the stakeholders should be given a chance to participate in the planning process of their own free will. In practice this means that the adequate conditions should be guaranteed, or the obstacles to the participation should be removed. E.g.
  - all the stakeholders should be informed about who is making what kind of a plan and on what purpose, when and where it is possible to take part in planning and/or give an opinion on the documents, etc.;
  - a communicative space is needed for face-to-face meetings (the choice of time and place is important, together with the accessibility of the place and the suitable arrangement of the furniture) with telephone and internet connection;
  - everybody should be given the relevant information required (briefing, training, continuous accessibility of information);
- All participants should have unlimited capacity of action and speech, without any restricting assumptions (continuous activity independent of the specific planning events);
- The roles in the dialogues should be interchangeable and the debate should be free from all constraint;
- In the course of the argumentation every participant should be expected to refer to the grounds on which their value choices are made and consensus should be built on arguments;
- Everybody should have full understanding of the ‘content’ of the plan and accept what is stated in there as complying with his own viewpoints.

These efforts can be successful only if the whole communicative community uses a similar stock of knowledge and meaning, follows similar basic norms which are respected by all members but sincere and intelligible participation should also be required.

*Habermas* (1986) considers the *mechanism for co-ordinating actions* to be an essential element of teleologically structured social action, because it allows the development of regular and constant networks of interactions. He makes a sharp distinction between communicative (co-operative) and *strategic actions* which represent *alternatives* for the actors. The former builds on ‘*consensus*’ based on propensity for mutual understanding, while the latter builds mainly on ‘*influence*’ to create a foundation for co-ordinated efforts. *The two mechanisms mutually exclude each other*. Inter-subjective consciousness leads to shared knowledge, consensus and mutual commitment, while external influence remains one-sided and consensus is easily broken when the stakeholders realize that the other party owes its impact to external influence.

*Habermas* therefore sets communicative action based on mutual understanding against imperative, success oriented (or strategic in his wording) action motivated

by the interests of the powerful where the tool of persuasion is not argumentation but influence. He calls it fragile consensus even if the strategist – instead of using pressure – offers benefits that the other party finds acceptable. *Habermas* (2001) thinks that in order to decide whether we have a case of rational consensus or a phoney one serving the interests of a powerful group with all its procedures and decisions we have to examine if all the stakeholders would have agreed to the decision made had it been preceded by a debate conducted in optimal circumstances. He proposes theoretical investigations of social criticism for this purpose.

With these considerations in mind we could give a negative opinion on the operation of the support systems (for regional/rural development) such as the Structural Funds of the European Union, because the applicants' choice of objectives and preferences identified in the project proposals (plans) is motivated by the requirements set in the call for proposals in the hope of obtaining the grant and these rarely coincide with the real practical goals of the regional or local communities which submit the proposals. *Habermas* is right in concluding that in such cases the allocation of resources and the operations are not based on real preferences. I could refer to *Habermas* again in saying that the promise of material benefits should also be considered a part of life world, or operative situation. Unfortunately the assumed *social theoretical criticism* cannot be put into practice and applied to establishing whether consensus was achieved on the basis of '*a compromise of particular interests*' or on the basis of more 'general interests'. We could perform a simple verification by allocating money to some local communities without requiring them to submit project proposals and find out whether they would finance the same programmes as the ones proposed in their projects. The answer would most probably be negative, which could be an argument for the recommendation that resources and decision-making should be decentralized.

Communicative ethics as described by *Habermas* can be *applied in practice only within certain space and time limits*. It is not possible to get to know and justify 'general interest' or norms during a discourse conducted at a given place and in a given time. *Habermas* also requires that all potential stakeholders should agree but the range of stakeholders can only be defined on the basis of knowledge/information valid then and there and even the potential stakeholders may be uncertain whether they are concerned or not. Furthermore, even if all the stakeholders take part in the discourse, we cannot be sure that everybody is capable of clearly expressing their opinions, define their own interests or understand the arguments given by others. *Habermas* supposes that during the discourses aimed at developing mutual understanding all participants tend to give a general validity to the standpoint they put forward. However, in the course of planning – which is by nature a success oriented strategic operation – only a limited validity can be guaranteed. I have serious doubts about the effectiveness of transcultural communication as well. An adequately performed planning process can do a lot to maintain

communication but it will not solve the problems. It cannot be taken for granted that the actors intend to reach an agreement. It is not quite clear what could motivate them to do so. Moral acceptance does not exclude lack of willpower. It is frequently experienced that even if we are committed to consensus building progress is often achieved through confrontation, conflicts of interests which seem to be the driving force behind the changes while consensus built on agreement may even conserve the status quo whose evaluation in the future is rather uncertain. The establishment of a consensus in itself is no guarantee for its survival.

Open discourses should not be dependent on the will of any of the partners. We engage in planning in order to avoid problems, control processes or attain our goals, it is therefore unconceivable for us at present to sit back and wait for discourses to begin, let the words take their effect on us, and the whole thing just happen internally. By asking the question whose interest it serves to create the ideal communicative situation we arrive at a strange contradiction. If a person 'creates' it in his own interest it becomes a tool of success-oriented strategic action. If it is nobody's interest to create and maintain it considering its time-consuming and costly nature then why would it come about? It is our common interest to have matters that concern all of us discussed openly it is therefore *reasonable to expect the gradual elimination of the obstacles to ideal communication*, which will strengthen the process of social rationalization with planning playing an important role in it. One precondition of this change is to make planning the daily manifestation of the teleological action in which people live day by day.

It is a critical issue to decide whom we should consider to be our partners in communication. At the level of philosophy defining the 'parameters' does not cause any difficulty, in political life, however, we are not able to create an optimal communicative community only a realistic one in line with the specific historical situation. On the other hand, those who have authority to make initiatives or plans also have the opportunity to manipulate unless the process can be administratively regulated as required by the ideal state. Even in this latter case we have to face difficulties caused by the periodicity of compliance with the regulations, continuity of communication, as well as the problems related to the application and obedience of the law.

Even if all the members of a given community have realized and become aware of 'what is good for them' building on the traditions of their own lifeworld and in the course of ethical-political debates, the goal they identify may be in conflict with the norms and goals that other communities have formulated in a similar procedure. If the discourse is resumed with wider participation and everybody mutually understands and accepts the common interest there is still a chance that the newly identified norms will again conflict those of others, not speaking of the future generations as potential stakeholders who are unable to participate in the debate.

The 'communicative solution' as described by *Habermas* – even if it can be reached in optimal conditions – can only be applied to allocative and innovative planning – the latter meant to enhance slow, long-term development. The group of those who want something radically new is left alone with its ethical and moral questions and since their main ambition is to change the accepted norms and structures the only model they can choose is strategic planning. New knowledge (e.g. invention, plan or strategy) usually originates in critical approach, 'unusual way of seeing things', difference in opinions. What consensus is needed for is not an invention or the birth of new knowledge, but their acceptance and legitimation.

*Habermas's* communicative ethics formulates the rational expectation that an actor (in our case a planner or decision-maker) should be able to refer to the guideline of his actions or system of values which served as a basis for his decisions. In contrast with this what we experience in the public sector is that planners usually conceal their normative choices with pragmatic arguments (e.g. lack of resources) and considerations (e.g. hope for success at the elections). In this way the normative values underlying the decisions remain hidden – even for the planners themselves – and *the hypotheses escape social control*. In consequence, rational argumentation is often replaced by reasons of dubious validity.

Ideal communicative situations cannot be created in practice. The development of operative programmes and plans is a linguistic process. The common language is a pre-requisite of conversations and understanding. Intentions and plans become intelligible for the stakeholders only if they are expressed in their own language. What we experience at plan debates and community forums is usually the confrontation of technical, apparently scientist and globalised arguments with the moral values and material interests rooted in the regionally and culturally determined life spaces. The other party is often unable to understand or qualify the arguments requiring scientific knowledge and mastery of the technical jargon therefore this kind of communication cannot lead either to understanding or acceptance. The explanation ('translation') or elucidation is an additional medium which actually prevent the understanding of the original intention.

Consequently, in the course of planning we should be satisfied with the implementation of the 'strategic model of action' presented so negatively by *Habermas*. Chances for building a consensus concerning the values and based on the common knowledge and language are rather limited. Even if the success-oriented actors with similar interests manage to make their decision within their own community with a consensus built on real understanding, in the course of implementation they may be compelled to stand up against external actions that might jeopardize the implementation of their operative plan. A typical example would be the fight for scarce development funds. Approaching this issue from a territorial viewpoint we can conclude that it is possible to develop a plan with consensus based on common history and knowledge within a community but *towards the external world* teleo-

logical action turns into a strategic operative model in the sense used by *Habermas*. Without this we would engage in a never-ending process of reconciliation without ever having the chance of implementing our intentions. It is not possible, for example, to break up a producing capacity built on economies of scale and transfer its pieces to areas suffering from unemployment, or similarly, waste should be dumped or disposed of even if none of the communities volunteers to do it unless some interest is linked to it and this situation is maintained by coercion.

Even if the optimal communicative situation can be created and all the stakeholders simultaneously understand and accept the intentions based on explicit values, it will have real validity only at a given point in time, and cannot be related to the time horizon of transcending, the whole teleological action, that is there is no guarantee for the acceptance of the result of implementation.

The alignment of the various interest groups and planning communities with one another can be expected to lead to a sustainable order that is in equilibrium if we implicitly assume that although the outcome of such an alignment is not predictable, we are able to guarantee equity and fairness without knowing their exact definition or the way to attain them.

The philosophy of *Habermas* was first adapted to planning by *Forester* (1989) and *Healey* (1992, 1997) who developed collaborative planning. In our days several other experts (e.g. *Hiller* and *Throgmorton*) also emphasize the importance of discourse in the planning process. NGOs strongly support this tendency because they expect it to guarantee democratic participation.

*In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the following:*

- It strives for communicative rationality, mutual (reflective) understanding through communicative action;
- It presupposes the existence of a pluralist, but consensus-based political (power) structure;
- It complements representative democracy with direct participation;
- It builds on meanings and truths that are valid then and there;
- It tends to be an interactive and interpretative process free from power pressure (institutional interests);
- All participants are equal, capable of arguing and raising questions;
- Participants should be trained and informed if necessary, they should be provided with all relevant political and technical information;
- It applies the earlier developed formal means complementing them with moral and ethical experiences;
- Assumes joint decision-making and operation on the part of the stakeholders;
- It explores the background of the decision and presents the arguments;
- The plans are less prescriptive, focus on future progress.

## 5.6 Post-modern modernity in planning: pragmatic eclectics

Those who accept the possibility of post-modern planning might think of using the terms post-post-modern to denote the new era. My objection to the term post-post-modern is that in my opinion – which is in contrast with other authors – there is no such thing as post-modern planning and there has never been – this is the reason why it is not included in my list. At the same time I am ready to admit that post-modern critical *Zeitgeist* has had a significant impact on planning theories as well, namely epistemological, ontological and procedural dilemmas have been replaced by ethical, axiological, aesthetic and legitimacy issues, new techniques and styles have emerged and the external conditions of planning have also changed. Several representatives of post-modern social philosophy (*Baudrillard, Derrida, Lyotard, etc.*) claim that modernism has failed beyond recovery and it is all over now. *Habermas*, on the other hand, holds that the central ideas of modernity should not be abandoned; on the contrary, we should complete the ‘unfinished project of modernism’. In my view planning has been complemented with new, one might say post-modern elements and methods, which have given it a new orientation but *planning as a whole has remained ‘a modern undertaking’*.

Post-modern criticisms have questioned the transcendence of intellect, teleology, which has been associated with it ever since the enlightenment, the rational foundations of intentions, that is the possibility of (traditional) planning. The post-modern theories of social philosophy recommended in the place of modern philosophies ‘cannot be translated’ for the purposes of planning or transferred into the practice of planning. Although post-modern planning does not exist, we cannot say that there is no need for planning or at least a teleological action that can replace it. Certain elements of ‘modern planning’ seem to survive post-modern attacks and – after a change of paradigm – can assume a function similar to the previous ones. However, we cannot step in the same river twice and post-post-modern planning cannot mean a return to the same modernity. *Pragmatic eclecticism* is a good reflection of fashion governed by *Zeitgeist* and could also be a suitable qualifier for the new theory of planning.

The emerging trends and the new conditions – often referred to as post-modern – will bring about fundamental changes that affect planning as well. *Lyotard* (1993) believes that the traditional regulating functions of the state will change in the post-modern conditions. The traditional poles of power will also lose their leading role but their place will not be taken by others: a new, continuously changing structure will develop instead. Power is in the hands of decision-makers today that this will remain the case in the future too, but they will be recruited not only from among politicians and bureaucrats, but from a wider, more varied group including experts, business people, leading administrators, religious leaders, etc. In the meshes of relations that are more complex and changeable than ever before

everybody has to rely on themselves, their allies and co-operating partners. Community planning cannot be squeezed into a hierarchic, static order; future is created along the nervous paths of the autonomous groups of various types and functions, along the networks of their teleological actions, and plan documents are elaborated in centres of different importance.

In the new power space the fight will be carried on for access to information, new knowledge, the opportunity to express and enforce one's standpoint, and the right to engage in planning, instead of land or raw materials. Competences related to plans, applications, decision-making will be the objects of power struggles. Creative planning expertise is a marketable product. The worst blow that post-modernism struck on traditional modern thinking was abandoning the conventional performance principle and questioning the power of consensus. *Legitimation is derived from communicative interaction, language practice*. The main point is how you can sell your ideas (yourself), get others to accept your interests and the ways you intend to enforce them, what is *the value of your arguments or evidence* while the effectiveness of your actions depends on what kind of co-operating partners you can find (Lyotard, 1993).

A planner who uses post-modern arguments as well does not believe in absolute, resolvable truth, he knows only norms that are accepted in a specific place at a given time. In the course of the discourses planners should explore the prevailing values and – through mutual understanding – seek solutions which produce no losers but promise the best possible output in the given operative situation, and help to secure the highest number of winning positions. Instead of the hardly definable public interest efforts should be focused on developing an integrated policy of the citizens and their communities with the widest possible co-operation in the course of implementation. It is not the suppression of the energies inherent in the differences but rather their articulation and involvement that can guarantee social equitableness.

We should be prepared to accept the existence of various approaches, yet, at the community level, we must find a way of handling heterogeneity and co-existence. The reason why we have difficulty managing this increasingly accepted plurality is that even our belief in the existence of the general canon and overall rationality has been shaken. The recognition of the need to find a principle or method which can help us handle the differences leads us back to certain elements of modern thinking, but not to the classical modern age.

The classical modern planning theories replaced each others in succession therefore we have to learn to accept the co-existence of a variety of approaches. How can these be handled as a unit or system? The only way is to continue the course of modernization, the process of emancipation-evolution which started with the enlightenment, to *emancipate* the cultures the various faiths, paradigms, sets of knowledge and *presume their manageability at the community level* (with the same



partiality to each one of them). There is no single salutary order or truth that we could believe in; neither should we act as chance directs us and suffer the consequences. It would be equally unacceptable to let technical rationality mediated by the market or profit-oriented thinking govern every area of our lives. By rejecting the need and possibility of the kind of planning that is built on uniform thinking and works by identical rules I do not mean to say that we should not make efforts to shape our life and environment according to our beliefs and principles. In everyday life making decisions and choices cannot be avoided – neither can the deliberations and the search for some base of comparison. The main decision is whether we choose to act consciously, in a methodical way, weighing alternatives with respect to our expectations from the future, in co-operation with others, i.e. in a planned way or individually, reacting instinctively to the challenges as they arise.

The procedural rationality of pragmatic planners works through the process of theoretical and practical debates, a series of various components of rationality (instrumental, practical aesthetic, etc.) to find the best arguments and symbolics in order to build consensus about the ultimate goals or – if this cannot be achieved – in order to attain the specific, practical goals and maintain the possibility of convergence. Planners are often compelled to be satisfied by merely outlining programme alternatives that can assert partial interests without conflicts, and win the special contribution, involvement of the specific community to the recreation of their life world. The new type of community planning is expected to simultaneously bind and loosen, manage interruptions and continuity, co-existence and inevitable interaction while maintaining coherence and pointing to some kind of integration. A common ‘umbrella’ or ‘roof’ is required to justify joint planning. Inevitable co-existence and common socialization can provide an opportunity for the co-ordination or interaction of the various life-styles and orientations.

Classical modern community planning has fostered the consummation of industrial development, bourgeois power (liberal democracy) and is still doing so apart from the ‘socialist experiment’. It was built on the conviction that technical development and economic growth can contribute to the elimination of social problems and increase the number of people belonging to the emerging middle class. The idea that post-modern modern community planning has taken over from modernity is that its mission is to serve public interest redefined as being constructed from autonomous elements that are not in conflict but in a synergic relation; it is not technical rationality any longer, but uniquely the privileged means of enhancing economic growth. As it has already been mentioned, first criticisms of modern rationality of planning appeared as early as the 1940s (*Horkheimer, Adorno* and later *Habermas*) to be followed by more radical objections raised by postmodern authors (*Lyothard, Derrida and Jameson*). Modernist apology treats reason as the principal means the individual has for self-expression, in practice, however it can become the servant of power. The normative expectations from

reason cannot be realized in practice! Modern rationality does not always mean reasonableness any more just like scientific rationality does not necessarily serve the public interest. This in itself is no reason for the rejection of rationality in general – but an indication that we should assume and accept its plurality. What we should do is liberate reason, allow various rationalities to manifest themselves and restore reason's ability to operate in an innumerable multitude of transitions. Practical (common) sense is capable of combining the various rationalities, manoeuvring through the transitions and making use of interfaces. In specific cases it may be possible or even necessary to choose among the various rationalities and paradigms but this does not exclude the heterogeneity of the world around us. What is more, there are no meta-criteria for the compulsory decisions or choices. Adapting the classical modern thinking we assume the existence of methods or methodologies that can help orientation, the recognition and initiation of relations among rationalities.

We do not live in separate worlds, but our lifeworlds overlap and interact with one another. The diverse paradigms or approaches based on various rationalities each throw a different light on the same events of our co-existence. We are also free to find a more favourable light, set a new stage, rearrange events and even appear with other companies in plays directed by others. We can make our choice among the co-existing paradigms, correct or combine them, develop new sets of conceptual elements. We can co-operate with all those whose conceptual elements do not exclude ours and therefore convergence is possible. The strategic actions taken by others, mainly those we have agreed to, are not necessarily in conflict with ours, or are not sure to have a negative impact on our lifeworld; they may even open up new opportunities for us. A new paradigm can even help the paths assumed to be parallel today meet in the future.

If we do not know the reality hidden behind the appearance, when we have to build on unstable grounds or running water and the traditional forms of rationality do not yield results we have to rely on aesthetic arguments. Aesthetic considerations have already helped several scientists (*Bohr, Einstein, Heisenberg, Watson*, etc) in making their discoveries. It is often experienced in practically all disciplines that unshakable ultimate foundations do not exist; all we can find is some basic aesthetic rules in the dimension of foundations (*Welsch, 1997*).

Communication, social discourse is also a kind of tool that is used in political games in many different ways. Discourses are not expected to end in a consensus all the time; they are useful even if they merely lead to the articulation of the differences in views by making them explicit because this is a pre-requisite of managing them. Some discourses are conducted under a stronger social control, while others are not, depending on their validity and legitimation. It cannot be contested that there is justification even for a strategic behaviour deriving from commitment to some partial system. In practice we must find a way to manage the conflicts

among the various strategic operations and also among their communicative strategies, making efforts to converge them.

In our days several authors (e.g. *Gerhard Schulze, Georg Simmel, or Wolfgang Welsch*) consider the aestheticization of lifeworld – i.e. that an increasing number of people are not governed in their daily life by their goals but by aesthetic considerations – as a sign of a new era beginning. This aesthetic ‘boom’ is observed today not only in the individual styles but in the economy, urban planning, image development of regions and countries as well. Reality tends to be an aesthetic construct and the world is being turned into a domain of experience.

Aestheticizing has become a part of strategic planning in the economy as well. Strategies and programmes now focus on creating fashion, covering products with an aesthetic polish and maintaining a high level of consumption. For an increasing number of products and services the main feature is not use value or the original function but presumed or real ‘feeling’, communicated life-style or status. This trend is strikingly present in the dominant advertisements. The exchange of roles between *essence and form* or *reality and appearance* refers to such deep processes that cannot be ignored by the planning theories either.

The Marxist reaction to these changes could be the following: the changes in the world of labour, the development of technology and microelectronics have made it possible to aestheticize the development, design, manufacturing, marketing and even the use of products. The product itself is often created in the virtual world, on a computer. The image we have of our world is also shaped by the media to an increasing extent. An ever-growing number of individuals are motivated by the post-material value of gratifying their own inclinations. Their goals, choices and action strategies are shaped by taste-senses the expected impacts of internal experiences. Homo oeconomicus is replaced by homo aesthetic, the experience subjective of our present-day society (*Honneth, 1997*). These individuals also create social groups (of a new type) together with those who have similar attitudes and form their habits in the course of interactions within the groups; the lasting desires are viewed as values, which can give a certain external orientation. The place of the traditional classes and strata is taken over by these new aesthetic or experience communities which can function both as subjects and objects of planning. The stylistic marks of the individuals and the group are more or less identical, open to interpretation. Vision takes the form of life-style orientations. The groups are differentiated not so much by profession or origin, but by philosophy of life and everyday life-style. Besides differences in behaviour, dressing, etc. this complex disposition can even lead to territorial segregation. In some cases it is possible to identify the geographical areas where patterns of behaviour, taste and experience are reproduced.

After the initial criticism of the above-described phenomena or trend we can expect planning to fall in line and serve the ‘new trend’. In addition to categories

like efficient, valuable, etc. planners will have to learn how to handle categories like beautiful, tasteful, uplifting, satisfactory, etc. Reference points for judgement and validation are mainly found in the conventions related to culture, area, place or social group – similarly to economics, ethics and aesthetics. Apart from the problems of elite and mass cultures the judgment of post-material values and experiences depends on the value judgement of specific groups, stratum or group conventions. Considering that the prevailing method used for defining the acceptable norms and goals has already become *territorial-cultural relativism* in which symbols, metaphors and linguistic element play a significant part, the same should be used for the handling of aesthetic and ethical hedonism. The plan documents, the written words or drawn maps, the conduct of plan reconciliation, the choreography of community forums are all *tools of transferring emotional intuition*. The internal architecture, symbolism of the plans is not the only important element; the conditions in which their acceptance is attained play an equally important part. The stakeholders need to feel and experience ‘yes, this is my plan, expressing my will’; thanks to the technical expertise and intuitive, artistic abilities of the planners the work that has been created has an effect on us and we can *identify ourselves with the roles included in it!*

I do not see any reason why the traditional patterns of planning could not be applied in the above described environment as well. In this case we should be prepared to handle not only the trivial model of ‘high-brow culture’ but other life-style combinations and life orientations as well. In addition to the conventional economic performance-orientation or solidarity tasks planning and communication can now focus on the development of life-styles, experience goals as well. The usual planning communities (municipality, neighbourhood, etc.) can be complemented with other life-milieus and these *aesthetic or experience communities will become the units of planning and legitimation*. In the case of the latter only we have to reject the assumption of the traditional positive normative content and emphasize the instrumental nature of planning.

Measuring or judging the aesthetic value criteria is rather difficult because nice or aesthetic ‘things’ are not similar in a comparable quality and can only be interpreted in terms of the individual aesthetic judgments or social conventions. The plans and operations built on aesthetic foundations can either prove correct or lead us astray, but the formerly described approach to planning that is based on experimenting and learning is capable of handling this problem. There seems to be another way open to us as well: we can judge the various aesthetic aspirations externally, on the basis of the conventional economic or moral criteria, and attempt to handle all the difficulties involved in the comparison. *Welsch (1997a)* has raised the point that the criteria of justice and science itself have become aestheticized it is therefore not possible to give a critique free of aesthetics. Consequently, the only measure of aesthetics-based actions and their results can be only our continuously

changing aesthetic sensibility, capable of making corrections, cutting back the 'wildings' of surface aestheticization or even turning into its opposite, as we all know.

*In my opinion the fundamental contentions of this theory (paradigm) are the following:*

- It is built on the means of procedural rationality which can integrate the various types of rationality and aesthetic criteria, or the common (or community) norms, values and interactions;
- The higher the level of community planning, the more it should focus on systematically stabilizing the specific aims of the various social groups and their interrelationships;
- General aestheticizing can change the direction and object of teleological actions;
- Universal truth is replaced by the results of the discourses;
- Planning is not unidirectional any more; there is no single end, 'goals' like 'unreasonable production' or aimlessness cannot be excluded; realization of utopian ideas, symbols, absurdities; objectification of sensations and ideas;
- The various types of knowledge do not necessarily constitute a hierarchy;
- Pluralism of values, goals and plans. Awareness of specificity and partiality;
- It is not enough to accept the co-existence of the different paradigms, they should be taken into account for integration, their contribution cannot be ignored;
- Teleological action is typical not only of the components of the conventional system; it can also express the radical exclusivity of the various specific groups/communities.

## **6 Theories in planning: methods and styles**

The main criteria I used for this classification is the 'planning environment', i.e. the operation of the receiving system, the role of planning or planners in governance, their place in the power structure, and the way in which power is used. The main issue is the extent of the autonomy that individual actors enjoy and of the influence that the operation of the society and power has on their thinking (decisions). Is there a chance of enforcing communicative power, do the completed plans express the free will of the community concerned, and to what extent can the central power or economic forces constrain it? The analysis of the legal regulations or the planning practice is a good starting point for our attempt to answer the above questions and additional information can be gained from the exploration of the power games that create the justice effects and maintain the operation of power.

Planners do not work in isolation, but as parts of a (power) structure defined in space and time, according to specific norms and rules in special framework. The various types of governance and the ensuing planning systems give citizens different opportunities to participate in planning. In some cases citizens' participation is reduced to formal comments (reacting) while in others they are truly expected to contribute, make proposals (proposing).

The borderlines between these planning 'styles' often get blurred and we can even find examples for the combination of the styles. The choice of the method should always depend on the specific task and situation, therefore several approaches are possible. Even command planning may become necessary e.g. at war-time, in the case of a disaster, or during the radical transformation of an inefficient sub-system.

## **6.1 Modern community planning: plan as a means of power execution**

According to the classical modern conception planning is able to take a comprehensive account of the facts, evaluate them and even rationalize socio-political decision-making. Its followers separate theory from practice, referring it back to the theory of sciences. Conception development and decision-making (the essence of strategy and plan formation) are treated separately from the technical part of planning, i.e. from functional planning in the narrow sense as well as implementation, the persons involved in the implementation and the stakeholders. Planning takes place in a hierarchic and bureaucratic power structure – is actually one of its sub-systems. Planners are assumed to be neutral as far as values are concerned and work for the public interest but – as in all other cases – planners are immanent parts of the hierarchic power structure. In a given sector only one plan can be made. Outsiders are treated in an instrumentalist way, citizens and actors of the economy have nothing to do with the plans before implementation. This type of governance and planning system is legitimated by 'efficient' operation itself. Planning theory focuses on the apology of 'reality analysis' and methodology.

### *a) Command planning: the plan is everything*

This method is Popper's 'utopian planning' (Popper, 2001) put into practice. It usually aims at governing (transforming) the whole society, but outcome is not, but the use of rationality but power (coercion). This *imperative planning* is typical of dictatorial systems (e.g. of Soviet or fascist type), it is strongly centralized and the institutions constitute a pyramidal model, but it is not the highest level planning agency that is at the top of the decision-making pyramid, but a political body,

committee or a dictator. This approach is fundamentally *interventionist*: the plans are based on compulsory goals and norms. Insistence on the utopian vision, and plans is also typical, therefore learning from the mistakes is out of the question. The plans contain specific and detailed operative programmes elaborated by experts and bureaucrats committed to the prevailing *ideology*. Both planning and implementation is controlled, monitored and sanctioned centrally. Plans are hierarchically related to one another and the higher level plans are compulsory for the lower levels. The competence of the latter is limited to breaking down the plan, which allows only the top-down approach. Planning competences are referred to special organizations. Citizens' participation is reduced to implementation. The 'invisible world of politics' remains the 'dark side' for the average citizen. The ironic symbols of social participation, the scenery of power execution, political demonstrations 'strengthening' the central will.

*b) Corporative planning: reconciliation among corporations*

The identification of the social and technical goals and the underlying value choice is performed by a larger bureaucratic system than in the previous type. Planning is done at several levels or in several 'arenas'. Power and planning (decision-making) is limited to a *small number of institutions*. Comprehensive, decisive goals are centrally defined here as well. The development of the 'politically efficient' will is in the hands of the powerful, the administrative elite and the executive power. Competences are clearly separated and the organizational system is *hierarchically articulated*. It is important from the viewpoint of power what kind of institutions emerge besides the government and market organizations and where they will find their places within the system. Planning serves directly these organizations but the plans focus on their goals and interests which are in line with those of the central power. Their own partial goals are developed within the institution at first, and are later co-ordinated in the course of negotiations, an iterative process. Co-operation exists only between the bureaucratic institutions; agreements are the results of a power/political game and conflicts of interest are managed according to pre-determined rules. Policy development is the part of the planning process during which the ends are identified. Bureaucratic expertise the administration play an important part in it but the 'lay' (democratic) community is ignored by this system as well. Outside the government goodies other participants of power enjoy a relative autonomy in their planning. The sectorial, functional and other priorities are *defined separately* before the results are confronted. Participants often have the right to veto negative decisions related to their special field. Participants of planning (programming) are parts of the power structure and their *interest is to maintain the prevailing structure*. These planners are committed to their employers who are also their clients.

c) *Political planning*: the plan is an indication

This family includes practice-oriented types of planning denoted by different names (long-term framework, strategic managements, etc) and applies specific methodologies developed mainly for strategic planning ('design school', SWOT, Harvard policy, portfolio making, modelling decision-making processes, etc.). In spite of its rational procedure and sophisticated techniques it is still a normative planning with focus on the formulation of goals and strategies, i.e. 'policy making'.

Within a clear-cut legal and institutional framework this method allows everybody to operate in a flexible way. The top level does not develop the traditional formal or blue-print type plan but operates a more loosely-knit, decentralized system with its procedures. The result is a methodologically founded, well structured 'policy making' which has a co-ordinating function in the long run, while being action and result oriented at the same time. Besides developing its own programmes, this type of planning also seeks to influence or regulate the actions of others without making obligatory rules. The top level *defines the external context, in which the community characterized by plurality of interests operates and elaborates the general rules for the operation of the sub-systems*. The lower levels are free to make their own programmes provided they respect these general rules. Indirect means are used to influence the actors of the socio-economic life, building on the competition among the regulated sub-systems. Direct control and intervention is allowed only in a small number of 'key areas'. The decision-making mechanism is well structure. Independent experts can also be granted the competence to make plans in addition to the members of the planning bureaucracy. Planners often work as advisors as well and can, therefore, participate directly in the development of a policy. The completed community strategies *reflect the results of the current political reconciliations*.

## **6.2 Pragmatic idealism: let us be democratic and plan directly for the people**

All the planning models that belong in this category intend to free planners from the one-sided dependence on the prevailing ideology, and assume a *pluralist planning system* where not only the agencies of the state, the local governments and their partners are allowed to make plans, but others as well. The application of these methods with the right support and regulation (call for proposals) can lead to a healthy competition of the various ideas, plans and programmes. This is possible mainly in the case of planning made outside the official structure considering that national administration allows only one plan at each level and in each sector.



Plurality of plans does not mean an equal division of power, but can undoubtedly guarantee more democratic conditions for planning than the methods treated in the previous section. *The planner, relying on his expertise seeks to contribute to the solution of problems, consequently becomes the advocate or supporter of the completed plans, programmes.* His situation is similar to the previous group inasmuch as he is also expected to identify himself with the views and interests of the client or groups represented; these interest or ideologies may, however, be quite different and it is the planner's task to identify them, or the interests/values motivating the organization represented. (Davidoff 1965). Although planners often appear only in the role of 'external experts' and act 'merely' as moderators, professional supporters of the process in reality technical planning and the determination of goals *cannot be separated* because the roles of the various actors involved are intermingled similarly to values and facts. It is impossible to establish to what extent the result expresses the will of the stakeholders or whether it is the product of the planner's manipulation (either positive or negative). Planners are often expected to take an active part in raising citizens' activity as well. By doing so they unquestionably contribute to democratisation, but the forms of 'community participation' used in this case are parts or instruments of the system itself, working for its survival. Decision-making and ultimate conception building remains in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats (planners).

*a) Planning based on extensive participation: achieving acceptance*

Advocates of this approach seek to involve all the stakeholders in the process of planning. This method is applied mainly when *implementation is decentralized* and the success of the programme greatly depends on the commitment of those who implement it. Communities, social organizations, actors of the economy, or even individuals can participate in the planning process. Participants voluntarily assume responsibility for raising the funds and performing the tasks. Planning focuses on the negotiations, reconciliations, the exploration and elimination of conflicts. Instead being 'devised' by the central bureaucracy, the process and structure of planning is adjusted to the problems and processes in the society.

The participants themselves usually contribute to the implementation of the programmes. The role of the central authorities is limited to transferring information and providing technical support. In this case planners are not employed by the (central) bureaucracy but work as independent experts choosing their own values and committing themselves form time to time. The plans or programmes made with this method are integrated in a bottom up way, or get implemented separately, besides the prevailing structure.

In the late 1970s the method became widespread in England and was put into practice as 'planning for real' (initiated by Tony Gibson at the University of Nottingham). Its followers sought to find social solutions to problems related to the

environment and neighbourhoods. They developed various techniques for involving the population and organizing forums, ranging from the choice locations to the arrangement of the chairs, from the processing of maps to the use of coloured paper and flags. After these community exercises planners summarize their experiences and draw the conclusions, i.e. after a communication procedure the 'traditional instrumental rationality' works again.

*b) Action planning:* focusing on the problem; identification of tasks to be performed then and there

This type includes mainly local, small-scale planning sensitive to social and welfare issues. This method requires the active participation of the stakeholders and involves fast implementation. Any particular problem is handled flexibly within the context valid only then and there. The key element is the logic of the situation – this determines whether the action should be rational or irrational instead of a formerly elaborated or subsequently constructed theory or model.

Planners have a general technical and psychological knowledge and work according to a general framework (e.g. guiding strategic plan, available budget, etc.); realizing the need to take action or recognizing a specific problem they empower themselves to take initiatives. Planners work in terms of paradigms valid only then and there, and usually do innovative planning (that is sometimes quite radical). This kind of work is hard to be regulated in advance, because the solutions are usually not developed on the basis of standard models. Planners make not only plans but decisions as well and also act as catalysts or moderators of the problem solving process. This method is similar to trans-active planning with extensive participation because it also relies on the participation of stakeholders, the main difference being that it is not suitable for planning complex systems, like whole cities or regions, since it is used to solve partial problems, often without even drawing up a planning document. It is typically used for crisis management, but is equally suited for other development projects requiring a radical approach.

This planning situation is best compared with the case when an organic building is erected by local labour using local skills and expertise, and mainly locally produced materials, without detailed drawings, under the supervision of the architect. The specific (partial) solutions are invented on the spot but the architect (works manager) who directs the process always bears in mind what the building is meant for. Action planning is practicable for the solution of the hygienic and social problems of slum areas where the traditional methods cannot be used, or for the elimination of unexpected problems and situations. For example: the planner, commissioned by the local government is granted a budget to 'humanize' the area by involving the minority civil organizations and the people living there.

### 6.3 (Post)modern romanticism: ‘let us shape our life together’

In Polányi’s view (1992) ‘dynamic order’ is found in a society which allows the actors of social life to act at their own discretion and the equilibrium of the society is maintained by the *mutual alignment* of the interacting parties. All this type of society and planning attitude expects its members to do is to be committed to the universally recognized values. The subsystems, planning units do not seek to find generally valid solutions, only those that are *rated as best in the given context* (at a higher level it would be called historical situation) *at the particular time*. ‘Conventional’ justification is replaced by argumentation and validity is limited to a given constellation or time-space relation. Objectivity or even rationality is not necessarily required, a ‘convincing’ solution or good argumentation seem to be sufficient. Emphasis has shifted to ethical legitimation issues.

The methods serving this approach attempt to integrate the planning, decision-making and operative systems into one organic unit. The individual roles are not separated very clearly, because both programming and implementation is seen as a common task. Direct participation in decision-making is more important than representation. The experiences gained in the course of past events are used and incorporated directly into the planning and decision-making process without being filtered by others. By applying these modes of planning we may happen to ‘plan for today’ and not for tomorrow, which makes it questionable from a plan dogmatic point of view, whether what we do is real planning or not.

#### *a) Trans-active planning: the mutual learning process*

Trans-active planning represents a transition between ‘pragmatic idealism’ and ‘(post)modern romanticism’ (Friedmann, 1972) and can be considered as a forerunner of communicative and collaborative planning.

Trans-active planning transforms personal knowledge into new knowledge or approach in the course of continuous inter-subjective communication, which has a direct impact on activities. This method is most suitable for bridging the communication gap between the various actors and also for the development of partnerships. In the case of institutions the key point is who will actually be involved in the processes because the work cannot be successful without competent people. In the course of trans-active planning the *open-minded the ready-to learn planner* puts his theoretical knowledge and former experiences into practice while performing a systematic technical task. The client contributes to the success of the process with his priorities, goals, sense of reality, his experiences about the details of implementation and by handing over confidential information. This leads to mainly innovative and radical planning, because it does not work in the structure required by the status quo and usually results in significant changes.

*b) Planning based on co-operation:* communication among individuals and their interest groups

This interactive mode of planning built on continuous discourse is a 'further developed' and theoretically better founded version of the (trans-active) methods (based on extensive participation) described in the previous section. The question it seeks to answer is the following: How is it possible to *reach agreements*, develop and implement plans without offending the values and interests in our rapidly changing world of plural values, where confidence in politics and representative democracy is shaken?

In the course of communicative or collaborative planning discourses are used because of their consensus building capacity. During the discourses participants can go beyond their biased views and *progress towards a rationally motivated consensus*. It improves the chances of practical application that the jointly realized situation analyses and cognitive processes are linked to the given historical context, derive from it and have a direct impact on the daily practice.

The communicative turn exempted planners from having to study and define the apparently timely norms and values in an increasingly polarized, multicultural society allowing them to become *seemingly* depoliticalized and get in a similar state of grace as in the case of functional planning. The place of surveys, analyses and rational decision-making was taken by social maps, consensus tables, discussion forums and interviewers' microphones. 'Facts' are collected and consensus is built with the help of pragmatic logic, language and speech.

We can only welcome this effort to further extend democracy, it is, however, equally important warn about the practical difficulties. It is only through the 'distortions' of the economic and administrative (power) systems that 'communicative brain potential' can influence practice, that is there are interferences in the communication process. This method in its pure form cannot operate at all in our present 'life world'. The ideal 'speech situations' described by Habermas cannot be created in a liberal democratic country or in an 'open society' presented by Popper either because we can never know how accurate, sincere and credible the individual manifestations are and consensus can only be created in conditions where instrumental rationality is dominant. What we have is *guided communication* from the apparently most democratic 'public-private partnership' through the associations for town embellishment to the school boards; authoritarianism is always present in the debates and – if consensus cannot be reached – decisions are made with majority vote; sometimes those who grab the opportunity given by the freedom of speech make it impossible for others to make comments, etc. Politicians can also abuse the opportunity of communication and social discourse and – using increasingly sophisticated tools – they actually do so. Providing information and training in order to make the participants well informed is also a success-oriented transfer of norms. The use of direct participation instead of elected bodies often increases the influ-

ence of uncontrollable cliques and lobby groups. Planners and all the other active participants of the planning process must earn their income somewhere; they also have racial, regional, cultural, professional, etc. identities, therefore their normative (political) neutrality is questionable. Enforcing interests is the main motivation for participation in the planning process.

Those who adapt *Habermas's* views often forget – or deliberately conceal – the point that Habermas always requires the simultaneous fulfilment of several strict conditions for the development of the desirable consensus and validity of his arguments, consequently the consensus built in this way can only be valid for the given point in time. The pragmatist adaptation of communicative ethics is a kind of new, naïve idealism that cannot be supposed *ex ante* to bring different results than the other forms of modern planning. Notwithstanding I believe that there is nothing wrong with the goal, we should make every effort to realize open and extensive communication with all those concerned to attain the ‘winner-winner’ state, which often goes together with the conflict of interests and the enforcement of a particular one. This undoubtedly furthers democratization. It should be made clear, however, that even if we proceed in this way, we can never be sure how close or far we have got to or from the truth or to what degree we actually serve public interests.

Post-modern thinkers (e.g. *Lyotard*, 1993) also warn that consensus is at best the horizon beyond our reach and in the pragmatism of scientific life the emphasis should be on opposing views. Consensus can be created artificially by methods which can make individuals want what the capacity of the system requires. In this case, however, we have hardly moved away from the first type of planning. More sophisticated procedures (like ‘learning,’ or the media) can produce the same results as brute coercion or the breakdown of the plans. The only consolation is that the rule of context is better than the lack of its influence.

## **7 Classification by interpretations of planner’s role**

The different situations and tasks require different planner attitudes, theoretical (normative) approaches and actions (role play) in agreement with the former. In a well-established democracy or a successfully operating institution/company ‘there is no need’ to change the fundamental goals and the existing structure; planning is used as an operative tool mainly for allocation and regulation purposes in order to efficiently implement the accepted and well proven normative will. In this case the planner acts as the loyal technocrat of implementation who never ventures on the marshland of transcending. Besides maintaining the general framework, the basic structure and continuity, there is also room for evolutionary development. In order to improve the operation of the system the planner is free to propose institutional

development or reallocation of resources within the limits of the Hegelian concept of freedom. This 'maintenance' type thinking together with the continuous improvement of successful operation and efficiency contributes to the choices of values, decisions and ultimately to the legitimating of power (leaders, decision-makers). A completely different, radical planner attitude or revolution becomes necessary when serious troubles are experienced in the whole system or an easily separable part of it and a new structure needs to be developed in the wake of new value choices and goals. An 'epistemological divide' or discontinuity is indispensable for a new development to begin.

In these operative situations various combinations of the formerly discussed theories of planning and theories in planning are possible and applicable. In this chapter I characterize and classify the various planner roles distinguishing them from the political decision-makers in order to see how they are related to the prevailing system or structure and to what extent they can influence the normative value choices.

It is not unusual that processes requiring different planning attitudes (the interest groups behind them) get into conflict with each other. For example, the allocative approach of traditional planners may clash with those who favour development and changes, especially if the latter aim at fundamental structural changes. At the same time it would be a mistake to oppose any one of the approaches with the others proclaiming it to be progressive, or positive, because all of them may become necessary and *in specific cases they are not interchangeable*.

The relationship with the external structure is also related to the condition of the inner system of planning and the constraint to change it. Allocative planning does not usually require any changes in the inner circle of planning. The learning process of innovative planning may, however, require inner modifications. The radical approach generally leads to the development of a new planning structure.

When writing this chapter, I extensively drew on the works by professor *John Friedman (Friedmann, 1964, 1987, 1988)*.

## **7.1 Allocative (functional) planning**

In the conditions of functional planning (see chapter 6) the planner assumes the normative (political) environment, the externally set goals and priorities to be granted and unquestionable. In most of the cases his task is to allocate the resources available (funds, land, raw material, market, labour, etc.) among the competing development needs or users and to perform a concrete task according to a specific goal. This is the traditional function of planning and is still its most frequently used form (e.g. financial planning and physical planning are built on this logic). It is based on the existing institutions, previously valid norms (e.g. partial

economic efficiency) and the accepted experiences, does not create fundamentally new knowledge. Within the framework of the existing system or (power) structure it seeks to find the most efficient or equitable solution; one that can maintain equilibrium and 'social peace'. Decision-makers provide planners with goals and priorities and the planners make proposals for the concrete tasks with regard to the given limits. A typical example for allocative planning could be the planning of the budget, physical planning (regulation of land/area use) and central sectorial planning in general.

The main characteristics of allocative planning are the following (see also the chapter on functional planning!):

- It operates within a strict framework defined by politics and law, in the existing structure;
- The autonomy of planners is minimal;
- *Functional rationality*: it is based on the modernist assumption that rational decisions can be made in the conditions of limited access to information and it is possible to separate the deliberate value choices made by the decision-makers and rationality used in the course of planning because they are independent from each other. Working within the given limits and relying on scientific findings, planners act rationally while decision-makers represent the 'common good' in a representative democracy. Planners treat the given basic situation in a deterministic way as a sociological (quasi-objective) fact;
- *Limited complexity*: nothing should escape the planner's attention within the well-defined scope of the task;
- *Allocating/dividing character*: the object of planning is divided among the given actors, tasks and functions; prioritizing of tasks, scheduling;
- *Equilibrium and optimization*: maintaining or redressing the balance of the various components of the system;
- *Quantitative approach*: measurability is important; the proposed solutions should be tested on various models in the course of planning (input-output, simulation, linear and dynamic programming and other models);
- *Limited time horizon*: since goals and priorities are supposed to be unchangeable, plans can lose their validity rather quickly in our rapidly changing world. This mode of planning is best used for short and perhaps medium term. In spite of this, it is often applied to particularize long-term objectives.
- *Periodicity and easy formalization*: the various periods and responsibilities are easily separated and identified and can, therefore, be institutionalized and operated individually as well,
- *Easy to regulate*: both the content and the procedure, and in practice it operates within the framework of legal regulations;
- *It is justified on the basis of means-end rationality*.

## 7.2 Innovative (development oriented) planning

Progress and true problem solving require an innovative, development-oriented approach. In such cases planners should not accept the formerly defined goals and operative framework without criticism, but should make efforts to change them. In contrast with the allocative mode, innovative planning does not focus so much on the distribution of the resources originating from the prevailing trends, but on fostering development, transcending the present. In the search for innovative solutions it does not go beyond the limits of the accepted paradigm or narratives. This way of thinking cannot remain within the limits of functional planning because it requires comprehensive, rational planning or rather a strategic approach/planning. In order to have the new innovations accepted proposals should be in line with the progressive trends within the transformation of social norms; the whole administrative (power) system should represent a uniform philosophy and obtain the support of politicians.

Here is a list of the main features of innovative planning – with the specific elements highlighted:

- *Political or general regulation*: the creativity of planners is restricted only by the comprehensive norms, political trends. They are free to propose solutions of their own within the main framework of the plan. Decision-makers (politicians) keep their controlling role acting as a kind of clutch between planners' proposals and implementation. The ultimate responsibility rests with the decision-maker;
- *Development orientation*: elaboration of developments and innovations within the existing structure;
- *Priority to quality*: in addition to quantitative changes/distribution the quality and character of the factors have also gained importance;
- *Changing the institutional system*: the new values and proposals usually require a new division of functions and competences, i. e. new institutions (people) become necessary;
- *Action orientation*: goals and their implementation are united inseparably, which occasionally makes it necessary for the planners to have a greater influence on the decisions and implementation;
- *Resource mobilization*: the planner functions as an 'entrepreneur' when he ferrets out resources for the new tasks and institutions or offers innovative forms of implementation. Decision-makers will not accept entirely new solutions unless it is made absolutely clear to them who is going to do what and how it will be financed. The problem here is not the allocation of the available (granted) resources as in the case of allocative planning;



- *Entrepreneurial skills, sensibility to innovation, creativity and intuition* have significantly more importance than knowing the inventory of assumed reality;
- *Continuously cyclical process*. The planner does not need to wait for external authorization; he has the right to make initiatives;
- Innovative planning cannot be regulated on the content side; it is only the procedure and the form that represent some kind of constraint.

### 7.3 Radical planning

In his work entitled ‘Theses on Feuerbach’ *Marx* writes that philosophers have merely given different interpretations of the world, but our task is to change it. This could serve as the *ars poetica* of radical planning. (The term radical planning was first used by *J. Friedmann*. A similar mode of planning is described by *T. Sager* (1993) as ‘recalcitrant’). It is a well established fact that we cannot go back from a deep (structural) crisis to the condition that preceded it, i.e. reproduce any former state; radical changes are needed during which something new (mutant) is created driving from new hypotheses and a different knowledge. Crises are important because they indicate that time has come to replace our prevailing concepts. The ‘ordinary individuals of world history’ have to undertake the initiative for the change of social norms and structure lining up the citizens behind the projects that contribute to social transformation.

In order to recognize the opportunity for a different kind of development and decide its orientations we have to abstract from conventional knowledge, the utilization of the resources and the organizations created for it as well as the results of the process. Transcendence, teleological thinking and action can help us go beyond the given (social) practice, but we should bear in mind the limitations of such a ‘take-off’. The ‘opportunities’ should be within the competence of the society in question; they should be identical with the decisive goals of practice. Radical ideas, the new order/structure or practice can become widespread if they are extensively accepted as better suited for the implicit ends and can improve operation.

Radical planning is a *series of actions* which – opposing the dominant trends and operational mechanisms of the prevailing order/structure – initiates fundamental (structural) changes on the basis of new knowledge thereby transforming the character of the former processes. It can create new structures and operations which *do not continue the prevailing trends, but trigger a new development spiral*.

Radical planning requires the merger of *plan making, decision-making and implementation*. The planner is the member of an action team. Radical planning is *independent of the decision-making mechanism of the existing power structure*. His

initially loose relationship with the scientific and lay groups has already become well structured. The planner (team) has to fend for himself acting both as programmer and implementer, raising the resources and utilizing them in an effort to extend his own power and increase his influence. Initially processes are realized outside the official (government) sphere or planning mechanism. In this case the client is quite obviously not the state or an 'external body' but the mobilised group that has taken the initiative. The project consists in the transformation of the existing order or one of its sub-systems.

The characteristics of radical planning are the following:

- Planner autonomy;
- Refusal of loyalty, withdrawal, protest;
- Based on the transformative theory and new knowledge (orientation), rejection of prevailing paradigms and narratives;
- Self-empowerment and self-management;
- Thinking without limitations or borders;
- Network building, development of relations (creating the right conditions);
- Dialogues, mutual learning process;
- Activity.

The process of radical planning:

- Criticism of the 'existing order' the given practice (or established customs);
- Creation of new knowledge, elaboration of an alternative proposal ('transcending');
- Development of action strategy and tactics;
- Dissemination of 'information', finding allies;
- Clash/Conflict with the existing order and institutions;
- Expansion in the case of success.

This mode of planning is not regarded as 'classical community' planning although it can also be linked to groups or interest groups. Control and internal learning process lend themselves to interpretation and operate in this case, too. If successful, it is justified by the changes in the targeted norms and structures and their acceptance.

Radical planning is rooted in the utopian, anarchist and Marxist traditions. Radical planning is voluntarist by nature. *Mannheim's* utopian 'militant democracy, planned communization based on the 'terrorism of honesty are also specific manifestations of this radical planning. By integrating political science and planning into administration *Mannheim* wanted to introduce the rule of knowledge into practice in order to avoid dictatorial extremities.

Radical planning is present in well established democracies as well (e.g. the anti-globalization movement), but usually ranges over small parts of the socio-economic existence only. Action-oriented social movements can be cited as the most frequent examples. Several socio-political movements and alternative economic endeavours could also be listed here such as the co-operative movement under capitalism, the introduction of special economic zones in communist China, various feminist, homosexual, lesbian and green movements, etc.

## **8. Integrated community (spatial) planning**

### **8.1 The specificity of spatial planning does not derive from its spatial character**

Our view of space is determined by a particular duality: on the one hand, *space is a pure way of looking at things, a conceptual construct* and independent of the objects around us; on the other hand, it is *the sine qua non, the form and framework of everything that exists; on the one hand it is seen as an abstract view or a priori notion, on the other hand as a practical construction consisting of concrete* ('objective') *experience elements*. Space is a source of cognition that objects consist of among others, but it does not determine them in their material reality giving them only their possible forms.

Space in itself is an unfathomable, imperceptible, homogeneous *empty form* of uniform 'density' in which phenomena get or are arranged. Empty space does not get structured, the space of non-existence has no central points, around which phenomena organize themselves or can be organized. This empty space offers the possibility or condition of filling it and defines the form of everything that exists; it is here that the different structures are built.

Human actions are not structured by space that is independent of us and constant in time; it is people with spatial relations developed according to their perception of space and their objectifications who create spatial structure. Spatial structures are thus created from the system of relationships created by use of space and are continuously transformed following changes in our perception of space.

Our a priori perception of space changes over time. Earlier the sensations connected to our experiences played the key role but today we are capable of abstracting from these. The view we have of space in everyday life is mainly determined by the experimental geographical space, its use, the related notions as linguistic tools, and the preliminary knowledge which provides a spatial interpretation of phenomena and in which – as pre-assumption – the various spatial interrelation-

ships governing the special organization of our actions are constituted. Objective reality, which partially fills up space and exists independently of our consciousness, is arranged according to its 'own logic' (e.g. physical laws). However, the *description and interpretation* of how the noumena get 'structured' or how animals behave in space mean *a reconstruction in accordance with our a priori perception of space*.

Space is one dimension of our daily life, time is the other. Every change, (e.g. movement) is possible only if it takes place in both of these dimensions; something can become a part of reality by filling (occupying/expropriating) space and time. *A general (universal) statement cannot become true unless the space-time coordinates are given*. If the spatial/territorial (mathematical/logical/geographical) coordinates of an existing or imaginary thing are given it will be assigned a place in space and thereby it will gain *additional content besides itself*. The interaction of the elements and their combinations has a different meaning in a concrete space from the elements of the material world taken individually.

Post-structuralists and post moderns (e.g. *Derrida, Lyotard and Thom*) do not accept the traditional interpretation of space but consider it to be *a political-practical construction*. They find it meaningful only as a living space and not as an autonomous domain, independent of subjective perception. *Space* is not impersonal but an *interpreted category*. Those who emphasize the role of language, the language a priori (e.g. *Wittgenstein, Searle*) warn that language use is not limited to a mere description of the facts and the use of notions related to space also shape not only space but territorial institutions and future use of space as well.

Consequently *the living space that we have* is basically a human construction, consisting of objects (things), acts (actions) and social facts. Its transformation is influenced not only by our constantly changing a priori space perception but also by the way in which we think or speak about it; how we share our knowledge with others, how we intend to organize our life in different structures and whether we can have this intention accepted by others.

Apprehensible and analysable space is a network of the relationship between human relations and spatial elements. The phenomena existing side by side (in space) create various arrangements or spatial structures determined by their spatial relations and connections. The phenomena include recognizable and generalizable spatial regularities as well as territorial differences. As time passes, the objects, instruments, institutions created by human activity and their structures can separate from their use and the activities that created them and become 'external potentialities' that we had better adapt ourselves to and count on when the new activities are being planned. With the demand for the original use ceasing the individual objectifications can take up a new meaning and allow a new kind of use. We can build virtual customs borders and pull them down, or a building as a physical framework may have many different uses.

Looking for the essential features of spatial planning we come to the people living in the territory concerned and their communities, i.e. community planning. This emphasis on territoriality means the ideation of the inevitable interaction and interdependence deriving from co-existence. Similarly to the concrete space that integrates the socio-economic events and establishes a particular relationship among the actors, spatial and community approaches are inevitably of interdisciplinary and integrative character.

## **8.2 Integration of different planning types by spatial/community levels**

The regionally-culturally defined population groups are both the subjects and objects of the socio-economic programmes and actions. In practice, planners work in isolation within the given community, level of planning or unit due to various practical and institutional considerations. The more fragmented the approaches, the stronger the need to handle them together.

Integration, the need to co-operate have become widely accepted by now, but it still has not been properly understood that besides the time dimension space also has an important role in community planning and therefore *all planning is spatial*. Consequently, in the case of spatial planning the adjective is not meant to express the distinction that planning is applied to a given component of space or the actions proposed are realized in a concrete space, but something else. On the one hand, the adjective 'spatial' may become necessary when we intend to distinguish planning from other kinds of plan which have different priorities and consider spatial character of secondary importance only. On the other hand – and this is a lot more important – when *planning reflects the will of a specific unit of space (settlement, county, region, country, etc.) and the knowledge and norms of the population living on a separate territory and deeply related to it (territorial identity) constitute the complex frame of reference for planning* instead of an external will or some partial professional criteria. Decentralization, subsidiarity and partnership are all principles used in both the organization of society and planning that strengthen planning linked to various social, economic, discourse, etc. spaces.

In the practice the spatial approach always becomes more important because particularization of the general values and legitimation of our statements can take place in a specific space and time only as well as every action or intervention is performed in a concrete space. In the course of planning individual predictions are deduced from general knowledge and sooner or later we have to define the space and time coordinates of the intended operations. Each particular statement involves the identification of space and time in addition to the other parameters. Specifica-

tion of place usually means choosing from the geometrical space categories. Individual designations imply classification into a more general space category (class, subclass, territorial level, settlement group, or territorial category).

Traditional sectors insist on planning independently and spatial planning also continues fighting for an integrating role. Initially this would mean highlighting the specific character of the spatial approach and establishing the independent institutions, while space-conscious thinking becomes a more and more important part of functional and sectorial planning. Development is expected to launch a new type of social rationalization process, in which space is again the form of every phenomenon and the possible framework of all thoughts. This, however requires us to treat form and content together and consider spatial structure to be a form in which content operates or manifests itself.

Every development operation has an adequate spatial dimension as well as an *artificial sectorial* nature in line with the division of labour prevailing in the age concerned. These two factors represent two inseparable aspects of the same thing. In contrast with it, however, decisions on development projects are dominated by sectorial viewpoints which may not only interfere with territorial interests, but significantly impair the efficiency of implementation as well. In the background of these sectorial viewpoints we often find efforts for centralization which are in conflict with decentralization associated with the territorial principle.

Practically all interventions proposed in the plan documents (specific actions or measures) belong to one sector or another and vice versa: the localization or territorial embedding of the sectorial developments is of key importance, it is therefore *imperative to ensure co-operation between territorial and sectorial experts*. The determination of the spatial dimension of sectorial development or a territorial breakdown (into regions, counties, small regions, etc) in itself does not mean that the spatial approach has been asserted.

For several decades territorial development was dominated by physical planning focusing on the development of the physical environment and the management of regulation of land use. Physical planners follow the principles of long-term comprehensive and rational theory of planning. They have a peculiar interpretation for functional rationality: in order to create the illusion of 'objectivity and professionalism' they pretend to rely on the natural and built environment in their value choices. Professional forums and plan reconciliations are also used to get the mostly 'professional criteria' accepted. Physical planners make incrementalist-strategic plans partly in order to meet the EU requirements. Developers emphasize the accelerated learning process and renew their plans in the medium run. Development planning is primarily innovative (perhaps radical), therefore change is put into the focal point while physical planning is *ab ovo* allocative, covers long periods of time and makes the preservation of the built environment a priority.

Physical planning is deeply influenced by natural philosophy (natural law). It builds on the view that there are principles, natural laws and conditions beyond people's control which, however, determine their life and set limitations to their actions. The application of the *laissez faire* evolutionary principle of natural philosophy opposes the assertion of human will to the laws of nature. Physical planning, based on the naïve philosophy of natural law and geographical determinism, has been widely criticised for the following:

- It erroneously confuses causality with teleology;
- Physical planners often empower themselves to act as the medium of nature;
- Referring to the laws of nature they often present their normative proposals as objective necessity;
- Statements related to the physical environment and experiments are superimposed on normative statements;
- It refers value choices to the competence of professional decision-makers;
- The ecological principle that physical planners so often emphasize is not the ultimate goal, but a principle to be applied continuously in the course of rationalization.

Followers of the French possibilists (*Paul Vidal de la Blache, Lucien Febvre*) took an important step forward when they broke with the traditional geographical and historical determinism. They think that people who shape history – including planners as well – *can choose from a range of opportunities offered by nature*. These choices reflect the specific features of their way of life and are also influenced by the historical situation. The decisions of the subjective individual are deduced exclusively from the past and the present milieu. This is an important step towards transcending traditional determinism, yet they do not reckon with the possibility of transcendental teleology, a utopian way of thinking in the best sense of the term.

Physical planning in itself is not an independent planning cycle, learning-controlling circle, but it is part of a uniform planning process; it does not postulate new goals of its own and answers only questions of *where and how*, leaving others, like when, from what sources, by whom, etc. unanswered.

Development and physical planning are parts of a uniform planning process in which the regulations and procedures of land use constitute a well distinguished sub-system. Development and physical planning should start from *a uniform analysis of the situation and conception building, the identification of the goals and the elaboration of the strategy should also be joint efforts*. At first the identification of goals happens at the moral level with the definition of universal, general norms that are acceptable for everybody. Then we have to answer some ethical-political questions in order to decide what is good for us, a territorially separate social group. The choice of the most adequate means is the outcome of pragmatic techni-

cal discussions. It is the first steps that require the greatest publicity and the widest participation. Later on efforts should be made to involve the stakeholders and when it comes to choosing the means it is sufficient to involve experts only.

The requirement of a uniform conception building process at all levels of a given institute (e.g. government, local government) does not mean that the various actors (e.g. at government level the ministries or sectors) cannot contribute their own proposals to the formulation of the integrated common will; they are, however not supposed to develop a conception of their own, and build their own action plan on it. The various sectorial, inter-sectorial and functional programmes and physical plans should be integrated in a uniform planning system. The functional and horizontal relationships can operate within this framework.


Physical – type thinking (planning) is required for the definition of the constraints, the accepted (undertaken) determinations, the regulation of the development programmes in line with them, and the technical designing of land use for the accepted development proposals. The specific (sectorial, functional and territorial) programmes (plans) and measures will be elaborated in line with the strategic resolutions and with regard to the opportunities and rules of physical planning. This desirable process is illustrated in *Figure 4*.

The part above the first dotted line is analytical work phase in the traditional terminology. It is in this phase that the various time planes meet, the lessons learned from the past and present are compared with our desires and the external opportunities. In the area between the two dotted lines will is made explicit, and new knowledge is created (synthesizing, conception building, paradigm formation); an important element of this work is the wording of the determinations undertaken and other constraints in normative regulations and their acceptance, i.e. physical planning. In the next part the separately planned (sectorial and functional) programmes and action plans can be elaborated in line with the uniform strategy, the accepted rules of physical planning and the special rational criteria, following the principles of functional planning. Consequently it is in this phase of planning that sectorial (partial) thinking can *appear on its own* and assert its own specific rationality of means within the above defined framework.



Figure 4

*Integrated (public/spatial) planning process*



Source: Author's.

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